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Abstract 
This study explores the significance and relevant contexts of the collected poems of James 
Beattie, within a detailed study of his own prose works and wider eighteenth-century 
intellectual debates. His position on the periphery of the literary canon means that this thesis 
deals largely with primary material, which permits a more thorough and objective analysis 
than has been conducted before. 
The first half of this study deals with Beattie's poetic output. Chapter 1 focuses on Beattie's 
first volume of poetry, Original Poems and Translations. In this chapter I analyse the poems 
within the context of other eighteenth-century poets, and explore Beattie's engagement with 
patronage, the eighteenth-century conventions for success as a new poet, and poetic genius. 
Chapter 2 deals with Beattie's second volume, Poems on Several Subjects, to illustrate the 
evolution in his ideas concerning the usefulness of poetry as a vehicle for philosophical 
investigation, and his engagement with eighteenth-century social and political issues. Chapter 
3 explores his best known poem, The Minstrel; Or. the Progress of Genius. This chapter 
discusses the poem in its entirety and within the context of Beattie's career as a poet and 
philosopher. Chapter 5 focuses on Beattie's final volumes of poetry, which represent his 
desire to control his poetic legacy. 
The second half of the study deals with selected critical and philosophical works, which 
provide insight into the development of Beattie's poetry and express in prose many of the 
subjects in his poetry. The most detailed attention in this section is given to the Essay on 
Truth, although there are also chapters examining other relevant critical works including 
Dissertations Moral and Critical, On Poetry and Music and On Laughter and Ludicrous 
Composition, and Beattie's collection of"Scoticisms." 
There are few modem critical studies of Beattie, and many of them are limited to The 
Minstrel and to specific areas of interest within this work. This study's comparative and 
interdisciplinary approach to Beattie's poetry and selected prose aims to justify Beattie's 
inclusion in our study of the eighteenth century. It is also intended to raise awareness of 
Beattie's importance in the eighteenth-century and to illustrate his influence on three first-
generation Romantic poets of generally recognised importance, namely Scott, Coleridge, and 
Wordsworth. 
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Introduction 
It is interesting that James Beattie (1735-1803) is listed in the British Library 
catalogue as "James Beattie, the poet," since his poetry, with the exception of The Minstrel; 
Or. the Progress of Genius (1771/4) has been relatively neglected by modem scholarship. 
Beattie's career as a poet, philosopher, and teacher, spanned more than forty years, and his 
works illustrate the wide-ranging variety of his intellectual interests. The neglect of Beattie's 
works has left a breach in the study of eighteenth-century poetical and philosophical topics, 
as well as the foundations of many Romantic ideas concerning the imagination and the 
intellect. This study aims to develop a more comprehensive analytical investigation into the 
corpus of Beattie's poetic and philosophical works than has been attempted before. 
Part of this investigation is meant to assess the influence and importance ofBeattie's 
various works to wider contemporary intellectual movements, such as the nature of poetical 
genius, issues of literary patronage, public self-fashioning, as well as the conflict between 
intellectual reasoning· and the characteristics of the poetic imagination. This study also looks 
to explore the influence of Beattie's works upon three first-generation Romantic poets, in an 
attempt to illustrate the far reaching influence of Beattie's generally overlooked works of 
poetry, criticism, philosophy, and satire. 
1 
I have chosen to focus upon a relatively minor poet for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
semi-canonical figures such as Beattie are more generally representative of their age, and 
hence are more telling to study in terms of understanding the period in which they wrote, than 
authors such as Johnson and Wordsworth, who are generally agreed to be transcendent 
geniuses, and therefore-are inevitably to some-extent-unrepresentative of their time. Secondly, 
focusing this study upon a minor poet enables me to spend more time with primary material 
2 
than is possible with a more canonical figure. Thirdly, my interests in this study include the 
interface between philosophy and literature, as well as textual history and bibliography, and 
James Beattie provides an unusually explicit opportunity to pursue these interests in one 
person, and one body of work. My final reason is to rectify what I perceive to be an injustice. 
I do not believe that modern scholarship has dealt justly with the works of James Beattie, and 
it is my intention to illustrate his integral position in the literary and intellectual world of the 
eighteenth-century, in an effort to earn for Beattie his rightful place in the dialogue of modem 
literary criticism of the eighteenth-century. 
My design here is to illustrate that the current periphery relationship of Beattie's 
works to the literary canon is a tragedy of circumstance, rather than a reflection of the merit 
of his works, or his contribution to his literary community. The progression of Beattie's 
decline in popularity and literary favour can be traced through the publication history of his 
works after his death. From his death in 1803 to the beginning of the twentieth century more 
than one hundred editions and reprints of Beattie's works were published on both sides of the 
Atlantic. These editions vary widely in structure, while they generally include a memoir 
recounting the life of the author and reproduce many of the poems Beattie himself salvaged 
from oblivion, as well as many of his earlier poems which he refused to include in his final 
edition of poems in 1784. 
Many of these Victorian editions link Beattie with eminent poets such as John Milton, 
James Thomson, and John Keats, as well as authors more obscure to modem readers, such as 
Robert Blair, Mark Akenside, and Thomas Gray. The connection of Beattie with authors of 
this calibre illustrates the continuing interest in his works up to the end of the nineteenth-
century. Beattie's Victorian popularity is sharply contrasted by the relative-obscurity of his 
works well into the twentieth-century. 
3 
Between 1900 and Roger Robinson's ten-volume collection of Beattie's works, there 
were only eight new editions published, and none of them included The Minstrel or indeed 
any poetry. This marked decline in interest in Beattie's poetry was probably the result of the 
movement toward specialization in scholarship. The twentieth-century was marked by a 
climate of specialization and intense theoretical analysis, and Beattie's works probably fell 
out of favour as a result of this desire to specialize and theorize. Beattie's works do not lend 
themselves to this type of analysis, since his works vary widely in subject and genre, and 
advance conservative philosophical and ethical views. The current academic trend seems to 
be reversing this telescopic method of investigation in favour of a more interdisciplinary 
perspective, one that recognises the versatility of authors as well as the intricacies and 
inevitable overlap between disciplines within the humanities. The current study operates 
within this critical context, by utilising a variety of evidence to bear upon Beattie's career. 
Autobiographical, bibliographical, cultural, historical, and philosophical contexts are 
essential to a full understanding of Beattie's career, and the influence ofthese works upon 
subsequent writers. 
Though literary criticism has largely moved away from studies dealing with single 
authors in favour of more thematic and theoretical work, Beattie's career is particularly suited 
to this type of enquiry. As Robin Dix has recently argued with elegance and persuasion, 
literary criticism that denies the power and individualism of an author can lead to an 
underestimation ofthat author's contribution to their wider intellectual and literary 
community, and the generations that followed. 1 I agree with Dix that though biographical 
research, textual bibliography, and wider historical context are areas of research that seem to 
-have gone out of fashion, they can enable a more-informative and-accurate investigation-into 
1 Robin Dix's new monograph on the literary career of Mark Akenside throws into sharp relief the value and 
importance of single author studies. 
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the merits and characteristics of a poet and his literary culture. 2 
James Beattie is generally perceived by eighteenth-century specialists in terms of his 
success with The Minstrel, which is considered to be a worthy anomaly amongst a body of 
hitherto neglected poems. To Scottish literary specialists Beattie is generally remembered as 
the author of a lively pre-Robert Burns poem in Scots Dialect. Romantic studies recognise in 
The Minstrel a feeble attempt to investigate the characteristics of poetic genius so eloquently 
explored by Wordsworth in The Prelude, as well as characterisations in The Excursion which 
bear strong resemblance to Beattie's. I hope this study will illustrate that these generally 
accepted perceptions rest upon an incomplete body of evidence, because of the inaccessibility 
of Beattie's works in the twentieth-century, as well as the limited critical engagement with 
his works since his death. 
There is a limited critical tradition exploring Beattie's poetry and prose works. In the 
past few decades, critics have begun to examine particular elements of The Minstrel, and its 
possible influence upon later poets. One of these modem scholars is Everard King, whose 
criticism deals with many of Beattie's works, but I am reluctant to recommend his criticism 
because it is plagued with sweeping statements, and critical analysis that is at times lacking in 
supporting evidence. King's study, James Beattie's The Minstrel and the Origins of Romantic 
Autobiography is significant because it introduces Beattie's work to modem scholars, but 
King's analysis repeatedly lacks support and makes many generalisations. King also prints a 
conflated version of The Minstrel in the appendix to his study, which led me to a number of 
bibliographical difficulties concerning the publication history of the poem. The text King 
includes in his appendix bears no date, but includes the final advertisement Beattie drafted, 
--- -whi~h-lled~ted 1777. The inclusion of the-adveitlsenient led nie to- as-sumetliiit llie text is 
2 See Robin Dix, Literary Career of Mark Akenside: Including an Edition of His Non-Medical Prose (Madison: 
Farleigh Dickinson UP, 2006) 15-16. 
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from '77, but in reality the text is a mixture of an 1821 edition and King's own textual 
changes.3 More recent scholarship investigates the complexities of Beattie's works, such as 
Conrad Brunstrom's examination of the impact of nature upon the mind, and its expression in 
the depictions of nature in The Minstrel, as well as its relationship to the philosophy of the 
Essay on Truth. Kathryn Sutherland focuses upon the characterisation of the ancient minstrel 
from its popularisation by Thomas Percy, through the character of Beattie's minstrel, and its 
connection with the characteristics of minstrels portrayed by William Wordsworth. Laura 
Bandiera also argues that The Minstrel had an influence on Wordsworth's poetry, but her 
study focuses on the ways in which the preface to Lyrical Ballads attempts to rejuvenate the 
character of the itinerant minstrel poet described in Thomas Percy's "Essay on the Ancient 
Minstrels in England." 
Though Beattie's critical prose has remained relatively obscure, Richard Terry in his 
recent study of the evolution of the genre of the mock-heroic, explores the essay "On 
Laughter and Ludicrous Composition" within the context of the eighteenth-century 
rehabilitation of the burlesque, as well its relevance to the evolution of eighteenth-century 
theories of laughter. 4 Similarly, David Hill-Radcliffe, in his investigations into the evolution 
of culture, English studies, and eighteenth-century Spenserian imitations, has linked James 
Beattie with the greatest writers of the eighteenth-century. However, his criticism reinforces 
many common misconceptions concerning the composition and content of The Minstrel. 
3 For an in depth investigation into bibliographical issue raised by King's appendix, see Roger J. Robinson, The 
Poetry of James Beattie: A Critical Edition. Diss. University of Aberdeen, 1997 pp. 26-28 
4 Richard Terry, Mock-Heroic from Butler to Cowper: An English Genre and Discourse. (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005). See pp. 245-46. 
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Detailed scholarly investigations of the works of James Beattie have been made 
possible by Roger J. Robinson, who collected all of Beattie's known poetical works in his 
doctoral thesis, and proceeded to introduce a ten-volume edition of Beattie's works. The 
collection contains three editions of poems and his complete prose, much of which remained 
unpublished until this collection. Though Robinson's collection appears comprehensive, 
"Hints for an Answer to Dr. Priestley's Remarks on the Essay on Truth" (AUL MS 30/46) is 
not included or referred to in any of these volumes, probably because it remained unfinished 
upon Beattie's death. Though unfinished, this manuscript work sheds new light upon 
Beattie's engagement with Joseph Priestley, as well as his private desire to vindicate himself 
from Priestley's criticism.5 Robinson also collected Beattie's complete correspondence, 
which is available to scholars for the first time. These recent publications have made the 
corpus of Beattie's letters, poetry, and prose accessible to modem scholars for the first time, 
enabling a more comprehensive investigation into his works than critics such as Everard King 
were able to conduct, given the relative obscurity and inaccessibility of these works before 
the new publications. 
This study begins with Beattie's first volume of poetry, Original Poems and 
Translations (176011) and traces the evolution of his poetic career through to what he 
considered his fmal poetical volume, The Minstrel. in Two Books: With Some Other Poems 
(1784). To gain a full understanding of Beattie's poems, his philosophical and critical essays 
are of vital importance, because they present in plain language the intellectual underpinning~ 
of much of Beattie's poetry, and further develop many of the conflicting issues that he 
attempts to reconcile through his verse. 
5 Seep. 171. 
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Beattie's works are dealt with in the order of their original publication,6 which enables 
one to trace the progression of the poetical revisions as well as the evolution of his career as a 
poet, and the conflict between his poetical ambition and the prose works he considered it his 
duty to publish. The study is limited to Beattie's poetical volumes rather than anonymous 
magazine submissions, with the exception of''To Alexander Ross," a short poem written in 
Scots Dialect. This poem is included for three reasons; first, it is unique among Beattie's 
poems because it is the only one written in Scots dialect. Second, it is relevant to Beattie's 
collection of"Scoticisms," which was intended to regulate the usage of English among 
Scottish students, whose success in a United Kingdom in part relied upon their ability to 
converse and compose in English, the language of the realm. And finally, it is included 
because the poem was composed and published as a means of exciting a readership for the 
poetry of Alexander Ross. The poem represents Beattie's only public, though initially 
anonymous, public foray as a patron. 
From his first volume of poetry, it is evident that Beattie is making a conscious 
attempt to work within eighteenth-century conventions set out for the serious minded 
intending to embark upon a poetic career. Original Poems and Translations contains many 
poems in conventional styles, such as elegy, epitaph, and translations. The volume deals with 
themes which remain important throughout Beattie's career. These themes include, but are 
not limited to, the effectiveness of Christian afterlife as consolation for the pain of loss, the 
conflict of ambition and inspiration in a poet's mind, and characteristics of poetic genius. 
6 The exception to this is the Scots dialect poem "To Alexander Ross" which is included in chapter 6 with the 
"Scoticisms" since the analysis of the poem is compelling within the context ofBeattie's Scottish language 
work. 
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The way in which his ideas concerning these issues change over the course of his 
career can be traced through the revisions ofthe early poems, and the changes illustrate his 
continuing desire to revise his public stance on these important subjects. The pamphlet poems 
printed anonymously in 1765 signal his desire to engage with contemporary political issues 
as well as current intellectual debates. His political and social engagement are pronounced in 
his pamphlet poem, "On the report of a Monument to be erected in Westminster-Abbey, to 
the Memory of a Late Author" (1765) and his desire to manipulate poetry as an adequate 
vehicle for reasoned philosophical argumentation begins with ''The Judgement of Paris" 
(1765). His second volume Poems on Several Subjects (1766) incorporates many of the 
poems from Beattie's first volume as well as the pamphlets. It also includes several new 
poems that reinforce the conscious development of his poetic profile by including poems that 
range more widely in subject and form. 
The Minstrel; Or, the Progress of Genius is the climax ofBeattie's poetic career, and 
brought him contemporary fame and renown. Its innovative use of the Spenserian verse form, 
its complex account of the growth of a poetically inclined mind from youth to intellectual 
maturity, and the moments of didacticism concerning the role of education and the function 
of philosophy, set the poem apart from Beattie's earlier works. The simultaneous success of 
this poem with his most well known philosophical work, An Essay on the Nature and 
Immutability of Truth, in Opposition to Sophistrv and Scepticism (1770), brought Beattie 
contemporary fame, and established his reputation as an important thinker and a great poet. In 
his later years Beattie takes care to perpetuate this reputation through his final volumes of 
poetry, and throughout the numerous editions of the Essay, as well as his other critical works. 
9 
Beattie's poetical volumes after The MinstreF represent his final forays into the public 
domain as a poet. The poems in the volumes are generally new versions of previously printed 
works that postdate the first publication of The Minstrel, and the care which Beattie took to 
revise them illustrates his desire to protect and preserve for posterity those poems which he 
hoped would encapsulate his career. The simultaneous composition of The Minstrel and the 
Essay, is one of the superficial connections between these works, but a close investigation of 
the poem highlights the importance of the philosophical arguments made in the Essay to the 
thematic development of the poem. 
The connection between these works reinforces the close connection in Beattie's 
works between philosophy and poetry, but as a philosophical work the Essay has been 
discounted by modem scholars, because of its harsh treatment of David Hume as well as its 
lack of proper evidence for his assertions. Despite modem condemnation, the Essay is an 
attempt to illustrate the illogical aspects of sceptical philosophy through the use of what is 
commonly known as the philosophy of common sense. Beattie's philosophical treatise was 
intended as a rebuttal of the sceptical doctrines of David Hume's A Treatise on Human 
Nature (1739), and so its style of argument deviates from conventional philosophical 
investigation and analysis. Because of these flaws, modem scholars have limited their 
engagement with the arguments of the Essay, but a close investigation of Beattie's ideas is 
necessary to a full understanding of the philosophy which animates a great deal of his poetry. 
7 Poems on Seveml Occasions (1776); The Minstrel. in Two Books: With Some Other Poems (1779 and 1784). 
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Beattie's two unpublished prose satires are also inextricably linked to his philosophy 
as expressed in the Essay. "The Castle of Scepticism" and "Letter: From a Regular Flow of 
Ideas and Impressions to the Idea of a Friend in the Country''8 are hitherto unexplored 
responses by Beattie to the dangerous consequences of scepticism and the character of its 
proponents. The second satire is written in the style ofVoltaire's Dictionnaire Philosophigue 
(1764) and parodies this work in style and content. These two prose satires show that the 
consequences of scepticism and its power to corrupt, as well as the implications of other 
doctrines he considered to be impious, were ever present in Beattie's mind. 
After editing the 1784 volume, Beattie made a conscious decision to abandon poetry, 
and turned his attention to the preparation of various essays, which were the culmination of 
the many topics which he lectured on during his tenure as Professor of Moral Philosophy at 
Marischal College, Aberdeen. Many of these essays deal with subjects that are closely related 
to the themes in Beattie's poetry, and they also provide insight into the development of his 
poetic career. These essays also illustrate that Beattie continued to intellectually engage with 
many of the issues which had occupied his poetry. 
Each essay which is investigated in this study is inextricably linked to Beattie's 
overall philosophical system, and the importance of this system to his poetry should not be 
underestimated. "On Poetry and Music as they Affect the Mind" (1776) is an example of the 
way in which Beattie's poetical investigations continue in his prose. The essay is divided into 
two parts, the first focusing on the role of the poet in society, characteristics of poetic genius, 
and poetical language, the second on poetry's relationship to music and its impact upon the 
mind. "On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition" (1776) shows his willingness to engage 
intellectually with varying theories, and, develops a theory-closelyrelated to that of 
8 These satires were Wlpublished in Beattie's lifetime, and were first transcribed and published by the Hume 
scholar Ernest Campbell Mossner. See pp. 187-88. 
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Mark Akenside. The essay is a critique of contemporary theories of ridicule and the causes of 
laughter in the mind. The other three essays which are integral to this study are taken from 
Dissertations Moral and Critical (1783). The collection originated as lectures to Beattie's 
students, and was intended as an introduction to youth of university age to a wide variety of 
intellectual topics.9 Since this is a literary study with limited space, I have not included those 
of Beattie's works that have no relevance to his poetic career. 10 
Beattie's various prose works, both fiction and non fiction, deal with many important 
questions concerning a variety of intellectual issues. His works highlight what he considered 
to be his duties and responsibilities, as a philosopher, a teacher, and a poet. He wrote the 
Essay in an effort to vindicate religious tenets in the face of sceptical philosophers, and 
Dissertations and the "Scoticisms" to better prepare the young for their higher education. 
His two unpublished prose satires illustrate his continuing attempts to reconcile philosophical 
investigation and the creative imagination. The fmal chapter of this study looks to three first 
generation Romantic poets, Sir Walter Scott, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and William 
Wordsworth, in order to illustrate the far reaching impact ofBeattie's poetical, philosophical, 
and critical works. Sir Walter Scott's Lay of the Last Minstrel (1804) illustrates the way in 
which Beattie's narrative continued to exert influence on Scottish poetry. Scott's depiction of 
the ancient minstrel in his narrative shares many qualities with Beattie's Hermit, similarities 
too numerous for them to be merely coincidental. Everard King has focused on the 
connection between selected poems of Samuel Taylor Coleridge and The Minstrel, but their 
9 The essays in this collection that are relevant to this study are: "Of Memory and Imagination," "011F!lble ~d 
Romance;"-and "Illustrations mfSubllmity:"-- -· -" --·- · - - · - - - - - -- · -- -- -
10 Beattie published numerous volumes on a variety of subjects. Theology and religious practice (Evidences of 
the Christian Religion and "A Letter to the Reverend Hugh Blair on the Improvement of the Psalmody in 
Scotland"), Linguistics ("The Theory of Language") and various others which vary widely in subject (Elements 
ofMoral Science, "On the Attachments ofKindred," "On Dreaming," and "On the Lawfulness of Slavery"). 
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philosophical connection has been underestimated. Coleridge's Biographia Literaria (1817) is 
not thought to have any connection to Beattie's philosophical system, since their two 
approaches are distinctly different. However, the connection between Coleridge and Beattie 
is clear in the theory of the imagination expounded by the former in the Biographia. Though 
Coleridge's philosophical ideas are most often connected to German idealists, his works are 
in many ways a reaction to eighteenth-century theories concerning poetry, the imagination, 
and the characteristics of genius. 
Modem scholarship has generally limited the connection between Beattie and William 
Wordsworth to the similarities between The Minstrel and various verbal echoes, but they 
share more than just occasional diction. Wordsworth's unpublished fragment "Essay on 
Morals" illustrates his intellectual engagement with the tenets of Beattie's version of common 
sense philosophy. The 1800 "Preface" to Lyrical Ballads presents his ideas concerning the 
role of the poet, the purpose of poetry, and deals with poetic diction, which is similar in many 
respects to Beattie's arguments in the essay "On Poetry and Music." These works highlight 
possible engagement with Beattie's philosophical and critical works, and there is also is 
striking evidence in The Prelude: Or. Growth of a Poet's Mind (1805) of the presence of 
Beattie's poetical and philosophical influence upon Wordsworth. 
Though modem scholarship has paid Beattie's career slight attention, his poetical, 
philosophical, and critical works represent an engagement with many commonplace 
eighteenth-century issues. His career as a philosopher and teacher encapsulates the 
eighteenth-century crisis over what is believable and what is not, in terms of philosophy, 
religion, and poetic narrative. The Essay was intended to prove that Christianity was 
believable_and that philosophical inquiry based solely-on argument and-sense data could not 
prove it false. In constant opposition with Beattie's desire to vindicate religion and morality 
13 
from sceptical inquiries was his poetic imagination. His career as a poet exemplifies the way 
in which a poet in the eighteenth-century was meant to introduce himself into the public 
arena, and to cultivate consciously a public reputation through his publications. James Beattie 
represents the eighteenth-century engagement with a variety of topics and disciplines. The 
works explored in this study illustrate his wide-ranging interests in contemporary 
philosophical, critical, and poetical issues, his contemporary importance in various roles, and 
the far-reaching impact of his career upon the next generation of poets. 
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Chapter 1: The Making of a Poet, the Inaugural Volume 
Beattie's Early Life 
James Beattie was baptized on 25 October 1735 in Laurencekirk, County Kincardine, 
Scotland. The youngest child of a less than affluent fanner/shopkeeper, his opportunities for 
advancement and professional success were slim. Through the industry of his elder brother 
David11 and his own academic prowess Beattie won a bursary to attend Marischal College 
Aberdeen in 1749. Upon completing his MAin 1753 he was installed in the parish of 
Fordoun in Kincardineshire, serving as precentor and schoolmaster. He hoped to progress to 
an ecclesiastical career, and his position in the parish allowed him to earn a living while 
pursuing the study of Divinity requisite for all wishing to enter into holy orders. He attended 
courses at Marischal and King's Colleges, when not teaching his own students in the parish, 
which grounded him in the Christian doctrine that would permeate his life's works. Beattie 
was nineteen when he took up this post, and it was during this time that he composed much 
of his early poetry. 12 Beattie's biographers depict this five year period as a starting point for 
Beattie's lifelong attachment to natural scenery, and its influence on the development of his 
poetic mind. 
11 Beattie's father James, died, when he was seven, and his elder brother David cared for his m()ther and 
siblings. Fromsir-William Forbes, An'"'AccountoftheLifeand Writings Of James-Beattie, 2. vols. (Ediiiburgh: 
Creech, 1806) 1:14-15. 
12 Beattie published twelve poems in the Scots Magazine before his first volume of poetry, Original Poems and 
Translations, appeared in 1760. See Roger Robinson's introduction to Sir William Forbes, An Account of the 
Writings of James Beattie, Sir William Forbes (London: Thoemes, 1999) xxxvi. 
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The biographies of Beattie vary in the letters they reproduce, and the emphasis they 
place upon various phases in his career. Alexander Bower's biography, An Account of the 
Life of James Beattie (1804) is the earliest and arguably most corrupt of these volumes. A 
nephew of Beattie's provided Bower with intimate details of the poet's youth, but the details 
of his later life are significantly lacking, and so his early life is the main focus of the work. 
Bower minimizes the importance of Beattie's prose works while celebrating his poetic 
success with The Minstrel. Bower justifies his lack of respect for these works by citing their 
inextricable link to Beattie's lectures on Moral Philosophy, which he considers to be a serious 
failing. He argues that the "prose works however must (with two exceptions) be considered 
as part of those lectures which he delivered to the students under his care."13 A more complete 
biography was published by Beattie's long-time friend Sir William Forbes shortly before his 
own death in 1806. Forbes is able to present a more comprehensive view of Beattie's life and 
career, as a result of their close friendship, and the assistance of Beattie's nephew-in-law 
George Glennie. 14 The Fettercaim Papers in the National Library of Scotland contain 
correspondence between them from the onset ofBeattie's final illness in 1803 through the 
composition and publication of the biography. 
One hundred years later, Margaret Forbes, a great grandniece of Beattie, composed 
Beattie and His Friends (1904) which was intended to supplement Forbes's earlier Life. She 
presents some letters which William Forbes felt were not fit for public perusal, because of 
their personal nature. These new letters enrich the narrative of Beattie's life, and provide 
insight into his motives and ambitions. The differences in style and perceptions of evidence 
reflect on the three biographers themselves rather than Beattie. The two Forbeses present a 
13 Alexander Bower, An Account oftii.e Life and Writings of James Beattie; LL.D.--(London: Baldwin, 1804) 
224. Bower points to the simplicity of Beattie's prose style as a flaw that resulted from the essays beginning as 
lectures to his students: "He therefore studied the greatest plainness of expression, and selected his illustrations 
from these familiar topics which were best accommodated to the capacity of his hearers." Bower, 224. 
14 Glennie and his wife cared, for Beattie in the fmal years of his life. 
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man whose poetic achievements are matched only by his philosophical and critical essays, 
while Bower focuses on The Minstrel. Add to this great literary talent a sincere commitment 
to students, and they claim, the person of James Beattie is conveyed clearly in its essentials. 
The biographies portray a young man whose poetic imagination is growing active and 
more sophisticated in the solitude and natural splendour ofFordoun. The remote parish did 
not present Beattie with the kind of intellectual companionship he knew while at university. 
Despite this lack of intellectual discourse, "he had a never failing resource in his own mind, 
in those meditations which he loved to indulge, amidst the beautiful and sublime scenery of 
that neighbourhood."15 His solitude allowed him to experience nature in a way that had a 
profound and lasting impact on his life, as evidenced by his preoccupation with nature, its 
influence, and the consequences of that influence, throughout his career. William Forbes 
depicts his communion with nature in similar terms to those Beattie uses to describe his poet 
Edwin. Beattie would often, "saunter in the fields the live-long night, contemplating the sky, 
and marking the approach of the day; and he used to describe with peculiar animation the 
pleasure he received from the soaring of the lark in a summer morning."16 
The young James Beattie is placed amidst the scenery that would animate his poetic 
career, which Beattie strove to validate in his first volume of poetry. His early "indulgence" 
in solitude, melancholy, and the impact of nature on the imagination pervades this volume, 
which he would later reject as self-destructive and impractical. Clearly, the biographers are 
presenting the young James Beattie as an original poetical genius, as Beattie thought of 
himself when young. But his opinion of the value of these early works would change 
dramatically over the course of his career, adding a particular poignancy to this initial poetic 
endeavour. 
15 W. Forbes, 1:20. 
16 W. Forbes, 1:21-2. 
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His first presentation of himself as a named poet in Original Poems and Translations 
(1760/1)17 is a self-conscious presentation by a poet determined to succeed within the 
conventions set forth by his contemporaries. He aspires to the greatness of Addison and Pope, 
and begins his career with conventional form and topics. His poetry is influenced throughout 
his career by philosophical ideas, and in this volume in particular he focuses on the debate 
over poetical genius. Theories of genius remain important throughout Beattie's career. 
Various theorists explore the characteristics of natural poetic genius he wished to present in 
himself, and to the wider world. Years later, when he composes The Minstrel, he explores the 
consequences of indulgence in this kind of engagement with nature and the effect of learned 
knowledge upon a mind trained by nature. His relationship with theories of genius illustrate 
his interest in poetry as a vehicle for philosophical topics, and show that from the beginning 
of his poetic career, philosophy and poetry are for him, inextricably linked. 
William Sharpe in A Dissertation upon Genius (1755) argues that the acquisition of 
learning and the knowledge of experience are the defining factors of genius. He argues 
"Genius, or Taste, is not the result of simple nature, not the effect of any cause exclusive of 
human assistance, and the vicissitudes of life; but the effect of acquisition in general. " 18 In 
Sharpe's system the person who is best enabled to acquire knowledge, both human and 
natural, is the truest genius, and this genius is improved by the possessors industry alone. He 
further argues that "Vivacity of Genius therefore cannot be inherent in nature herself' 19 since 
it is a catalyst for learning rather than an active force. For Sharpe, genius is the result of 
nature and humanity in harmony. 
17 For an explanation of the alternative dating of Original Poems and Translations, see Appendix, pp. 313-14. 
18 William Sharpe, A Dissertation upon Genius (Delmar: Scholars, 1973) 6. 
19 Sharpe, 9. 
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Alexander Gerard's20 Essay on Taste (1758) presents an opposing theory. Gerard 
argues that only a fine imagination can produce genius, and that taste acts as judge over the 
products of genius.21 This line of thought becomes the dominant one in the field, developed 
by William Duff and Immanuel Kant among others. For Gerard: "Quickness of taste is 
essential to poetic genius; and Horace has assigned to poets the correspondent tum of 
passion, when he characterises them [as] genus irritabile."22 Thus, genius is distinguished by 
the use of the imagination and the taste that moderates the products of genius. In this system 
the passions are ruled by taste; genius enables the imagination to conjure sublime natural 
images, and these images remain true to their counterparts in nature. It is the vivacity and 
force of these faculties that set genius apart. 
Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition (1759) characterises natural 
genius in a way that can be inferred in Beattie's OPT. According to Young: "An Original 
may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of Genius; it 
grows, it is not made: Imitations are a sort of manufacture wrought up by those Mechanics, 
Art and Labour, out of pre-existent materials not their own."23 Young argues that genius is a 
product of nature and is innate, the genius grows in nature not in practical learning or 
practices. Beattie's excursions into the wilderness at Fordoun exemplify this kind of organic 
growth of genius; the occasion which led to the composition of his translation of Lucretius's 
invocation of Venus from the first book of De Rerum Natura throws into sharp relief the 
similarities between the young Beattie and Young's depiction of poetic genius. 
20 Gerard served as Professor of Moral Philosophy when Beattie took his degree, and served as Professor of 
Divinity after 1760. He was also a founding member of the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen. Forbes explains 
"Dr. Beattie and he were constant and intimate friends from their first acquaintance." W. Forbes, 1 :3 5. 
21 The date given above refers to the frrst edition of Gerard's essay. Because the frrst edition i~ difficult to find, 
my quotations refer to a repriii.tofthe'3nl edition; Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Taste!To-getner\vith -
Observations Concerning the Imitative Nature ofPoetry 3rd ed. (Delmar: Scholars, 1978) paraphrased from 165, 
166, 167. 
22 Gerard, Taste 187. 
23 Edward Young, Conjectures on Original Co:mposition (Leeds: Scolar, 1966) 12. 
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Beattie met his first patron Francis Garden (Sheriff of Kincardine and later Lord 
Gardenstone) while in Fordoun, and their relationship would prove important to Beattie's 
professional advancement to the chair of Moral Philosophy. Garden had heard of the youth's 
poetical talents, and to test them he asked Beattie to translate the invocation. The task chosen 
suggests that Garden was also aware of Beattie's predilection for philosophical material: by 
requesting the invocation he allowed Beattie to prove his poetic mettle, while acknowledging 
his philosophical interests. And so "In compliance with this request, Beattie retired into the 
adjoining wood, and in no long time produced the translation, bearing all the marks of 
original composition."24 It was in retreat amidst natural scenery that Beattie composed the 
poem, illustrating the importance of nature as the inspiration of the poetic mind. His first 
collection of poems reinforces the importance of natural images and the intellectual 
impressions made upon his mind, when life and tragedy had not yet tempered his ambition. 
Beattie consciously depicted Original Poems and Translations as the product of his 
experiences in nature, so as to reinforce his character as a natural genius, as well as a serious 
poet through chosen themes and verse forms. The poems in this volume might initially appear 
conventional in content, but throughout Beattie's poetry, the "occasion [that sparks 
composition] provides a satisfyingly opaque grounding for the mental event which it 
occasions, that mental event becomes the focus of the poem, until at last the mental event 
becomes itself the ground of the poem."25 The poems of this volume introduce many of the 
philosophical, political, and emotive subjects that will occupy Beattie throughout his career. 
Like his favourite poet, Thomas Gray, he uses single occasions and activities as the basis for 
complex intellectual contemplation. The varying poetic genres in the volume illustrate the 
already diverse poetic interests ofBeattie's-imagination. 
24 W. Forbes, 1:25. 
25 Jolm Dolan, Poetic Occasion from Milton to Wordsworth (London: Macmillan, 2000) 123. 
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Original Poems and Translations (176011) 
The dedication of Original Poems and Translations (176011) to James Earl ofErroll, 
Lord High Constable of Scotland, etc. is complex in both meaning and intent. Superficially it 
was an expression of gratitude to the Earl for his aid in securing for Beattie a royal 
appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen, at the end of 
September 1760. Bower recounts that "He (Mr. Arbuthnot) actually prevailed upon his 
Lordship [Erroll] to recommend him to his Majesty, as one well worthy of being appointed to 
a vacant professorship."26 Forbes explains the dedication as a ''testimony of gratitude to that 
nobleman, to whom he was indebted for his chair in the university."27 
It is significant that in his first extended public display Beattie does not separate his 
life as poet from that of philosopher, because in later years his philosophical duties will be at 
odds with his poetical ambition, and eventually lead him to abandon poetry in favour of his 
critical works. His poetic career is not yet in conflict with his duties as a teacher or his 
philosophical interests, but throughout his life the relationship between poetic inclination and 
philosophical duty would become increasingly at odds. Beattie's early experiences with 
patronage present an interesting addition to the debate over its decline in the eighteenth 
century and throughout. His early career supports Dustin Griffin's argument that the forms of 
literary patronage changed rather than disappeared in the eighteenth-century in response to 
the changing position of both author and patron.28 The eighteenth century saw the growth of 
authorship as a profession; prominent patrons, consequently, came to see their function 
increasingly as being instruments of introduction and influence rather than economic support. 
26 Bower, 145. 
27 W. Forbes, 1:47. 
28 Dustin Griffin, Literary Patronage in England. 1650-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), Paraphrased 
from 5-7. 
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An example of this in Beattie's later career is the publication by subscription of 
Essays in 1776, which was proposed by Beattie's friend, the famous bluestocking Elizabeth 
Montagu, as a means of securing Beattie a more stable financial situation. Scotland had its 
own system of patronage, and its power extended beyond the literary world. As Robert 
Emerson argues, within the political and social realm of Scotland, "Without the endorsement 
and sanction of patrons, little happened."29 It was through this system that Beattie would 
make his way as poet, philosopher, and teacher. Francis Garden, had, after all, introduced him 
to intellectual members of his local community, which enabled him to engage in the limited 
amount of intellectual discourse available in Fordoun.30 
Original Poems and Translations, hereafter OPT, is a new poet's conscious attempt to 
establish himself using accepted modes of poetry. Beattie's perceptions of the paths of the 
careers and characters began with conscious self-fashioning, Beattie believed that "Great 
poets forge their own identities"31 in their own works by presentation and content. His preface 
betrays the self-awareness that characterises this initial foray into the public sphere. He 
begins by depicting himself in universal terms, with general humility: "Few writers are 
qualified to form a proper judgment of their own talents"32 and so they must rely on public 
rejection or ovation. He then makes a direct request to his readers: "to the goodnatured 
Reader ... [the author] will apologize for his rashness (if it shall be deemed rashness) in 
venturing abroad into the public view" (vi). His supplication before his readership is not a 
complete fabrication, but it does work to his advantage: the reader is intentionally put into a 
sympathetic mood by the humble author's supplication, and will read (the author hopes) with 
29 Robert Emerson, "The Contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment," The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish 
Enlightenment, ed. Alexander Broadie (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003) 16. . . . . 
30 Atthis time he metJames Burner(later Lord Monboddo) and.thi!facquaintlmccne·d to Beattie's composition 
of an elegy upon the death ofMonboddo's sister, Elizabeth Walker. 
31 Lawrence Lipking, The Life of the Poet: Beginning and Ending Poetic Careers (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 
1981) 4. 
32 James Beattie, Original Poems and Translations (London: Millar, 1760) v. 
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this persona embedded in the mind. 
Beattie's first volume is one in which the "reader who would make sense of the book 
must allow himself to be instructed by it in how to read"33 through the structure and the text 
itself The other topics of the preface deal with the translations of Virgil's Eclogues, and the 
invocation from De Rerum Natura. He does not claim to write a work comparable to the 
translations by Dryden and Warton, but would ''be thought only an humble Copier of 
VIRGIL" (ix). Yet he does not completely disclaim his personal adaptation of the original 
Latin that is inevitable in translation. He reveals to his readers that the translations were 
''written at a very early time of life, when solitude left the mind at liberty to pursue, without 
any fixed design, such amusements as gratified the present hour" (x). 
In his own voice he describes the inspirations that led to the translations and by 
extension to the volume as a whole. In an apologetic tone he ends the preface with a sort of 
dedication to his first patron, Francis Garden. The invocation from Lucretius "was written at 
the particular desire of a Friend, whose commands the Translator hath reason to honour'' (x). 
The preface illustrates Beattie's desire to introduce himself as a serious and conscientious 
poet. The poems in this volume deal with political and social tensions that are relevant to 
writings of the eighteenth century generally. The conflicts between the establishment and 
opposition concerning the conduct of the Seven Years' War, as well as the government's 
domestic policy, present an interesting context for the "Ode to Peace" and "Ode to Hope." 
"Retirement, an Ode" and "The Triumph of Melancholy" question the implications of 
solitude upon the mind and its creations, while also exploring the necessity of generally 
negative emotions such as melancholy to the process of poetic creation. 
33 Lipking, 16. 
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These two poems highlight the status of melancholy as an affliction with particular 
benefits, and Beattie's desire to explore its implications within the context of contemporary 
conceptions. Indeed, melancholy: "for most of the century, [is] shadowed by images of the 
pleasures and privileges that might come with such supposed afflictions. The pleasures and 
privileges are typically associated with kinds of retreat, variously rendered as evidence of 
'Indolence' or of 'Sensibility', from worldly ambition and commercial activity."34 The 
memorial poems in the volume deal with the mental process of mourning, and the 
effectiveness of Christianity as consolation for grief and bereavement in both public and 
private situations. The fable and song, like the earlier odes, make veiled critical comments 
upon eighteenth century society and its values. 
The translations initially seem out of place, but they highlight Beattie's desire to 
situate himself within the tradition of Warton, Dryden, and Pope. The classical authors 
Beattie chose to translate present poignant political and social criticisms in the tradition of his 
predecessors. The Eclogues focus on the differences and similarities between an Arcadian 
world and reality; while the other translations reveal Beattie's early engagement with 
philosophical poetry, and the relationship between the two disciplines. Together, the poems 
present to the world Beattie's varied poetic interests. 
34 John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1988) 215. 
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The Odes 
Throughout the odes there are verbal echoes of, and formal stylistic similarities to, the 
Pindaric odes of Thomas Gray. Gray would continue to be an important influence on 
Beattie's poetry throughout his career. He presented a modem model to Beattie of how an 
ancient structure can be updated and transformed into a new vehicle for poetic expression. 
Beattie also took from Gray the use of obscurity, an unknown narrator and subject, to focus 
attention on the lines rather than the speaker, and as the poem develops the surface setting is 
overshadowed by the overarching mental process. "Ode to Peace" and "Ode to Hope" (both 
written in 1758) are poetic responses to the disastrous opening of the Seven Years' War. 
From the first, Beattie attempts to utilise poetry for an instructive purpose, and here it is a 
means of criticism of contemporary politics and morals. The regime change occurred "In 
1755-6, failure to deal the French navy a decisive blow in the Atlantic, and the loss of 
Minorca in the Mediterranean .. .left the old Whig regime discredited if not devastated.ms 
Out of this frustration with the government's handling of events abroad, the Pitt-
Newcastle ministry grew. The Commons at this time was divided over strategies and 
priorities concerning the war. The loss ofMinorca and Fort William Henry renewed anti-war 
sentiments among the wider population, while the Convention of the Kloster Zeven forced 
the demobilisation of the Hanoverian army, which led to controversy over further British 
involvement in the region.36 Disagreements on foreign and domestic policy in the period 
created intense public debate and general social unrest. Within this climate of political and 
social discord Beattie presents his concerns and opinions about current events. 
35 Paul Langford and Christopher Harvie, The Oxford Histoxy of Britain: The Eighteenth Century and the Age of 
Industry, ed. Kenneth 0. Morgan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 52. 
36 Daniel Marston, Essential Histories: The Seven Years' War (Oxford: Osprey, 2001) 33, 37. 
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The conventions of this genre make it an ideal form for Beattie's social and political 
criticism. The Pindaric "was basically a formal, public or social poem, usually occasional, 
celebrating something. "37 The "Ode to Peace" is a Pindaric in structure, but does not follow 
Pindar in subject. Pindar's odes were to celebrate the triumphs of a great athlete, and were 
meant to be sung and danced at the festival honouring the sportsman's achievement. They 
were public displays of triumph and celebration, recounting past glories and giving thanks to 
the Gods for present ones. In the Pindaric tradition ''The ode regularly has a brilliant opening, 
often an image, or a piece of gnomic wisdom, sometimes a prayer or an invocation"38 and 
Beattie's odes are no exception. 
Beattie's ode opens with a prayer to Peace, the "heaven-descended maid" (1) whose 
character and function in the mortal world are central to the poem. In the golden age before 
man's wars every angel "To loftiest raptures tuned the heavenly lyre, I Pour'd in loud 
symphony th' impetuous strain; I And every fiery orb and planet sung" (8-1 0). Beattie revises 
line 8 to "Striking through all their ranks th' eternal lyre" (8) in the 1766 version, so that the 
imagery of the line is changed from preparation to action, the performance of music by the 
angels creating a sense of immediacy. The use of'eternal' rather than 'heavenly,' also is a 
significant change; it reinforces the unchanging character of the song instead of simply 
suggesting an angelic, or other-worldly quality. The music of these angels also hints at the 
existence of a heavenly equivalent to pre-lapsarian Eden. This ode depicts the vices of 
mankind that banish Peace from the world, and the devastation humanity causes because of 
ambition, hatred, and revenge. It chastises the leaders whose policies have led to war, as well 
as those whose overriding desire for wealth and ambition has clouded their proper judgement. 
37 Carol Maddison, Apollo and the Nine: A History of the Ode (London: Routledge, 1960) 3. 
38 Maddison, 8. 
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The beauty of the first strophe contrasts with the rising terror in the second: "Murder 
deep-rous'd, with the wild whirlwind's haste I And roar oftempest, from her cavern springs, I 
Her tangled serpents girds around her waist, I Smiles ghastly-stem, and shakes her gore-
distilling wings" (21-24). The already imagined sweep of death is able to silence the natural 
forces: "The mighty ocean's more majestic voice I Drown'd in superiour din is heard no 
more; I The surge in silence sweeps along the foamy shore" (34-36). Beattie has gone to the 
negative end of the sublime in the second stanza. The stage is now set for humans to enter the 
scene and with them come vices, which separate humanity from the virtues of the divine. 
Now ''The mingling multitudes, the madding car I Pouring impetuous on the plain 
below, I War's dreadful Lord proclaim" (39-41). Alliteration pervades the introduction of 
war, giving it quickness and preserving intensity of the poem. These lines echo Gray's 
"Elegy": "Far from the madding crowd's ignoble strife" (73). The images of man's futile 
attempts to conquer nature are reinforced by disturbing images. Man is separated from the 
beauty of heaven by his embrace of vices such as hate, war, and revenge: "The chearful face 
of heaven no more is seen, I Fades the Mom's vivid blush to deadly pale, I The bat flits 
transient o'er the dusky green" (45-47). The actions of men alienate them from nature, which 
Beattie will argue that nature is in fact the physical manifestation of the divine, and so the 
disconnection from nature subsequently separates them from God. 
The characterisation of nature is ambiguous, and requires the reader to infer more of 
the character than Beattie seems to have deemed appropriate. He thus changes the image of 
morning in the 1766 version, making it less ambiguous and more thematically active: ''The 
bloom of morning fades to deadly pale" ( 46). Morning is here personified as a blooming 
flower; the loss of its beauty and colour reinforce the connection he is making between the 
actions of man and its effects on the world around him. 
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At the end of the epode, there is a powerful invocation of ambition which the poem 
labels as the most destructive of human failings: "Disparting from behind the clouds disclose 
I Of kingly gesture a gigantic form, I That with his scourge sublime directs the whirling 
storm" (70-72). Ambition is the notorious vice that sets mankind on the path to destruction of 
the natural world and his own conscience, because its result is luxury, greed, and ultimately 
despair. The ambitious nature of British imperial expansion in India and North America made 
the material luxuries criticised in this passage readily available to the developing consumer 
society. 
John Brown, in his virtually contemporary study, Estimate of the Manners and 
Principles ofthe Times (1757-58) blamed the nation's obsession with luxury for "the decline 
of education, music, and painting and in the omnipresence of personal vanity, dandyism, 
gluttony, gambling, [and] avarice"39 among the population. The introduction of Ambition to 
the poem foreshadows the eventual discord between man and nature. The world "Where late 
the shepherd told his tender tale; I And wak'd by the soft-murmuring breeze of mom I The 
voice of cheerful Labour fill' d the dale" (81-83) will be destroyed by this impending force. 
The images harken back to classical images of rural poets in an environment of peace and 
harmony between man and nature. The third epode continues to develop the characteristics of 
peace. The scenes that fly before the speaker are as dreams: they are the universal memory of 
peace before man chose knowledge, which forever changed the world. These dreams of a less 
corrupted world are transient, and their exit is depicted as a kind of ghastly exorcism: "But 
ah! the landscape glows with fainter light, I It darkens, swims, and flies for ever from my 
sight" (107-8). 
39 David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New Haven: Yale UP, 1990) 215. 
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The diction of the passage is chilling; the world is seen to be turning away from the light of 
virtue, and physical actions present the narrator's thoughts on the world's lost perfection. 
The final section of the poem highlights the inherent conflict between peace and 
ambition, the other vices previously cited: 
But ah! the landscape glows with fainter light, 
It darkens, swims, and flies for ever from my sight. 
N.i 
Illusions vain! Can sacred PEACE reside, 
Where sordid gold the breast alarms, 
Where cruelty inflames the eye of Pride, 
And Grandeur wantons in soft Pleasure's arms! (107-12) 
Ambition pushes mankind toward vices and destruction; it eclipses the beauty of nature and 
replaces it with images of material luxury and wealth. The sublime in this passage is a 
positive force in the mind, though the images of sublimity evoked earlier impress more 
negative notions upon the imagination. Beattie uses the power of the sublime to impress 
horrible images upon the reader in order to illuminate the consequences of an indulgence in 
ambition. It draws attention to the "true" state of affairs in the world, rather than cloaking 
them in shadows. Beattie will later question the value of this power of the sublime, and 
explore its destructive consequences.40 
The poem cites material wealth, physical pleasure, and ambition for pensions and 
appointments as the vices keeping peace from Britain's shores. In the 1766 version Beattie 
replaces the final"!" with"?"; the lines are suited to this change, because the question mark 
reinforces the didacticism while, not forcing a resolution; 
40 This is one of the important arguments made in The Minstrel. See pp. 113-14. 
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The uncertainty in the speaker's mind, is expressed by the change in punctuation. The 
numerous vices of the poem are encapsulated in ambition: "Ambition! These are thine: I 
These from the soul erase the form divine; I These quench the animating fire" (113-15). 
Ambition pushes mankind toward vices and destruction; it eclipses the beauty of nature and 
replaces it with temporal pleasures and preoccupations, that are ultimately frivolous. The 
obsessions ofthe ruling elite with French luxuries became a point of popular conflict as the 
war raged without any decisive victories.41 Britain is estranged from peace by its own actions, 
through the drive for power and material wealth. The poem's didacticism is motivated by 
moralistic ideals against the lust for luxury through violent means. 
Peace is personified as a melancholy maid, whose compassion for humanity is 
palpable: "grief dim'd her radiant eyes, I Her swelling bosom heav'd with boding sighs" 
(137-38). The fmal two lines of the poem depict her setting off without hope: "She saw; and, 
on refulgent pinions born, I Slow wing'd her way sublime, and mingled with the morn" (143-
44). There is no resolution of the conflict the poem has chronicled between mankind and the 
better and worse angels of his nature. The poem makes a political statement through 
contrasting the imagery of rural shepherds and poetic angels with the destruction and torment 
caused by man's aspirations to material wealth, which is encapsulated in the Seven Years' 
War. 
The poem also makes a cultural critique, addressing the role of poetry in society and 
the poet's motivations. The poem reaches back to a golden age of poetry, before profit and 
ambition motivated the pen. The damning of ambition, however, is problematic for Beattie, 
because he is aware of the necessity of a readership and the imperative to instruct and delight. 
41 W. A. Speck, Literature and Societv in Eighteenth-Century England 1680-1820: Ideology. Politics. and 
Culture (London: Longman, 1998) paraphrased from 95. 
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He wishes to characterise himself as a natural poet, but he must also court public favour if he 
is to be known. From the start, ambition is at odds with his poetic character. These conflicting 
forces are not resolved in the poem, but are revived later in his career.42 The poem argues that 
peace is thwarted by the actions of greed and mass consumption, but is inevitably the only 
solution to the struggle. 
In ''Retirement, an Ode," Beattie projects his own growing poetic character. Perhaps it 
is the autobiographical nature of the poem that prompts him to include it in his final volume 
of poetry. 43 In a letter he writes in middle age to Mrs. Montagu, Beattie describes his youthful 
beliefs concerning solitude and its effect on the mind. "In my younger days, I was much 
attached to solitude, and could have envied even 'The shepherd of the He bride isles, placed 
far amid the melancholy main.' I wrote Odes to Retirement; and wished to be conducted to its 
deepest groves, remote from every rude sound, and from every vagrant foot. In a word, I 
thought the most profound solitude the best.'>44 His ideas concerning melancholy, the sublime, 
and solitude will change over the course of his life, but in ''Retirement," solitude is a positive 
force, because it allows the mind to commune with the natural world. Young Beattie explores 
the implications of solitude upon the poetic imagination, but does not resolve any of the 
complications with regard to poetry and the progression of the career of the poet through life. 
The opening of the poem introduces the speaker as a votary of nature. The speaker 
shifts early on to a swain similar to the character of Edwin: "Beside a plaintive stream, I A 
meek-eyed Youth of serious mein, I Indulged this solemn theme" (6-8).45 The young poet is 
situated amongst sylvan scenes that will inspire his imagination. The youth wanders: "By 
42 See Chapter 3. The Hennit in The Minstrel and his relationship to Edwin reyive th_e issue in interesting ways. 
43 Beattie's fiilal volume of p<>etry, Tlie~Mmstfet in Two-Books: with-Some other Poems ( 1784) includes only 
"Retirement," "Elegy," "Ode to Hope" and "The Hares," from OPT. 
44 W. Forbes, 1:288. 
45 These lines are altered in 1776: "Beside a lulling stream, I A pensive Youth of placid mien, I Indulged this 
tender theme." 
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wilder'd Fancy led, I What time the wan moon's yellow rays I Stream through the chequer'd 
shade" (14-16).46 This passage seems to depict Beattie's own youthful wanderings in 
Fordoun; the fancy rather than reasoning lead the poet through this enchanting landscape. 
The poem tracks the development of his poetic imagination amidst the wild scenes of 
this neighbourhood. Beattie's swain retreats from human desires by seeking refuge in this 
protected grove. This is a crucial movement, because it is the swain's invocation of nature as 
his protector against the material world that gives the reader a glimpse into his character and 
his relationship with the world around him: 
Scap'd the tumultuous world's alarms 
To your retreats I fly. 
Deep in your most sequester'd bower 
Let me at last recline, 
Where Solitude, meek modest Power, 
Leans on her ivy' d shrine. (19-24) 
For the swain, solitude in nature evokes a protection against the tumultuous human world 
depicted in the "Ode to Peace." He supplicates before the altar of nature, pleading for peace 
and the positive consequences of such contemplative and serene scenery. Solitude is 
personified as an unattainable lady: "How shall I woo thee, matchless Fair! I Thy envy'd 
smile how win!" (25-26). His prayer to nature has not yet yielded him the benefits he believes 
solitude should; nature has not proved to be the wholly fulfilling entity he believes it is in the 
opening of the poem. 
46 This line changes in 1776: "And Woe retires to weep, I What time the wan moon's yellow hom I Gleams on 
the western deep." 
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This signals a shift in the poem from an unrealistic degree of optimism to a more 
pragmatic depiction of solitude and the relationship between the poet and nature. The poet 
makes an almost desperate appeal: "Let no rude sound invade from far, I No vagrant foot be 
nigh," (37-38) to disturb his solitude, which he hopes will bring him closer to nature. The 
revisions of 1766 insert a new passage of reminiscence, distancing the speaker from the 
youthful swain of the poem. This new passage is marked by a regretful tone: 
Blest days! when Fancy smiled at care, 
When Pleasure toy' d with truth, 
Nor Envy with malignant glare 
Had harm'd his simple youth. (37-40) 
The speaker is recalling those earlier days of solitude, when worldly aspirations had not yet 
infected the youthful poet's psyche. The revision in 1766 presents an interesting shift in 
Beattie's self-presentation. The practical demands of his life at this time (he married in June 
of 1767), as well as his personal desire of success have taken precedence over his idealism. 
This is an important change, because the speaker's optimism for the swain's future seems to 
be lacking; it could reflect the decline of his own poetic ambition in the wake of his 
appointment to the Chair at Aberdeen, and the duties which the post entailed. 
The speaker then prostrates himself to the lady Solitude by denying any interest in 
worldly acclaim, with the hope that nature will once again work upon his imagination: ''For 
me, no more the path invites I Ambition loves to tread; I No more I climb life's panting 
heights" (41-43). This youthful poet has been replaced by a worldlier one, who recalls the 
futility of ambition. From the outset Beattie must strive to reconcile his desire for fame with 
the qualities expected of a poetical genius. The-poem argues for a life of solitude and 
disconnection from the human world, while looking to nature for comfort and inspiration. 
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But Beattie's bids for patronage complicate the development of himself as a natural poet. 
Again ambition is labelled as a vice rather than a virtue of humanity, but it is one that had a 
profound impact on Beattie's career. The final lines reinforce the youth's insecurities 
concerning the positive power of nature, because it is in sharp contrast to the inevitable decay 
of human life, which becomes the poem's focal point. 
The poem ends in a melancholy and brooding tone: "To Joy's enlivening lays- I 
Soon are the glittering moments o'er, I Soon each gay form decays" ( 46-48). The lays that 
once stirred his heart are as impermanent as his body; they will grow and decay into 
obscurity. This impermanence is taunted by the cycles of nature; though the solitary poet 
rejoices in nature and the comfort he finds in it, he cannot truly become a part of it until death 
decays his body. Similarly, the speaker's presentation of himself in the poem as a creature of 
solitude is complicated by Beattie's obvious desire for patronage and acceptance as a 
professional poet. 
For Beattie, this solitary communion in nature is rooted in the connection between 
man and God, which is introduced in the "Ode to Peace." Though nature provides temporary 
relief from human pain because it reflects the benevolence of the divine, and awakens the 
mind with divine inspiration, dwelling too long in solitary places leads to the indulgence of 
melancholy emotions, which stimulate the imagination, but also distract from day-to-day 
human duties and society. This complex relationship between the poet and nature illustrates 
the inevitable futility of Beattie's desire for worldly success as a poet. As his career grows he 
concludes that a solitary life and poetic ambition cannot flourish in one person. This negative 
yet necessary relationship complicates Beattie's desire for poetical fame. 
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The revised version of the poem in 1766 contains four new stanzas, with lines 41-48 
revised and inserted as the new conclusion. The new stanzas focus on the poet/speaker, and 
are characterised by reminiscences of his youthful solitary experiences in nature. The solitude 
that opened nature up to him has been eclipsed by worldly concerns and a desire for wealth 
and comfort. The speaker recalls his conscious abandonment of that natural neighbourhood in 
favour of more material pleasures: "Why did fate his steps decoy I In stormy paths to roam, I 
Remote from all congenial joy!" (45-47) far from the retreats of the natural world that once 
inspired his poetry. The speaker makes a desperate supplication to reclaim those lost days: 
"Henceforth thy awful haunts be mine! I The long-abandoned hill; I The hollow cliff, whose 
waving pine I O'erhangs the darksome rill" (49-51). 
Now removed from these scenes by duty and responsibility, the poet longs for the 
natural sublimity that once sparked the poetic imagination and animated his soul. In the next 
stanza he longs to remove himself again: "Let no rude sound invade from far, I No vagrant 
foot be nigh" (60-61). These lines appear to be spoken in vain, because the poet is caught 
within society and can find no respite in nature. The poem shifts focus to those solitary 
experiences in nature: "Thy hallow'd bowers explore, I 0 guard from harm his hoary head, I 
And listen to his lore" (65-67). The revisions add a kind of resignation and melancholy alien 
to the original version. The speaker becomes a poet whose experiences have taken him away 
from nature, and through that separation he has learned its importance to his creative 
imagination. The next stanza of the poem is the revised from lines 41-44 in 1760 version.47 
Their inclusion here reinforces the futility of a poetic career fuelled by worldly ambition 
rather than natural inspiration. 
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"For me no more the path invites I Ambition loves to tread; I No more I climb those toilsome heights, I By 
guileful hope misled" (81-84). 
35 
The last line is where the sentiment diverges most obviously from the earlier text. 
Instead of"Soon each gay form decays" (48), the poem ends, "All the past is vain" (79). This 
change is significant to the thematic development of the poem; the former focuses on the 
inevitable end of the physical existence, while the revision declares actions before death as 
vanity, since they are ultimately impermanent. The poem's revised tone is bitter rather than 
optimistic, emerging perhaps from Beattie's experiences as a poet. 
"Ode to Hope" is the second Pindaric, though the third ode in the volume, and deals 
with similar themes of mutability and inevitable pain. The opening situates the speaker in an 
awful landscape. "Left all night long to mourn I Amidst the horrors of the dreary waste" (3-
4), we find the speaker dejected and ill. The entrance of Hope puts to flight the vices that 
plague the speaker. They look upon Hope and "Appal' d retire: Suspicion hides her head" (17) 
and "With haste unwonted Indolence upsprings, I And heaving lifts her leaden wings, I And 
sullen glides away" (22-24). These images impress harshness and illustrate the power of 
Hope to conquer Indolence and Vice. The diction of these flights builds in intensity to 
reinforce both the evilness of the Vices and Hope's goodness. 
Hope is personified as a mother whose duty is to instruct the youthful poet, and free 
the mind from the pitfalls of the earlier stanza. Hope invites the poet to explore nature, and 
"Fond he surveys thy mild maternal face, I His bashful eye still kindling as he views" (45-
46). Hope is complicated, because it can be negative as well as positive: it teaches the poet to 
strive for the images of the imagination, but though it can inspire peace and ''Bring Love 
along and Harmony, I Tomorrow the gay scene deforms; I Then all around, the thunder's 
sound" (68-70), it can be negative because it blinds mankind to their frailty and inevitable 
death. 
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If Hope enables the poet to attain glory, it cannot stop his eventual death, and so the 
victory is fleeting: "For now Youth's eminence he gains, I But what a weary length of 
lingering woe remains!" (79-80). While his youth brings him pleasure and success, the 
eventual aging and decay of his body is constantly on his mind. Humanity's vices are 
introduced in the third strophe to destroy the hope inspired by the scenery. Virtue is invoked 
to save the youth from the destruction wrought by the vices but it cannot defeat them, "And 
onward rolls the war" (1 04). The final stanza reinforces the importance of Hope as the 
antidote to these vices: "HOPE bursts all radiant on the sight: I Her words the troubled bosom 
soothe" (1 08-9). Though Hope can be damaging because it disguises mutability, it also gives 
hope of an afterlife. Hope speaks the final words of the poem, which express hope for the 
heaven promised by Christianity: "Dreams of heaven's opening glories I impart, I Till the 
free'd spirit springs on high I In rapture too severe for weak Mortality'' (118-20). And so 
hope is generally a positive force when coupled with a Christian doctrine, and its negative 
consequences marked in the poem are not resolved. Beattie further explores the power of 
hope and the negative consequences of it in "The Triumph of Melancholy." 
"The Triumph of Melancholy'' explores the negative forces at work within the poet's 
mind, which complicate his own prosperity and happiness, but inspire his poetry. Natural 
scenes connect the intellectual landscape with the physical. The poem's verse is the elegiac 
verse form used by Gray in his "Elegy," which "contributes to the elusive sense of half-
personal emotionalism characteristic of the transition verse ofmid-century."48 The poem 
deals with many themes: ambition, the inevitable human death, isolation from society, and 
the influence of solitude and melancholy emotion inspired by the natural world. 
48 Eleanor Sickels, The Gloomy Egoist: Moods and Themes ofMelancholy from Gray to Keats (New York: 
Columbia U. Press, 1932) 295. 
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Through the poem Beattie recognises the necessity for melancholy in some degree as 
a propellant of poetic creation, and recalls his own intellectual experience. Negative as well 
as positive emotions and experiences are necessary for a poet to truly represent the natural 
world in its duality.49 The familiar subject of the poem is a youthful swain, whose meditations 
will occupy the body of the argument. The speaker introduces his swain into a fantastical 
landscape "Deckt gorgeous by the lavish hand of Spring" ( 6). In this valley the youthful poet 
"tempers sweet his sprightly-warbling lay" (12). This poetic solitude is invaded by reality to 
"distract that placid mien" (15) from its poetic occupation. His musings are in vain, for 
"Yonder she comes! The heart-enflaming fiend!" (18). Passion enflames the mind rather than 
melancholy, and so this is a passive rather than active emotion upon the mind. This opening 
contrasts Thomas Warton's "Pleasures ofMelancholy,"50 in which melancholy is an 
animating force upon the imagination, bringing gloom: "Congenial with my soul; to chearless 
shades, I To ruin'd seats, to twilight cells and bowers, I Where thoughtful Melancholy loves 
to muse" (18-20). Though Beattie's poet is also placed amongst this sublime scenery, the 
effect of melancholy on the mind he diverges from his model. 
For Warton, melancholy acts as a catalyst for creative expression, but Beattie portrays 
w2it as double-edged sword, inspiring the imagination but hindering the development of 
other aspects ofthe mind. Melancholy's effect upon the mind of the poet is disturbing: "Pain 
with strong grasp distorts his writing limbs, I And Fear's cold hand erects his bristling hair!" 
(27-28). Beattie depicts through striking physical imagery the inward torture of melancholy 
upon the mind. 
49 This negative impact of nature upon the mind is further explored in "The Hermit:" See pp. 224-26. 
50 Thomas Warton, The Three Wartons: A Choice ofTheir Verse Ed. Eric Partridge (London: SCholartis, 1927) 
101. 
38 
The poet/speaker retreats into nature for solace and protection, from this melancholy 
state: "Here Health has oft in blushing beauty glow' d, I While loose-robed Quiet stood 
enamour'd by" (47-48). The revisions of 1766 alter "oft in blushing beauty glow'd" to ''rosy 
bloom has often glow'd" (47). The diction alters the subject of the image from an 
anthropomorphic one to a natural one; it reinforces the connection Beattie is making between 
serenity and the natural world. The revised line suggests Gray's "Ode to Spring": "Lo, Where 
the rosy-bosom'd Hours, I Fair Venus' train appear" (1-2). Changing the diction removes any 
tendency by readers to relate the beauty to humanity rather than nature. The inability of 
nature to soothe the pain of death separates it from humanity: "Say, can ye chear pale 
Sickness' gloomy bed, I Or dry the tears that bathe the untimely urn?" (67-68). The 
melancholy inspired by death and sickness is not soothed by communion with nature. For 
Warton, melancholy also opens the mind to question the purpose of human actions: "This 
fleeting state of things, the vain delights, I The fruitless toils, that still our search elude, I As 
through the wilderness of life we rove" (80-82). The beauty and health of nature does not 
forever please the poet because it emphasizes by contrast his inevitable decay. The poet 
questions the use of poetry in the light of humanity's inevitable death and pays obvious 
tribute to his patron: 
But hopest thou, Muse, vainglorious as thou art, 
With the weak impulse of thy humble strain, 
Hopest thou to soften Pride's obdurate heart, 
When ERROLL's bright example shines in vain? (85-88). 
These lines are completely altered for the 1766 version of the poem, 51 but they retain the 
sentiments of the original. In the later version these lines are not questions but statements; 
51 
"But hope not, Muse, vainglorious as thou art, I With the weak impulse of thy humble strain, I Hope not to 
soften Pride's obdurate heart, I When ERROLL's bright example shines in vain" (81-84). 
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which relieves some of the ambiguity of the earlier version. Clearly the praise ofErroll is 
done in Beattie's voice, and so the identity of the poeVspeaker is transparently identified with 
the poet himself. 
The poem then shifts to more universal questions concerning the ultimate purpose of 
human ambition and the use of virtues. Beattie invokes the muse of history to "swell to 
thought sublime th' exalted soul" (96).With the recounting of history comes a battle between 
Liberty and Ambition, but the cause of virtue cannot be won for man. It is "Not Virtue's self, 
when Heaven its aid denies, I Can brace the loosen'd nerves, or warm the heart" (125-26). 
Beattie is recalling Gray's "On a Distant Prospect ofEton College," which makes a similar 
comment on the state of humanity. Beattie echoes specifically Gray's presentation of man's 
universal condemnation in melancholic terms: ''To each his suff'rings: all are men, I 
Condemn'd alike to groan" (91-92). To prove the ultimate futility of hope against human 
suffering the poem shifts to an impressive description of the death of Brutus. Virtue is 
personified as a Goddess whose mourning of Brutus is depicted with emotionally evocative 
imagery: ''From her dishevel'd locks she rends the plume; I No lustre lightens in her weeping 
eyes, I And on her tear-stain'd cheek no roses bloom" (142-44). As a result of the demise of 
virtue's final champion, "Meanwhile the world, Ambition owns thy sway, I Fame's loudest 
trumpet labours in thy praise" (145-46). The poem points to this ancient death as the sign of 
the decay of virtue. 
40 
The imagination is now a servant of ambition rather than virtue, because the products 
of the imagination are used to gain success. For the poet solitude is the final refuge, because 
it is also the refuge of virtue. The poet recognises that "Full oft, where Solitude and Silence 
dwell/ Far far remote amid the lowly plain, I Resounds the voice ofWoe from Virtue's cell" 
(153-55). Virtue is depicted as an unattainable entity amidst the human world of corruption; 
the morally unpolluted world can only be approached through supplication to nature. The 
poet indulges in melancholy in an effort to reclaim his creativity: "How vainly have I strove I 
Thy power, 0 melancholy, to withstand! I Tir'd I submit; but yet, 0 yet remove I Or ease the 
pressure ofthy heavy hand" (157-60). 
Even at the moment of submission, the poet still pleads to be released from the 
affliction of melancholy. His poetic endeavours to combat melancholy are characterised as 
selfish rather than selfless actions. Melancholy is characterised as an essential part of the 
creative imagination, whose banishment by the poet is fleeting. The consequences ofthe 
poet's dissent from melancholy bring the poem back to the question of human mutability and 
the place of poetry within our limited life. The speaker wonders whether poetry can rescue 
man from his fate: "Or on the withering limbs fresh beauty shed, I Or soothe the sad 
INEVITABLE HOUR, I Or chear the dark dark mansions of the dead?" (194-96). The diction is 
borrowed from Gray's "Elegy": "And all that beauty, all that wealth e'er gave, I Awaits alike 
th'inevitable hour, I The paths of glory lead but to the grave" (34-36). The temporal rewards 
of an indulgence in melancholy are insignificant in comparison to the reality of death and its 
ultimate equality. 
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The melancholy in the poet's mind enables him to investigate the limitations of his 
actions. He hopes his poetry will continue after death and so he will live on through his 
works, but there is an underlining sense in the poem that he will inevitably be forgotten. For 
Beattie, poetry inspires his soul and the souls of others to sublime and awesome emotions, 
but it cannot protect mankind from the transitory nature of life. Having settled on this 
conclusion, the poem shifts from his specific fate to the universal. The traveller of the final 
stanza is a metaphor for the poet. He takes on a universal character, as one "Wilder'd and 
weary sits him down at last~ I For long the night, and distant far his home" (215-16). 
The journey of the traveller becomes a metaphor for the conflict between the poet and 
his desire to indulge the melancholy he knows will make him incapable of continuing social 
concerns. This metaphor of the melancholic traveller is reminiscent of Mark Akenside's 
"Hymn to Cheerfulness" (1745). Akenside argues that melancholy is a negative force because 
it separates the poet from his peers. 52 For Akenside, the solitude of a poet who "Retires in 
desart scenes to dwell, I And bids the joyless world farewell" (1 09-1 0) is in vain. Akenside's 
speaker inevitably continues, and "asks a clue for nature's ways, /But evil haunts him through 
the maze" (119-20). The evil brought on by this solitude is melancholy, which for Akenside 
can be dissolved by Cheerfulness. It is an emotion which "founds on discord beauty's reign, I 
Converts to pleasure every pain, I Subdues each hostile form to rest" (135-37). 
The argument of''The Triumph of Melancholy'' is more akin to Milton's in "ll 
Penseroso." Milton portrays melancholy as a negative, yet necessary influence upon the mind 
and heart. It is melancholy that brings the speaker to a place of peace and solitude: "Till old 
experience do attain I To something like Prophetic strain I These pleasures Melancholy give, I 
And"l with-thee will choose to live" (173-76). 
52 In "Verses Occasioned by the Death of the Rev. Charles Churchill" Beattie puts Akenside in the company of 
Milton, Shakespeare, and Spenser: ''Is this the land, where AKENSIDE displays I The bold, yet temp 'rate flame 
of antient days?" ( 41-42). 
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Like Milton's speaker, Beattie brings his traveller to rest amidst the solitude of nature, where 
melancholy will continue to influence his imagination. Beattie's poem ends without a clear 
resolution in favour of melancholy (Milton), or a firm stance against it as self-indulgence 
(Akenside). Instead, the poem finishes with a romantic sense of hope and faith in the 
continuing struggle of man, without reconciling any of the opposing thoughts present in the 
poem. 
Memorial Poems 
The mental process of mourning and the divided emotions ofthose left on earth are at 
the centre of these four poems. The opening poem in this series, "An Elegy, Occasioned by 
the Death of a Lady," depicts virtue as a human attribute rather than as a gift from the divine. 
It offers a meditation on death in terms of its impact on the living, and its finality. Hope in all 
its forms is depicted as deceptive; defeating death today simply defers "th' inevitable hour." 
"Epitaph on************" was written in his youth and intended for himself, making these 
abstract meditations more poignant and personal. To reinforce the importance of his eventual 
poetic legacy he includes "Epitaph" which was written for the grave of two drowned 
brothers; to show his reputation as a poet and his power to immortalise the dead. It also 
explores the emotions that impending death brought to the two tragic figures. "Elegy" 
complicates the uses of the imagination, and the relationship of sleep and death. 
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"An Elegy" was composed in honour of Elizabeth Burnet, a sister of James Burnet 
(later Lord Monboddo). Her family lived in the parish ofFordoun and would have known 
Beattie through his position as church precentor. The poem is a public celebration of the 
lady's life, and a depiction of the mourning of family and friends. It is also supports the 
notion of Beattie's self-awareness in his volume; he intends to prove his importance as a poet 
through his verse. He pays tribute to an influential family in his parish by immortalising one 
of their members in verse, which was originally printed and circulated amongst the family 
and their friends. 53 The poem teaches us how to mourn, and to celebrate the life of the loved 
one lost, by depicting the mental process of grief and mourning, and ways to grieve. 
The death of Elizabeth Burnet is the occasion of the poem, which "provides a 
satisfyingly opaque grounding for the mental event which it occasions, that mental event 
becomes the focus of the poem, until at last the mental event becomes itself the ground of the 
poem."54 This is clear throughout the development of the poem from specific to more 
universal didacticism. The speaker entreats us to be forever prepared for death, "Lest, like the 
lightning's glance, the sudden ill I Flash to confound, and penetrate to kill" (15-16). Death is 
an altering event for anyone connected with it, as it inevitably evokes complicated emotions 
and forces changes. 
The speaker then praises Burnet by reinforcing her intellectual as well as physical 
beauty. She was "Wise! Beauteous! Good!- 0 every grace combin'd I That charms the eye, 
that captivates the mind!" (21-22). These beauties of soul and appearance now only live in 
the memories of others. Her physical and spiritual attributes are now ideas to be conjured by 
the imagination: "Since still to Fancy's eyes I I see I see the lov'd Idea rise, I Still let me 
gaze,-and every care-beguile" (31-33). The memories of the dead-in the mourner's mind 
53 A version of this poem entitled "An Elegy, Occasioned by the Death of Mrs. Walker" and signed February 
1759, survives in a bound volume with three other poems. (NLS RB.S.1611.4) 
54 Dolan, 123. 
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eclipse all other mental pictures, and so the mourner becomes consumed by the need to 
recreate these scenes in the mind. Such thoughts are expressed in an important rhetorical 
question in the poem. The speaker wonders at the indiscriminate nature of death: "Why spare 
the weed, and lop the lovely flower! I Why fly thy shafts in lawless error drivin?"' (70-71) in 
despair. These questions become overwhelming since there can be no answer, and so the 
poem shifts to the immortal soul's freedom through death. The Christian belief in an afterlife 
is the only consolation offered to those in mourning. Death is the liberator of the spirit 
because it frees the soul from corporeal cares: 
0 happy stroke, that breaks the bonds of clay, 
Darts through the bursting gloom the blaze of day, 
And wings the soul with boundless flight to soar, 
Where dangers threat, and fears alarm, no more (85-88). 
This sentiment was a commonplace of Christian doctrine, as evidenced by Samuel Johnson's 
"On the Death of Dr. Robert Levet'' (1783). When describing the death of his friend the 
comfort of the Christian afterlife becomes clear: in Levet's case "Death broke at once the 
vital chain, I And free'd his soul the nearest way'' (34-36). Though Johnson suggests that 
Levet did not suffer, Beattie is concerned with the release from physical pain that comes with 
death, and in the final stanza Beattie addresses the futile nature of mourning and sorrow. The 
mourners: "in speechless, hopeless anguish, bend I O'er her loved dust, the Parent, Brother, 
Friend! I Vain hope of mortal man!-But cease thy strain" (93-95). The mourners experience 
intense dual emotions: happiness that comes from belief in Christian immortality and sorrow 
for their own personal loss. Though the speaker urges those mourning to take comfort in the 
promise of their own lives; the reader becomes-united with the imagined mourners, and 
"Mix'd with yon drooping Mourners, o'er her bier I In silence shed the sympathetic tear" 
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(97-98). The poem deals with the effectiveness of Christian consolation for those left to weep 
and mourn, which will remain a theme ofBeattie's elegiac poems throughout his career. 
"An Epitaph on************" is a public display ofBeattie's own juvenile 
thoughts on his personal mortality and poetic legacy. It was first published in the 
Scots Magazine in 1757 with the title "An Epitaph. Designed for its Author" and signed K-d-
esh-e, Moriturus. The signature is no doubt an abbreviation of Kincardineshire, and is further 
evidence that Beattie signed the poem only semi-anonymously. The shift in self-presentation 
between the magazine publication and the revised version is interesting. 
The title change provides Beattie with a degree of anonymity, but he makes no 
pretence that the subject is not himself. Beattie's nephew-in-law, George Glennie, recalls he 
had heard the poem "repeated in conversation, as an Epitaph designed by Dr. Beattie for 
himself."55 At the beginning of his career as a poet, and throughout his later life, the future of 
his poetic reputation is important to Beattie, and he takes care to present himself well in the 
poem. It is also a poetical exploration of the melancholy related to the inevitable obscurity of 
poets and their work that is reminiscent of the epitaph that ends Gray's "Elegy." This epitaph 
is Beattie's contribution to the convention of presenting himself at the altar of public scrutiny. 
The poem opens with a depiction of a youthful poet who has not garnished public acclaim, 
and who rests safe from vain hopes of success: "Escap'd the gloom of mortal life, a soul/ 
Here leaves its mouldering tenement of clay, I Safe, where no Cares their whelming billows 
roll, I No Doubts bewilder, and no Hopes betray'' (1-4). 
55 George Glennie to Sir William Forbes, 4 August 1804 (NLS Ace 4796, Fettercairn Collection, Box 41). 
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This opening is very similar to that of Gray's epitaph: "HERE rests his head upon the 
lays of Earth I A Youth to fortune and to Fame unknown, I Fair Science frown'd not on his 
humble birth, I And Melancholy mark'd him for her own" (117-20). The tense of Beattie's 
poem shifts in the second stanza, and the reader is directly addressed by the subject. Rather 
than characterize himself as a poet, he first identifies himself with universal man, who "Like 
thee, have languish'd after empty joys; I Like thee, have labour'd in the stormy strife" (6-7). 
He does not reveal himself as a poet until the final stanza, which is an appeal to preserve his 
poetic voice. He asks readers to overlook his personal faults: "Forget my frailties, thou art 
also frail; I Forgive my lapses, for thyself mayst fall; I Nor read unmov' d my artless tender 
tale, I I was a friend, 0 man, to thee, to all" (13-6). This is similar to the end of Gray's 
"Elegy," in which the poet's virtues and vices are deemed inconsequential, since he has been 
reunited with God: ''No farther seek his merits to disclose, I Or draw his frailties from their 
dread abode, I (There they alike in trembling hope re_pose) /The bosom of the Father and his 
God" (125-28). In this epitaph, Beattie is aware that "The immortality of the poet survives 
only so long as posterity keeps faith, and posterity is notoriously fickle."56 He deliberately 
presents himself as a supplicant before his readers; begs their leniency for his poems and their 
themes. To reinforce his poetic reputation and notable talent, he includes an epitaph he was 
asked to compose for two brothers, who died tragically while crossing a local river. 
"Epitaph on Two Brothers" was composed to commemorate two brothers who 
drowned, and were found in each other's arms. 57 It begins with a retelling of the 
circumstances of their death, which were well known throughout the county. The rest of the 
epitaph is a message to the mourner who will come and read it. 
56 Liphng, 149. ' - . . . . - . 
57 
"The beautiful "Epitaph on two Brothers" was written on occasion of a fatal accident which actually took 
place, when, in crossing the river Southesk, on horseback, in the neighbourhood of Montrose, in the county of 
Angus, two young men, of the name of Leitch, were carried down by the stream, and both drowned. Their 
bodies were afterwards found clasped in each other's arms." W. Forbes, 1:31-2. 
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The speaker reminds the mourner of the futility of questioning God's plan: "Heaven's hidden 
ways to trace, for us, how vain! I Heaven's wise decrees, how impious, to arraign!" (19-20). 58 
The final two lines comfort the mourner in an artful and poignant way, if unoriginal: "They 
liv'd united, and united died; I Happy the friends, whom Death cannot divide!" (25-26). It is a 
succinct way of connecting all the arguments about death in the poem. Death cannot separate 
the brothers and worldly harm can no longer touch them. Before OPT went to press Beattie 
discovered that "They liv'd united ... ", ''was identical with a line in a translation of 
Musaeus's ''The Loves ofHero and Leander," which had just been published by Francis 
Fawkes."59 Robinson remarks that Beattie was conscious of the possible charge of plagiarism, 
and changed the date of the poem's composition before its publication in OPT.60 He clearly 
desired to protect his integrity as a poet, albeit by deception, while keeping an effective line 
of poetry he had originally composed. There is no other mention of any such deception made 
in his career, and his later volumes illustrate his desire to uphold his authorial integrity. 
"Elegy" emphasises human mortality and the promise of eternal life. There are two 
conflicting ways man can deal with the grief and struggles of life. Firstly, there is the 
imagination: that can enable man to forget temporal problems and find pleasure in the natural 
world. Our unconscious imagination is active during sleep, which the poem presents as an 
antidote to life's torments. Sleep can "Lighten th' oppressive load which Anguish bears, I 
And warm with hope the cold desponding breast" (7-8). Sleep is often connected with the 
eternal sleep of death, and the poem speculates upon the dreams that may come: "Fancy to 
fairy scenes exaults to rove I Now scales the cliff gay-gleaming on the mom, I Now sad and 
silent treads the deepening grove" (14-16), these scenes of sublimity and beauty not known to 
the waking mind. 
58 This preoccupation is echoed in The Minstrel: "trace the ... ofthe skies I be courteous and be wise" (1.449-50). 
59 Robinson, The Poetry of James Beattie: A Critical Edition PhD. Thesis University of Aberdeen, 1:164. 
60 Robinson, The PoetryofJames Beattie 1:164-5. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:54. 
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The transitory nature of these pleasures in sleep, however highlights the problem addressed in 
the poem, because sleep's joys are transitory, and ultimately darkened by death: 
Be taught, vain man, how fleeting all thy joys, 
Thy boasted grandeur, and thy glittering store; 
Death comes, and all thy fancy'd bliss destroys, 
Quick as a dream it fades, and is no more (33-36). 
The pleasures of the imagination are transitory and fade just as human life does. Transient 
cares and pleasures affect mankind deeply while living, "But these shall vanish like the 
dreams of mom, I When Death awakes us to immortal life" (43-44). The immortal life 
promised in Christianity will eclipse from the human mind the pleasures of the world which 
are small in comparison. 
Miscellaneous Poems 
"The Hares, A Fable" follows after the "Elegy on a Lady" in the edition of 1760/1, 
which makes little thematic sense. The question of why Beattie inserted this poem between 
the memorial ones does not have a simple answer, but "The Hares" does continue the 
meditation on virtue and purpose begun in the "Elegy." The "Song: In Imitation of 
Shakespear's Blow, blow, thou winter wind" was inspired by William Shakespeare's song 
from As You Like It, set in a mythical forest which exists independently from the characters 
who seek shelter there. "The Hares" exemplifies the way in which morality fable in the 
eighteenth century became a vehicle for truth, and so the relevance of the narrative was often 
adapted to the tnotal pl.upose of the poem. The fable-"was applied to so many new arid 
different literary contexts as to make it clear that writers saw this as a form of 'use' in 
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itself."61 This poem is an example of the genre of fable as moral allegory, which is also the 
motivation of the Aesopic fable Beattie made his model. The "verse fable in particular 
exhibits a peculiar flexibility, an ability to blend with and adapt to changing cultural 
surroundings."62 Though the versatility of the genre is well known, Beattie's first overt 
morality poem aligns itself with standard fabulist traditions. Beattie opens the poem by 
quoting John Gay's "My Own Epitaph," which situates the poem within a satirical context of 
morals and fables popular in his century. The plot of the fable is little changed from previous 
versions. 
There is "a reasoned debate in a council of the hares, a hunt and then a storm which 
frightens them, and a suicidal intent in their flight to the lak:e."63 Beattie's version of the 
Aesopic fable uses a linnet as something more graceful and powerful to show the hares the 
absurdity of their suicide mission. His opening borrows "My Own Epitaph: "Life's a jest; and 
all things show it, I thought so once; but now I know it."64 The first line: "Life is a jest. You 
call it worse" (1) establishes a sardonic tone to be carried throughout the traditional sing-song 
verse. The poem does not immediately introduce the hares; instead it makes universal 
statements about the harshness of life and seeming futility of its struggle. Though "You 
loathe the nauseous load of life" ( 4), hope for the future comes disguised as a friend "With 
dimply cheek and smiling eyes" (1 0) offering to instill ambitions for a better life, whether 
man or hare: "Thus Hope, our smiling flattering friend, I Proves our tormentor in the end" 
(33-34). But the friend is false, and this is made plainer in the revised version of the poem in 
1766 where line 34 is altered: "Proves false and recreant in the end" (34). It reinforces the 
characterisation of hope as a negative force; it is deceptive and disloyal after this revision. 
61 Mark, LOveridge, A History ofA.u@Staii Fable (Cambridge:· Cambndge UP, 1 99-8) 11. 
62 Loveridge, 5. 
63 Robinson, The Poetry of James Beattie 1 : 181. 
64 John Gay, Poetry and Prose, ed. Vinton Dearing and Charles Beckwith. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1974) 
1:253 
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There is marked exasperation when the speaker accepts the negative assertions made 
about life: "Yes, yes, I grant the sons of earth I Are doom' d to misery from their birth" ( 41-
42). Yet despite this seeming exasperation, the speaker continues with a rhetorical question, 
and so the parable of the hares and linnet reinforce the universal aspects of life: "We all of 
sorrow have our share; I But say, Is yours beyond compare?" ( 43-44). The suicidal hares 
decide on death "Since Fate on every side prepares I For us inextricable snares" (179-80), and 
they no longer wish to face them. This pivotal scene is revised in 1766, with more pressing 
diction: "Since fate is evermore pursuing I All ways and means to work our ruin?" (177 -78). 
The invocation of fate is more proactive in the revised scene, and exasperation in the 
tone intensifies, because it seems the hares come to believe that fate manoeuvres relentlessly 
to work for their individual suffering. The revision evokes stronger pathos on their behalf, 
and makes their flight to the lake toward suicide predictable. For these weak animals death 
means "Our sorrows are for ever fled, I For not even dreams molest the dead" (193-94). Their 
resolve is tested when their presence frightens off the linnet. It is not the happiness of their 
life but the idea that something else lives in greater fear that animates their decision to 
abandon the suicide plan. Just as the linnet forgot its fear shortly after it was startled by the 
hares, they resolve to put their sorrow aside. And so "Discord and Care were put to flight, I 
And all was peace and calm delight" (327-28). The poem illustrates the universal nature of 
suffering and panic, as well as joy. The fmal poem in this section ofthe volume imitates a 
song from As You Like It which Beattie composed because his musician's ear approved of 
the metre and tone. 
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"Song: In Imitation of Shakespear's Blow. blow. thou winter wind &c!' follows the 
structure, metre, and diction of the original but omits the refrain. Beattie had reservations 
about the music and lyrics being used in Shakespeare's song.65 The song is from As You Like 
I!. (Act II scene 7,lines 175-94) in which Orlando takes refuge with Duke Senior in the 
mythical forest of Arden, and the song is perfonned just as Orlando has been welcomed by 
the Duke to take rest and refreshment at his forest court. Though this poem seems to be an 
anomaly among the other poems in the edition, the pastoral setting and the connection 
between man and nature that features in the song are similar to the themes of Beattie's 
pastoral translations ofVirgil. 
The poem opens by lamenting nature's indifference to the plight of the speaker, who 
is suffering from unrequited love. The speaker begins with the element of air: "Blow, blow, 
thou vernal gale! I Thy balm will not avail I To ease my aching breast" (1-3) and the next 
stanza focuses on the inability of water: "But thou canst not compose I The tumult of my 
woes, I Though soft thy waters roll" (10-12). The poem then shifts to the subject ofthe 
speaker's desire, whose beauty surpasses that of nature: Blush, blush, ye fairest flowers! I 
Beauties surpassing yours I My Rosalind adorn" (13-15). The speaker then implores nature to 
become a conspirator with him to woo his beloved, but this inevitably fails, because the final 
stanza shifts back to the despair of the opening: 
Fade, fade, ye flowrets fair! 
Gales, fan no more the air! 
Ye streams forget to glide! 
Be hush'd, each vernal strain! 
Since nought can·soothemy pain, 
65 Beattie remarks on the diction used in a new publication of the song and asks for a copy of the music as soon 
as possible. Beattie to Aaron Lithgow 20 March 1759. James Beattie, The Correspondence of James Beattie, ed. 
Roger Robinson (Bristol: Thoemmes-Routledge, 2004) 2:7. 
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Nor mitigate her pride (25-30). 
The speaker's resignation in this final passage to the stubbornness of his beloved is depicted 
in terms of the physical and poetical natural world. Line 28 exemplifies the unity between 
poetry and nature in the speaker's mind, as he commands the natural world to cease its 
regular operations, since they are not assisting him in his courtship of Rosalind. 
Translations 
Translations were essential in the repertoire of a young man embarking upon a poetic 
career in the eighteenth century. Beattie's translations are a public affirmation of his abilities 
as a poet and his determination to follow the accepted conventions of a poetic career, though 
it is worth noting that the only fault cited by the reviewers was the inclusion of so much 
translation, where original poems would have brought more pleasure. Indeed, the reviews of 
the volume gave the pastorals little praise; but their criticism was generally limited to the 
originality of translation as a genre, rather than any specific deficiencies in the poem 
themselves. According to the review published in the Monthly Review, the translations, 
"must have taken up that time, which a writer possessed of our Author's fancy, might have 
better employed in composing originals."66 
The Scots Magazine was "concerned to see a genius of superior rank, employed in 
rendering the thoughts of others, who is capable of giving us such agreeable productions of 
his own."67 The reviewers do not share Beattie's view of translation as an important building 
block for a poetic career. The conventional nature of translation as a genre is challenged by 
these reviewers, who represent the-development of a new kind of criticism, one that seems to 
66 Monthly Review 24 (1761): 393-5. 
67 Scots Magazine 23 (1761): 196. 
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praise the invention of Beattie's own poems, but deplores translation because it is inherently 
an imitation. Though the reviewers thought little of these poems, they have far- reaching 
political implications and in some cases, illustrate the philosophies which Beattie engaged 
with at this early stage in his career. 
Anacreon, Lucretius, Horace, and Virgil poetically express different philosophical 
suppositions concerning the nature of man and the universe. Beattie's engagement with these 
ideas through the process of translation provides his introduction to philosophical poetry, and 
this kind of poetry had a lasting impact on his career. The works of Anacreon focus on 
temporal pleasure, and are sometimes noted for explicit sexual overtones. Traditionally 
"Anacreon, Ode 22" was seen as an invitation from one swain to another to rest in a cosy 
spot, but some offer the interpretation that a more erotic meaning is meant.68 Beattie's 
translation puts human pleasures at the centre ofthe poem. The added line: "And gales 
warble wild through the boughs" (7) reinforces the involvement of the senses in the 
experience of the natural setting. 
"The Beginning of the First Book of Lucretius Translated" illustrates Beattie's early 
interest in philosophical poetry. De Rerum Natura is a didactic poem that promotes Epicurean 
philosophy utilising poetic devices. Lucretius attempts to examine the mechanisms of the 
natural universe to prove that mankind's preoccupations with divine powers and the fear of 
death are unfounded. The poem is a natural model for poets interested in poetically exploring 
philosophical ideas. Beattie's translation ofthe invocation is his first pragmatic attempt to 
unify these two disciplines, which is a significant moment in his intellectual development. 
The invocation Beattie translates is a plea to Venus for inspiration and guidance in the poem, 
and-a supplication for peace similar to that of Beattie's "Ode to-Peace." 
68 Sentence paraphrased from Robinson, The Poetry of James Beattie 1:161-62. 
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The dominating poetic device in the invocation "is metaphor, and this is a device which 
Lucretius uses to devastating effect. , 69 Venus is the goddess whose "sovereign influence 
guides the reins I Of Nature, and the Universe sustains; I Since nought without thee bursts the 
bonds ofNight, (31-33). Only with the approval of the goddess can any man or beast emerge 
into the light of spring from the darkness of winter, as the goddess is identified with the 
elements of the earth's rebirth in that season. The poet enlists the aid of the goddess so that 
the work will bring honour to himself and his patron. The final two lines of the invocation 
praise Memmius, the addressee of Lucretius. His occupation is neither philosophy nor poetry; 
the speaker explains, "Paternal fires his beating breast inflame, I To rescue Rome, and 
vindicate her name, (69-70). The end ofthe invocation reinforces the strength ofthe poet and 
the powers of his patron. It is a fairly free translation and illustrates Beattie's capacity to 
preserve meaning while stamping it with his style. 70 
Beattie translated Horace's Book IT Ode 10 after he had been rejected for a teaching 
post in Aberdeen. 71 The odes of Horace address political tensions in Rome and at times 
promote philosophy of moderation. This poem celebrates moderation in lifestyle and 
ambition, in the wake of Beattie's own professional setback. According to Horace ''The man, 
whose stedfast soul can bear I Fortune indulgent or severe" (17 -18) will prosper in his life. 
This man "With unabating courage, brave I [defies] Adversity's tumultuous wave" (29-30) 
without fear. Given the messages of moderation in his other poems, it seems natural that the 
message of this poem would appeal to Beattie at a time when he was forced to accept a dip in 
his fortunes. 
69 Lucretius, On the Nature of the Universe, trans. R.E. Latham revised by John Godwin (London: Penguin, 
1994) XXX. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . · .. 
70 
"for. without any paifl, wftbout danger~ itsef:t iliighfY hy fts OWn resources, needing uS not at all, it is neither 
propitiated with services nor touched by wrath." Lucretius De Rerum Natura. trans. W.H.D. Rouse revised by 
Martin Ferguson Smith, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975) 7. 
71 The date of composition given in the Scots Magazine (9 Dec 1757) supports this claim. Robinson, The Poetry 
of James Beattie 1:206. 
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Horace, Book Ill Ode 13 was prompted by a spring Beattie had seen late in 1758. The 
ode centres on the beauty of the fountain, and the poet's ability to immortalise it in his verse. 
The spring in the mind of the poet cannot be hindered by any natural elements, just as the 
water from the physical spring is unaltered by the heat ofthe sun, and so remains refreshing: 
"When fiery Sirius blasts the plain, I Untouch'd thy gelid streams remain" (15-16). It serves 
as a refreshment for nature's creatures: "the fainting flocks" (17) and the "ox with toil 
opprest" (19) find refuge at it. There comfort is not eternal, but the poet can immortalise the 
object: "Blest fountain! I devote to fame; I Thus while I sing in deathless lays" (20-21). The 
beauty and functions of the fountain preserved in the poet's verse defy the physical decay and 
destruction that inevitably will occur. The ode celebrates the poet's power over mutability, 
but also yields to the inevitability of death for physical beings. 
The translations of Virgil's Eclogues are Beattie's most sustained poetic effort;72 and 
some of them address contemporary political and philosophical topics. I believe Beattie 
included these poems in the edition because they were the product of great labour, and 
because he had a strong attachment to the works of Virgil. Indeed, Robinson notes that 
''Beattie had a lifelong devotion to Virgil, whom he admired more than any other poet, 
ancient or modem.'m Beattie's translations of the pastorals use the rustic scenery and 
language as a means to an end. For Beattie and many others in the eighteenth century the 
pastoral: "should reflect only the simple affairs of shepherds, that is, the loves and sorrows of 
a simple rural life; the fable should be simple and plain, the style neat and plain.m4 Because 
Beattie's translations are so close to the literal translation as presented in the Loeb Library 
edition, I have chosen to focus upon the first and the ninth pastoral. 
n- --- ---------------------------- ----------------"---'--- _______ :___ ___ - -----~~ ---- ----- ----- -
The ten pastorals are 1331 lines, compared to the 1116 lines of The Minstrel that took Beattie eight years to 
~roduce. Paraphrased from Robinson, The Poetry of James Beattie 1:71. 
3 Robinson, The Poetry ofJames Beattie 1:71. 
74 Alexander Pope, Pastoral Poetry and An Essay on Criticism. ed. E. Audra and Aubrey Williams, (London: 
Methuen) 15. 
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These two poems are unique among these translations, because they represent the stamp of 
his topical slant on the Virgilian original. The first pastoral is a dialogue between farmers, 
one displaced from his land and another whose lands were restored to him by a patron. The 
first is a dialogue; "Meliboeus here impersonates one of the unhappy exiles, and Virgil is 
represented under the character of Tityrus."75 Beattie connects the cast-out farmers with his 
own countrymen, who had been displaced from their land during the Highland Clearances of 
1745: "In Britain some, from every comfort tom, I From all the world remov'd, are doom'd 
to mourn" (101-2). 
The comments on the suffering brought on by dispossession must have chimed with 
Beattie's views on the social and economic impact of the forced emigration and destruction 
which occurred in the Highlands. 76 The quiet and solitude of the farm is now gone, and the 
speaker laments this loss of serenity: "No more shall I, beneath the bowery shade I In rural 
quiet indolently laid" (115-16). Beattie believes that the ninth "and the first eclogue seem to 
have been written on the same occasion.'m Beattie's introduction to his translation attempts 
to defend it against Virgil's critics; 'The Critics with one voice seem to condemn this eclogue 
as unworthy of its Author; I know not for what good reason."78 The plot is straightforward, 
one shepherd telling another to come and rest from his travels beside the road. It opens with a 
lament for their loss of land and innocent occupation: 'The unexpected day at last has come, I 
When a rude alien drives us from our home" (3-4). This displacement is reminiscent of the 
barren state of the Highlands in the aftermath of Culloden, which Beattie would have heard 
about when young. The classical vehicle presented by Virgil allows Beattie to make a thinly 
veiled commentary on this contemporary situation. 
'
5neattie. ori 9o-9i. 
76 For historical information concerning the aftermath of Culloden see Eric Richards, A History of the Highland 
Clearances. 2 vols. (London: CroomHelm,1982-1985) 1:1-20. 
77 Beattie, OPT 171. 
78 Beattie, OPT 172. 
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The lays of Virgil's shepherds, like the once applauded Highland bards, are no longer 
valued because, "music's charms, I Amid the dreadful clang of warlike arms, I Avail no 
more, than the Chaonian dove" (17 -19). Within this lament for the now lost power oftheir 
lays, Virgil inserts himself as noble poet and to the patron who is the subject of the 
dedication. The pastoral is also about Virgil's relationship to his patron, as well Virgil's 
poetic powers. The speaker asks, "Who but MENALCAS could compose the lay, I Which, as. 
we joumey'd to my love's abode, I I softly sung to chear the lonely road?" (34-36). Virgil is 
the absent poet being heralded in the poem. The relationship between Virgil and his patron is 
also discussed by the two shepherds: "Or who could ftnish the imperfect lays I Sung by 
MENALCAS to his VARUS' praise?" (41-42). Beattie's version of the poem considers whether 
this relationship between poet and patron can survive in a world beset with wars, 
displacement and constant social upheaval. 
Beattie's translations of Virgil's Eclogues represent an important progression in his 
poetic career. The translations received a lukewarm reception from critics, and later scholars 
had mixed opinions concerning their merit. Sir William Forbes asked his friend, Lord 
Woodhouselee, an accomplished translator, to compare the translations of Virgil by Dryden, 
Warton, and Beattie, and Forbes included these remarks in the appendix to his Life. 
Woodhouselee argues that Warton's translation was overall the best of them, while "Beattie's 
translation, though not equally correct, ... has in the more remarkable and splendid passages, 
done most justice to the original: and that Dryden, ... has, from carelessness and a defect of 
taste, ... fallen below them both.m9 John Conington recognizes in the translations Beattie's 
personal style: "Beattie is pleasing rather than vigorous, and this is the character, both 
19 W. Forbes, 2:368. 
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positively and negatively, of his translation, which is freely executed, and contains at least as 
much of the author as of his Latin model."80 Beattie includes the various translations to prove 
his versatility and competence as a poet. 
This first volume of poetry is essentially what Beattie perceived was expected from a 
new poet with serious ambition, as its forms and themes vary widely to illustrate his ability 
and sincerity. The preface is an interesting example of a youthful poet's attempt to introduce 
himself as a selfless poet, lacking the ambition to fame and glory which various poems in the 
collection deride. This characterisation is complicated by the inclusion of various poems 
written for particular patrons, such as "The Invocation of Venus" for Francis Garden and 
"Elegy Occasioned by the Death of a Lady'' in honour of Lord Monboddo's sister. Clearly in 
this first volume, Beattie is anxious to honour his patrons, and to prove that his poetical 
powers are highly regarded among the best in his neighbourhood. 
This inaugural volume is interesting in that Beattie consciously attempts to present 
himself as a new poet worthy of notice, and also presents provocative ruminations upon the 
effectiveness of the Christian faith to console those in mourning. Beattie's elegiac poems in 
this volume are unique, because they question the extent to which Christian dogma can 
console those who lose loved ones. For subsequent editions he removes such questioning 
sentiments from those elegies he chooses to retain, and dooms the rest to ignominy. OPT is 
also interesting because in it he also introduces many of the themes that will occupy his 
poetic career, such as the problematic nature of ambition, the consequences of worldly 
success, the workings of the imagination, and how solitude effects the processes of the mind. 
80 John Conington, The Miscellaneous Writings of Conington, ed. J. A. Symonds, 2 vols. (London: Longman, 
1872) 1:165. 
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Chapter 2: Politics, satire, and philosophy; the ambitious second collection 
Poems on Several Subjects (1766) 
Beattie's second volume of poems took on a different character from his first volume. 
Though this volume does include many of the poems in OPT, he confided in Thomas 
Blacklock that in revising them he had "bestowed no little pains in correcting [them]; and I 
flatter myself they are much less exceptionable now than they were formerly. "81 The revised 
poems are interspersed throughout the volume, and its structure is not altogether thematic. It 
opens with a poem that was first published in pamphlet form in 1765, a little more than a year 
previously to this publication. ''The Judgement of Paris" represents a pivotal moment in 
Beattie's poetic growth; it is his first extended poetic exploration of philosophical subjects. 
He states in the preface that his purpose is to poetically investigate philosophical issues 
relating to morality and the ethics of virtue and ambition. The inability of the poem 
adequately to explore these themes foreshadows the crisis of development in The Minstrel. 
The revised odes follow, and "An Elegy Occasioned by the Death of a Lady" is 
followed by a new elegy. He then includes "The Hares," followed by a new fable "The Wolf 
and Shepherds." He also includes a second poem that had appeared as a pamphlet earlier in 
1765, "On the report of a Monument to be erected in Westminster-Abbey, to the Memory of a 
Late Author." Verses written by Dr. Thomas Blacklock in the margins of a volume he 
presented to Beattie as a gift appear after the satire, and Beattie's epistolary response to 
Blacklock's comments are also included, and focus generally upon ambition and worldly 
success. 
81 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 26 May 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:45. 
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Curiously, the volume ends with the new "The Battle of Pygmies and Cranes," an 
imitation of the Latin from Addison. Though Beattie's is particularly modelled upon 
Addison, the mock epic had been employed earlier in the century by Parnell, in his translation 
of the Battle of the Frogs and Mice. He opens the volume with his most recent poem, and 
then proceeds, as before mentioned, in a slightly thematic fashion. There is no hint in his 
letters as to his design for the structure of the edition, except for a mention of the final 
poem.82 This volume has a more focused political purpose than his first volume, and 
illustrates Beattie's firm desire to protect and defend established values and morality from the 
libels of radicals such as Churchill and Wilkes, as well as questioning the contemporary 
desire for success and ambition. 
The new poems in the edition are divided into elegy, fable, and epistle; each 
thematically dealing with the political and social context of England during the Seven Years' 
War and the mid seventeen-sixties. Beattie's letters during the this period reveal his 
consistent concern with the public's reception of this volume, concern which is not recorded 
in connection with his first volume, doubtless because his reputation and acquaintance has 
enlarged since 1760. He is poignantly aware that the popular reception of his work might not 
be positive: "Every body reads poetry, if perhaps one of a thousand readers understands it; 
but of those who do understand it not one in two thousand has the courage or activity to think 
for himself."83 His assessment of the popular opinion regarding poets and professional writers 
illustrates his continued desire to please an audience, but to do so through good work. 
82 
''I beg you will be fond of the last piece in the collection, the battle of the pygmies and cranes; for I am very 
fond of it myself." Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot 28 June 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:47. 
83 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 28 June 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:47. 
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Many of the poems in this edition are not included in Beattie's subsequent poetical 
volumes. One of the poems which was not included in any other editions is the satire of 
Charles Churchill.84 He feared Churchill's popularity and his influence among the London 
literati, whose political leanings and satirical bent could be troubling. His only published 
satire85 is interesting within the context of the decline in satire, and also exemplifies Beattie's 
desire to build a reputation in the manner common in the mid seventeen-sixties. 
Pamphlet Poems revised in the Edition 
"The Judgement of Paris" occupied Beattie's poetic imagination for many months up 
to its publication in pamphlet form in 1765. It is Beattie's most ambitious poetic expression 
up to this point; his first extended attempt to utilise poetry as a vehicle for philosophical 
expression. Naturally his plans and ambitions for the poem occupy many of his letters during 
the period of its composition and publication, illustrating his high expectations for its 
reception among his friends, and among the public at large. His motivations for this poem's 
composition are made clear in a letter to Robert Arbuthnot: "Though instruction be no 
essential part of Poetry, yet I think they ought never to be disjoined. The poet, both in 
choosing his subject, and in laying down his plan, should have an eye to Morality."86 His 
beliefs in the merits of poetic didacticism mirror those of Alexander Pope's "Essay on Man," 
which provided Beattie with a model for his own poetic philosophy. 
84 
"Iliave not now thc:-least expectation, that tliis publication will-prove successful; tlie verses that relate to 
Churchill will prove the damnation of the whole, at least in as far as the English criticks can damn it." Beattie to 
Robert Arbuthnot, 28 June 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:47. 
85 Beattie composed but never published two prose satires. Seep. 187. 
86 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 October 1764. Beattie, Correspondence 2:30. 
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It is interesting that Beattie characterises the poem as an "Essay" (iv) in his 
explicating preface, a word of course reminiscent of the ''Essay on Man." In Pope's design 
for the "Essay on Man" he highlights the precarious nature of philosophical poetry: "I was 
unable to treat this part of my subject in more detail, without becoming dry and tedious; or 
more poetically, without sacrificing perspicuity to ornament, without wandring from the 
precision, or breaking the chain ofreasoning."87 lt is not surprising that Beattie's desire to 
portray moralistic ideas in verse would be plagued by many of the problems cited earlier by 
Pope. Beattie chose allegory as the vehicle for his moral investigation, and he explains the 
setting and character of the goddesses of the poem later in the same letter to Robert 
Arbuthnot. 
He explains how he has altered this pagan myth to suit eighteenth-century morality: 
"Let Juno represent the Patroness of Ambition, Pallas the Power of Wisdom, and Venus the 
goddess of Pleasure; and let them talk in such a way as becomes beings of a superior order; 
and then it is possible to apply the Judgement of Paris to a moral purpose."88 The poem's 
versification is part of the elevated speech referred to in the letter; and the poem assesses 
different arguments for satisfying human desires and passions through the speeches of these 
three goddesses. Beattie hopes that "philosophical poetry promises to bring a larger repertoire 
of human responses to bear on philosophical questions than is usual in prepositional prose: 
the emotional, the aesthetic, and the ethical as well as the logical."89 Beattie's inability to 
fulfil this purpose for philosophical poetry will climax in the crisis of the conflict between 
poetic inspiration and.reason in The Minstrel. 
87 Alexander Pope;The~Poems~of AlexanderPope:~ A One Volume Edition oftne TwiCkenham Pope, ed. John 
Butt (London: Methuen, 1963) 502. 
88 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 October 1764. Beattie, Correspondence 2:31. 
89 Harry M. Solomon, The Rape of the Text: Reading and Misreading Pope's "Essay on Man" (Tuscaloosa: U of 
Alabama P, 1993) 57. 
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The poem did not receive much revision between the first publication as a pamphlet 
and its subsequent version in PSS. Given the great care and attention Beattie lavished on the 
poem for its 1765 debut, it is understandable that les than a year later there would be few 
significant changes needed to suit his plan. Beattie's preface to the poem for the pamphlet 
version is included some editions ofPSS, and it reflects many of the sentiments he expressed 
to Arbuthnot. The ambitious philosophical purpose set out in the preface is not fully 
developed in the poem, illustrating Beattie's limitations regarding the use of poetry as a 
philosophical mode of expression. 
He begins with the nature of virtuous self-denial: "For our appetites and affections are 
in many instances incompatible; and whatever course of life we pursue, we must forego some 
gratifications, if we hope to attain others" (iii). He then turns to sensual pleasure, and the 
characteristics of virtue and ambition: "Virtue hath a natural tendency to produce, and is 
perfectly consistent with the amplest and most diffusive gratification of our Whole Nature" 
(iv). Conversely, "The pursuit of Ambition, or of Sensual Pleasure, can promise only partial 
happiness; being adapted, not to our whole constitution, but only to a part of it" (iv). These 
two opposing views of pleasure and self-denial are clearly stated, but find no clear expression 
in the poem. The preface does explain the overarching thematic elements of the poem, but 
vindicates the use of a pagan myth to his Christian audience. The poem attempts to reconcile 
the varying kinds of pleasure and levels of fulfilment in different human vocations and 
activities. 
This initial frustration will have lasting effects upon the further development of 
Beattie's poetic career, the abrupt ending of The Minstrel being an example of this crisis of 
development. The poem-opens with Paris depicted as a shepherd amidst natural scenery: 
"Where flowery woodbines wild by Nature wove I Form'd the lone bower, the Royal Swain 
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reclin'd" (3-4). This neighbourhood is devoid oftemporal cares, and "He to oblivion doom'd 
the listless day; I Inglorious lull'd in Love's dissolving arms, I While flutes lascivious 
breath'd th' enfeebling lay" (46-48). Paris is characterised by sloth, his poetic powers 
producing feeble songs, because they are not inspired by activity in nature. Introducing him 
as an animal of pleasure alone is important to the development of the poem's moral 
argument, because it is through various types of pleasure that the three goddesses will 
champion virtue. 
This attempt to reconcile pleasures with virtue is the most prominent investigation of 
the poem. The goddesses are introduced into the poem with great spectacle, one in which 
"Keen were her eyes to search the inmost soul; I Yet virtue triumph' d in their beams benign" 
(97-98). On this manifestation Paris looks in awe, "His kindling cheek great Virtue's power 
confess'd; I But soon 'twas o'er, for Virtue prompts in vain, I When Pleasure's influence 
numbs the nerveless breast" (1 02-4). Pleasure is here indicted for its ability to distract the 
soul from virtue which Beattie argues leads to destruction ofthe soul and of society 
generally, as evidenced by his chosen fable. Juno, ''the Empress of the skies" (118), makes 
the first appeal to Paris. Beattie explains to Arbuthnot his intentions for this introductory 
speech: "I endeavoured in that speech to set off the charms of Ambition with every ornament 
consistent with the semblance ofvirtue."90 Juno attempts to illustrate the compatibility 
between ambition and virtue, but this is shown to be an unrealistic pairing, because ambition 
becomes the strongest motivation, and will ultimately destroy virtue. 
Though ambition and virtue are opposing forces, Juno praises the worth of ambition 
because it urges humans to reach their potential: 
Hence the bold wish, on boundless pinions born, 
90 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 October 1764. Beattie, Correspondence 2:31. 
That fires, alarms, impels the maddening soul; 
The hero's eye, hence, kindling into scorn, 
Blasts the proud menace, and defies controul" (137-40). 
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Ambition becomes the driving force within Paris, guiding all his actions in pursuit of an 
undisclosed goal. Ambition is characterised as all-consuming, which leads to an eclipse of all 
virtue within the soul. Although ambition can sometimes be a great asset it must be checked 
by virtue, because ''unimprov'd, Heav'n's noblest boons are vain" (141). In fact, by 
championing the cause of ambition Juno also exposes its flaws, in that she holds up the 
products of ambition as selfish vanity: "Vain then, th'enlivening sound ofFame's alarms, I 
For Hope's exulting impulse prompts no more; I Vain even the joys that lure to pleasure's 
arms" (161-63). The warnings and cautions of virtue are overshadowed by the lust ambition 
plants in the soul. 
The following speech belongs to the goddess Pallas, who "recommends Virtue, 
[which Beattie considers to be synonymous with knowledge] as being that which gratifies our 
whole nature, and the perfection ofit."91 It is wisdom that will lead Paris from the dangers of 
ambition and war, but this wisdom can only be found in calm scenery by a mind mild and 
open to receive it: "Rage, ecstasy, alike disclaim her power, I She wooes each gentler impulse 
of the breast" (227-28). The landscape of the poem is fitting for such enlightenment, but the 
mind and heart of Paris must also be calm and penitent. Pallas urges the swain to "curb the 
keen resolve that prompts thy soul" (240) to the extreme emotions and ambitious actions that 
separate him from wisdom. The main argument Pallas makes is that virtue, not ambition 
alone, can satisfy all the needs of humanity: 
Explore thy heart, that rous'd by glory's name 
91 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 October 1764. Beattie, Correspondence 2:31. 
Pants all enraptur'd with mighty charm-
And does Ambition quench each milder flame? 
And is its conquest that alone can warm?" (243-6). 
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To prove this true to Paris, the goddess then recounts the consequences of ambition in war. 
Implicitly undercutting Juno's argument, Pallas asks ifwars that "drench the balmy lawn in 
steaming gore" (246) and leave maids weeping, "Her love for ever from her bosom tom" 
(252) can bring Paris contentment or joy, which is prophetic of his and Helen's fate. By 
satisfying the lust of ambition he turns his back upon the virtue. Pallas urges him to listen 
"With grateful awe attend to Nature's voice, I The voice ofNature Heav'n ordain'd thy 
guide" (307-8). Should Paris follow this path, ''Then shall the Shepherd sing in every bower, I 
And love with garlands wreath the domes of Pride" (339-40). Harmony and peace will 
continue in this secluded place if Paris heeds Pallas and chooses internal and intellectual 
prosperity over the temporal glory won by ambition. 
Venus, on the contrary, "recommends Primarily and directly Pleasure, because life is 
short,"92 very similar to the argument of the Epicureans Beattie had encountered in Lucretius 
or indeed the Cyrenaic school of Aristippus, who believed the pursuit of pleasure should not 
be mingled with restraint or moderation. Venus first turns to wars, disclaiming them because 
their end result is not pleasure: "Joyless and cruel are the warrior's spoils, I Dreary the path 
stem Virtue's sons ascend" (375-6). This is the first time in the poem any goddess has 
specifically referred to the life of the virtuous in negative terms. Ambition is called into 
question not because it alters the noble heart and mind, but because the difficulty encountered 
in obtaining it brings no pleasure: "Ah! why should man pursue the charms of Fame, I For 
ever-luring, -yet for ever coy?" (389;..90). 
92 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 October 1764. Beattie, Correspondence 2:31. 
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The argument against ambition is not because it is adverse to virtue, but rather because it 
does not satisfy the human need for pleasure. 
Venus reasons that violence sparked by ambition can never bring pleasure and so she 
urges Paris to continue his ease: 
Let not my Prince forego the peaceful shade, 
The whispering grove, the fountain and the plain. 
Power, with th'oppressive weight of pomp array'd, 
Pants for simplicity and ease in vain (437-40). 
The natural scenery lends itself to ease, which is contrasted by the struggle of ambition. 
Venus does advocate virtue in Paris, because it can satisfy his need for pleasure without 
removing him from the enchanted plain: ''Nor I from Virtue's call decoy thine ear; I Friendly 
to Pleasure are her sacred laws" (481-82). Venus shows Paris that "The bower of bliss, the 
smile of love be thine, I Unlabour'd ease, and leisure's careless dream. I Such be their joys, 
who bend at Venus' shrine" (513-15) which will lead him to choose her. The reference to the 
Bower of Bliss in The Faerie Queene recalls another warning bell, which foreshadows the 
importance of Spenser's epic to The Minstrel. The speech of Venus is persuasive, and reflects 
the Epicurean philosophy that informed upon Beattie's earliest poetry.93 
The beauties of nature enabled Venus to win Paris to her cause; and this choice 
foreshadows the devastation of the fall of Troy. Beattie uses graphic personification to drive 
home his point: "With horror's scream the Dian towers resound" (530). By gratifying sensual 
pleasure rather than wisdom or even ambition, Paris leads his people to destruction. Sensual 
pleasure wins Paris because its gratification is more immediate and perceptible than the 
others. 
93 His early knowledge of Epicurean philosophy is supported by his translation of the invocation in 1760. Beattie 
questions the tenets of Lucretius's philosophical poetry through his own composition, but he is not yet very 
effectively explicating the philosophical ideas he recounts in the preface. 
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"The Judgement of Paris" is Beattie's first poem that openly attempts to advance 
moral imperatives, and signals an important shift in his poetical thought. It shows his 
personal understanding of his role as a poet, to please and instruct his readers by whatever 
apparatus is most effective. Beattie's desire to use poetry as a moral and political vehicle is 
more evident in his satire of Charles Churchill, because it expresses Beattie's personal 
political and social values with regard to the nature of poetry and satirical verse as 
propaganda. 
By early February 1765 Beattie had finished composing ''Verses occasioned by the 
death of the Reverend Mr Charles Churchill," a satire in the tradition established by Dryden 
and Pope, either of whom envisaged "the satirist as moral physician. "94 Everard King argues 
that this is the context in which the poem is the most compelling: "the poem offers an 
interesting perspective on the political, literary and religious ideas which marked the waning 
of the spirit of Augustan satire, but also that it is a better poem than the modem 
commentators on Churchill will allow it to be.'095 The biting nature ofthe satire fed Beattie's 
insecurities concerning the timeliness of the poem, but his desire to defend established 
religious and political values made him feel justified in publishing this satire after the death 
of its subject. 
Despite his confidence in the justness and the motivation of the satire, he was not 
altogether confident that it would be received well. This lack of confidence in his satire came 
from his lack of public attention to Churchill during his lifetime: "Had I appeared as his 
antagonist during his life, I would not have hesitated a moment to attack his memory. "96 This 
satire is the first of Beattie's public forays as an antagonist, though his name was withheld 
94 William C. Dowling, The EpisfuliD Moment: the Poetics o(the Eighteenth-Century Ve~se Epistle 
~Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991) 83. 
5 Everard King, "James Beattie's 'Verses Occasioned by the Death of the Revd Charles Churchill' (1765) and 
the Defense of Augustan Satire" Studies in Scottish Literature 11.4 (1974): 235. 
96 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 5 February 1765. Beattie, Correspondence 2:34. 
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from the poem until its inclusion in PSS. It is his inaction in the face of the living Churchill, 
who would undoubtedly have responded in kind to the poem that animated Beattie's 
insecurities. To combat the expected ill reception he consented to publish the satire: "Only 
the name of the Author must remain a secret at least till the nation comes to a better way of 
thinking; a period which I am afraid is not very near."97 
The pamphlet version of the poem was printed anonymously in London in 1765, (the 
poem is signed January but it is unclear when in that year it went to press), and retains the 
title proposed in this letter. This anonymity did not last as long as originally intended, but 
revisions made to the text subvert the subject of the satire. Beattie's awareness of Churchill's 
popularity, even in death, is clear in his stipulation that the pamphlet should be published 
anonymously. He was not yet willing to sign his name to such defamatory verse, which 
differed little from Churchill's slandering of others, except in so far as Beattie felt his cause 
was indeed a noble one. 
Charles Churchill had begun his career as curate at Rainham, but turned to poetry as a 
better means of sustaining his household.98 The late eighteenth-century satirist inherited from 
Pope the role of moral observer but Churchill's satires are anything but objective. Beattie 
perceived Churchill as a satirist who employed the genre for his own personal ends, without 
any thought to the justice of his cause. Beattie believed that Churchill's satirical attacks 
dismissed the moral underpinning implicit in ridicule and satire. It is an interesting response 
to the kind of political and social commentary in London after the death of Pope. Many of the 
jibes and sins he lays at Churchill's door are a reaction to the use of poetry as propaganda 
rather than virtuous didacticism. 
97 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 5 February 1765. Beattie, Correspondence 2:34. 
98 Charles Churchill, The Poetical Works of Charles Churchill, ed. Douglas Grant (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1956) 
paraphrased from xii-xiii. 
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Augustan satire was "a group effort against pride, irrationality, extremism, credulity, and 
vulgarization."99 But for Churchill and his friends satire takes on another purpose; to ridicule 
enemies and to advocate radical Whig sentiments at the expense of their political opponents. 
It lacks the moral agenda Dryden, Pope, and Beattie believed necessary to the genre. Indeed, 
''the informing principle of Beattie's satiric technique entails the presentation of the world of 
English letters in terms of the very worst and the very best in literature."100 Beattie considered 
satire which was intended to advance political agenda and debase reputations to make a living 
was dangerous to society, because it lacked a moral focus. 
While Beattie insists in letters and in the poem's preface that it was composed and 
printed solely upon the advice and urging of friends, there is I think a more personal 
motivating factor. Churchill co-edited with John Wilkes101 The North Briton, a pamphlet 
intended to satirize the inhabitants and customs of Scotland. The pamphlet was part of a 
larger campaign to discredit the King's Scottish advisor, Lord Bute, who they saw as 
exercising undue influence upon the young monarch. 102 Wilkes and Churchill's publication 
also presented a radical Whig political outlook, which was intended to combat a government 
circular of similar name, which was used to reconcile the public to unpopular government 
policies. The North Briton was, among other things, "a satirical commentary on the widely-
held belief that the new administration was over-heavily staffed with Scots and over-tender to 
Scottish interests."103 
99 Thomas Lockwood, Post-Augustan Satire: Charles Churchill and Satirical Poetty. 1758-1800 (Seattle: U of 
Washington P, 1979) 14. 
100 King, "Beattie's 'Verses"' 238. 
101 Beattie's brother-in-law Alexander Dun was mentally disturbed and was imprisoned for an attempt on John 
Wilkes's life. Roger Robinson, "The Madness of Mrs. Beattie's Family: The Strange Case of the 'Assassin' of 
John \V}~es" British Journal for Eighteenth-Century Studies (19.9§) l85:2'Z.. . . . .. . . . .. _ ~·. _ 
102
=Joliil"Stuart, 3nt·Earl ofBute, served-as futor t()George III andwaslater illade acahmet-iillnistei.Though-
Bute resigned from the cabinet in April 1763 "He retained the King's confidence and friendship but without 
public office and public responsibility" which unnerved some politicians as well as the public. Frank O'Gorman, 
The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History 1688-1832 (London: Arnold, 1997) 204. 
103 George Rude, Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962) 21. 
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It seems logical that these overt attacks upon the Scots would not be looked upon 
favourably in Scotland, and it stands to reason that the youthful Beattie would feel morally 
bound to strike back at the memory of the author of such anti-Scottish propaganda. It would 
be naive to argue that Beattie's outright condemnation of Churchill's satire was solely based 
upon its lack of merit. I believe Beattie found Churchill's lifestyle, his neglect of his duties as 
a clergyman, and his radical politics, to be damaging to the sensibilities of moral citizens. It is 
also possible that these factors clouded his judgement of Churchill's poetry, since the latter's 
intent was to undermine the establishment, which had already elevated Beattie; it was in his 
interest to publicly denounce him, even initially anonymously. 104 
The characterisation of Churchill in the pamphlet remains in the version printed in 
PSS, though his name is omitted along with that of his compatriot John Wilkes. Churchill is 
known as "Bufo" and Wilkes is left with mere "-" to denote his name. Beattie also made the 
title of the poem a little ambiguous, "On the report of a Monument to be erected in 
Westminster-Abbey, to the memory of a Late Author." The pamphlet edition has no 
introduction, but the revised version of PSS does include one. With regard to the pamphlet, 
Beattie reasoned: "the introduction to a poem written under the impulse of indignation does 
not stand in need of that simplicity of thought and expression, which in works of a different 
spirit may be very commendable."105 To introduce the version Beattie would place his name 
upon, he includes "Part of a Letter to A Person of Quality," which was originally a private 
letter to Lord Errol1. 106 The letter is a public display of Beattie's motivations, as well as his 
attempt to justify his degrading verse to his patron. 
104 His chair of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen was a crown appointment. 
105 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 11 February 1765. Beattie, Correspondence 2:35. . 
106
-"I have sent the verses to Lord-Errol;·accompanied-witlia letter, of which I musfoegleave to Insert a copy. 
'My Lord, I take the liberty to offer to Your Lordship a small poem[ ... ] And less your Lordship, who are so 
well acquainted with every thing that relates to true honour, should think hardly of me for attacking the memory 
of the Dead, I beg leave to offer a few words in my own vindication-" Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 20 April 
1765. Beattie, Correspondence 2:38. 
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He admits that if the verses were written ''to gratify private resentment, to promote the 
interest of any faction, or to recommend myself to the patronage of any person whatsoever, I 
should have been altogether inexcusable."107 Beattie situates his poem against Churchill as a 
noble endeavour "to do some small service to my country, and to the cause of truth and 
virtue."108 Truth and virtue are, of course, the very qualities that, Beattie argues Churchill 
manipulated, in order to stir the sentiments of the mob and make a profit. 
The poem characterises Churchill as a poet whose only thoughts are of "Fame, dirty 
idol of the brainless crowd" (3). Churchill's personal life was not above reproach, which 
added fuel to Beattie's arguments concerning his witty jibes at prominent government 
officials. To Beattie, he is "By nature uninspir'd, untaught by art, I With not one thought that 
breathes the feeling heart, I With not one offering vow'd to Virtue's shrine" (7-9). His satires 
in defence of Wilkes, such as "An Epistle to William Hogarth," defame the government and 
its supporters. Therefore it is natural he would have found an enemy in Beattie and his circle 
of Scottish intellectuals. The poem asserts that Churchill made his name "For ribaldry, for 
libels, lewdness, lies, I For blasphemy of all the good and wise" (13-14). The pamphlet wars 
in which Churchill participated were sparked by the political manoeuvrings ofthe time; 
clearly "the politics of the early years of George ill's reign presented too large a scope for 
satire not to have attracted him. "109 It is this use of poetic talent to defame officials in office 
and enliven the ignorant crowd that disturbed Beattie, because it is fundamentally opposed to 
what he believed to be the purpose ofpoetry. 110 
107 James Beattie, Poems on Several Subjects (London: Johnston, 1766) 122. 
108 Beattie, PSS 122. 
109 Grant, XV. 
110 Beattie outlines the purpose of poetry in his "Essay on Poetry and Music," see pp. 233-34. 
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Beattie's main method of discrediting Churchill as a poet is to hold his writing up to 
real poetic geniuses England has produced; namely Milton, Spenser, Shakespeare, Pope, 
Gray, Shenstone, Young, and Akenside. These poets are held up as exemplars of true poetic 
beauty and virtue, whose poetry "Soothes, melts, alarms, and ravishes the heart" (30). The 
speaker then ponders the ability of Britain to produce these poets of superior quality and 
genius as well as a money-seeking political meddler such as Churchill: "And shall a 
Churchill's most polluted name I Stain her bright tablet of untainted fame? I Shall his 
disgraceful name with their's be join'd" (57-59). Beattie further labels Churchill as an 
impious scribbler whose memory should be cast into ignominy: "His name accurs'd, who 
leagued with Wilkes and hell, I Labour' d to rouse, with rude and murderous yell, I Discord 
the fiend, to toss rebellion's brand" (61-63). Beattie demonises the satires of Churchill 
because their only purpose is to inflame the populace against certain ministers and 
regulations of the new regime. Their cleverness and wit serve only to degrade other men, 
rather than express any universal truths, and their manipulation of ''virtue" and "art" to his 
fulfil his ambition. 
The caricature of Churchill in the poem draws on the natural poet in ''The Prophecy of 
Famine," which Beattie no doubt deplored, because it seems to legitimise poetry as an 
instrument of widespread political defamation and seduction. It is reminiscent of the 
temptation of Paris by Venus that Beattie condemns in ''The Judgement of Paris." In 
Churchill's satire, the swain is described thus: ''Trembling and blushing he the fair one views, 
I And fain would speak, but can't-without a MUSE" (7-8). The inspiration of the new poet's 
lays is a young maiden rather than any sublime natural scenery. The speaker argues that 
nature's law, "Which bends to fashion, and obeys the rules, I lmpos'd at first, and-since 
observ'd by fools" (95-96) loses its power. This satire labels the natural poet a mere 
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chronicler of the fashions and political trends of his time. Such a profession to Churchill was 
lucrative and wholly honourable, but to Beattie and his friends, Churchill's political 
propaganda threatened their values and general perceptions of poetry. Beattie places 
Churchill among such men: "hypocrites to truth, and fools to sense, I And fops to taste, have 
sometimes made pretence" (91-92) to pensions and other scraps of political favour earned by 
their verse, but their claims are not based on merit. 
Beattie then calls into question Churchill's talent as a poet, which he admits is not 
wholly absent: "tho' here and there one lonely spark I Of wit half-brightens thro' th' 
involving dark, I To show the gloom more hideous for the foil" (99-101). Churchill's 
sporadic sparks of poetic talent are marred by his subject, tainting a talent that could be used 
for a more noble purpose. Indeed his wit and turn of phrase hides the defaming remarks from 
the less educated: "With gluttons, dunces, rakes, thy name had slept" (127). Then Beattie 
would not have "Rais'd this bold strain for virtue, truth, mankind, I And thy fell shade to 
infamy resign'd" (131-32). The poem vilifies Churchill in the way his verse did others. The 
final two lines of the poem close this chastisement of Churchill with eternal disapproval: 
"Sacred from vengeance shall his memory rest?- I Judas though dead, though damn'd, we 
still detest" (145-46). Linking Churchill's memory with that of Judas Iscariot is a poignant 
final analogy. Churchill has turned his back on God by neglecting his duties as a clergyman; 
he is a man who betrayed his talent as a poet in exchange for money and reputation, both 
among the general populace and Pitt's political followers. Beattie hopes that posterity will see 
through the witty turn of phrase and gentle rolling verse to see Churchill as a prostituted poet 
of propaganda. 
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Beattie explains that upon hearing "a monument in Westminster-Abbey was intended 
for one, whom even his Admirers acknowledge to have been an incendiary and a debauchee," 
he took himselfto recording for posterity what he believes to have been Churchill's true 
character. What led Beattie to compose this poem was a simple idea: that opposition would 
be forgotten over time with such public and pennanent honour as a monument dedicated to 
Churchill in such an important place. This introduction is an interesting example of Beattie's 
self-fashioning within the volume. He is aware that the poem is of an inflammatory nature, 
and to justify his actions and win supporters he includes this history of the poem's 
composition. Such an introduction was not needed in the pamphlet, since his identity 
remained unknown to the wider world. Beattie knew that to include the poem in this volume 
it would be necessary for him to explain his motives, since in style and content it differs 
significantly from the more refined and complicated verse that dominates the other work. 
New Poems in the Edition 
"Elegy [On Lady Erroll]»~ 11 is a remembrance poem for a lady of higher status than 
any Beattie has addressed before, but the poem's thematic elements are similar to those of his 
previous elegies. The opening of the poem establishes the lady's importance by raising the 
moral and social status of both subject and mourner: "If Fame pronounce thee beautiful and 
wise, I If pompous blazonry thy name adorn!- I Approach, with trembling awe, where 
*"'**** lies;" (2-4) while in the following stanza her qualities are labelled as gifts of the 
divine, elevating her character. The question of the poem is essentially whether the virtues of 
the lady are eclipsed by her death. If this is so, "What then avails to deck th' exalted scene, I 
111 
"The Elegy on Lady Erroll is printed without a title, as you advised." Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 28 June 
1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:47. 
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If there the blasting storms of anguish fly, I If Frailty there displays her withering mien?, (10-
12). This question is quickly followed by the first answer the poem will make, and introduces 
virtue as an integral part of human nature, thereby linking divine gifts to humanity with 
virtues gained by human experience. 
The nature metaphors reinforce the connection between humanity and nature: "But 
Virtue (sacred plant!) no soil disdains; I The plant that Frailty,s fiercest drown defies. I 
Retir,d it blooms amid the lowly plains, (13-15). Virtue is personified as a plant that 
flourishes amidst even the roughest soil of humanity and blooms anew in every soul. The 
plant imagery is echoed from Gray, s "Elegy,, which also comments on the virtuous who live 
and die unknown: "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, I And waste its sweetness on 
the desert air, (55-56). The image of regeneration Beattie uses in the passage is complex, 
because it at once situates the dead within the cyclical movement of nature, and the blooming 
of that plant is an indelible reference to the rejuvenating power of human virtue. 
The lady is characterised by a divine constitution: "Hers was th, indulgent soul 
untaught to blame, I Hers all the graces of the mildest mind,, (23-24). The nobleness of her 
heart and soul are reinforced by the speaker, which makes the pain of her loss more poignant 
to the mourners. In the next stanza the usefulness of mourning is contemplated in the face of 
the heavenly existence promised by Christianity; but the language of the question seems to 
reinforce the inability of the question to be satisfactorily resolved: 
Slight is your wound, who mourn a Guardian lost, 
Though griefs sharp sting now prompt the pious sigh; 
He lives, the friend of man, the muses boast, 
And Bounty!s hand shall wipe your-streaming eye (25-28). 
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The mourners are chastised for sorrowing over their loss, because it should be cause for 
rejoicing in the lady's heavenly ascension. The 'pious sigh' is evidence among the mourning 
that there is belief in this Christian afterlife: of course the 'He' of line 27 is Jesus, whose 
death and resurrection has made her new life possible. 
Beattie chooses faintly sardonic diction in expressing what should be the consolation 
of these mourners. The 'muses boast' has obvious pagan connotations, but here cleverly 
refers to the narrative of Paradise Regained, the Christian epic in which Milton recounts the 
story of the death and resurrection of Christ, which makes eternal life possible for human 
beings. "Bounty's hand" takes away the mourner's tears because through Jesus there is a 
promise of eternal life. The effectiveness of this Christian consolation is apparent in the next 
stanza. But the effectiveness of the Christian afterlife as consolation to the living is once 
again called into question: "But ah! What balm shall heal His bleeding heart, I Who for the 
friend, and for the Lover mourns!" (29-30). The subject of the ambiguous pronoun has shifted 
from Jesus to a more contemporary mourning man, whose heart cannot be soothed by the 
cerebral promise made to him by religious doctrine. The speaker does not discount religious 
faith, but recognises that it does not act as a cure-all for the ills of a suffering caused by the 
death of someone dear. The poem then turns to other sources of comfort for the hurting heart. 
Poetry is the first prospective consolation: "Could ought of song avail to ease thy pain; I Or 
charm a Parent's, Sister's, Friend's despair; I Fain would the Muse attempt some soothing 
strain" (38-40). Poetry is powerless in the face of death, as is religious faith, an admission 
found at various levels of explicitness throughout Beattie's early memorial poetry. He 
questions the ability of poetry and the promise of eternal life to effectively heal the heart 
broken by the loss ofaloved one. Though the-poem offers no cure-aU-for this kind of pain, 
the poem shifts to more abstract mental possibilities. 
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Memory is initially invoked as a cure, after the pain of loss, but quickly "The vision 
flies, and leaves the mind to mourn, I Saddening each scene that pleas'd while SHE was by;" 
(49-50) and so reminiscences of pleasure become pain in the mind of the mourner. The 
remedy for the multifarious pain depicted here and in earlier elegiac poems is acceptance: 
"Come, Resignation, with uplifted brow, I And eye of rapture smiling though in tears; I 
Come, for thou lov'st the silent house of woe" (53-55). It is acceptance of our mutable nature 
that this poem champions as the true avenue of consolation. The poem argues that acceptance 
is the cure for the pain of loss, and for the pain and fear for the dying woman herself: "Come, 
for 'tis thine to soothe the Mourner's smart," (57). "And melt in heavenly dreams the parting 
soul" (60). The mourning must prepare themselves for their own ascension, by allowing her 
soul and theirs to bend to the contemplation of heaven. "Melt in heavenly dreams" is a 
perfect image to portray this dual resignation. The lady gradually disappears into dreams of 
heaven which become her reality; while the mourners allow her to disappear from their 
physical sight and exist only in their dreams and memories. The speaker then inserts himself 
as a mourner in the next stanza "We mark'd Thy triumphs in that hour of dread;" (61) 
evoking more pathos in the reader, and intimately connecting him to the subject. The lady's 
personal resignation is depicted on her deathbed: "When from Her eyes, that look'd a last 
adieu, I Each weeping friend seem'd vanishing in shade, I And darkening slow the swimming 
scene withdrew" (62-64). Death separates the lady from her physical form and her earthly 
friends, leaving acceptance as her final companion during her transition from this world to 
the next. 
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Resignation is personified as the "Charon" of Christianity; the companion of the 
lady's soul to heaven: "Thy chearing whispers calm'd her labouring breast, I And hymns of 
quiring angels charm'd the while; I Till the weak frame dissolv'd in endless rest" (66-68). 
Heaven is not specifically identified, but is depicted as the absence of suffering and 
mutability. "Elegy'' depicts the mental process of grief, with our mutable life coupled with 
faith in a Christian afterlife as the proper response to mortal life and death. 
Beattie's fables were not looked upon by even his closest friends as the best of his 
poems. 112 The versification of "The Wolf and Shepherds, A Fable" is simple and of little 
novelty, but its commentary on the political situation of 1757 adds significance to it and its 
justifies its inclusion in the edition. The veiled political commentary of the allegory 
reinforces Loveridge's argument that fable was used in this period as a '"vehicle 
distinguished by the author's ability to bend its traditions to suit his own needs." 113 The 
satirical nature of this poem's content also has linkages with the evolution of this tradition. 
Beattie's comments on the popular discontent stemmed from the defeats of the British navy 
and the losses in North America and the continent in the early part of the war. 114 The fabulist 
tradition allows him to chastise government immorality and present the moral of the poem as 
social commentary, mingled with a high level of didacticism. 
The opening of the poem introduces the charge the fable attempts to prove that laws 
"Have been like cobwebs in all ages. I Cobwebs for little flies are spread, I And laws for little 
folks are made" (2-4). The allegory will test the justice of laws and their authors, an 
important poetical question during this period of internal tension and threats from foreign 
powers. The wolf passes the shepherd's home and finds a scene that excites his appetite. 
112
"'"The W ~lf and the Shepherds~ "aFable;-; Iii pialse of which ~ucli cannot -be s~id: for it has been alieady 
remarked, that 'Fable' was by no means a species of composition in which Dr Beattie excelled." W. Forbes, 
1:82. 
113 Paraphrased from Loveridge, 5-11. 
114 For fuller account of Beattie's political idea, see pp. 24-25. 
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The shepherds were celebrating a holiday and the wolf saw a lamb: ''That smoking, 
recent from the flame, I Diffus'd a stomach-rousing steam" (52-53). The wolfs sense of 
smell prompts the speech that fully explicates the moral of the fable. The wolf asks the 
shepherds if they can commit "What in a beast so much you blame? I What is a law, if those 
who make it I Become the forwardest to break it?" (71-73). The wolf then points to the 
hypocrisy of those who draft laws but fail to adhere to them: "Such laws from base self-
interest spring, I Not from the reason of the thing" (76-77). This indictment of lawmakers and 
the establishment continues in the following stanza, in which one of the shepherds responds 
to the wolfs accusations. The response of a shepherd reinforces the hypocritical nature of 
law the fable attempts to prove: "But laws are made for such as you. I Know, Sirrah, in its 
very nature I A law can't reach the legislature" (83-85). The implications of these lines are 
self evident: they reveal a knowing hypocrisy from the law-makers. The diction of the fable's 
resolution creates an interesting role reversal. As the wolf begins to stalk away the shepherds, 
"The full-fed mongrels, train'd to ravage, I Fly, to devour the shaggy savage" (1 08-9). The 
shepherds are portrayed as greater predators than the wolf because they knowingly create 
hypocrisy within the community they are meant to protect. At the end of the poem Beattie 
includes "1757," to vindicate his politically charged allegory from its critics, and to establish 
the context in which it should be read and judged. Beattie then turns to the exaltation of 
Thomas Blacklock, a poor poet, whose gift of his poetry inspired Beattie's poetic epistle. 
"Verses Written by Mr. Blacklock; on a blank leaf of his Poems, sent to the Author" 
was the inspiration for Beattie's poetic epistle that follows it. William Forbes tells us this 
poetic exchange began their friendship, 115 and so its inclusion in the edition was a testament 
to anew friendaswell as background for the epistle. Thomas Blacklock studied-theology and 
liS ''Dr Beattie's and Dr. Blacklock's first intercourse seems to have arisen from a present, which Dr Blacklock 
had sent him of his works, accompanied by a copy of verses; to which Dr Beattie replied in a similar manner." 
W. Forbes, 2:371. 
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became a minister in the Church of Scotland; however his blindness instigated opposition to 
him within his parish and he resigned. 116 He resided in Edinburgh and composed poetry as 
well as moral and religious philosophical tracts. 
This particular poem deals with the tensions between the mind's inclinations to 
compose poetry versus more academic prose, as well as the ambition of a poetic audience. 
The tensions Blacklock recounts are similar to the conflict between poetic imagination and 
philosophical reasoning that culminate in The Minstre1. 117 Blacklock's poem is a supplication 
before the shrine of poetry, but also to Beattie, who, he believes, possesses a poetic genius 
superior to his own. This elevation of Beattie's talents is clear from the first line: "0 Thou! 
whose bosom inspiration fires!'' (1) The supplication of the first stanza is addressed to 
Beattie: "Though with superior genius blest, yet deign I A kind reception to my humbler 
strain" (3-4). The next stanza attempts to explain to the reader how Blacklock's imagination 
is being used. He explains: "Severer studies now my life engage, I Researches dull, that 
quench poetic rage" (7-8). While his intellectual pursuits bend toward philosophy and 
religion, he hopes that poetry will not abandon his imagination, but rather "Resolve the 
labours of the tuneful choir, I And what I cannot imitate admire" (15-16). His hope is for the 
muses to allow him leave to revel in the poems his imagination is no longer able to create, 
because his focus has been turned to other more intellectual pursuits. 
The final two lines of the poem reinforce his insecurity concerning his ability to 
continue composing poetry: "As thine melodious could my accents flow; I Then thou 
approving mightst my song attend, I Nor in a BLACKLOCK blush to own a friend" (18-20). 
Reproducing a private message Blacklock wrote to Beattie on the title page of his gift of 
poems sets the tone for Beattie's own poetic answer to this praise. 
116 Paraphrased from W. Forbes, 2:371. 
117 The second book ofThe Minstrel (1771-74) was the last poem Beattie composed for publication. 
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Beattie's response, "An Epistle, to the Reverend Mr. Thomas Blacklock," is an 
important moment in his career, for it marks the point at which he acknowledges the conflict 
between poetic and philosophical imagination. 118 The conventions of the verse epistle lead to 
questions of authorial voice and poetic invention, and his chosen tone and voice in the poem 
are largely influenced by the epistles of Alexander Pope. An important element of those 
poems is that "Apart from George II, the recipients of his verse-letters are embodiments of 
those values which the poet seeks to uphold." 119 The character of Blacklock Beattie builds in 
the epistle certainly fits within the tradition of exemplary recipients established by Pope. The 
poem is a monologue by Beattie to Blacklock, while at the same time offering a vehicle for 
the exploration of moral sentiments. In this way Beattie is able to explore the nature of the 
poet and the poet's relationship with society more personally than ever before. This personal 
stratum is evident in the apparent insecurity of Beattie concerning the fmished poem: "I know 
not whether I have gained my point or not: but in composing that letter I was more studious 
of simplicity of diction than in any other of my pieces. " 120 Beattie also took great care because 
the poem was foremost a response to a new friend whom he wished to honour. 
The simple language of the poem lends itself to clear understanding, while the genre 
of epistle allows the reader to readily identify the public persona with the author. The opening 
of the poem shows Beattie consciously attempting to please his subject and inform his wider 
audience: "Hail to the Poet! whose spontaneous lays I No pride restrains, nor venal flattery 
sways" (1-2). Praise for Blacklock as a natural poet is coupled with Beattie's general dislike 
of poets who make their living through vulgar rather than virtuous verse. 
118 
"Mr. Blacklock was so kind as to send me lately a copy of all his works, with a complimentary copy of 
verses prefixed to it: I am preparing an epistle to him; it is now a~ost ~nished." (B~attie to ~o!;l~rt .N''buthnot 
Oct/Nov. 1765. Beattie;"Coriespondeitce 2:40. - - · · - - · 
119 Peter Dixon, The World of Pope's Satires: An Introduction to the "Epistles" and "Imitations of Horace" 
(London: Methuen, 1968) 4. 
120 Beattie to William Forbes 30 January 1766. Beattie, Corremondence 2:43-44. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:78. 
M. Forbes 42. 
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Poets inspired by nature must develop a more robust skin: "Who nor from Criticks, 
nor from Fashions laws, I Learns to adjust his tribute to applause" (3-4). The poem 
acknowledges that the reception of poetry from unambitious poets is often harsh: "Criticks, 
who, ere they understand, defame; I And friends demure, who only do not blame" (11-12). At 
the end of this verse paragraph, Beattie places his readers above such unthinking 
commentators and embraces the inevitable displeasure of critics: 
Pleas' d to their spite or scorn I yield the lays 
That boast the sanction of a Blacklock's praise. 
Let others court the blind and babbling croud: 
Mine be the favour of the Wise and Good (15-18). 
There is an explicit reference to Blacklock's approval ofBeattie's poems, and reveals 
Beattie's desire to cultivate the good opinion only of those who are worth his effort. Beattie 
intends to raise his reputation above the work of pamphleteers and professional scribblers; he 
accomplishes this end first by praising Blacklock, whose verse inspired this response, and by 
putting himself forward as a poet worthy of the notice of the wise and good. 
The poem holds up Blacklock as an exemplary votary ofthe muses, a poet whose 
attachment to nature is worthy of emulation. Beattie presents himself as one "Who longs to 
emulate thy tuneful art; I But more thy meek simplicity of heart" (31-32). Blacklock's 
supplication to the muses in his poem is transformed by Beattie into a pensive desire and 
ambition, and he looks to Blacklock for guidance. The poet's first request is for the ability to 
empower or console his readers: "Teach me to rouse or soothe th'impassion'd soul, I And 
breathe the luxury of social woes" (38-39). This line echoes the sentiments of Pope's 
"ImitationsofHorace" Epistle I.ii: 
Let me for once presume t'instruct the times, 
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To know the Poet from the Man ofRymes: 
'Tis He, who gives my breast a thousand pains, 
Can make me feel each Passion that he feigns, 
Image compose, with more than magic Art, 
With Pity, and with Terror, tear my heart" (340-45). 
Beattie's second request harkens back to classical models through distinctly pastoral imagery: 
"Teach me thine artless harmony of song, I Sweet, as the vernal warblings born along I 
Arcadia's myrtle groves; ere art began" (47-49). The poet seeks to emulate classical political 
and social involvement exemplified in Homer and Horace, as well as the remote sylvan 
groves ofVirgil's Eclogues. The poem expresses the combating elements of pleasure and 
instruction which Beattie was unable to fully reconcile in The Minstrel. 
As if intended to foreshadow the crisis of imagination which abruptly ends The 
Minstrel, the poem then abruptly shifts to the current state of affairs in Britain, and Europe 
generally. The tone of the passage is in keeping with the social commentary of Pope, in 
which the poet acts as "A friend to truth and virtue, he is therefore a friend to all honest 
men."121 Beattie's motivation for this chastisement of the establishment is its abandonment of 
universal morality. Like Pope, Beattie calls into question the "defences and refuges of the age 
[as] convenient excuses for cowardice and inaction."122 Beattie then condemns the imperial 
ambition and obsession with characterises the age: 
Too long, 0 Europe, have thy oceans roll'd, 
To glut thy lust of power, and lust of gold; 
Too long, by glory's empty lure decoy'd, 
Thy haughty sons have triumph'd and destroy'd (85-88). 
121 Dixon, 9. 
122 Dixon, 202. 
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The expansion of European states into the far reaches of the globe is of obvious concern, as 
well as the behaviour of the Europeans in the remote parts of the world. The poem cautions 
that the success and affluence of Europe should not be founded on the destruction and 
exploitation of others. This moral structure is extended to sceptical philosophers, whose 
theories, according to Beattie, trap the mind in a web of insecurity and doubt. The speaker 
asks "Can that be joy, which works another's woe? I Can that be knowledge, which in doubt 
decays? I Can truth reside in disappointment's maze?" (98-100). This is the first poetic attack 
on such philosophy and foreshadows the arguments that are essential to a full understanding 
of the philo~ophical undertones of The Minstrel. 
The negative view of sceptical thought is personal to Beattie, and he will explore 
these flaws in scepticism in greater detail both in poetry and prose. 123 But this poem can do no 
more to address these dangers, and remains wary, "quench thy kindling zeal, presumptuous 
strain" (101), and so Beattie resumes his poetry of nature. In an ironic tone the speaker urges 
the natural poet, whose commitment to nature and virtue is only superficial, to become a 
follower of fashion: "Go, thou fond fool, thou slave to Nature's charms, I Whose heart the 
cause ofinjur'd Truth alarms; I Go, herd in Fashion's sleek and simpering train" (107-9). 
And so the uncomitted natural poet must enter a world adverse to his nature: "Go learn with 
courtly reverence to admire I A taste in toys, a genius in attire, I Music of titles, dignity of 
show" (115-17). These ironic instructions are rooted in Beattie's own experiences during his 
first trip to London. He made this first trip in 1763; and as he was relatively unknown his 
experience was not as positive as his triumphant stay in the summer of 1773. 
123 Essay on the Nature and Immutability ofTruth in opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism (1770) and The 
Minstrel: Or. The Progress of Genius (1771-74). Both deal thoroughly with the negative consequences of the 
indulgence of these theories. 
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The lines echo Pope's Essay on Man, specifically Epistle II which holds up the 
accomplishments of mankind in opposition to the knowledge of his own character: "Go, 
wond'rous creature! mount where Science guides, I Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state 
tides; I Instruct the planets in what orbs to run" (19-21). Pope was also commenting on the 
deplorable state of man, and his arrogant attitude toward the mysteries of nature. Beattie's 
reaction to the customs and behaviour of Londoners in 1763 presents an interesting context 
for the contrast the poem makes between natural poet and professional pamphleteer: 
I have contracted too inveterate a relish for simplicity of manners, and the 
sentiments and the feelings of nature, for tranquillity, retirement, and 
meditation; here there is nothing but uproar, confusion and perpetual alarm; 
here every body labours to rid himself of thought; and here every thing that is 
worthy the attention of a reasonable being is hourly sacrificed to fashion, a 
Demon, which, though honoured with no temples, seems to be acknowleged 
here as 'king of kings, and lord of lords.' 124 
Beattie's poet would better serve society in seclusion with the natural world for inspiration, 
rather than amongst the bustling, and ever changing attitudes of society. The poet should 
"Strive not on Fancy's soaring wing to rise; I The plodding rabble gaze not on the skies; I Far 
humbler regions bound their grovelling view" (133-35). The poets who do strive for popular 
fame and material success now come under the scrutiny of the poem, and meet with little 
sympathy. 
124 Beattie to James Dun, 1 June 1763. Beattie, Correspondence 2:15-19. 
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Before attacking two particular political satirists the poem speaks of their kind in 
general tenns. These poets "Like spoils from Politicks thou may' st derive: I The theme is 
dirty, dark, and lucrative" (139-40). They represent the ebb and flow of popular opinion, and 
write for profit at the expense of all other aims. These pamphleteers are epitomised by 
Charles Churchill and John Wilkes, whom Beattie attacked in his "Verses." In this society of 
money mongering "Thus------ arose distinguish'd in the throng, I Thus Bufo plied a 
profitable song" (157-58). The author unnamed is John Wilkes, who attacked John Bute 
among many others. Bufo (a name borrowed from Pope) is Charles Churchill, a satirist and 
great friend of John Wilkes. These two are not mentioned again; instead the poet hopes their 
legacy shall be lost through time: "Proceed, Great Years, with steady glare to shine I Where 
guilt and folly bend at Fashion's shrine" (159-60). 
In stark contrast to those figures, the poet of nature reaches out to the beauty and truth 
of the universe: "Beauty's pure ray diffus'd from Nature's face, I Fancy's sweet chann, and 
Truth's majestic grace" (173-74). The poet is the moderator between humans and the natural 
world, and his poems enable them to connect with the world around them. For Beattie, the 
true poet is "The messenger of joy to man below, I Friend of our frailty, solace of our woe" 
(179-80). The failure of men such as Wilkes and Churchill to realise this purpose of the poet 
is their great tragedy. Their craving for temporal delights is vanity, because it neglects nature 
as the physical expression of the divine: ''Th'applause of multitudes, or smile of kings. I But 
ah! can these, or those afford delight? I Can man be happy in his Maker's spite?" (21 0-12). 
Their ambition alienates them from nature and leads to despair: "We perish, muttering this 
unrighteous strain, I 'Joy was not made for man, and life is vain'" (221-22). In contrast to the 
end met by the poets whose goals are temporal success and worldly luxury, the poem lists the 
attributes necessary for the natural poet, which have been discussed throughout Beattie's 
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early poetry: "Bring Resignation, undebased with fear; I And Melancholy, serious, not 
severe; I And Fortitude, by chance nor time controul 'd" (23 5-3 7). The poem concludes with 
the hope that Beattie will be able to continue to be worthy of the title natural poet, with the 
abandonment of worldly ambition: 
So shall my days nor vain nor joyless roll, 
Nor with regret survey th'approaching goal; 
Too happy, if I gain that noblest prise, 
The well-eam'd favour of the Good and Wise. (241-44) 
Beattie clearly speaks in his own voice, expressing his strong desire to be considered a poet 
in this tradition. 
After the poem was printed, Beattie wrote to Blacklock, in terms that reinforce this 
disguise, and the kindred spirit he recognised in him: "Your approbation of my Epistle leads 
me to think, that you have the same taste for nature, for virtue, for simple truth, which 
animates my own breast."125 The friendship sparked by this poetic exchange flourished 
throughout Beattie's lifetime, and this epistle articulates many of the general ideas 
concerning the character of the natural poet, ambition and the purpose of poetry that can be 
found throughout Beattie's early work. While the reception by critics and the population at 
large may not have been as warm, the poem seems to have pleased its most important reader. 
"The Battle of Pygmies and Cranes; Imitated from the Latin ofMr. Addison" is the 
final poem of the edition; and its political commentary is reminiscent of the other fables in 
the collection. Beattie held Addison's work in great esteem, and his desire to imitate him 
further illustrates his admiration. 126 The plot of the poem is a particularly biting comment on 
12s Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 26 May 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 2:45-46. 
126 Beattie's admiration for Addison continued throughout his life: ''My models of English are Addison, and 
those who write like Addison, particularly yourself, Madam, and Lord Lyttelton. We may be allowed to imitate 
what we cannot hope to equal: nay I think we are, in every laudable pursuit, commanded by all the great 
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the empire building of Britain that results from the settlement of the Seven Years' War. The 
poem opens with the conventional invocation of the muses, and intermingles many ancient 
tales with one of contemporary importance: "JEneas founder ofthe Roman line, I And 
William glorious on the banks of Boyne? I O'er Pompey's fate who hath not learn'd to 
weep?" (15-17). Beattie juxtaposes ancient histories and larger-than-life heroes with the 
Battle of the Boyne, the victory that secured the English crown for William of Orange in 
1690, and changed the political and social landscape of Britain. It is ironic that Beattie 
recounts this battle in these terms, since it initiated Britain's wider role as a Great Power, 
which Beattie seems to deplore. 
The narrative of the battle between the pygmies and the cranes then begins, in which 
the fortunes of the once proud pygmies are reversed and they are destroyed. Initially, "While 
reign'd, invincible through many an age, I The dreaded pygmy; rous'd by war's alarms, I 
Forth rush'd the maddening manikin to arms" (40-42). Despite this strength, the ruthless 
behaviour of the pygmies during battle comes back to haunt them. The cranes, "For rous'd to 
vengeance by repeated wrong I From distant climes the long-billed legions throng" (75-76). 
In the battle that ensues between them the cranes lay waste to their enemy, and the climax 
occurs when the mightiest warrior of the pygmies is taken: "A fowl enormous, rousing from 
above, I Th' impetuous champion grasp'd, and soaring high, I (Sad chance ofbattle!) bore 
him up the sky" (162-64). With this event the tide of the battle turns irrevocably to the cranes, 
and so "[The pygmies] raise a weak and melancholy wail, I All in distraction scattering o'er 
the vale" (187-88). The destruction of these mythical people leads to the explication of the 
thinly veiled moral of the poem: "Short is the date to earthly grandeur given; I And vain are 
all attempts to roam beyond I Where fate hath fix'd the everlasting bound" (196-8). 
Teachers of mankind to do so." Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 30 January 1783. Beattie, Correspondence 4:163. 
Also found in W. Forbes, 2:113 and M. Forbes, 188-190. 
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The final lines bring the poem back to the inevitable end ofhumanity, attempting to give the 
poem a universal rather than merely political purpose. 
This second volume of poetry solidifies many of the important topics Beattie 
introduced in OPT, such as the character of the natural poet, the consequences of ambition 
and success, and the adequacy of the afterlife promised by Christianity as comfort to those in 
mourning. The pamphlet poems represent Beattie's first extended use of poetry as a vehicle 
for philosophical reasoning, and a strongly phrased criticism of the professional political 
scribblers. Poems on Several Subjects is a mature attempt to reach a wider audience than his 
initial volume, and the poems collected explore many ofthese important themes, which find 
expression in The Minstrel. 
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Chapter 3: The Minstrel; the pinnacle of a poetic career 
The Minstrel; Or. The Progress of Genius: Planning and Composition 
More critical attention has been paid to The Minstrel; Or. the Progress of Genius 
(177114) than to all of Beattie's other poetical works combined. This corpus of criticism 
repeats a number of common misconceptions concerning the planning and composition of the 
poem. It is essential to my comprehensive study of Beattie's works to bring new evidence to 
bear upon these arguments, and in so doing to situate the poem within the wider context of 
Beattie's professional and intellectual growth. The protracted composition of the poem and 
the abrupt ending of the final Book have led many scholars to a simple conclusion: "Beattie 
does not know what to do with the Minstrel once he has made him."127 Critics often mention 
the planned but never executed third Book as evidence of Beattie's lack of imaginative force, 
marking his inability to write a truly narrative poem. Kathryn Sutherland argues: "The 
planned third book in which his [Edwin's] career was to begin in earnest was, however, 
abandoned"128 because its autobiographical nature could not sustain a full narrative. Conrad 
Brunstrom also subscribes to this conclusion: "He [Beattie] abandoned a third book ... where 
he [Edwin] actually does something."129 Everard King also refers to The Minstrel as an 
"unfinished poem [that] takes Edwin's development only to early manhood." 130 The only 
evidence produced to support this supposed third book comes from the diary of Fanny 
Burney. Upon meeting Beattie in London she "ventured a wish for a conclusion to the 
127 Kathryn Sutherland, "The Native Poet: The Influence ofPercy's Minstrel from Beattie to Wordsworth," RES 
33 (1982): 425. 
128 Sutherland, 425. 
129 Conrad Brunstrom, "James Beattie and the Great Outdoors: Common sense Philosophy and the Pious 
Imagination," Romanticism 3 .I ( 1997): 25. 
130 Everard H. King, "James Beattie and the Growth of Romantic Melancholy," Scottish Literary JournalS 
(1978): 24. 
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Minstrel. He (Beattie] owned he had written another book, but that he had disapproved and 
burned it."131 I am reluctant to rely solely upon this evidence to assert that Beattie did in fact 
compose a third book of the poem. It seems unlikely that Beattie would have confided in 
Fanny Burney the existence of a third book, and neglected to share this information with his 
literary confidants. The composition of The Minstrel was protracted, and Beattie shared 
particular issues and themes, and I believe that if he did in fact draft a third book, it would 
have been mentioned in his correspondence, since he took particular care to inform various 
friends ofthe poem's progress from 1766. 
A close examination of his letters over the course of the poem's composition calls into 
question this idea that in fact Beattie's poem is unfmished. The circumstances of Beattie's 
life changed significantly over these years, and so his plans and intentions for the poem 
developed and changed also. The evolution of his plans concerning the composition and 
publication of the poem as illustrated in the letters, as well as the circumstances that surround 
those decisions, make it difficult to simply label the poem as "unfinished" and "abandoned" 
by its author. For critics to determine adequately the state of the poem when Beattie finished 
it, his personal circumstances, both emotional and intellectual, must be taken into account. 
Beattie initially introduces the poem to friends as the pastime of his mind during the 
gruelling composition of the Essay on Truth: "When tired of these dry and disagreeable 
disquisitions, I sometimes have recourse to my old acquaintance the Muse."132 His intentions 
for the product of this relationship with his muse are also made clear later in this same letter: 
"I never intended more than two cantos; and if they were finished, I believe I should publish 
them."133 Later in the summer of 1768 he relates the narrative plans of the two cantos to Dr. 
131 Fanny Burney, Diarv and Letters ofMadame D'Arblay, ed. Charlotte Barnet. 6 vols. (London; New York: 
Macmillan, 1905) 3:382. 
132 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 24 May 1768 Beattie, Correspondence 2:58-60. 
133 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 24 May 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:58-60. 
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John Gregory. Beattie lays out the plot of the First Canto and introduces its moral subtext: 
The First Canto is a Description of the childhood of a poetic visionary, in a 
solitary country, who derives most of his acquisitions in knowlege from his 
own observation; with reflexions and digressions, so continued as to diversify 
the subject, and suggest some useful moral meditations. Here and there too is a 
little touch of Satire. 134 
Beattie clearly exposes the autobiographical nature ofthe poem; the childhood of the poetic 
visionary is reminiscent of Beattie's own experiences, which he will share with friends many 
years later. 135 These basic characteristics of the poem remain throughout Beattie's revisions of 
the finished poem, except the satirical passages. The early satirical passages connect the 
poem to contemporary Spenserian imitations, which utilised the verse form for its comedic 
potential. Beattie's elimination of the most striking of these passages shows his later desire to 
distance his poem from these eighteenth-century imitations, and to use Spenser's stanza, to 
explore a variety of new subjects. 
The plan of the Second Canto clearly defines the role of the Hermit in the narrative, 
and the overarching themes for the poem. It also explains the later emendation of the plan to 
include a third canto: 
I propose to introduce my Visionary to a Hermit, who is to give him 
instructions relating to arts literature and human life; he (the said Hermit) 
having been a man of the world in his youth. He will earnestly advise his pupil 
not to meddle with public life, nor devote himself to the unthrifty trade of the 
Muses. The young man is willing to follow his advice; but being stript of all 
134 Beattie to John Gregory, 1 July 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:61-63. 
135 
"I have made him [i.e. the poetic visionary] take pleasure in the scenes in which I took pleasure, and 
entertain sentiments similar to those of which even in my early youth, I had repeated experience." Beattie to 
Dowager Lady Forbes, 12 October 1772. Beattie, Correspondence 2:186-88. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:204. 
94 
his possessions by a hostile invasion, is obliged through necessity to take his 
harp on his shoulders, and trudge abroad. 136 
Beattie envisioned a long narrative to be developed in the poem, but over the protracted years 
of composition he amended his plan to span two rather than three cantos, dismissing the plot 
development alluded to in the final line of the above quotation. As David Hill Radcliffe 
astutely observes, the poem "terminates not in action, but in a higher state of 
consciousness."137 At the end of the poem there is no clear resolution to conflict between the 
poetic imagination and the consequences of the knowledge Edwin has gained from the 
Hermit. 
Critics too easily label the underdeveloped plot as a simple failure of Beattie as a 
poet-which stigmatises him as an author unable to complete his vision because it stretched 
beyond his abilities. His understanding of the complex narrative he wanted led Beattie to 
consider adding a third canto, but he chose rather to limit the plot of the narrative and fully 
develop the swain's education by the Hermit. 138 In 1769 Beattie intended The Minstrel to 
consist of three similar sized cantos, but since he limited his writing to leisure hours, the 
prospect of writing the third book became more and more remote. 139 Critics have 
acknowledged Beattie's intentions for a third book, but none has more than superficially 
questioned why this plan was never realised; but in fact, the circumstances of Beattie's 
personal life in the later years of composition shed some light on this neglected question. 
136 Beattie to John Gregory, 1 July 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:61-63. 
137 David Hill Radcliffe, "The Poetry Professors: Litemry Imitation, Untutored Genius, and Cultural Identity." 
Beauty and the Critic: Aesthetics in an Age of Cultural Studies, ed James Soderholm (Tuscaloosa: U. of 
AlabarnaP, 1997) 174. 
138 
''But you must observe that I never intended it should exceed two cantos, though now I forsee that the second 
mustbeaJong one-p~,rhapsifJ.finci the r,hymingbum()\U' con~ue,I 111aXP~ssibly~,xtend it,~thre~, }lutthis! 
thirik Wilfbe the very utmost liiiiit." Beattie-to RooerfArbuthnot, 17 March 1769. Beattie, Correspondence 2:-82-
84. 
139 Describes the poem as a piece of three books to Thomas Gray, 1769 (NLS Acc.4 796, FB 99). However he 
does not sound optimistic about writing the third book: "If I live to finish the tale, from the action of the third 
book." Beattie to Thomas Percy, 4 May 1772. Beattie, Correspondence 2:168-71. 
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The death of his close friend and confidante Dr. John Gregory in February of 1773 
affected Beattie deeply, so much so that he adapted his plan for The Minstrel to include a 
memorial to Gregory. Beattie expressed the strength and importance of his relationship with 
Gregory to that gentleman's son: "I have lost the most attentive and most affectionate friend 
that ever man was blessed with. He knew me thoroughly, for I concealed nothing from him, 
and all my interests were as dear to him as to myself."140 The elegy which ends The Minstrel 
was composed close to the first anniversary of Gregory's death, and Beattie relates to Mrs. 
Montagu his concern regarding the public reception of the conclusion in particular: "I am 
impatient to know your opinion of the other part, and particularly the conclusion, which I do 
not like the better for its being on a new plan, but to which I cannot help being partial."141 
Though critics have declared in unison that Beattie's poem was unfinished, this 
passage reveals that Beattie consciously adapted his plan for the poem to include the elegy 
for Gregory, and nowhere in the letter does he mention the possibility of future expansion. 
Shortly after the publication of Book ll in 1774, he laments in his letters to friends the poem's 
lack of fable, which he saw as a consequence of a defect implicit in the initial plan. This 
dissatisfaction with the limitations of the original plan could be a third factor influencing his 
decision not to continue the poem into a third book. He believed that the poem's defects "are 
faults in the first concoction; they result from the imperfection of the plan."142 The extended 
plot Beattie initially intended could not be realised once he decided to end the Second Book 
with an elegy and a farewell. 
140 Beattie to James Gregory, 27 February 1773. Beattie, Correspondence 2:209-11. 
141 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 13 March 1774. Beattie, Correspondence 2:258. Also found in W. Forbes, 
1:332 and M. Forbes, 110. 
142 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 3 May 1774. Beattie, Correspondence 2:265-68. 
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Beattie's abrupt abandonment of his chosen fable has been used as proof of simple 
imperfection, and critics such as Radcliffe argue that it led later poets to finish Edwin's story, 
expanding on issues the poem does not resolve. 143 The imperfection that Radcliffe attributes 
to failure, Beattie recognised to be a fault in the poem's ability to offset didactic purpose with 
narrative flow. There is also a practical reason Beattie might have ended the poem abruptly. 
The immediate concern was his health. His letters rehearse in detail his physical ailments 
such as vertigo and a weak constitution. Whether his decision resulted from dissatisfaction 
with the original plan, or from a loss of commitment and stimulus in the aftermath of 
Gregory's death, or from some combination of the two is unclear, but the end Beattie chose 
for Book II leaves no room for future expansion. 
The influence of Spenser upon The Minstrel is difficult to easily grasp; Beattie chose 
not to adopt many of The Faerie Queene's characteristic traits, such as archaic diction and 
allegory, though "Beattie's love of The Faerie Queene is described in one of his earliest 
surviving letters."144 Beattie's evolving plans for The Minstrel mirror Spenser's own 
fluctuating intentions for The Faerie Oueene. In the preface to the earlier poem, Spenser 
"rapidly sketches a plan to develop the three books he has written into a twelve-book epic, 
with an airy promise that, on proper encouragement, he will write twelve further books on the 
political virtues."145 He does not fulfil this initial intention, and critics have investigated the 
circumstances that led Spenser to end the poem with the Mutability Cantos, the consensus 
being that by this time "he was tired; preoccupied; disenchanted."146 
143 
"This imperfection proved a standing invitation to imitators taking up three significant issues left unresolved 
in The Minstrel: 1) the relation of genius to historical progress, 2) the relation of genius to community, and3) 
the relation"'fgeniusto'education." David-Hili-Radcliffe~ "ColnpletingJames Beattie's The Miiiitre~;; StUdies 
in Philology 100 (2003): 535. 
144 Robinson, "Origins and Composition" 227. 
145 A.C. Baugh, A Literary History of England (New York, London: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1948) 497. 
146 From Edmund Spenser, The Fairy Oueene, ed. Douglas Books-Davies (London: Everyman, 1996) xxvi. 
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The Mutability Cantos were first published ten years after Spenser's death, a fact 
which has led critics to question whether they are meant to be a continuation of the original 
narrative or something separate. I agree with those critics who argue that these cantos 
"represent the fundamental struggle between constancy and change at the heart of The Faerie 
Queene"147 and consider them the poem's end. Opposing critics argue that the numbers given 
to the books of the Mutability Cantos suggest that Spenser is beginning an entirely new 
narrative, but since these Cantos were not published in Spenser's lifetime, it is difficult to 
confidently ascertain his original intentions. These cantos in particular are of interest when 
considering The Minstrel as a Spenserian imitation. 
They present a narrative separate from the other books, the trial and judgement of the 
Goddess Mutability; in the Eighth Canto the author's own voice reflects upon the human 
condition. The poem ends with a prayer: "With Him that is the God of Sabaoth hight: I 0 
great Sabaoth God, grant me that sabaoth's sight."148 The abrupt intrusion of the author's 
narrative voice to end the poem is reminiscent of Beattie's ending of Book II. However, some 
critics who have investigated the influence on The Minstrel of The Faerie Oueene have 
concluded that "Beattie borrowed from Spenser only the stanza form and praised its 
flexibility," creating no more than a tenuous link between the two poems. Beattie's use ofthe 
Spenserian stanza marks an important shift in the use of the verse form. Previous imitations 
in the century had focused on the verse form's allegorical and didactic possibilities, but 
Beattie exploits ''the melodic versatility of the stanza, the rich tonality, and the medievalism 
or, at least, the suggestion of the romantic past and exotic lands."149 
147 Rosemary Freeman, The Faerie Oueene: A Companion for Reac1ers (London: Chatto, 1970) 139. 
148 Saboath =Hosts, bight= called, host's; also sabbath's= eternal rest's. From Spenser, 582. 
149 The last two quotations in this paragraph are taken from Earl Wasserman, Elizabethan Poetry in the 
Eighteenth Century Illinois Studies in Language and Literature. (Urbana: U. of Illinois P, 194 7) 121. 
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Beattie explains in his preface that the verse form pioneered by Spenser "admits both 
simplicity and magnificence of sound and language, beyond any other stanza that I am 
acquainted with."'so Beattie uses the descriptive nature of the stanza to depict scenes of 
intense natural beauty and their effect upon the imagination ofhis swain. His inventive 
manipulation ~~established the Spenserian stanza as a legitimate vehicle for mildly wistful, 
often moody, descriptive poetry'''s' in the eighteenth century, which continued into the 
Romantic period in works such as Shelley's Adonais. 
The autobiographical nature of the poem is more complex than most critics have 
recognised, and there is also an important element of didacticism which leaked into it from 
Beattie's lectures. It is commonly held that Beattie put much of his experience as a youth in 
Fordoun into the scenery and his own character into his youthful Edwin, but the didactic 
passages of the poem are also pointedly drawn from Beattie's intellectual life. It is clear that 
"Beattie's theology is also represented in Book One; the celebration of immortality, and the 
teaching of natural theology, closely follow his student lectures. In Book Two, the Hennit's 
teaching reflects Beattie's idea of the true purpose of philosophy: that it should be "the 
knowledge of nature applied to practical and useful purposes." 1s2 Though this is an important 
part of the development of the poem, a case can also be made from his letters that from the 
start Beattie knew this would be his final poem, and he is carefully rehearsing the issues 
involved in his own poetic career. The poem touches on the many important issues facing the 
poets of the eighteenth century, and focuses specifically upon Beattie's own experiences. It is 
a multifaceted story of Beattie's own life; as a youth in the guise of his minstrel Edwin, and 
in old age as the didactic narrator, and to some extent the Hennit Edwin will meet in Book II. 
rso James Beattie, The Misntrel; Or. The Progress of Genius. A Poem. Book the First (London: Dilly; 
Edinburgh: Creech, 1771) v. 
rsr Wasserman, 133. 
152 Robinson, "Origins and Composition" 228. 
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The first Book introduces Edwin into the natural world and attempts to portray his 
growing poetic genius. This book also explores the poet's relationship to nature and its 
influence upon the imagination, as well as the effects of solitude and melancholy upon the 
creative mind. Scenes of nature's sublimity dominate the allusions ofthis book; they situate 
the poet in scenery that excites the imagination and inspire creation. The education Edwin 
receives in this book comes from the oral tradition, with his mother singing well-known 
ballads, reinforcing the reader's sense that the budding minstrel lived in the distant past. 
The role of the oral tradition in the poem and the effect of those ballads upon the 
Minstrel's imagination is in fact an interesting contribution to the fierce debate at that time 
over the place and validity of oral tradition as a precursor to written poetry. The publication 
ofThomas Percy's Religues of Ancient Poetry (1765) had inflamed the debate over the 
validity of written versus oral traditions concerning language and literary history. Percy's 
collection comes from manuscript sources; he argued that orally transmitted ballads could not 
be authenticated and deserved little acknowledgement from the intellectual community. 
The previous publication of James Macpherson's Ossianic poems (1760) had 
complicated the issue of the validity of oral poetry, because "Ossian was presented as an oral 
phenomenon."153 Macpherson himself also contributed to the ongoing debate, arguing that the 
oral nature of the Ossianic poems: "did not diminish the historical significance of the 
culture."154 Beattie also engaged a little in the debate over the value of Ossianic poetry. Lord 
Kames believed Beattie to be writing a work "to depreciate the writings of Ossian,"155 but 
Beattie explains his actual position to Robert Arbuthnot: "(I informed Lord Kames] That I 
was very far from any design of depreciating Ossian; that I had an high opinion of the merit 
of that bard,_though I could not bring myself to think him on an equality with Homer and one 
153 Nick Groom, The Making of Percy's "Religues." (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999) 75. 
154 Groom, 75. 
155 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 5 March 1763. Beattie, Correspondence 2:14-15. 
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or two more."156 He considers Ossian here merely on his merits as a poet, and nowhere 
engages in the debate over the authenticity of the poems. Beattie uses the oral tradition in The 
Minstrel as a device to situate his swain in primitive surroundings, while remaining true to 
what he perceived as his cultural heritage. 
The Second Book depicts the education of the youthful poet by the worldly-wise 
Hermit, and the eventual disillusionment Edwin feels as a result of this tutelage, which relates 
in a complex way to Beattie's own life. He explores the implications and effects of 
knowledge and responsibility upon the act of creation by depicting Edwin's reaction to his 
new-found knowledge. Education in human history and sciences comes from the Hermit, and 
will create the tension between imagination and intellect, which is at the very centre of the 
poem's concerns. The resemblance of Edwin to the youthful Beattie is transparent, but there 
is a more veiled close relationship between Beattie and the character of his Hermit. 
The Hermit represents the older, jaded man whose life experiences have challenged the 
validity of his youthful ideas. Seen from this perspective, the education of Edwin presents an 
interesting dichotomy, with the older poet questioning the values of his younger self. The 
complications of this relationship help to explain the abrupt end of the poem's narrative, in 
that the issues Beattie sought to address could not be continued into an expanded narrative. 
The poem's depiction of genius and the characteristics of its specifically poetic form 
are informed by contemporary philosophical investigations of the subject, such as William 
Duff's An Essay on Original Genius (1767), which further explores the elements of original 
genius, and articulates many of the arguments Beattie expresses poetically. The role of the 
imagination has always been important in discussions of genius, and Duff outlines its 
relationship with taste in the mind of a-poetic genius. 
156 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 5 March 1763. Beattie, Correspondence 2:14-15. 
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According to Duff, imagination "lays the foundation for all our knowledge, by 
collecting and treasuring up in the repository of the memory those materials on which 
Judgement is afterwards to work."157 Beattie particularly adheres to Duffs suppositions 
concerning the environment in which a genius thrives, and the age within human history 
during which poetic genius best flourishes. Duff also insists on original poetic genius "being 
most remarkably displayed in an early and uncultivated period of society."158 This advantage 
comes from the undoubted novelty of ideas and expression available to poets in the earliest 
times of human history. An object such as a poem can more easily appear new and fresh to an 
ancient genius and his readers, thus exciting "[the] attention, curiosity and surprise, [which is] 
highly favourable to the exertion ofGenius."159 Beattie's depiction of the landscape and the 
young minstrel's interactions with nature poetically express these basic tenets of Duffs 
theory. 
Duff also stipulates that imagination, which denotes genius in its most infantile stage, 
is at its most active in the "vacant season of childhood and youth, [because this is] before the 
reasoning faculty discovers itself in any considerable degree. "~60 Book I of The Minstrel 
introduces Edwin as a poetic genius of the kind characterised by Duff, and his experiences in 
nature and the basic teachings of his parents reinforce this characterisation. His education by 
the Hermit in Book II poetically depicts his intellectual awakening, which forever changes his 
perceptions of the world and will ultimately lead to the crisis between reason and 
imagination. 
m William Duff, An Essay on Original Genius (Bristol: Thoemmes-Routledge, 1994) 29. 
158 Duff, 265. 
159 Duff, 266 
160 Duff, 29. 
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Duff argues that "critical knowledge, which is so considerably diffused in modern 
times, must be equally unfavourable to the exertion of Original Poetic Genius in those 
times."161 It is the critical knowledge Edwin gains in Book II that brings this conflict to the 
fore. For Duff, critical knowledge impedes creativity by staunchly regulating the creations of 
the imagination; it is the stifling of the imagination that is the greatest hindrance to poetic 
genius. Beattie's depictions of Edwin in nature and the development of his poetic mind 
before the introduction of the Hermit are reminiscent of Edward Young's theory of genius in 
Conjectures on Original Composition. 162 According to Young, "genius is knowledge innate, 
and quite our own" while formal education "sets us above the low, and illiterate; [genius sets 
us] above the learned, and polite." 163 In his theory Young strongly insinuates that formal 
education cannot improve upon genius, "for genius is from heaven, learning from man."164 
The characteristics of Edwin explored in Book I, and the disillusionment that results from 
Edwin's education by the Hermit in Book IT, present strong thematic links between the poem 
and Young's theory of genius. 
Alexander Gerard's An Essay on Genius (177 4) further explores issues concerning 
genius he introduced in his Essay on Taste. Beattie would most likely have heard the 
arguments of this treatise before its publication,16s but the published work would not have 
been influential until later revisions. Gerard argues that "Genius is properly the faculty of 
invention; by means of which a man is qualified for making new discoveries in science, or for 
producing original works of art."166 For Gerard it is the degree and quality of this faculty that 
161 Duff, 295. 
162 For more on the influence of Young's theory of genius on Beattie's early poetry seep. 18. 
163 Both quotations taken from Young, 17. 
164Young, 1'7. - - -
16s Gerard gave nineteen discourses to the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen and ''probably all of them 
concerned the subject of genius, though we lack information about three of them." H. Lewis Ulman ed., The 
Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP, 1990) 36. 
166 Alexander Gerard, An Essay on Genius (London: Straham; Edinburgh: Creech, 1774) 9. 
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separate levels of genius and the originality of works both in science and the arts. The 
Minstrel also explores an element of genius pivotal to Gerard's argument; the role and 
significance of the imagination in the act of poetic creation. 
The imagination "does not, like memory, professedly copy its ideas from preceding 
perceptions of sense, nor refer them to any prior archetypes. It exhibits them as independent 
existences produced by itself."167 According to Gerard, the imagination processes sensory 
knowledge to create something wholly independent from the original sensation. Beattie 
illustrates this creative power in his depictions of Edwin's exploration of the natural world, 
and the dream vision initiated by the tales he hears from his mother. Gerard does not agree 
with Duffs assertion that knowledge dulls the edge of genius. He argues: "If fancy were left 
entirely to itself, it would run into wild caprice and extravagance, unworthy to be called 
invention."168 For Gerard, then, knowledge tempers the imagination and enables it to function 
properly within the mind, allotting it a much more positive function than Duff-or Beattie-will 
allow. 
This conflicting view of knowledge and its effect upon the imagination provides an 
interesting context for Edwin's education by the Hermit in Book II. He champions the value 
of knowledge and seeks to improve Edwin by sharing it, in order to enable him to engage 
intelligently with the world around him. The Minstrel hints that Edwin himself does not share 
the Hermit's approval of knowledge, because it complicates his initially simple perceptions 
of the natural world and their power to inspire his imagination. Though initially knowledge 
benefits his poetry, it also has the capacity to hinder his creativity. This particular aspect of 
the poem is drawn from Beattie's own experiences as well. He explains this dwindling of his 
creative-impulses early in his career, though -he found~ that his poems were"ofgreater merit: -
167 Gerard, Genius 30. 
168 Gerard, Genius 3 7. 
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"Indeed I find Metaphysics have made a very considerable revolution in my poetical 
faculties; for though I write with equal or perhaps superior accuracy, my ideas occur not half 
so readily as before."169 It is significant that this hindrance of Beattie's creative impulses by 
both his duties as a professor and his desire to discredit scepticism and its proponents begins 
early in his career, because it culminates in the abrupt end of The Minstrel, thus illustrating 
that his inability to compose new poetry after this work was not a mere whim, but the result 
of a long struggle between his philosophical duties and his creative imagination. 
Beattie engages with many arguments throughout The Minstrel, but the poem's 
philosophical investigations are not limited to genius: scepticism, ambition, pleasure, and the 
sublime, are all integral parts of the poem. The references to scepticism overtly link the 
poem's composition with that of the Essay on Truth, and give the poem a didactic tone. In 
addition, the poetic attacks on sceptics and the philosophical sub text of the poem generally, 
make a strong connection between the philosophy of Beattie's prose and that which pervades 
the poem. Their thematic links highlight that, though Beattie himself would have considered 
them opposing forces, "The Minstrel cannot be dislocated from the intellectual and emotional 
demands of forging the Essay on Truth;mo as Conrad Brunstrom astutely observes. 
169 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 2 September 1763. Beattie, Correspondence 2:27-29. 
170 Brunstrom, 31. 
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The Minstren; Or. the Progress of Genius: Boolk. I 
The poem's textual history is long and is largely complicated by the decisions of 
nineteenth century editors, whose arbitrary changes to the text further confuse the revisions 
Beattie made to the poem over the course of his lifetime. The initial two editions of Book I 
went through the press in 1771, followed by a revised version that was attached to Book II in 
1774. 171 Both books were significantly revised for Beattie's 1776 volume of poetry, Poems on 
Several Occasions. The following edition of his poems printed by Dilly in 1779, The 
Minstrel. in Two Books: With Some Other Poems is the least revised, with the only change 
made to stanza IV172 and no changes made to the second book. 
The most striking changes Beattie made to the poem for his final poetical volume in 
1784, The Minstrel. in Two Books. With Some Other Poems, which he intended to be his 
final public foray as a poet. The later omissions and additions made to the poem for these 
editions show both Beattie's meticulous desire for clarity, and his changing attitudes towards 
particular topics, as well as his desire to control the text to be read in remote posterity. The 
first publication of Book I in 1771 was anonymous, and its tentative advertisement reinforces 
the insecurities Beattie felt in presenting the poem to the public, since its composition was 
initially not driven by a strong desire to publish it. First, the advertisement explains the use of 
the minstrel as the principal character, since minstrels were not yet highly regarded. Beattie 
reasons: "A poetical illustration of such a subject seemed to promise variety of amusement, 
and even some topics of instruction both moral and philosophical."173 
171 The first edition was a small run, and to meet demand a second was printed: "The sale.ofThe Minstrel at 
LOtidon-has"irideed-beenveifquiCk .. Tthirik tli'eieforttharMrKilicaid snould" cause a second Editloii6e printed 
immediately in London." Beattie to Sir William Forbes 24 April 1771. Beattie, Correspondence 2: 138-39. 
172 See Appendix pp. 315-16. 
173 Beattie, The Minstrel: Or. The Progress of Genius. A Poem. Book the First 2nd ed. (London: Dilly; 
Edinburgh: Creech, 1771) v. 
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The advertisement makes reference to the continuation of the poem into more than 
two books, as well as the independence of the First Book as a poem in its own right: "if the 
title were altered, and a few phrases struck out that refer to a sequel, it might perhaps be 
considered as a sort of whole by itself. The incidents that qualify him for his profession, and 
determine him to enter upon it, will furnish materials for the Books that are to follow." 174 It 
has been shown that Beattie's commitment to honour this promise faded as the second book 
progressed with difficulty. The poem opens with a comment on the difficulty of success, 
building a tone of cynicism towards the modern literary culture into which the poet now 
embarks. According to the poem, authors are most often left in obscurity, "In life's low vale 
remote has pined alone, I Then dropt into the grave, unpitied and unknown!" (8-9). The 
public at large cannot mourn obscure poets, since the public never recognised their talents. 
These lines echo Thomas Gray's "Elegy'' where the speaker ruminates upon the possibility of 
the unknown potential resting in the graveyard: "Some mute inglorious Milton here may rest, 
I Some Cromwell guiltless of his country's blood" (59-60). The inference here is that the poet 
"hero" of The Minstrel is also amongst these people ofunrealised potential. The subject of. 
the poem is not a modern poet, rather an ancient one, whose solitary circumstances develop 
his poetic imagination; and he is not in pursuit of public praise or worldly wealth. In contrast 
to a modern poet intent on fame and fortune, the poem turns to the kind of poet Beattie once 
aspired to be, who possesses the attributes he most values: 
Him, who ne'er listen'd to the voice of praise, 
The silence of neglect can ne'er appal. 
There are, who, deaf to mad ambitions call, 
Would shrink to-hear the obstreperous call of-Fame" (12-15); 
174 Beattie, The Minstrel: Or. The Progress of Genius. A Poem. Book the First 2nd ed. (London: Dilly; 
Edinburgh: Creech, 1771) v-vi. 
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In the footsteps of"Retirement" and "The Triumph of Melancholy" ambition is 
labelled as a negative force that has the potential to harm the soul. 175 Though the poem 
advocates neglect of public affirmation and material wealth, Beattie's comments on ambition 
are not always mirrored by his own career: his early aspirations and pursuit of patronage 
noted in chapter one reinforce this relationship. The older Beattie, tempered by the world and 
his own attempts at poetic fame, and traces the growth of his own poetic genius through 
Edwin. The poem then outlines the character of the poetical genius and portrays a congenial 
environment for its development, which borders on the didacticism that characterises much of 
the poem. 
These descriptive stanzas went through significant revision in the subsequent editions 
of the poem. An entire stanza from '71 is cut from all other editions, probably because it is 
slightly repetitious: one repetitive passage is the description of Edwin's humble status: 
"Life's slender sustenance his only meed; I 'Twas all he hoped, and all his heart desired" (28-
29) perhaps echoes, "Supremely blest, if to their position fall I Health, competence, and 
peace" (16-17). These two passages reiterate the simple origins of Edwin, and reinforce the 
absence of materialism which Beattie believed to be essential to a natural poet. The revisions 
to the poem also remove much of the satire and develop a more sentimental descriptive tone. 
The conscious culling of satirical material might have been an attempt to reinforce the status 
of The Minstrel above contemporary satirical imitations of Spenser. 
The satirical elements of the poem reinforce its connection with Spenserian 
imitations. Shenstone's "The Schoolmistress" began in 1737 as a staunchly satirical poem, 
but from the first revisions it took on a more pious air, while the poem also utilised pastoral 
images qf nature, which_influenced The Minstrel.cBeattie' s debt to Shenstone-is"more than 
175 
"Ambition, outside fair! within more foul I Than fellest fiend from Tartarus sprung" (Retirement, 73-74). 
"Meanwhile the world, Ambition, owns thy sway, I Fame's loudest trumpet labours in thy praise, I For thee the 
Muse awakes her sweetest lay" ("Triumph of Melancholy" 145-47). Passages from fmal volume of 1783. 
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superficial: in 1762, he composed a comic poem in Spenserian stanza to Sylvester Douglas 
which was written "in the style and measure ofShenstone's Schoolmisstress."176 Another 
important Spenserian model for Beattie was James Thomson's The Castle of Indolence 
(1748), which is the poet's earliest personal attempt to shrug off lethargy and contribute to his 
community through poetry. In very similar fashion, Beattie refers to The Minstrel as an 
attempt to use poetry as an intellectual respite from the demands of study during the 
composition of the Essay on Truth. 
An example of Beattie's satirical culling is the removal of Homer as a model poet. 177 
The phrase Beattie uses is reminiscent ofThe Castle oflndolence,178 which is further 
evidence of the influence of contemporary Spenserian imitations upon the poem, and 
Thomson in particular, whom Beattie considered to be one of the greatest Scottish poets. The 
allusion to Homer also reinforces poetry's oral origins, and the environment in which such 
poetry first existed. For subsequent editions Beattie's reputation has been made, and so 
further reinforcing his talent becomes superfluous. The final line of the stanza in '71 is no 
doubt cut because by the next edition in '74 he had received a royal pension for his defence 
of religion in the Essay on Truth, and so including this line would not be prudent: "Then 
courts of Kings can yield, with pensions, posts, and praise" (36). Cutting this line also 
removes some of the biting satire that is present in the initial two editions of the poem. 
Stanza V in '71, which becomes IV in all other editions, gets edited slightly for the 
'74 edition, but is significantly changed between 1776 and 1779; the changes made for the 
1779 edition are in the final version of 1784. The first version is satirical in tone, but this tone 
176 Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 15 May 1794. Beattie, Correspondence 4:207-79. Also found in M. Forbes, 
·283;- ·----------- - __ c __ . --·· --· 
177 For complete stanzas and their revisions over the years, see Appendix, p. 315-317. 
178 
"Whence, as Dan Homer sings, huge Pleasance grew, I And sweet Oblivion of vile earthly Care; I Fair 
gladsome waking Thoughts, and joyous Dreams more fair" (1.241-43). James Thomson, Libertv: The Castle of 
Indolence and Other Poems, ed. James Sambrook (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986). 
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is removed in later editions: "Fret not thyself, thou man of modem song" (3 7) becomes, "Fret 
not yourselves, ye silken sons of pride" (28). The line begins as a critique of specifically 
modem poets to a more general condemnation of fortune seekers. The '71 version then 
illustrates the absurd pursuit of fame and fortune by modern poets, whose goals are no longer 
altruistic: 
Nor violate the plaister of thy hair; 
Nor that dainty coat do aught of wrong; 
Else how shalt thou to Cesar's hall repair? 
(For ah! no damaged coat can enter there) (38-41). 
The revised stanza draws an opposition between the natural poet and the opportunist: "The 
Muses fortune's fickle smile deride, I Nor ever bow the knee in Mammon's fane; I For their 
delights are with the village train" (30-32). The final couplet illustrates this change sharply, 
with the '71 version containing more biting commentary: "But of poor old-fashion'd pilgrim 
wite, I Whom thou wouldst shun, I ween as most unseemly sight" (44-45). The '74 version is 
more philosophical, celebrating the traits of natural poets but does not chastise the others: 
"The parasite their influence never warms, I Nor him whose sordid soul the love of wealth 
alarms" (35-36). 
The changes between '74 and '76 are very few as noted before, 179 but those between 
'76 and '79 are more significant. Stanza N in '76 reads: 
Fret not yourselves, ye silken sons of pride 
That poor Wanderer should inspire my strain 
The Muses fortune's fickle smile deride, 
Nor-ever bow the knee-in Mammon's fane; 
179 See Appendix, p. 316. 
For their delights are with the village-train, 
Whom Nature's laws engage, and Nature's charms (28-33). 
The tone of the poet's condemnation of material wealth and ambition in this stanza is 
softened in the '79 version, and the "hero" of the poem is no longer characterised as a 
"Wanderer" but rather a "Villager'': 
Fret not thyself, thou glittering child of pride, 
That a poor Villager inspires my strain; 
With thee let Pageantry and Power abide: 
The gentle Muses haunt the sylvan reign; 
Where through wild groves at eve the lonely swain 
Enraptured roams, to gaze on Nature's charms" (28-33). 180 
The marked chastisement of the '76 version has been softened, and Edwin more properly 
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characterised as a "villager" a member of a rural community, rather than a ''wanderer" which 
would be more fitting if Beattie had continued the poem with his swain being forced to leave 
his home and take up the occupation of wandering minstrel. 
This Arcadian scenery is unique to the uncultured antiquity of human life, in which 
poets are "happily exempted from that tormenting ambition, and those vexatious desires, 
which trouble the current of modem life, he wanders with a serene, contented heart, through 
walks and groves consecrated to the muses." 181 The poem's condemnation of modem vanity 
is more pronounced in the '76 version of the stanza, and this revised version is more even 
handed in its reproach of material wealth. The revised stanza sets the poet and his hero apart 
from those who would prostitute their poetic genius in order to attain worldly wealth and 
fam~_. 
180 See Appendix, pp. 315-16 for the full stanzas. 
181 Duff, 271-72. 
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The poem argues that poetic a genius should not be concerned with modem wealth 
and success, nor should the poetic genius be seduced by the notion of fame. Beattie argues 
that the modem poetic genius should be content if the Muse, "vouchsafes a portion of 
celestial fire; I Nor blame the partial Fates, if they refuse I Th' imperial banquet, and rich the 
attire" (56-58). The stanza that follows introduces the delectations that draw modem poets 
from the path of genius laid out by Duff. The poem asks whether a natural poet could "On the 
dull couch of Luxury to loll, I Stung with disease, and stupefied with spleen" (66-67). The 
diction in this passage illustrates the negative impact of luxury and pride on the life of genius, 
as had many of Beattie's earlier poems. 
The next stanza introduces the untouched rural scenery, and Edwin himself is 
depicted for the first time. As Beattie's career progressed, he came to believe in the inevitable 
failure of the poetic geniuses to express adequately their ideas concerning abstract 
philosophical questions. Poetry had always been a pastime for Beattie, a pleasant distraction 
from his responsibilities and intellectual pursuits, as is evident from his first volume of 
poetry. Duff draws an important distinction between the poetic and philosophic genius, 
throwing into sharp relief the conflict between reason and imagination within Beattie's own 
mind. The imagination is an integral part of the process of discovery, but it operates in a 
different way in a philosophic genius. The imagination "enables the Philosopher, by its 
active, vigorous, and exploring power, to conjecture shrewdly, if not to comprehend fully, the 
various springs which actuate the visible system of Nature and Providence."182 Duff also 
observes that the philosophic genius must have an equal proportion of reason and 
imagination, because the latter "would be perpetually employed in forming genius indeed, but 
extravagant theories ... and we should be amused with the DREAMS of a ROMANTIC visionary, 
182 Duff, 96. 
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instead of being instructed in the TRUTHS of SOUND PHILOSOPHY."1s3 It is interesting to note 
that Beattie first describes Edwin as a "poetical visionary'' to John Gregory in 1768.184 The 
poem then moves to the positive effects of nature upon the soul: "These charms shall work 
thy soul's eternal health, I And love, and gentleness, and joy impart" (82-83). Yet these 
"benefits" must be sacrificed "But these thou must renounce, I But these joys must be 
sacrificed iflust or wealth I E'er win its way to thy corrupted heart" (84-85). This conflict 
between success and natural wealth is shelved in the narrative but remains within the larger 
theme. The poem then shifts back to narrative: "Return, my roving Muse, resume thy 
purpos'd theme" (90). The poem depicts Edwin's environment, beginning with the shepherd 
father of the minstrel, and situates him in the primitive Scottish landscape. This is a shepherd, 
"Whose fires, perchance, in Fairyland might dwell, I Sicilian groves, or vales of Arcady; I 
But he, I ween, was ofthe north countrie" (93-95) which Beattie explains to Thomas Percy 
that in this line he meant the lower borders rather than the highlands. Iss Edwin is introduced 
in the next stanza, and his character sets him apart from his peers: "And yet poor Edwin was 
no vulgar boy; I Deep thought oft seem'd to fix his infant eye" (136-37). 
This introspective character is further reinforced by Edwin's inaugural experience in 
nature, which Beattie based upon his own youthful experiences in the hills ofFordoun. Edwin 
is depicted in sublime scenery that acts upon his mind: "To deep untrodden groves his 
footsteps led, I There would he wander Wild, till Phoebus' beam, I Shot from the western 
cliff, released the weary team" (151-53). This image introduces the kindred relationship with 
nature the rest of the poem builds, as well as the kind of nature imagery Beattie will 
183 Duff, 102. 
184 !~e'first canto is'a Description of the childhood ofa poetical-visionary,- in-a solitary colihtry." Beattie -to 
John Gregory, 1 July 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:61-63. Also found in M. Forbes, 56. 
Iss "By the words North Country, in the poem, I meant not the northern part of the island, but the southmost 
part of Scotland; as will appear, if I live to finish the tale, from the action of the third book." Beattie to Thomas 
Percy, 4 May 1772. Beattie, Correspondence 2:168-71. 
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incorporate throughout the poem. The poem then depicts the sublimity of natural scenes 
impact upon Edwin's imagination. This relationship is illustrated by his first glimpse of the 
sea, which comes directly from Beattie's own past- not only his experiences, but his 
intellectual growth. He relates these forces at a time when his imagination did wander freely, 
as evidenced by his earliest poetry. 186 
Beattie explains his youthful experiences and perceptions in a letter to the Dowager 
Lady Forbes: 
The scenery of a mountainous country, the ocean, the sky, thoughtfulness and 
retirement, and sometimes melancholy objects and ideas, had charms in my 
eyes, even when I was a schoolboy; and at a time when I was so far from 
being able to express, that I did not understand, my own feelings, or perceive 
the tendency of such pursuits and amusements. 187 
This letter reinforces the idea that the poem is Beattie's rehearsal of his own growth from a 
solitary youth into a mature thinker, whose reason and imagination become conflicting forces 
as he acquires knowledge. The poem then depicts Beattie's first view of the sea with drama 
and intensity: 
What dreadful pleasure! there to stand sublime, 
Like shipwreck' d mariner on desert coast, 
And view th' enormous waste of vapour, tost 
In billows, lengthening to th' horizon round, 
Now scooped in gulfs, with mountains now emboss'd! (183-87). 
This stanza evokes the classical image of sublimity from Lucretius: "Pleasant it is, when on 
the great-seathe winds trouble the waters, to gaze from shore upon another's great 
186 The poems of Original Poems and Translations were written in Beattie's late teens/early twenties. 
187 Beattie to the Dowager Lady Forbes, 12 October 1772. Beattie, Correspondence 2:186-88. 
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tribulation ... " 188 Edwin takes pleasure in darkness, and storm, because they stir his 
imagination, and he meditates on those experiences. The sublime in the imagination is 
created by "a kind ofhorror .. .infused into the mind by both natural appearances, and by 
verbal description."189 It also locates the youth amongst powerful natural forces that work 
upon his mind without guidance. 
Edwin's voice takes over the poem, and we are privy to his private musings. He 
rehearses many of the topics that Beattie addressed in his early poetry, such as the mutable 
nature of human beings: "Yet such the destiny of all on earth: I So flourishes and fades 
majestic man" (217 -18). This standard poetic sentiment is revived from many of his earlier 
poems: for instance, in "Retirement: An Ode" we read, "Soon are the glittering moments 
o'er, I Soon each gay form decays" (47-48). He then entreats nature to spare humans such a 
fate, but the vanity of such a request is also clear: "Born on the swift, though silent, wings of 
Time, I Old age comes on apace to ravage all the clime" (224-25). The poem wistfully hopes 
that this melancholy can be banished by the promise of eternal life through Christianity. 
The afterlife will give all human beings a chance to be reborn into paradise, a chance 
which is unique to man: "But lofty souls, who look beyond the tomb, I Can smile at Fate, and 
wonder how they mourn" (228-29). This idea turns from universal to personal in the next 
stanza, as Edwin ponders his own fate in contrast to nature: 
Shall I be left forgotten in the dust, 
When Fate, relenting, lets the flowers revive? 
Shall nature's voice, to man alone unjust, 
Bid him, though doomed to perish, hope to live? (235-38). 
This sentiment appeared-in "An-Elegy Occasioned by-the DeathofALady" with similar 
188 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.1-3. 
189 Beattie, Dissertations 615. 
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melancholy questioning: "Why spare the weed, and lop the lovely flower! I Why fly shafts in 
lawless error drivin'! I Is Virtue then no more the care ofheav'n!-" (70-72). Beattie answers 
this question in the final line of the stanza with the promise of the Christian afterlife: "No: 
Heaven's immortal spring shall yet arrive, I And man's majestic beauty bloom again" (241-
42). In The Minstrel there is a confidence in the promise of eternal life that evaded Beattie in 
his early explorations of the subject. 
"An Elegy" attempts to find solace in Christian afterlife but it falters toward the end, 
and the poem ends with the depiction of mourners over the bier. 190 "Epitaph" labels 
mankind's need to understand the divine as vain, and its ending alludes to those in paradise 
with an urgency to be among them. 191 The decisiveness and confidence in the promise of 
Christianity illustrates Beattie's growth as a poet, and his own personal conviction 
concerning an important tenet of his religion. For Beattie, this kind of conviction is integral to 
our existence, and an important refutation of scepticism. In the Essay on Truth he argues: 
"Conviction, and steadiness of principle, is that which gives dignity, uniformity, and spirit, to 
human conduct, and without which our happiness can neither be lasting nor sincere."192 
Beattie is now able to express confidence in the religious conviction which he was not able to 
muster in his youth. 
190 The afterlife is praised: "And wings the soul with boundless flights to soar, I Where dangers threat, and fears 
alarm. no more." (87-88). But the poem ends: "Mix'd with yon drooping Mourners, o'er her bier I In silence 
shed tll.e sy111pathetic tear" (9§-97). 
191Tne ·speaker-expresses"faitlfinihe -diviDe: ''Heaven's -lii<tdeii ways ·totrace, for us, how vain! /Heaven's Wise 
decrees, how impious to arraign!" (19-20). And the poem ends: ''They liv'd united, and united died; I Happy the 
friends, whom Death cannot divide!" (25-26). 
192 James Beattie, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistiy and Scepticism 
(London: Thoemmes-Routledge, 1996) 155. 
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The poem then shifts to the instruction of Edwin by his father, who brings the focus 
back to a moral and didactic purpose. The father begins with a veiled attack on sceptical 
philosophy, attacking its desire to understand more than is readily available to man's 
understanding. The father declares: "'Let man's own sphere (said he) confine his view, I Be 
man's peculiar work thy sole delight"' (248-49). This denial of ambition is reminiscent of 
Beattie's earlier attitude toward the subject, as presented in "Ode to Peace"193 and Retirement, 
an Ode. " 194 The father urges Edwin to be content with life and his necessity of daily life. 
The father's desire for Edwin to refrain from contemplation of abstract ideas, and to 
focus upon the business of life, is an important tenet of the Essay on Truth, in which Beattie 
argues that sceptical philosophers distract us from the business of life, because they "infeeble 
and harass the soul, [and] divert its attention from every thing that can enlarge and improve it 
... and disqualify it alike for action, and for useful knowledge."195 The poem continues with 
the instruction of basic Christian tenets, such as "Forgive thy foes; and love thy parents dear" 
(259). After this instruction the speaker depicts Edwin escaping back to scenes of natural 
beauty and sublimity: "And lo! in the dark east, expanded high, I The rainbow brightens to 
the setting sun!" (266-67). This image reinforces the power of knowledge to improve the 
mind's interpretation of objects in nature such as the rainbow. This reference to education 
enriching the beauty of the rainbow is reminiscent of Akenside's The Pleasures of 
Imagination: 
Nor ever yet 
The melting rainbow's vemal-tinctur'd hues 
193 Ambition enthralls mankind and leads them to self-destruction and the worst vices: "Illusions vain! Can 
sacred PEA€E reside; 1 Where sordid-gold the breasnlarms, /Where cruelty inflainestlieeye ofl>iide; I And -
Grandeur wantons in soft Pleasure's arms!" (109-12). 
194 Ambition breeds melancholy because of its unattainable nature: "For me, no more the path invites I 
Ambition loves to tread; /No more I climb life's panting heights" (41-43). 
195 Beattie, Essay 492. 
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To me have shone so pleasing, as when first 
The hand of science pointed out the path 
In which the sun-beams gleaming from the west 
Fall on the watry cloud (103-8). 
Knowledge has the potential to enrich the beauties of the world, but it can also remove the 
mystery and power from occurrences in the natural world. The following stanza foreshadows 
the disillusionment that occurs as people learn and grow into adulthood and the conflict 
between innocence and experience. This occurs through Edwin's education from the Hermit 
in Book II. 
The older and more jaded Beattie reflects upon the conflict he felt between his affinity 
for nature and solitude, and the desire for worldly success and fame: "Yet couldst thou learn, 
that thus it fares with age, I When pleasure, wealth, or power the bosom warm, I This baffied 
hope might tame thy manhood's rage I And Disappointment of her string disdain" (271-74). 196 
The speaker condemns the worldly concerns that brought Beattie, and will bring Edwin, away 
from nature's solitude and inspiration: "Perish the lore that deadens young desire! I Pursue, 
poor imp, th' imaginary charms, I Indulge gay Hope, and Fancy's pleasing fire" (276-78). 
The imagination enlivened through interactions with nature is curbed by worldly knowledge 
and ambition, and the speaker laments that this also should be Edwin's fate. 
196 Radcliffe also recognises the connection-between Beattie himself and-the Hermit; burliis idea Of their 
connection differs from mine greatly: ''The Hermit, quite as much as Edwin, is James Beattie, who later chose to 
remain cloistered at Aberdeen rather than accept preferment in Edinburgh or the Anglican Church." David Hill 
Radcliffe, ''The Poetry Professors: Eighteenth-Century Spenserianism and Romantic Concepts of Culture," 
1650-1850: Ideas. Aesthetics. and Inguiries in the Early Modem Era 5 (2000): 141. 
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The poem shifts to Edwin's dream vision, to illustrate the processes of his 
imagination. He dreams of strong noble minstrels and the halls that once made them 
welcome, poetically presenting the characterisation Percy made of the minstrels in Religues 
of Ancient Poetry. 197 First "the long-robed minstrels wake the warbling wire" (305) and then, 
"With merriment, and song, and timbrels clear, I A troop of dames from myrtle bowers 
advance" (307-8). The poem rehearses the nobility of minstrels advanced in Percy's essay, 
and illustrates Edwin's subconscious desire to take his place among them. The dream is 
broken by the approach of dawn; and the speaker chides the daylight "Fell Chanticleer! who 
oft hast rest away I My fancied good, and brought substantial ill!" (318-19).The tone of this 
passage is cynical, because it signalled a return to serious contemplation. The elder poet 
reflects upon the initial conflict between creations of his imagination and intellectual 
questions. The speaker's reaction is contrasted by Edwin's: "Even now his eyes with smiles 
of rapture glow, I As on he wanders through the scenes ofmorn" (329-30). 
For Edwin, the dawn brings more opportunities to explore nature and exercise his 
imagination, because he is not yet burdened by knowledge, which, as Duff had claimed, will 
be shown as stifling creative power. The following two stanzas describe the sounds as the 
people and the landscape aw'aken to a new day, and begin their work. These ruminations are 
interrupted by a significant didactic passage, which introduces the philosophical arguments 
that will occupy much of the poem, and their treatment mirrors that in the Essay on Truth. 
The speaker turns to the dangers of some philosophical teachings: "Blest be the day I scaped 
the wrangling crew, I From Pyrrho's maze, and Epicurus' sty; I And held high converse with 
the godlike few" (356-58). 
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''Their skill was considered something divine, their persons were deemed sacred, their attendance was 
solicited by kings, and they were loaded with honours and rewards." "An Essay on the Ancient English 
Minstrels" Thomas Percy, Religues of Ancient Poetry 3 vols. (London: Dodsley, 1765) 1 :xv. 
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This passage makes reference to Beattie's early philosophical explorations, which 
also influenced his poetic development; an example of this influence is the translation from 
De Rerum Natura. 198 He admonishes these philosophers in terms similar to those in the Essay 
on Truth: 
Hence! Y e, who snare and stupefy the mind, 
Sophists, ofbeauty, virtue, joy, the bane! 
Greedy and fell, though impotent and blind, 
Who spread your filthy nets in Truth's fair fane" (361-64). 
Clearly, "The Minstrel has harsh words for those who delimit the scope of experience with 
their close metaphysical formulae."199 To combat the negative effects of this philosophy the 
speaker seeks strength from the spirits of previous poets, "Whose song, sublimely sweet, 
serenely gay, I Amus'd my childhood, and inform'd my youth. I 0 let your spirit still my 
bosom sooth" (372-74). Beattie himself pays homage to the poets who inspired his earliest 
musings, and attempts to guard himself from sceptical philosophy by invoking their memory. 
The poem then centres again on the narrative ofthe swain, whose interactions with 
poetry inspire the same sublimity experienced by a younger Beattie. Edwin's knowledge of 
poetry comes through the oral tradition, "Her legend when the Beldame 'gan impart, I Or 
chant the old heroic ditty o'er, I Wonder and joy ran thrilling to his heart" (385-87). The 
emotions these lays evoke lead Edwin to question the motives of the characters, and the 
philosophy behind human choices, as well as the nature of the human condition. After the 
rehearsal of the "babes in the wood" ballad Edwin questions the lusting of humans after 
worldly wealth: "But why should gold man's feeble mind decay, I And Innocence thus die by 
doom severe?" ( 417-18). This curiosity will lead Edwin to his- instruction by the Hermit. 
198 One of his earliest poems of course, had been a translation of the Invocation of Venus from the First Book of 
De Rerum Natura. See pp. 18-19. 
199 Brunstrom, 28. 
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The poem does not turn to exploring these questions, but shifts back to the speaker's 
nervousness for the future of his swain. It is greed and malicious behaviour in the name of 
greed, which the poem will label as a fault of sceptical philosophy. While the speaker 
consoles himself with hope for the future and faith, he condemns doubting sceptics: "But 
dreadful is their doom, whom doubt has driven I To censure Fate, and pious hope forego" 
( 428-29). The poem continues to upbraid sceptical philosophers, who attempt through their 
industry and investigation to understand the operations ofthe universe: 
Shall the poor gnat with discontent and rage 
Exclaim, that Nature hastens to decay 
If but a cloud obstruct the solar ray, 
If but a momentary shower descend! 
Or shall frail man Heaven's dread decree gainsay, 
Which bade the feries of events extend 
Wide through unnumber'd worlds, and ages without end!" (435-41). 
Such anger and discontent which the speaker laments is a result of sceptical theory, because it 
defies the limitations of the human intellect, particularly our ability to understand the wider 
workings of the universe. The poem argues that in contrast to what the sceptic's argue, our 
knowledge is far more limited: "One part, one little part, we dimly scan I Through the dark 
medium oflife's feverish dream" (442-43). The sceptics attempt to reach beyond those 
limitations, by questioning the truthfulness of our senses and intuition. Beattie argues that the 
existence ofthe universe is known in the same fashion as the existence of self. 
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For Beattie, we believe ourselves to exist because we cannot help but believe that we 
exist; and just as "there is something in my mind which necessarily determines me to this 
belief, I must also, for the very same reason, believe, that the whole universe (supposed to 
have had a beginning, proceeds from some cause."200 This is the explanation he gives for the 
creation of the universe, and it is also reinforced in verse. The poem demands that we 
disclaim philosophy "That aims to trace the secrets of the skies: I For thou are but of dust; be 
humble, and be wise" (449-50).201 According to Beattie, sceptics do not acknowledge the 
limitations inherent in man's intelligence, and the speaker thus labels scepticism as an 
arrogant philosophy. 
The attack upon sceptical philosophy continues through the movement of the 
narrative. As Edwin grows and his experiences in nature multiply; he is still unaware of 
intellectual concerns he is still: "On Fancy's wing above this vale of tears; I Where dark cold-
hearted sceptics, creeping, pore I Through microscope of metaphysic lore" (453-55). Poetry 
raises Edwin (and the elder Beattie) from the laborious task of dissecting metaphysical 
philosophy. Nature becomes the chief antidote to such musings, and it is the effect of natural 
scenes upon the imagination that becomes the focus of the poem: "Fancy a thousand 
wondrous forms descries I More wildly great than ever pencil drew, I Rocks, torrents, gulfs, 
and shapes of giant size, I And glittering cliffs on cliffs, and fiery ramparts rise" (474-77). 
These sublime images are meant to strike the reader with awe, as they do in the cases of both 
Edwin and the elder Beattie, who is recalling this scene. 
200 Beattie, Essay 119. 
201 Many of Beattie's early poems make a similar claim for humility, such as the elegies in OPT and "The 
Judgement of Paris." See pp. 42-47 and 63-65. 
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Solitude and poetic melancholy also inspire Edwin, just as they did young Beattie. In 
a letter Beattie himself acknowledges his early affinity for such natural scenes: "In my 
younger days I was much attached to solitude .. .I wrote Odes to Retirement; and wished to be 
conducted to its deepest groves, remote from every rude sound, and from every vagrant foot. 
In a word, I found the most profound solitude the best."202 Beattie gives Edwin this same 
affinity for solitude and melancholy, "To the pure soul by Fancy's fire refined, I Ah what is 
mirth but turbulence unholy, I When with the charm compared of heavenly melancholy!" 
(493-5). An indulgence in melancholy and solitude are no longer acceptable to Beattie, 
though, as is clear from a later passage of the aforementioned letter: "But I have now changed 
my mind. Those solemn and incessant energies of imagination, which naturally take place in 
such a state, are fatal to the health and spirits, and tend to make us more and more unfit for 
the business of life. mo3 In his youth Beattie considered melancholy and solitude essential to 
an environment conducive for poetic creation, but this letter illustrates that they have 
considerably fallen in his estimation. Though this letter seems to insinuate that Beattie's 
decision to abandon poetry might have been made with less regret than I have previously 
argued, I believe the letter is evidence of the progressive depression of Beattie's creative 
powers, and his desire to eliminate anything that might be hindering the performance of his 
daily duties. This letter also explicates the crux of the poem; indulgence in the imagination 
makes it difficult to carry on temporal necessities. 
The conflict between reason and imagination is illustrated by Beattie's own life. The 
sentiments of the Hermit Edwin meets in Book IT are akin to Beattie's in this letter, which 
brings into sharp relief the contrast between the youthful Beattie and his older self. The poem 
then,shifts back. to an attack on the way scepticalo philosophers-manipulate language to serve 
202 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 26 July 1773. Beattie, Correspondence 2:226-29. 
203 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 26 July 1773. Beattie, Correspondence 2:226-29. 
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their own investigations. For Beattie, these authors have ''unhappily been too successful in 
producing that confusion of thought, and indistinctness of apprehension, in the minds of 
authors and readers, which are so favourable to error and sophistry."204 A person who does 
not understand the positive virtues of solitude and melancholy, "The sophist's rope of 
cobwebs he shall twine; I Mope o'er the schoolman's peevish page; or mourn, I And delve for 
life, in Mammon's dirty mine" (501-3). The investigations into nature pursued by Edwin are 
contrasted with the more methodical and to Beattie's mind potentially dangerous logical 
processes, which he defines more explicitly in Book IT. 
The poem then foreshadows Edwin's career as a minstrel in prophetic terms: "Song 
was his favourite and first pursuit. I The wild harp rang to his adventurous hand" (506-7). The 
final two stanzas reinforce Edwin's captivation with the natural world and the solitude that 
inspires his imagination. The last stanza restates important elements of the poem, such as its 
place in Beattie's work as a mental respite from philosophical writing: "Here pause, my 
Gothic lyre, a little while. I The leisure hour is all that thou canst claim" (532-33). The poem 
states Beattie's own opinion, that poetry is meant as an intellectual escape from daily life. 
The poem's status as a mental escape from more important work is restated, as the speaker 
dismisses all claims for worldly approval: "At lucre or renown let others aim, I I only wish to 
please the gentle mind, I Whom nature's charms inspire, and love of mankind" (538-40). 
In light of Beattie's earlier works it would be easy to dismiss this as mere artistic 
invention, but in this poem the reference is not artistry. The Minstrel was the last new poem 
Beattie ever presented to the public, and these lines reaffirm the denial of a career that he 
never realised. His poetic career culminates in The Minstrel, because it traces his initial 
inspiration and the frre of his imagination, and through-the growth that-leads-to the inevitable 
204 Beattie, Essay 20. 
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battle with the intellectual faculty, which he will resolve by ending his poetic career and 
turning his attention to critical and philosophical prose. He traces his own search for poetic 
fame and the complications such ambition can create in the poet's mind. 
'fhe Minstrel; Or. the Progress of Genius: Book H 
Book II opens with a restatement of the universal nature of human suffering and 
eventual death: "All feel th' assault of fortune's fickle gale; I Art, empire, earth itself, to 
change are doom'd" (5-6). Mutability has been a prevalent topic in Beattie's poetry from the 
beginning. The speaker then takes up the narrative, but with an air of cynicism: "So I, 
obsequious to Truth's dread command, I Shall here without reluctance change my lay, I And 
smite the Gothic lyre with harsher hand" (19-21). The speaker foreshadows the 
disillusionment that envelopes Edwin after his instruction by the Hermit. 
Knowledge has improved his mind but tempered his imagination, and it is the 
understanding of human history that causes depression and melancholy, dampening his 
imagination. Radcliffe argues that "to become a poet he [Edwin] must learn to give over 
village ways and moralize his song. "205 This idea is problematic, especially in light of the 
following passage, in which the speaker laments the loss of youthful belief and ignorant 
happiness, which Edwin loses through his intellectual awakening. The double-edged nature 
of knowledge is reminiscent of Gray's "Eton College Ode:" ''Yet ah! why should they know 
their fate? I Since sorrow never comes too late, I And happiness too swiftly flies" (95-97).206 
The narrative resumes by depicting a mature Edwin. 
205
-Radcliffe,"•'fie·Paeti'Y'Proressors:·Eigllteenth'-:centmys}>enserianism';-r38. 
206 Thomas Gray, "Ode on a Distant Prospect ofEton College" The Complete Poems of Thomas Gray: English. 
Latin. and Greek. Ed H. W. Starr and J. R. Hendrickson. (Oxford: OUP, 1966) 
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He no longer contents himself with the nature close to his home, and so he searches within a 
broader radius for scenes to inspire his imagination even further: "And walks of wider circuit 
were his choice, I And vales more wild, and mountains more sublime" ( 48-49). fu this 
scenery the speaker depicts the influence nature has on his imagination: "Sooth' d by the 
lulling sound of grove and stream, I Roman tick visions swarm on Edwin's soul" (77 -78). And 
while thus reposed the swain is roused by the speech of the faraway Hermit, which will spark 
his curiosity. The Hermit, as I have argued, can be seen as representing the wiser Beattie, 
who has sought to indulge his poetic imagination, and speaks to his former self the questions 
he has never been able to answer. The elder Beattie is aware of the conflict between poetic 
imagination and philosophical explorations, which has been an important theme throughout 
Beattie's work. The Hermit's speech reveals that he has had experiences similar to Edwin's 
in the soft scenery of nature, and felt the positive influence of solitude upon the mind: "0 
Solitude, the man who thee foregoes, I When lucre lures him, or ambition stings, I Shall never 
know the source whence real grandeur springs" (88-90). The Hermit's speech expresses 
Beattie's personal ideas concerning solitude, ambition, and material wealth that he began 
exploring in his first volume of poetry. 
The Hermit denounces ambition and worldly success in favour of eternal, Christian 
benefits: 
True dignity is his, whose tranquil mind 
Virtue has raised above the things below; 
Who, every hope and fear to heaven resign'd, 
Shrieks not, though Fortune aim her deadliest blow (100-103). 
The idea that the-poet -should aspire for divine praise-rather than worldly wealth has been a 
key theme throughout Beattie's work, but his own career complicates this notion, because 
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while his poetry denounced fame, he clearly wanted to be remembered and succeed as a poet, 
as we have seen in chapter one. The poem then explains that the Hermit once hoped for all of 
the glories he renounced as damaging to the natural poet. 
Here the Hermit is the vehicle through which the elder Beattie can recall past 
temptations, and confess his own history of ambitious behaviour. The Hermit admits: '"I 
sought for glory in the paths of guile; I And fawn' d and smiled, to plunder and betray I 
Myselfbetray'd and plundered all the while" (119-21). The Hermit is depicted as the 
ambitious poetic genius derided in the first Book of the poem, but his seclusion illustrates his 
abandonment of his ambition. The ignominy the Hermit faces is contrasted with the divine 
joys experienced by natural poets: "And if no future age shall hear my name, I I lurk the more 
secure from fortune's blast, I And with more leisure feed this pious flame" (132-34). The 
Hermit champions Christian rewards over temporal advantage, and also over posthumous 
fame, which is traditionally considered a stimulus to noble action. 
Then comes a shift in the poem's subject; the creations of the imagination take centre 
stage. The sublime creations of the imagination influenced by nature are negative to the mind, 
because they instil horror, and are damaging to the soul: ''But, in the mental world, what 
chaos drear! I What forms of mournful, loathsome, furious mien!" (177 -78). The ability of 
the sublime to damage the soul is also present in philosophy, which can utilise sublimity 
when dealing with metaphysics and ethics. It is the capacity of sublimity to cause harm that 
worries Beattie, and also the Hermit of The Minstrel. 
The Hermit warns Edwin of sublimity because it can harm him as a poet, and through 
him his readers. Akenside had depicted a similar thought of the sublime in "Hymn to 
Cheerfulness(l745):" "But evithaunts-him through the,maze:-1 He sees ten thousand demons 
rise I To wield the empire of the skies" (120-22). 
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Morning banishes these scenes from the swain's mind, but the remnants of the emotions 
linger, as they are described in sublime imagery: "0 when shall that Eternal Morn appear, I 
These dreadful forms to chase, this chaos dark to clear!" (179-80). Edwin internalises these 
meditations and they lead to the questions he will ask the Hermit regarding the history ofthe 
world. The final phrase of the Hermit's speech provokes Edwin to question whether in 
courtly life and society men betray each other and pervert "Each social instinct, and sublime 
desire?" (195) to achieve worldly success. The Hermit has planted uncertainty in Edwin's 
mind, and this leads him to seek out the Hermit, believing: "'Tis he my doubt can clear, 
perhaps my care dispel" (216). Edwin seeks to avoid doubt, which Beattie labelled as a 
fundamental characteristic of scepticism. In the Essay on Truth he asserts that "The 
fundamental principles of truth must therefore rest upon their own evidence, perceived 
intuitively by the understanding."207 
Sceptical philosophy denies such reliance on the a priori and seeks to investigate 
further into causation and perception, which is one reason Beattie vehemently sought to 
discredit its approach. It is with the hope of quelling uncertainty that Edwin seeks the Hermit, 
but the resulting tutorial does not bring resolution. Edwin, then, is seeking to avoid doubt, 
which for Beattie is a fundamental element of scepticism. Edwin hopes the Hermit will instil 
in him confidence in the courtly world of man. If this is not the case, the swain implores the 
Hermit to: 
Restore those tranquil days, that saw me still 
Well pleased with all, but more with humankind; 
When fancy roved through Nature's works at will, 
Uncheck' d by cold distrust, and uninform' d of ill" (258-61 ). 
207 Beattie, Essay 146. 
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Beattie seems to be recalling the loss of his own poetic innocence; through Edwin he depicts 
his own loss of faith in humanity and the power of nature to improve mankind's situation. 
The Hermit responds that as yet Edwin knows little of human failings: "Alas, what comfort 
could thy anguish soothe, I Shouldst thou th' extent of human folly know. I Be ignorance thy 
choice, where knowledge leads to woe" (268-70). The final line is reminiscent of Gray's 
"Eton College Ode:" "when ignorance is bliss, I 'Tis folly to be wise" (99-100). Like Gray, 
Beattie is reflecting on the innocence of childhood and the pain knowledge will inevitably 
cause minds that were once innocent and free. Unlike Gray's speaker, however, the Hermit 
feels obliged to share with Edwin the pain and complications that understanding brings. 
Indeed, the Hermit wishes to have a companion in misery, instead of hiding "From every 
gentle ear the dreadful truth" (265). 
It is supposedly with a desire to improve the world that the Hermit entreats Edwin to 
return to him for instruction on how to improve his intellect by stifling his imagination: 
"Come often then; for, haply, in my bower, I Amusement, knowledge, wisdom thou may'st 
gain: I If I one soul improve, I have not lived in vain" (286-88). This is the elder Beattie 
attempting to validate his poetic endeavours, and illustrates the desire of the Hermit to 
educate the young. In Lamia208 John Keats articulates this Romantic attitude toward the 
empirical education of the eighteenth-century, which Beattie was an inextricable part: 
Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven; 
We know her worth, her texture; she is given 
In the dull catalogue of cormilon things. 
208 John Keats, The Complete Poems. ed. John Barnard 3rd ed. (London: Penguin, 1988) 431. 
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Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings 
Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, 
Empty the haunted air, and gnome'd min~ (11.229-36). 
For Keats, knowledge has the potential to destroy the mysteries of nature, and dampens 
creative impulses. Beattie hints at the consequences of education which Keats laments in this 
passage. 
The Hermit begins his vaticide invoking the muse of history, and the image he 
presents of virtue is reminiscent to "Ode to Peace": "Here smiling Virtue prompts the 
patriot's rage, I But lo, erelong, is left alone to mourn, I And languish in the dust, and clasp 
th' abandon'd urn" (295-97). Beattie added the next stanza in 1784, and it also echoes the 
"Ode to Peace" by condemning ambition: "Ambition's slippery verge shall mortals tread, I 
Where ruin's gulph unfathom'd yawns beneath! I Shall life, shall liberty be lost, (he said) I 
For the vain toys that Pomp and Power bequeath!" (298-300). But these images are not the 
most important the Hermit will present, for he reasons "To those, whom Nature taught to 
think and feel, I Heroes, alas! Are things of small concern" (311-12). They inspire the natural 
poet because they reinforce the vanity of humans, an idea which is also introduced in ''The 
Judgement of Paris," where the hero aligns himself with sensual pleasure rather than virtue, 
and this choice results in the destruction of an entire civilization.209 These ruminations do not 
discourage Edwin from his relationship with poetry, and the poem shifts to explore 
characteristics of the imagination. The Hermit presents education as the necessary moderator 
of the imagination, so that its creations are enriching to the mind. The danger of the 
imagination is its ability to make images real, especially images of despair and horror that 
co_uld_harm the soul. It is_significant that Beattie also perceived the same danger to the soul 
209 The poem explains: "The bower of bliss, the smile of love be thine, I Unlabour'd ease, and leisure's careless 
dream./ Such be their joys, who bend at Venus' shrine" (513-15)" which leads Paris to chose Her. As a result 
"With horror's scream the Ilian towers resound" (530) at the fall of Troy. 
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from the use of the intellect. Beattie condemns sceptical philosophy for this very reason, he 
argues that sceptical philosophy undermines the foundations of belief, and by extension daily 
activity. 
For Beattie, the imagination, ''by its plastic power of inventing new associations of 
ideas, and of combining them with infinite variety, is enabled to present a creation of its own, 
to exhibit scenes and objects which never existed in nature."210 The harm that these 
associations can cause is explicated in a pivotal stanza, which is rich in images depicting the 
consequences of an unchecked imagination: 
And often, where no real ills affright, 
Its visionary fiends, and endless train, 
Assail with equal or superior might, 
And through the throbbing heart, and dizzy brain, 
And shivering nerves, shoot stings of more than mortal pain (365-9). 
The imagination assigns real qualities to imagined objects, and in so doing confuses reality 
with the mind's own creations. The speaker questions the value of these associations, because 
they are easily turned into negative emotions. The speaker then argues that even a carefully 
prepared mind cannot completely combat the negative visions the imagination creates, 
because they mimic the outer world, which is also full of negative forces: "And yet, alas, the 
real ills of life I Claim the full vigour of a mind prepared, I Prepared for patient, long, 
laborious strife, I Its guide Experience, and Truth its guard" (371-73). The idea that truth and 
virtue cannot protect mankind from pain and disaster is essential to Beattie's overall view of 
poetry. Negative forces that mingle in the imagination are essential to creation and the growth 
of the-mind; 
zto Duff, 7. 
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The poem explores the role of the imagination in this process as well as its unique 
operations in the minds of poets. Philosophy is then called upon "To curb Imagination's 
lawless rage" (399). This line further reinforces Duffs idea that judgement, which results 
from knowledge, must govern the products of the imagination. Each discipline is invoked to 
temper imagination, and this reinforces education's role in the development of taste and 
judgement. The speaker argues: "The mind untaught I Is a dark waste, where fiends and 
tempests howl; I As Phebus to the world, is Science to the Soul" (412-14). This is a 
significant moment, because it conflicts with the idea that natural poetic genius does not rely 
on outside influences, other than nature itself. The final simile further illustrates the 
importance placed upon learning; it brings light and warmth to the mind, enabling it to 
develop and mature. However, science is also presented by the Hermit as morally active: 
"Nor less to regulate man's moral frame I Science exerts her all-composing sway'' ( 469-70). 
"Science" in the passage is clearly used in its broadest sense here, to mean general knowledge 
rather than a particular discipline, because it tempers the imagination and allows man to 
understand the world around him. This understanding of the natural world logically leads to a 
better understanding of the divine. The Hermit also argues that an intemperate imagination 
and attachment to solitude are dangerous, because they confuse reality and fiction, and can 
lead to intense negative emotions, and a dangerous relationship with nature. This attitude 
toward solitude further illustrates Beattie's projection of his elder self into the Hermit's 
character. Here we see Beattie's attempt to show through a contradiction between character 
and doctrine the negative nature of the Hermit's own message. A Hermit, one might expect, 
would value disconnection from the community and highly regard the influences of nature 
upon-the imagination, but instead rejects them as seditious to the well trained mind. 
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The Minstrel succeeds because one is able to present various arguments without one 
or another becoming the dominant force of the poem. The narrative shifts back to Edwin, and 
this education by the Hermit leads him to look upon nature differently. But in his mind "The 
Muse, and her celestial art, I Still claim th' Enthusiast's fond and first regard. I From Nature's 
beauties variously compared I And variously combined, he learns to frame I Those forms of 
bright perfection" (516-20) the products of his imagination. Edwin explores the natural world 
with a more studied eye, and so he tempers his poetry with his newly acquired knowledge of 
human history and philosophies of the mind. The connection between Edwin and nature has 
shifted; he now uses nature to aid his own expression, and it becomes one of his poetic 
devices rather than inspiration. Nature "Tempers his rage: he owns her charm divine, I And 
clears th' ambiguous phrase, and lops th' unwieldy line" (530-1). The influence of nature 
upon his imagination is now managed by his judgement and taste, which enriches rather than 
inhibits his creative processes. 
The next stanza alludes to the rest of Edwin's story, which is one of the only allusions 
in the poem to a possible third book: "Fain would I sing (much yet unsung remains) I What 
sweet delirium o'er his bosom stole," (532-33). The speaker then makes clear the 
development Edwin's poetry has undergone as a result of his education: "And how his lyre, 
though rude her first essays, I Now skill'd to sooth, to triumph, to complain" (541-42). 
Edwin's judgement is refined by his education by the Hermit, and his governed imagination 
creates more sophisticated poetry. His mind is enhanced by his newly acquired knowledge, 
but its far- reaching effects upon the swain are not developed. 
The fmal stanza before the elegy for Dr. Gregory, is Beattie's final farewell to poetry. 
His own voice takes over-the narrative without question once the poem' alludes to his friend's 
death. The fable is interrupted by Beattie's meditations, on his friend and his own future as a 
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poet: "Adieu, ye lays, that Fancy's flowers adorn, I The soft amusement of the vacant mind! I 
He sleeps in dust, and all the Muses mourn" (550-52). The grief caused by the death of his 
friend deadens his imagination, and the poem begins to falter: "Ah, how should 
I pursue I My theme! To heart-consuming griefresign'd I Here on his recent grave I fix my 
view, I And pour my bitter tears. Ye flowery lays, adieu!" (555-58). Beattie here makes a 
conscious choice between his poetic and philosophic leanings. The death of his poetic 
confidante has left him without the inspiration of his poetic muse. 
This rejection of poetry sets up the final stanza of the poem, which is a sort of elegy 
for Gregory, though it talks more of Beattie's personal loss than any particular virtues of 
Gregory: 
No more thy soothing voice my anguish chears: 
Thy placid eyes with smiles no longer glow, 
My hopes to cherish, and allay my fears. 
'Tis meet that I should mourn: flow forth afresh my tears" (564-67). 
His poetic lament over the loss of Gregory harkens back to Gray's "Sonnet on the Death of 
Richard West." The speaker of the sonnet reflects upon the indifference of the rest of the 
world to his immense loss: ''My lonely Anguish melts no Heart, but mine; I And in my Breast 
the imperfect Joys expire. I Yet Morning smiles the busy Race to chear" (7-9). Beattie's 
particular poetic expression of grief for Gregory is supported by the correspondence. Gregory 
was often the first reader of Beattie's poems, and edited many ofthem before they went to the 
press. He was one of Beattie's sounding boards, and encouraged him to publish his poems. 
It is possible that the loss of Gregory stole from him the desire to compose poetry, 
especially since this-finalpoemdelves so deeply into the poet's own-psyche and, explores the 
growth of his mind from his adolescence through middle age. 
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The Minstrel: Or, The Progress of Genius, represents the climax of Beattie's poetic 
career. His evolving plan for the composition and publication of the poem presents an 
integral context to an understanding of his poetic career before and after its commercial and 
critical success. The simultaneous composition of the poem with Beattie's seminal work of 
philosophy illustrates the close relationship between the two disciplines in Beattie's mind, as 
well as in the poem itself. 
The Minstrel is also an inaugural investigation into the creative process and the 
function of the imagination upon the poetically inclined mind. Beattie transforms the usage of 
the Spenserian stanza, exploiting its richness and versatility to create a unique, sublimely 
striking environment, which is able to inspire the imagination of his young poet. In the poem 
Beattie explores uncharted territory, and his efforts in it and the Essay on Truth no doubt left 
him intellectually and physically drained. The issues he sought to address concerning the 
effects of the imagination, the consequences of scepticism, and the growth of the poetic 
career could not be continued into a larger narrative, not because Beattie lacked talent, but 
because his fable lacked the scope of his philosophical vision. He is the older, experienced 
poet of Book II, a man whose life experiences have challenged his youthful indulgence in the 
poetic imagination, and left him with no spark of creative power or ideas to explore. The 
success of The Minstrel marks a turning point in Beattie's poetic career; he has completed an 
expansive poetical investigation into philosophical ideas that range from scepticism to the 
role of poetry, and he has illustrated his ability to instruct and entertain with grace and style. 
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Chapter 4: The philosophy behind the poetry, the Essay on Truth 
An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and 
Scepticism 
The Essay on Truth (1770), as it is commonly known, brought Beattie national 
recognition and fame. In recognition of his work, he received a royal pension of £200 per 
annum, an honorary LL.D. from Oxford, as well as acquaintance with the greatest thinkers of 
his time. By 1776 six editions of the Essay had been published and it was widely read 
throughout the rest ofthe century. Beattie's fame and influence is attested by Boswell in his 
Life of Johnson: "BOSWELL: Then Hume is not the worse for Beattie's attack? JOHNSON: 
He is, because Beattie has confuted him."211 Further evidence of the contemporary influence 
and popularity of the Essay and its treatment ofHume can be seen in the dictionary of 
Samuel Johnson. As Howard Weinbrot explains: 
The Postscript includes a remark that becomes an illustrative quotation for the 
second definition of the verb to violate, 'To infringe': 'those reasonings 
which, by violating common sense, tend to subvert every principle of rational 
belief, to sap the foundations of truth and science, and to leave the mind 
exposed to all the horrors of scepticism. ' 212 
The use of Beattie's postscript by Johnson as an illustrative quotation in his dictionary 
highlights the high level which the arguments and tone of the Essay were applauded by 
contemporaries. Beattie clearly believed that the philosophies of modern sceptics were not 
211 James Boswell, Life of Johnson, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, revised by L. F. Powell6 vols. (Oxford: Oxford 
UP, 1934-50) 5: 273-74. 
212 Howard D. Weinbrot, As,pects of Samuel Johnson: Essays on His Arts. Mind. Afterlife. and Politics (Newark, 
DE: U. of Delaware P, 2005) 65. 
136 
following the course of virtuous investigation, and he considered their deviation from the 
path he outlines in the Essay as dangerous to the very fabric of society. The postscript 
contains an interesting explanation/apology for the Essay, while vindicating the intensity of 
feeling which has been its Achilles heel among modem scholars.213 Beattie explains: "I am 
not so much addicted to controversy, as ever to enter into any but what I judge to be of very 
great importance: and into such controversy I cannot, I will not, enter with coldness and 
unconcem.m14 It is in fact his lack of objective investigation and heated argumentation that 
have led modem scholars to discount the importance of the Essay. 
In contrast to its contemporary reception, however, modem scholarship has not 
praised the Essay; even those sympathetic to Beattie have labelled it "not truly a work of 
philosophy at all, but a polemic, and one with many faults, the worst being bitterness and 
unfairness to Hume.m's I believe this commonly held notion arises from an objective, but not 
contextual, reading of the Essay. It is my intention to place the arguments and evolution of 
the Essay within the context of Beattie's growing literary career, and to explore those ideas in 
it that are important to Beattie's development, and those which had a significant impact upon 
his fellow Britons. The merits of the Essay as a work of philosophy may possibly be 
underestimated by modem scholars, but its contemporary influence and success without any 
doubt present an interesting contrast to the modem dismissal of his arguments. 
An investigation into his motivations and intentions, the arguments of the text, 
contemporary responses to the Essay, as well as its implications for Beattie's career, are 
essential to a fuller understanding of the text and its place in eighteenth-century thought. 
Beattie's involvement in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, or "Wise Club," was an 
213 This postscript was fli'st pri.Iited in the second(l771) eilition ofthe Essay. For more on this postscript seep. 
164. 
214 Beattie, Essay 568. 
215 Roger Robinson, introduction, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Op_position to So.phistry 
and Sce,pticism, by James Beattie (London: Thoemrnes-Routledge, 1996) vi. 
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important part of the development of the Essay. Through it he became acquainted with 
founders of common sense philosophy such as Thomas Reid, George Campbell, and 
Alexander Gerard, and it presented him with a receptive sounding board for his evolving 
philosophical ideas. 
In a letter to Sir William Forbes, he recounts the event, and introduces his initial 
motivations for his exposition: 
but an accidental question lately furnished me with an hint, which I made the 
subject of a two hour discourse at our last meeting. I have for some time 
wished for an opportunity of publishing something relating to the business of 
my profession, and I think I have now found an opportunity; for the doctrine 
of my last discourse seems to be of importance. "216 
It is clear that Beattie's initial composition of the Essay began as a discourse to the 
Philosophical Society, and as his composition progressed he presented a number of 
discourses that closely relate to the subjects of this work.217 Beattie's philosophical arguments 
are introduced and developed in his lectures on moral philosophy to his students, which 
present an interesting context for the composition and publication of the Essay.218 
In some respects the Essay began as a part of Beattie's responsibility to the students in 
his care, to alert them to the dangerous consequences to society and religion he identified in 
Hume's sceptical theory. The majority of Beattie's letters during the subsequent four years 
deal with varying aspects of the Essay, the most significant of these addressing the evolving 
structure and arguments of the work. In this letter to Forbes, Beattie introduces his initial, 
216 Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 30 January 1766. Beattie, Corre&pondence 2:43-44. Al!lo fo~d in W. Forbes, 
1:78 and M:"Foroes;"42. · - · · · ·· - -
217 For a comprehensive list of these discourses, see H. Lewis illman ed., The Minutes of the Aberdeen 
Philosophical Society: 1758-1773. Aberdeen: Aberdeen U. Press, 1990. 
218 Relevant excerpts from Beattie's lectures can be found in Appendix, 318-20. The lectures also contain 
important initial observations upon many of the subjects of Beattie's later essays on the imagination and poetry. 
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somewhat simplistic plan for the work, and also provides a context for the challenge that he 
felt he must make to scepticism and its proponents. He begins by outlining his philosophical 
doctrine, which borrows its foundation from Thomas Reid's An Inquiry into the Human Mind 
on the Principles of Common Sense (1764). 
The ideas expressed by Reid concerning the operation of the senses and the ideas of 
the mind are integral to an understanding of Beattie's arguments, because he intended his 
own work to supplement the investigations of his colleague, and specifically to refute 
sceptical arguments. Reid (also a member of the "Wise Club") deals with each of the five 
senses and traces their functions to the notion of common sense, which he defines as those 
ideas: 
which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are 
under a necessity to take for granted in the common concern of life, without 
being able to give a reason for them; these are what we call the principles of 
common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call 
absurd.219 
The Inquiry clearly presents the doctrine of common sense and its function in relation to the 
five senses, but Beattie did not believe it explained the ways in which the philosophy of 
common sense disproves sceptical theories.220 Additionally, Reid's praise of sceptical 
philosophers, David H ume in particular, worried Beattie. His fears concerning the influence 
and popularity of sceptical doctrines were intense and very real in his mind. In the early days 
of his composition Beattie shared his perception of the justness of his attack on scepticism: 
"The farther I advance, the more thoroughly am I satisfied that my own principles are just, 
219-Thomas'-Reid~An-InQ!.rirY into"tlie'HumjurMiild on the Principles of Common Sense~ ed. DerekR. Brookes 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1997) 33. 
220 
"My principles, in the main, are not essentially different from Dr Reid's; but they seem to offer a more 
compendious method of destroying scepticism." Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 30 January 1766. Beattie, 
Correspondence 2:44. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:78 and M. Forbes, 42. 
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and that those of Scepticism are false and frivolous."221 This conviction naturally arises from 
Beattie's adherence to the inseparable connection between theology and philosophy. For 
Beattie and many of his contemporaries: 
Ethics and religion were inseparable, because the moral human being 
reflecting on his own constitution could not but recognize that his benevolent 
affections and moral sense were the gift of his creator and confirmed that 
creator's existence. 222 
In defence of this conviction Beattie argues diligently and at times harshly with the sceptical 
theories ofHume. Beattie reveals in a letter to Thomas Blacklock his motivation for this 
harsh treatment ofHume, and his perceptions ofHume's doctrines: he says he "treated him as 
a rational, moral and immortal being, a sceptic and an Atheistical writer. My design was, not 
to make a book full of fashionable phrases and polite expressions, but to undeceive the 
publick in regard to the merits of the Sceptical philosophy and the pretensions of its 
abettors. "223 
It is this conviction of the connection between religion and philosophy which earned 
The Essay high praise among Beattie's contemporaries, but has clouded its philosophical 
arguments among modem readers. Beattie felt scepticism presented a true danger to religion 
and society, and "he believed that Hume's high philosophical reputation would allow his anti-
religious views to carry the day with those who did not understand his arguments."224 Beattie 
believed his essay to be a vindication of religion and proper moral values in the face of 
scepticism, and utilised the language he deemed necessary to achieve his purpose. 
221 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock 26 December 1767. Beattie, Correspondence 2:55-58. 
222 Isabel'Rivers;"-Reason;·Grace;'and~Sentiinent:'ASfudy of the Language'of Reii!!ioil-arid Ethics in England. 
1660-1780 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 1:239. 
223 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 27 May 1770. Beattie, Correspondence 2:106-9. 
22~oger Robinson, introduction, An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Qpposition to Sqphistry 
and Scsmticism. by James Beattie (London: Thoemmes-Routledge, 1996) viii. 
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In his introduction to the Essay Beattie defends the tone of his treatise: "I must take 
the liberty to treat this author [Hume] with that plainness, which the cause of truth, the 
interests of society, and my own conscience require."225 It is ironic that this treatment, which 
Beattie believed essential to the influence of the Essay, has partially led to its relative 
ignominy among modem readers. Indeed, Hume's Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding (1748) can be seen as an attempt to explain in clearer language the complex 
philosophical system he introduced in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739). Hume himself 
recalls: ''Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. It 
fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such distinction, as even to excite a murmur 
among the zealots. "226 Though this is of course an exaggeration, David Hume in his 
Life portrays the Treatise as a work of youthful ambition, which was tempered later in the 
Enquiry. Hume's seeming discontent with his early work in this excerpt is not as negative as 
it initially seems. 
As Stephen Buckle explains, the borrowing from Pope's "Epilogue to the Satires"227 
provides an interesting context for Hume's attitude toward the Treatise: "So Hume seems to 
be saying, not merely that the Treatise did not attract a wide readership, but also that this is 
what one should expect, given its flaws."228 Some modem scholars point to the Treatise as a 
youthful convoluted initiation into philosophy, and suggest that with the Enquiry "he 
attempted to achieve a similarly cultivated form of communication [to that achieved by 
Joseph Addison] with the broader literary community."229 
225 Beattie, Essay 12-13. 
226 Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1954) 116. 
227 The line Hume borrows: "All, all but Truth, drops dead born from the Press" Alexander Pope, "Epilogue to 
the Satires" Dialogue 2, 226. The italics of the line inHume's narrative support Buckle's argument that Hurne 
-cJmowingly borrows the line. - ----- - - -- - ~ - --- . . . . 
228 Stephen Buckle, Hume's Enlightenment Tract; The Unity and Pwpose of"An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding" (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001) 8. 
229 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
2000) 9. 
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In the 1777 advertisement to his works, Hume explains "The reason for writing the 
Enquiry and the other works is there given terms of the lessons the young author learnt from 
the Treatise's poor reception."230 The content of the Enquiry is very similar to the Treatise, 
but its ideas are presented in it are more accessible, and therefore, from Beattie's viewpoint, 
its content was more insidiously dangerous. The respective merits of the Enquiry and the 
Treatise are points of contention among modem scholars. One argument stresses the 
importance of the Treatise as the work of true philosophy, and insists that it eclipses the 
repackaged popular philosophy of the Enquiry. Buckle, in making a case for the serious study 
of the Enquiry, discounts the philosophy of the Treatise, arguing that "attending to the 
Treatise alone easily gave a reader a false impression of the author's philosophy."231 He 
believes the Treatise is valuable to trace "the early history ofHume's opinions,m32 but not as a 
representation ofHume's philosophical system. 
Yet Hume's contemporaries did not share this predilection for the Enquiry, as 
evidenced from the fact that serious examination of his doctrines focuses solely upon the 
arguments of the Treatise, because it was the work which made Hume's reputation as a 
serious philosopher. It is significant that nowhere in the Essay does Beattie quote from, or 
refer to, the Enquiry; he focuses his attention entirely upon Hume's arguments as presented in 
the Treatise. Beattie probably recognised the Treatise as the more developed coherent 
philosophical system, which could win over philosophers and influential thinkers, who would 
endanger the general public by popularising it. The separation inHume's system between 
theology and philosophy is a glaring example of their differing philosophical outlooks. Hume 
perceived philosophy as a separate discipline from theology, and "attempted to provide an 
original analysis of human moral principles that had no connexion with"religion, andche 
230 Buckle, 10. 
231 Buckle, 11. 
232 Buckle, 11. 
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regarded this as his most important contribution to philosophy."233 
The harshness towards Hume and sceptical philosophy in the Essay is, in part, 
Beattie's reaction to both what he saw as the dangerous nature ofHume's sceptical 
assertions, and the compliments paid to sceptics by their adversaries. 234 Beattie makes his 
opinions clear in his initial letter on the subject: "I own it is not without indignation, that I see 
sceptics and their writings (which are the bane not only of science, but also of virtue) so 
much in vogue in the present age."235 This early vehemence Beattie himself endeavoured to 
temper in the second edition of the Essay, which contains a long postscript that is meant to 
justify his strong condemnation ofHume's doctrines. 
The Arguments of the Essay on Truth 
Beattie intended the Essay to illuminate the errors of sceptical doctrines through the 
philosophy of common sense, and in so doing uphold the validity of the idea of truth, 
illustrating the proper role of philosophy in the process of human life. It is not a philosophical 
explication of an entire system of thought, but rather a specialised investigation of particular 
theories advanced by sceptical philosophers. Thomas Reid's Inguiry establishes the system of 
common sense regarding the functions of the five senses, and it is likely that Beattie expected 
his readers to be familiar with its tenets. The Essay on Truth and A Treatise of Human Nature 
are different kinds of philosophical explication, and so I intend to investigate their 
233 Rivers, 1:239. 
234 Reid praises sceptical thinkers generally: ''They have made many openings that may lead to the discovery of 
truths which they did not reach, or to the detection of errors to which they were involuntarily intangled." Reid, 
18-19. He also calls Hurne: " ... undoubtedly one of the most acute metaphysicians that this or any age hath 
produced." Reid, 32. Beattie explains his desire "to _exhibit our Metaphysical Scepticks in that light in which 
-they ought-to be nuide to appear;· but in•which·none of their-professed answerers' hafever plRced ·the~ namely 
as the bane of science and the pest of society." Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 24 May 1768. Beattie, 
Corres,pondence 2:58-60. 
235 Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 30 January 1766. Beattie, Corres.pondence 2:44. Also found in W. Forbes, 
1:78 and M. Forbes, 42. 
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relationship thematically rather than structurally. 
I will explore the main tenets of the Essay in the order in which they arise: the 
definitions of truth and common sense, the existence of matter and internal sense, memory 
and the imagination, the definition of belief, cause and effect, liberty and necessity, and the 
consequences (according to Beattie) of a firm adherence to scepticism. Beattie's defmition of 
truth is an important beginning, since it is the base upon which he will construct the rest of 
his argument. He declares: "I account That to be truth which the constitution of my nature 
determines me to believe, and That to be falsehood which the constitution of my nature 
determines me to disbelieve."236 Beattie here seems to be arguing that truth is subjective 
rather than transcendent, but the following passage makes it clear that God has embedded the 
same test of truth in every subjective mind, because belief is linked with the nature ofthe 
universe as created by God: "I say, that I believe them to be true [ie. existence of God]; that 
is, I conceive them to express something conformable to the nature ofthings."237 
Though Beattie seems to be dangerously close to scepticism, he further expands on 
the previous passage by dividing truth into probable and certain, and proposes that they are 
fmite and universal in nature: 
Whatever a rational being is determined, by the constitution of his nature, to 
admit as probable, may be called probable truth; the acknowledgement of it is 
as universal as rational nature, and will be as permanent. But, in this inquiry, 
we propose to confme ourselves chiefly to that kind of truth which may be 
called certain, which enforceth our conviction; and the belief of which, in a 
sound mind, is not tinctured with doubt or uncertainty. 238 
Though Beattie~initially-arguesthat personal conviction is paramount-to recognition of truth, 
236 Beattie, Essay 29. 
237 Beattie, Essay 27. 
238 Beattie, Essay 30. 
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which is undoubtedly subjective, he labels personal conviction as a characteristic of the 
human mind endowed by God, and is therefore both finite, and universal. 
This is a key difference between Beattie's common sense and Hume's scepticism; 
according to Beattie, truth cannot be proved or disproved by philosophical reasoning- it exists 
simply because it would be against our inherent character to believe otherwise.239 According 
to Hume, truth relies upon the individual's experiences, and the verdict lies in his own 
reasoning faculty. He explains: "After the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can 
give no reason why I shou 'd assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong propensity to consider 
objects strongly in that view, under which they appear.m40 Truth inHume's system becomes a 
matter of debate within the individual based upon evidence :from experience, habit, and the 
testimony of our senses. 
The decision between truth and falsehood "consists in an agreement or disagreement 
either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter offact.m41 Reality for 
Hume is solely based upon perceptions, and so the mind's interpretation of these perceptions 
leads to the assignment of truth or falsehood to a proposition. Beattie and Hume each base 
their systems upon different definitions of truth, a divergence that is at the heart of their 
respective philosophies. Beattie's doctrine of common sense is another pillar upon which he 
will build his arguments in opposition to sceptical philosophy. He defines common sense as 
''that faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth"242 and as that which comes to the mind 
"neither from education nor habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will.m43 
239 Beattie argues that "The certainty of some truths, for instance, is perceived intuitively; the certainty of others 
is perceived, not intuitively, but in consequence of a proof." Beattie, Essay 31. 
!40~David Hume~A"Treatise of Human Nature:"Beiitg-anAttemi:ltto-Introdt.icethe E2ij)"eriffienta1Metliod of 
Reasoning into Moral Subjects, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1978) 65. 
241 Hume, Treatise 458. 
242 Beattie, Essay 31-32. 
243 Beattie, Essay 40. 
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The refutation of sceptical doctrines in the Essay is based upon this principle as the 
foundation for understanding and rational thought. This principle, as Beattie defines it, does 
not easily lend itself to the kind of argumentation and system-building ofHume's Treatise or 
indeed of Reid's Inquiry. Beattie and Reid's doctrine of common sense was presented within 
the context of the Scottish philosophical movement to refine and specifically Christianize the 
moral system first articulated by Lord Shaftesbury in Characteristicks of Men. Manners. 
Opinions, Times (1711).244 The moral sense according to Shaftesbury, is the part ofthe mind 
through "which [we] can reflect on our affections and passions" and in this context he 
introduces the term 'moral sense' which Hutcheson made central to his own thinking.245 The 
problematic nature of common sense as a viable philosophical argument should be examined 
within the context of the Christianisation of Shaftesbury's moral arguments effected by 
Joseph Butler,246 Francis Hutcheson, Lord Kames,247 and Adam Smith.248 The theory of 
common sense Beattie explicates in the Essay arises within the context of the Scottish 
movement to reconcile philosophical enquiry with religious doctrines and beliefs. Beattie 
does not attempt to recast Hume's doctrine in a form he finds acceptable, but to prove it to be 
detrimental to society on all counts. His desire to validate the position of his own philosophy 
within this Scottish context is illustrated in the arguments that follow, the first of them being 
the question of the existence of matter. 
244 Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of. Characteristicks of Men. Manners. Opinions. Times, ed. Philip 
A~es. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999) 1:201-2, 1:214-15. 
24 Francis Hutcheson, Philosophical Writings, ed. R. S. Downie (London: Everyman, 1994) xx. 
246 In Fifteen Sermons ( 1729) Butler attributes to humankind conscience and reflection, and articulates the basis 
ofBeattie's ideas of liberty and necessity: Seep. 155-56. 
247 Lord Kames supports his argument concerning trains of perceptions and ideas by first asking how this could 
not be, and his statements demonstrate the experience of the senses. Henry Home, Elements of Criticism 3rd ed. 
~}s;:dTh~ ~e~~~=~~!=:~1(~;~9~~~~ c~~~u~s ~e-arguments of-Hu:hes~n co:c~~-th: ~~ral 
sense and argues that moral sentiment is connected to the perceptions of what is natural and just in society and 
the natural world. Adam Smith, The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1976) 323-24. 
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The debate concerning the existence of matter was not new, and Beattie's arguments 
on the subject are nothing if not conventional. He bases the belief in matter upon the notion 
that such facts cannot be proved by argument, but are rather based upon the notion of 
common sense, and so cannot be disputed: "But I cannot prove by argument, that there is 
such a thing as matter in the world, or even that I myself exist: and yet I know as assuredly, 
that I do exist, and that there ... is a real material world. "249 This argument is directed at 
Berkeley's theory that the existence of matter is dependent upon its being perceived by the 
senses. Berkeley, in other words, takes Locke's theory of empirical knowledge presented in 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689) to one of its possible logical 
conclusions, while at the same time deflecting attention from the atheistic suggestions others 
found in empiricism.25° For Berkeley: 
The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived: the trees therefore are 
in the garden, or chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody 
to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is 
reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them is it again created. 251 
His theory seems to deny the physical existence of objects, but he resolves this by arguing 
that God continually perceives the world, and enables human perception: "The ideas 
imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things: and those excited by 
the imagination being less regular, vivid and constant, are more properly termed ideas."252 
249 Beattie, Essay 62. 
250 In the Essay on Human Understanding Locke refutes the notion of innate or instinctive knowledge and 
argues that all knowledge is acquired through experience. He also asserts that God would not have created 
humans with senses able to attain knowledge if knowledge were innate. Berkeley argues that God and the soul 
exist with certainty even though this cannot be proved by empirical evidence:-Paraphrased from Stephen Priest, 
The British Empiricists: Hobbes to Ayer (London: Penguin, 1990) 53-54, 104. 
251 George Berkeley, Philosophical Works: Including the Works on Vision, Introduction and notes by M. R. 
Arrs (London: Dent, 1975) 90. 
25 Berkeley, 86. 
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Beattie specifically refutes Berkley's theories of existence, explaining that "By 
inde.pendent existence, we mean an existence that does not depend on us, nor, so far as we 
know, on any being, except the creator. BERKELEY, and others, say, that matter exists not but 
in the minds that perceive it; and consequently depends, in respect of its existence, upon 
those minds."253 Despite his negative remarks on Berkeley's system, he treats the philosopher 
with polite regard, and praises his defence ofreligion.254 However, Beattie feared the sceptical 
potential of Berkeley's empirical theory, and with reason, because Hume builds upon 
Berkeley's theories in his ideas of existence. Hume argues that we arrive at the concept ofthe 
existence of objects through our perceptions. He reasons: "the idea of existence must either 
be deriv'd from a distinct impression, conjoin'd with every perception or object of our 
thought, or must be the very same idea of the perception or object.mss 
The conviction of the existence of the object comes from the perception of it by our 
senses, and the interpretation of those sensations by the mind, which relies upon memory, 
experience, and custom to give the object a value or category. The function of the memory "is 
not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position.m56 It is in this process of 
identification that the imagination becomes a significant player. The imagination can 
manipulate the order of these simple ideas, and allow the mind to make connexions that were 
never present before it. According to Hume, the existence of objects is an idea, not a value 
inherent in the object itself: "The idea of existence, then, is the very same with the idea of 
what we conceive to be existent."257 Beattie, on the contrary, argues that the ideas prompted 
253 Beattie, Essay 283. 
254 Berkeley's Alciphron: Or The Minute Philosopher (1732) presents scepticism as detrimental, highlights the 
importance of common sense in reasoning and moral judgement, and vindicates belief in Christianity and its 
-principles."Beattiebuilds·on,many·of-hisassertions'and'presentsan-interesting'context for'Berkeley's ideas 
concerning the purpose of philosophy and the nature of truth. Seep. 143. 
255 Hume, Treatise 66. 
256 Hume, Treatise 9. 
257 Hume, Treatise 66. 
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by the perceptions of our senses are the result of characteristics inherent in the object and do 
not rely upon our perception of them for their existence: "things are what our external senses 
represent them."258 He then restates the argument of Hume and others plainly, but refutes it by 
stating simply "that is it not in the power, either of wit or of madness, to contrive any conceit 
more inconsistent, more absurd, or more nonsensical, than this, That the material world hath 
no existence but in the mind."259 This case is representative of the kind of refutations found in 
the Essay. According to Beattie, the existence of matter cannot be proved through argument, 
and so he cannot argue against Hume's hypothesis in usual philosophical language. The 
debate concerning the existence and nature of the soul is another point of difference between 
the two theories. He asserts that our knowledge of the existence of the soul as distinct from 
the body is verified by an internal sense, and is innate to our basic understanding of the self. 
For Beattie the function of the internal sense is modified from that of his Scottish 
predecessors, who each in turn modified the function of this faculty. Francis Hutcheson 
identifies internal senses as "an inward sensation, perception, or consciousness, of all the 
actions, passions, and modifications, of the mind; by which its own perceptions, judgements, 
reasonings, affections, feelings, may becomes its object: it knows them and fixes their 
names."260 He argues that the internal and the external senses operate in the same general 
ways: "All our primary and direct ideas or notions are derived from one or other of these 
sources. But the mind never rests in bare perception; it compares the ideas received, discerns 
their relations."261 This is a distinction which Beattie does not make; in his system conviction 
about the ideas of the internal sense does not arise from any external objects, and the 
interpretation of the data from external senses is not interpreted by an internal sense. 
258-B~~tti~, Ess~i64. 
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For Beattie, the internal sense is the means through which we intuitively perceive unalterable 
characteristics of our self, such as the existence of the soul. 
Gerard multiplies the number of internal senses, and deals with them with regard to 
the development of taste. For Gerard, the function of the internal senses is to identify "finer 
and more delicate perceptions, than any which can be properly referred to our external 
organs.m62 Lord Kames also multiplies the number and function of internal senses, and 
assigns them each different functions. He explains: "All the objects of internal sense are 
attributes: witness deliberation, reasoning, resolution, willing, consenting, which are internal 
actions; as also passions and emotions."263 Beattie does not articulate the various internal 
senses or their functions within the mind. For his purpose, the internal sense is a generic term 
used to denote that which is perceived through something other than external senses. 
An individual's conviction that he has a soul "could arise from nothing but 
consciousness, a certain irresistible persuasion, that we have a soul distinct from the body. 
The evidence of this notion is intuitive; it is the evidence of internal sense."264 This is directly 
the opposite ofHume, who does not make a distinction between body and soul as separate 
elements ofhuman beings,265 and he resolves that "the question concerning the substance of 
the soul is absolutely unintelligible.'0266 The soul cannot be perceived by the external senses, 
which means that no impression exists that enables us to form an idea of it. This conclusion 
becomes clear when considered in terms of his assertion that ''the existence, therefore, of any 
being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are 
262 Gerard, Taste 1-2. 
263 Kames, 50 1. 
2~-Beattie,-Essay-79; 
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"Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider' d by the mind; but 
arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or 
~erception." Hume, Treatise 276. 
66 Hume, Treatise 250. 
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founded entirely on experience. "267 Since the soul does not have a corporeal existence it is not 
perceptible by the external senses; and therefore we cannot be certain of its existence or its 
properties. 
Where for Beattie, the soul is recognised intuitively by the internal sense, for Hume 
intuition is linked with knowledge, and defined as the certainty in the relations that arises 
from the four relations observable to the senses, these being: resemblance, contrariety, 
degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity or number.268 These characteristics are 
assigned by the mind on the basis of custom and experience, and require no abstract 
reasoning. He also takes issue with Hume's assertion that man is "a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 
perpetual flux and movement."269 He refutes this idea through the application of the doctrine 
of common sense: ''That our soul exists, and continues through life the same individual being, 
is a dictate of common sense; a truth which the law of our nature renders it impossible for us 
to disbelieve.00270 His conclusion attempts to defy refutation by resting upon his definition of 
truth and his conviction of the validity of common sense. 
And this debate concerning the soul then leads him to question Hume's idea of 
identity. Beattie believes the same doctrine that upholds the soul also supports the stability 
and certainty of personal identity without dispute. According to his system "Our identity is 
perceived by consciousness; but consciousness is as different from identity, as the 
understanding is different from truth."271 Hume's arguments concerning identity no doubt 
appeared impious to Beattie, because Hume does not agree that the self is a constant. 
267 David Hume: Enquiries: Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L. 
A. Selby-Bigge revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) 164. Hume's ideas concerning cause and 
effectare addressed later in the-chapter.-- -
268 Paraphrased from Hume, Treatise 70. 
269 Hume, Treatise 252. 
270 Beattie, Essay 91. 
271 Beattie, Essay 84. 
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This disbelief undermines moral accountability for one's actions, which Beattie believes will 
lead to immorality and mischief.272 For Hume the self cannot be a permanent fixture, because 
the idea of self cannot be derived from a sensory impression, which is the basis of all 
knowledge. 273 For an impression to give rise to the identity of self, "that impression must 
continue invariably the same, thro' the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos'd to 
exist after that manner."274 But since every impression is constantly changing and being 
reassessed by the mind, the self does not exist in a state of permanence. 
Beattie is confident that "this very notion of his [Hume's] concerning identity, when 
fairly stated, is absurd and self-contradictory."275 The vehement attempt Beattie makes to 
refute Hume's argument attests to the influence he felt it would have, and illustrates once 
again the limitations of a refutation based upon the doctrine of common sense. The Essay 
then shifts to a discussion of the role and function of memory. Beattie does not begin by 
defining memory or outlining its function; instead the Essay operates upon the usual 
defmition of that faculty, and insists upon confident belief in the ideas presented to the mind 
by memory. The separation between the faculties of memory and the imagination is also 
clearly made: "Sometimes we doubt, whether in a particular case we exert memory or 
imagination; and our belief is suspended accordingly: but no sooner do we become conscious, 
that we remember, than conviction instantly takes place."276 Conviction of the validity of 
ideas presented by the memory does not arise from reasoning but from the same instinctive 
property that distinguishes between truth and falsehood. 
272 He-investigates this idea, further in chis section on Liberty and Necessity; see pp. 155~58. 
273 See Hume, Treatise 251. 
274 Hume, Treatise 251. 
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He claims that this conviction is innate to the human mind: "The same Providence 
which endued us with memory, without any care of ours, endued us also with an instinctive 
propensity to believe in it, previously to all reasoning and experience."277 This conviction 
cannot be proven through reasoned argument, and so Beattie relies upon a number of 
illustrations of the conviction we place upon the ideas of the memory to support his claim. 
Hume does not ascribe to the memory the usual function: in his system it is the part of the 
mind responsible for the order and position of sense impressions. He explains this distinction 
in simple terms: "The chief exercise of the memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but 
their order and position."278 
Memory is also the faculty of the mind that allows humans to perceive a personal 
identity, because it orders the perceptions and sensations, and enables us to perceive 
continuance and causation. Once this continuance has instilled in us the idea of personal 
identity ''we can extend the same chain of causes, and consequently the identity of our 
persons beyond our memory, and can comprehend times ... which we have entirely forgot, but 
suppose in general to have existed."279 Hume does not ascribe permanence to perceptions, and 
it is through the memory that our conviction of the continuity of our existence is founded. He 
also makes an important distinction between memory and the imagination; the former 
preserves the order of impressions while the latter "is not restrain'd to the same order or form 
with the original impressions."280 Whilst the imagination can vary the perceptions and create 
something wholly new to the mind, this new creation must be based upon a sense impression, 
and is distinguished from remembered ideas by the comparative dullness of the imagined 
idea. 
-··-· -
277 Beattie, Essay 93. 
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Beattie points out the complications with this doctrine, arguing that it ''may 
sometimes, but cannot always, be true: for ideas of imagination are oft mistaken for objects 
of sense; ideas of memory never. The former, therefore, must often be more lively than the 
latter; for, according to Mr. Hume's own account, all ideas are weaker than impressions.11281 
Beattie distinguishes memory from imagination in terms of how one operates in relation to 
the other: "a retrospect to former experience always attends the exertions of memory, but 
those of imagination are not attended with any such retrospect."282 
He further asserts that these distinctions are made within the mind without any need 
of reasoned explanation: "The truth is, that when we remember, we generally know that we 
remember; when we imagine, we generally know that we imagine: such is our 
constitution."283 According to Beattie, the mind's ability to distinguish between products of 
the imagination and of memory comes from an internal sense endowed upon all humans from 
the time of creation, and the conviction of validity of these impressions does not require any 
further explanation. Hume links the notion ofbeliefto the division between memory and the 
imagination, whilst Beattie makes no attempt to defme belief as anything more than an 
intuitive conviction which cannot be explained. 
Beattie does not specifically define belief as we have seen, in his system, it results 
from the intuitive sense and does not rely upon any outside data for validation. Beattie 
distinguishes belief in the existence of an object from the intensity of the perceptions that 
arise from that object. He explains that ''the vivacity of a perception does not seem necessary 
to our belief of the existence of the object perceived."284 Hume, by contrast, explains that the 
''belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of 
281 Beattie, Essay 99-100. 
282 Beattie, Essay 100. 
283 Beattie, Essay 101. 
284 Beattie, Essay 95. 
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those perceptions they present; and ... this alone distinguishes them from the imagination."285 
Hume also links the intensity of a perception with belief in the existence of an object: "belief 
is a more vivid and intense conception of an idea, proceeding from its relation to a present 
impression."286 According to Hume, belief is another word for the conception of the object in 
the mind as it relates to the first impression, and is marked by its vividness in the mind. 
For both philosophers, belief is an idea that has no basis in rational thought or 
reasoning, and arises from intuitive sense in Beattie's case, and the vivacity of an idea and its 
impression for Hume. The relationship between cause and effect is an important part of 
Hume's system, but Beattie does not assign it the same power within the mind. Beattie 
explains the relationship between cause and effect in much the same way as he supposedly 
despatched Hume's other arguments. The notion that "every thing beginning to exist 
proceedeth from some cause"287 initiates his contention with Hume. Beattie agrees with Hume 
that it cannot be proven but takes issue with the larger element ofHume's rebuttal: "This 
maxim therefore he affirms, and I allow, to not be demonstrably certain. But he further 
affirms, that it is not intuitively certain; in which I cannot agree with him."288 Beattie intends 
to refute Hume's argument that instead of intuitive certainty, this maxim relies upon cause 
and effect. 
Beattie directly challenges this tenet ofHume's system through the usual method of 
common sense: "I cannot admit, that all certainty arises from a comparison of ideas .. .I 
cannot conceive that any comparison of ideas is necessary to produce these convictions in my 
mind.11289 Beattie argues his maxim is true because "it is a principle of common sense: we 
believe it, not because we can give a reason, but because, by the law of our nature, we must 
285
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believe it."290 In the Enquiry Hume observes cause and effect in terms of the existence of 
objects: "All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause 
and effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory 
and senses. " 291 Beattie identifies danger in this theory because of its atheistic consequences. 
To attribute the relationship between cause and effect to associationism implicitly 
questions the idea of the first and final cause, which is inevitably God. According to Hume's 
assertions, the existence of objects is based upon this relation between cause and effect. 
Beattie, predictably, does not agree, and argues that conviction in the existence of objects is 
intuitive certainty rather than an effect from a cause perceived by the mind. This comparison 
of ideas which Beattie dismisses is integral to Hume's system, especially as it relates to the 
functions of the imagination: "there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in 
the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and 
effect betwixt their objects."292 For Hume, cause and effect is an associating principle that 
orders impressions and ideas, enabling the mind to form connections between them in both 
the memory and the imagination. Beattie does not make the same distinctions between the 
mental faculties, and bases his refutation ofHume's doctrine upon the foundation of common 
sense, which cannot be argued with the same logical structure as Hume's scepticism. 
The section concerning liberty and necessity is a large section of the Essay, which is 
interesting in the context of the intense theological and philosophical debate surrounding the 
topic. Beattie's argument on this topic is representative of the pious vehemence he felt 
necessary to protect religion and morality, which he informally recounts in a letter to Thomas 
Blacklock: 
That! am a free agent, is what I not only believe, but what Ijudge to be of 
290 Beattie, Essay 111. 
291 Hume, Enquiry 26. 
292 Hume, Treatise 11. 
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such importance that all morality must be founded on it, yea and all religion 
too. To vindicate the ways of God to man, is not so difficult a thing when 
we acknowledge human liberty; but on the principles of fatality, it seems to 
me to be absolutely impossible.293 
This passage illustrates the dangers to religion and morality he perceived in fatalist doctrines. 
Beattie will attempt to discredit the theory of association presented in David Hartley's 
Observations on Man (1749). He argues that this theory undermines the idea of man as free 
agent.294 Hartley explains that the ideas in the mind come from common observations of the 
senses: ''Thus the Names, Smells, Tastes, and tangible Qualities of natural Bodies, suggest 
their visible Appearances to the Fancy."295 According to Hartley "every Action, or bodily 
Motion, arises from previous Circumstances, or bodily Motions, already existing in the 
Brain. "296 
Hartley then builds upon this account of action and the circumstances that lead to an 
action or its opposite, and defines free will as "the Power of doing what a Person desires or 
wills to do ... or of resisting the Motives of Sensuality, Ambition, Resentment &c."297 Hartley 
removes from free will the notion of morality and illustrates that human action is mechanistic 
in nature. In this section Beattie attempts to illustrate through common sense the absurdity of 
philosophy that attempts to undermine free will and the inherent ability to distinguish 
between good and evil actions. Beattie begins by claiming that distinctions between good and 
evil actions are "as natural to the human constitution, as the faculties of hearing, seeing, and 
293 To Thomas Blacklock, 27 May 1770. Beattie, Correspondence 2:108. 
294 Joseph Priestley's positive view of Hartley and his theories of association provide an important intellectual 
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memory; it is clear, unequivocal, and affecting, as any intimation from any sense external or 
internal.m98 This natural relationship is attributed by Joseph Butler in Fifteen Sermons (1729) 
to the conscience, which is also an integral part of human beings. They are endowed with 
"reflection or conscience, an approbation of some principles or actions, and disapprobation of 
others.'0299 According to Butler any investigation of morals leads to "our obligations to the 
practice ofvirtue."30° Charles Mayne301 in the Essay on Consciousness (1728) attributes to 
consciousness the same power and awareness of choice in any action in its relation to the self: 
"the Mind, before it exerts its Will or Power of Chusing, knows and is Conscious to it self, 
that it hath a Power of Choice and Preference. mo2 
Beattie picks up this same argument in response to Hume's assertion that such 
judgements between vice and virtue are derived from perception, like every other action of 
the mind.303 InHume's system, "moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, 
and are deriv'd from our situation with regard to external objects, the relations, from which 
these moral distinctions arise, must lie only betwixt internal actions, and external objects.m04 
The universal and inherent qualities Beattie assigns to morality are not valid inHume's 
system, because ''we cannot prove a priori, that these relations, if they really existed and were 
perciev'd, wou'd be universally forcible and obligatory."305 Hume's restriction of morality to 
the relation between objects and the interpretation of these perceptions within the mind is 
another example of what Beattie perceived as dangerous inHume's system. 
298 Beattie, Essay 320. 
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This doctrine by its very nature undermines moral culpability and the responsibility of 
the individual. It is within this context of intense fear for religion and society that Beattie 
harshly attacks this particular part ofHume's doctrine. Beattie believes the free will of every 
person is undeniable, but "My liberty in these instances I cannot prove by argument; but there 
is not a truth in geometry of which I am more certain. "306 Mayne and Butler each articulate 
this same idea of personal power and the culpability for actions. For Butler the rule of moral 
action is dictated by God, because the human conscience is a divine creation. Beattie believes 
that Hume's doctrine of power attacks this notion of personal culpability as well as morality 
as a divine creation. For Mayne: "the Mind, in its acts of Willing is free, or does determine 
itself; and [that] it is not determined, or forced and necessitated, to Will as it does, by the 
Object or Motive to it."307 Butler also acknowledges the freedom ofthe mind to determine 
actions, but he argues that God's morality is the basis upon which human conscience is built. 
According to Butler: "A machine is inanimate and passive: but we are agents. Our 
Constitution is put in our Power. We are changed with it: and therefore are accountable for 
any disorder or violation ofit."308 The use of the term ''machine" by Butler is taken up two 
decades later by La Mettrie in L'Homme Machine (1747), in which he adapts Descartes' 
theory that animals are machines without souls, and attempts to illustrate the truth ofthis 
maxim regarding human beings. In this treatise he also makes an interesting argument 
concerning the knowledge of human nature philosophers can gamer: "Man is a machine 
constructed in such a way that it is impossible first of all to have a clear idea of it and 
consequently to defme it."309 
306 Beattie, Essay 321. 
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308 Butler, 9. 
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Beattie defines the will through his illustrations as the power of an individual to act or 
not to act, but according to Hume the will is "nothing but the internal impression we feel and 
are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new 
perception of our mind."310 According to Hume, the will is not a part of the mind with any 
power of action, but rather an impression (that is, an emotion- in this case desire) sparked by 
the movement of a new motion or perception within the body. He argues that all ideas are 
copied from impressions presented to the mind, and the will is the recognition of such new 
impressions. Beattie also takes issue with Hume's argument that we cannot have an idea of 
power, but neglects many of his opponent's arguments on the subject.311 Essentially, Hume's 
doctrine is that ideas and emotions arise in the mind from sensory impressions, which are 
based upon sense perceptions, and since power cannot be perceived by the senses we cannot 
have an idea of it. For Hume power is merely the ability to perform an act to satisfy desire: "a 
man has no power, where very considerable motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of 
his desires, and determine him to forbear what he wishes to perform.11312 Beattie perceived 
this notion of power as dangerous to society as a whole, because Hume bases the actions of 
human beings solely upon the fulfilment of desire, and Beattie perceives this as the 
elimination of morality and conscience from human action or inaction. Beattie remarks that if 
Hume can prove his proposition of power true, "he can also prove, that all human discourse is 
nonsense, all human actions absurdity, and all human compositions (his own not excepted) 
words without meaning. 11313 Once again Beattie does not argue against any ofHume's 
statements, instead he illustrates that ifHume were correct in his assessment, all human 
actions and creations would be meaningless, since they would be the product of desire alone. 
31~Hume, :rreatise,399. 
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Hume's proposition concerning power logically leads to his definition of necessity, 
which he labels as an essential part of causation, and "consequently liberty, by removing 
necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing with chance."314 To this 
proposition Beattie makes the same disavowals, which are based upon the consequences of 
the application ofHume's system in day-to-day human life. Beattie argues that "we cannot 
admit this theory of power and causation, without admitting, at the same time, the grossest 
and most impious absurdities. Is this a sufficient confutation of it? I think it is.m1s He once 
again argues that common sense inherently opposes Hume's doctrines, and proceeds by 
illustrating that his common sense "doctrine hath in all ages been supported by some of the 
most powerful principles of our nature; by principles which, in the common affairs of life, no 
man dares suppose to be equivocal or fallacious."316 This passage illustrates an important part 
of what Beattie saw as his philosophical ideals. 
For Beattie, philosophy should enrich life and enable humans to understand the 
workings of God and the universe in a way that will benefit society. He argues that sceptical 
philosophers do great harm to society because "they want to prove, or to disprove, what I 
know by instinct to be unquestionably certain."317 The purpose which Beattie gives 
philosophy and his nervousness over the negative consequences of sceptical investigations 
were shared by Berkeley. This is the crux ofthe conflict Beattie recognises between 
scepticism and common sense, which he will develop in his final section that focuses on the 
consequences of scepticism. 
314 Hume, Treatise 407. 
315 Beattie, Essay 335. 
316 Beattie, Essay 337. 
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He also insists that Cartesian doubt,318 when employed in practical rather than esoteric 
matters, is harmful: "Would not the same spirit of doubt and disputation, applied to more 
familiar instances, transform a philosopher into a madman, and a person of plain sense into 
an idiot?"319 This attack upon the sceptical doctrines leads to the final section of the Essay, 
which deals with the consequences of metaphysical scepticism. 
Beattie's open attack upon scepticism in this final section undoubtedly contributed to 
the Essay's contemporary success, and inevitably to its modem ignominy among modem 
scholars. The separation between theology and philosophy began "after 1650, [when] 
everything, no matter how fundamental or deeply rooted, was questioned in the light of 
philosophical reason and frequently challenged or replaced.m20 Shaftesbury's development 
"of a moral theory grounded in human nature and of a new moral vocabulary''321 further 
moved philosophy from a religious to secular mode of discourse. 
This section of the Essay does not contain reasoned refutation, but rather an 
emotionally charged defence of what Beattie saw as the purpose of all philosophy: to improve 
the mind and soul for the day to day operations of life, with forward thinking toward the 
afterlife. In this section the lack of reasoning and Beattie's tendency to dismiss the reasoned 
arguments of sceptics are more pronounced than in the earlier sections. These failings have in 
part led philosophers to discount the contribution of the rest of the Essay to eighteenth-
century philosophy. Whether this attack upon Hume's sceptical philosophy was warranted or 
not, it represented an important moment in eighteenth-century philosophy. 
31~"By-this I mean' Descartes' method of beginning in doubt; and using logical-argument to'arrive at conviction. 
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In this section, Beattie clearly outlines the insecurities and fears of the establishment 
regarding the popularisation of sceptical philosophies, which is more intemperate than 
anywhere else. Beattie reverts back to his ideas concerning the purpose of philosophy, and 
declares that scepticism does not prepare men for the business of life, which he believes 
should be its chief end. According to him, sceptics "infeeble and harass the soul, [and] divert 
its attention from every thing that can enlarge and improve it, give it a disrelish for itself, and 
for every thing else, and disqualify it alike for action, and for useful knowledge."322 He then 
turns to discount some of the specific sceptical doctrines he has dealt with already in the 
Essay, relying upon his previous arguments to make his case. He begins with ''the doctrine of 
the non-existence of matter; which no man in his senses was ever capable of believing for a 
single moment."323 He then moves on to disclaim in strong language the basis ofHume's 
system: 
That the universe is nothing but a heap of impressions and ideas unperceived 
by any substance, is another of those profound mysteries, from which we need 
not apprehend much danger; because it is so perfectly absurd, that no words, 
but such as imply a contradiction, will express it.324 
Intermingled with these seemingly irrational attacks upon sceptical doctrines is the maxim 
that informs upon the entirety of the Essay: "Every doctrine is dangerous that tends to 
discredit the evidence of our senses, external or internal, and to subvert the original 
instinctive principles of human belief.mzs This statement no doubt rang true among his 
conservative contemporaries, and angered those whom he wished to refute. 
322 Beattie, Essay 492. 
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Edward Stillingfleet in his Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity (1697) 
recognised similar danger in Locke's doctrines, and "blamed Locke for giving weapons to the 
free thinkers, even though they were used in ways Locke had not intended."326 Beattie also 
recognised the inadvertent contribution Locke's theory of primary and secondary qualities 
lends to sceptical thinkers: "Nothing was further from the intention of LOCKE, than to 
encourage verbal controversy, or advance doctrines favourable to scepticism.m27 Beattie goes 
on to examine what he believes to be the dangerous elements of Locke's system, specifically 
the notion of the mind as a blank slate: "That the human mind, previous to education and 
habit, is as susceptible of any one impression as of any other: a doctrine which, if true, would 
go near to prove, that truth and virtue are no better than human contrivances."328 
Beattie illustrates the dangerous consequences of specific elements of Locke's 
system, while insisting upon the value of his work to society and the nobleness of Locke's 
intentions: 
To do good to mankind, by inforcing virtue, illustrating truth, and vindicating 
liberty, was his sincere purpose: and he did not labour in vain. His writings are 
to be reckoned among the few books, that have been productive of real utility 
to mankind. 329 
His recognition of Locke's philosophical value illustrates the purpose of philosophy Beattie 
advocates throughout the Essay. He measures the contributions of Locke's philosophy by its 
usefulness to society and the virtuous intentions of the man himself. His opposing 
characterisations of Locke and Hume are telling when examined within the context of 
Beattie's overarching philosophical vision. 
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Locke is praised because his work (in Beattie's mind generally) benefits society and 
sprang from noble intentions to enrich human life. Hume is discounted because his system (in 
Beattie's mind) is dangerous to the very foundations of society and the human constitution 
generally. For Beattie, the use of Locke's theory by sceptics is an example of the subversive 
and manipulative nature of that method of inquiry. Beattie no doubt intended his attacks upon 
sceptical doctrines to be logical results of the arguments in the Essay concerning these topics, 
but they do as much to harm his case with modem readers as they did to win him fame 
among his contemporaries. 
The postscript he attached to the second (1771) edition of the Essay30 attempts to 
soften this attack upon scepticism. It begins by acknowledging sceptical doctrines to be 
useful in certain contexts: ''where it tends to make men well-bred and good-natured, and to 
rid them of pedantry and petulance, without doing individuals or society any harm, [it] is an 
excellent thing.m31 Beattie tempers his criticism by illustrating the obvious difference 
between moderate and radical scepticism, which had significant classical foundations. 
Lucretius, in Book IV of De Rerum Natura had warned against the implications of sceptical 
reasoning that attempts to refute the evidence of the senses, such as Pyrrhonian scepticism. 
Pyrrhonian scepticism was indeed held in disrepute by Lucretius, as Creech himself remarks 
in his notes to his translation of De Rerum Natura. Lucretius himself argues that the sceptical 
questioning of the senses undermines the tenets that govern every day life, and confound 
morality. The following passage as translated by Thomas Creech in his 1700 translation 
illustrates the consequences of allowing abstract reasoning to undermine daily activities: 
Tho Reason cannot tell thee, why a Square 
330 This is the.edition-ofthe Essay that was owned by·both"the-King"and Samuel Johnson: ''theK said-he-had 
one copy of it [Essay] at Kew and another in town, and immediately I went and took it down from a shelf: I 
found it was the second Edition." Walker, London Diary 86. Samuel Johnson's annotated copy is in the British 
library (pressmark c.60.L.l3) Also found in Robinson, introduction to Essay, xxvii. 
331 Beattie, Essay 535-36. 
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Should seem a perfect Round, when seen from far: 
Better assign a false, than this pretence 
Should overthrow the certainty of Sense, 
Question it's truth, rather than that should fall, 
On which depends our Safety, Life, our All. 332 
It is possible that Beattie's own conviction in the subversive nature of sceptical inquiry began 
with this classical reference,333 although he did not agree with other tenets of the Epicureans. 
Creech's notes present a less temperate view of sceptical investigation. Creech 
supports the arguments made by Lucretius, which presents an interesting example of 
opposition to scepticism in the seventeenth century: ''Hence they proceed to deny all ftrst 
Principles, and so are put beyond all possibility of Conviction, for still demanding proof after 
proof, they must reel on to eternity without satisfaction."334 Throughout the Essay Beattie 
labels sceptical doctrines with the same shortcomings Creech articulates, and he attempts to 
reconcile the arguments scepticism undermines through his doctrine of common sense. 
Contemporary Reception of the Essay on Truth 
The Essay's reception amongst contemporary readers was in fact the polar opposite of 
posterity's verdict. The review in the Annual Register for 1771, most probably written by 
Edmund Burke, praises the strong rebuttal of scepticism: "If he may sometimes be thought 
too warm, it may be easily forgiven, when his warmth neither hinders him from doing justice 
to the merits of his adversaries, where they have real merit, nor leads him to any 
33~ Lucretius: His· Six Books.of Epicurean.Philosophy:cAnd-Manilius:"His-Five Books,-Containing a-System of 
the Ancient Astronomy and Astrology. Together with The Philosophy of the Stoicks, trans. Thomas Creech 
~London: Booksellers of London and Westminster, 1700) Book N. 518-23. 
33 Beattie was introduced to De Rerum Natura in his early youth, see pp. 18-19. 
334 Thomas Creech, notes to Lucretius: His Six Books of Epicurean Philosophy 346. 
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intemperance of language, unworthy of himself or his subject."335 James Fieser comments that 
Beattie's friends cautiously attributed the slow response of the Critical Review to the Essay to 
the influence ofHume's friends, and their desire for the publication to condemn the work. 
Fieser speculates that "the delay reflects the journal's attempt to avoid controversy."336 
Despite the delay and the possible motivations behind it, the review praises the attitude of the 
Essay toward scepticism: "The author has also ingeniously investigated the labyrinth of 
metaphysical sophistry and illusion and irreparably sapped the foundations of the sceptical 
system ofphilosophy."337 Clearly the Essay had succeeded with its target audience, but its 
reception amongst friends of David Hume-naturally-was not positive. 
The only wholly negative response to the Essay was an anonymous pamphlet: The 
essay on the nature and immutability of truth. in opposition to sophistry and scepticism. by 
James Beattie. L.L.D. &c. shewn to be sophistical. and promotive of scepticism and 
infidelity. With some remarks on priestcraft. subscriptions. and establishments. In a letter to a 
friend. By a professor of moral philosophy in the college of common-sense. 338 Fieser proposes 
that the likely author of this pamphlet is Thomas Cogan (1736-1818), a physician and 
Unitarian minister. Fieser explains that the pamphlet attempts to illustrate the dangerous 
consequences of Beattie's common sense in terms of religion and morality. 339 Though the 
pamphlet argues against Beattie's philosophy, it is also "hostile towards the clergy, church 
authority, and religious dogma.m40 Beattie mentions the pamphlet in his London diary in 
terms that illustrate the work's seemingly insignificant status: "The monthly Review last 
month contains a long account of the pamphlet lately published against me, which account is 
335 Annual Register 14 (1771): 353-60. James Fieser, ed., Early Responses to Reid. Oswald. Beattie and Stewart 
Scottish Common Sense Philosophy: Sources and Origins 5 vols. (Bristol: Thoemmes-Routledge, 2000) 3:131. 
3~6 Fieser,,3:140, 
337 Critical Review 32 (1771): 453-9. 
338 London: Baker and Galabin, 1773. 
339 Fieser, 3:180. 
340 Fieser, 3: 181. 
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favourable to me as I could desire, and indeed favourable enough to the pamphlet too, 
considering its insignificance."341 Aside from this anonymous pamphlet, few public 
condemnations of the arguments of the Essay appeared. David Hume himself never 
responded specifically to the Essay, but exclaimed: "Truth! There is no truth in it; it is a 
horrible large lie in octavo!m42 Beattie never met Hume either before or after the publication 
of the Essay, but his letters immediately following its success show a nervousness concerning 
the state of his reputation in Edinburgh. Reasoned responses to the treatise are varied, the 
most positive and comprehensive of these being an anonymous verse epistle dedicated to 
Beattie, with philosophical notes attached, which are intended fully to explain the 
philosophical arguments outlined in the poem. 
A significant philosophical examination ofBeattie's arguments is Joseph Priestley's 
An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common 
Sense, Dr. Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth. and Dr. Oswald's Appeal 
to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion (1774). Priestley examines the three theories of 
common sense as one collective system. The criticism of the Examination is based upon 
Priestley's view of the Scottish philosophy of Common Sense as reactionary and 
overzealous. 343 The section of the Examination that deals with Beattie is the shortest, and 
Priestley's tone towards Beattie is more complimentary than towards Reid or Oswald, but 
even so he does not treat the arguments of the Essay with much respect. 
341 Fieser, 3:182. 
342 Robinson, introduction to Essay, v. 
343 Paraphrased from Priestley's Writings on Philosophy. Science. and Politics, ed. John Passmore (London: 
Macmillan, 1965) 23. 
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The crux of his argument is that the arguments of these authors (which he links, even 
though there are significant differences between them) in favour of common sense are 
inherently false and contradictory. His particular issue with the Essay is Beattie's irreverent 
treatment ofHume's doctrines and what he calls Beattie's desire to involve himself in a 
philosophical controversy. Beattie frequently mentions Priestley's work in his letters around 
this time, and his attitude towards Priestley and his arguments present an interesting context 
for his drafted response. Beattie comments candidly upon what he believes to be Priestley's 
personal attack upon him to Elizabeth Montagu in the fall of 1774: "He [Priestley] attacks 
only the doctrines of the other two; but he is at considerable pains to give the publick a mean 
opinion of my character; which would indeed be a most hateful composition of ill-breeding, 
malevolence, and pride, if Dr Priestley's account of it were true."344 Beattie considered 
Priestley's Examination as a personal affront published by an influential person, and was 
therefore determined to take public notice of it. In numerous letters he makes this intention 
known, explaining that "Had his [Priestley's] work been anonymous, I should not have 
thought it incumbent on me to take notice of it; but as it bears a respectable name, I have 
resolved ... to answer in print."345 Beattie's reason for abandoning this work is unclear, but it is 
likely that his personal circumstances, coupled with a desire to refrain from involving himself 
in open antagonism with Priestley, led him to set this refutation aside. 
344 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 5 October 1774. Beattie, Correspondence 2:283-88. 
345 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 4 October 1774. Beattie, Correspondence 2:288-91. 
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The only response of Beattie's toward Priestley which reached the press was 
originally a private letter. Priestley wrote a letter to Reid, Beattie, and Oswald explaining his 
intention to publish a treatise examining their works in turn, and he subsequently printed the 
response of each of these authors in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review346 along with his 
own opinion of their characters and their responses to his intentions.347 It is unclear whether 
Priestley had permission to print these letters, and Beattie's reference to Priestley's 
publication is not extensive. It is likely that Priestley printed these letters in an attempt to 
excite interest in his forthcoming book, and to perpetuate the myth of controversy and 
contention between himself and ihe authors he criticises in the Examination. Priestley prints 
the letters to Oswald and Beattie that are meant to inform them of his upcoming publication 
and inviting them to respond to his arguments, which he sets out in the preface enclosed with 
each letter.348 Oswald's reply to Priestley's letter demands that the former's remarks not be 
made public,349 while Beattie's is more temperate in tone. Beattie's reply addresses some of 
Priestley's particular arguments concerning Beattie's personal beliefs, and some of those 
which he explicated in the Essay. His letter quotes from Priestley's preface in particular 
instances, and reveals the points of contention between them. 
346 The submission was printed in September 1774 and bears the title: ''The Correspondence of Dr Priestley with 
Dr Oswald and Dr Beattie, relating to the Appeal to Common Sense in behalf of Religion, by the former; and 
the Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, by the latter." 
347 This letter is mentioned in a letter to William Creech on 20 October 1774: "I took but little pains with the 
letter which I sent to Dr Priestley, and which he has published; .. .I kept a copy of it, and made it as concise as 
possible. There is an error in the printed copy, which I beg you to correct in your next magazine ... You have 
never sent me the Edinburgh Magazine for June. I shall be impatient to see the next one, for the reason you 
mention." Beattie, Correspondence 2:288-91. 
348 These letters are also reprinted in James Fieser's appendix to his Early Responses to Reid. Oswald. Beattie 
and Stewart:3:376-84>"'-<,_,_- "----'~ · - ==, - "'- - .· c -- , · 
349 The letter ends: "When you have thought better of the matter, you will not, I presume, chuse to publish the 
sheet you sent me, in the present form; but, if you do, I shall expect you will do me the justice of publishing this 
letter along with it. I have declined entering into a controversy, but this I insist on." The Edinburgh Magazine 
and Review 2 (1774): 635. 
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Beattie begins by reinforcing his sincere desire to do a service to society through the 
Essay: "The Essay on Truth is so well intended, and its principles so well founded, that its 
author can have nothing to fear from the animadversions of a man of science and candour."350 
He then turns to address what he perceives as personal attacks made in the preface, which in 
his mind reflect misunderstandings of his doctrine by Priestley. Beattie then clarifies his 
position concerning the nature of religion, which he believes does not deny the ability of 
reason and the possibility of proof in religion, but establishes a boundary for the reasoning 
faculty: "My doctrine is only this, that all reasoning terminates in first principles, and that 
first principles admit not of proof, because reasoning cannot extend in infinitum; and that it is 
absurd for a man to say, that he disbelieves a first principle, which his conduct shows that he 
does not disbelieve."351 This passage illustrates the differences in the way each philosopher 
understands the power and use of the reasoning faculty. The other significant point of 
contention which Beattie addresses is the definition of common sense. 
In the preface common sense is referred to as a new principle, which Beattie denies: 
"that which I call common sense, is a real part of the human constitution, and as old, and as 
extensive as human nature.m52 This letter exemplifies the opposing philosophical doctrines 
which animated both authors, and also illustrates Beattie's careful attention to Priestley's 
preface and his desire to correspond with an opposing philosopher in a polite fashion. 
Priestley includes his response to this letter from Beattie in this article, which further 
articulates the former's desire to appear before the public in polite terms. 
~-
350 The Edinburgh Magazine and Review 2 (1774): 636. 
351 Edinburgh Magazine and Reyiew 2 (1774): 636. 
352 Edinburgh Magazine and Review 2 (1774): 637. See pp. 177-80 for a detailed investigation into these 
opposing views of common sense. 
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Priestley's reply to Beattie predominantly addresses the fact that they hold similar 
religious convictions and opposite philosophical ideas, and illustrates Priestley's conscious 
desire to be considered as a moderate, well-meaning philosopher, rather than a blind 
adversary to Beattie's particularly popular philosophical ideas. There is only one specific 
point of contention which Priestley addresses in his reply, and that is the lack of moderation 
he perceives in Beattie's reply to the preface. Priestley argues for moderation considering the 
popularity of Beattie's sentiments: "it were to be wished that we might all improve this 
circumstance into a lesson of mutual moderation; and that it might teach us to think as well as 
we possibly can of each other, and especially of the moral influence of our respective 
opinions. To me you appear to have been exceedingly to blame in this respect.m53 Here 
Priestley is upbraiding Beattie's treatment of Hume, which he addresses particularly in the 
Examination,354 and it is a charge which Beattie addresses in his unpublished answer to 
Priestley; but aside from the letter which Priestley published in the Edinburgh Magazine and 
Review Beattie makes no further attempt to address his opponent's arguments publicly. 
Though Beattie never made an intentionally public response, a manuscript bearing the 
title, Hints for an Answer to Dr Priestley's Remarks on the Essay on Truth, survives in the 
Beattie Collection at the University of Aberdeen Special Collections Library. The manuscript 
is not dated, but evidence from the letters places the beginnings of his drafting in late 1774. 
However, by the summer of 1775, his plan to continue with the project faltered, possibly due 
to ill health. 355 The manuscript contains a rough table of contents with subject headings and 
page numbers, which highlight the importance he assigned to each of what he believed to be 
Priestley's important arguments. The text itself is nearly three thousand words in length, and 
353 Edinburgh Magazine and Reyiew vol. 2 (1774): 638. 
354 See pp. 168-69. 
355 Beattie comments that he believes Priestley's book has received a poor reception. Beattie to James Dun, 11 
June 1775. Beattie, Correspondence 2:303-6. 
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contains a mixture of clearly thought-out prose and sporadic brain-storming style notes. It is 
clear from the language and the copious amount of empty space that Beattie was still very 
much in the drafting stage when the project was abandoned.356 This response, while never 
finished, provides an interesting context for an investigation into Priestley's arguments. The 
table of contents in the manuscript illustrate which arguments Beattie identified as important 
in Priestley's work as well as the attention he foresaw each would require in his answer. For 
my investigation of Priestley's arguments I follow the order which Beattie planned to answer 
them, because his drafted comments are best dealt with in the context ofthe arguments which 
prompted them. The sections deal with: the term common sense, evidence of sense, liberty 
and necessity, moral obligation, and miscellaneous remarks. 
Priestley begins his section on the Essay on Truth by acknowledging the sincere 
nature of Beattie's attacks upon scepticism in defence of religion, but condemns what he 
considers to be his impolite and insolent treatment of his adversaries. Priestley specifically 
condemns Beattie's harsh treatment of David Hume's philosophy, claiming that Beattie is 
"insolent to those who think differently from himself'357 and ascribes to sceptical 
philosophers "dangerous and frightful consequences, which they are far from being justly 
chargeable.m58 ln a letter to Blacklock, Beattie accuses Priestley of this same disregard for 
those who disagree with him,359 which informs upon the tone and substance of Beattie's 
remarks in the manuscript. Priestley also calls the value of the Essay into question, 
specifically with regard to the learned readership. 
356 Because this manuscript has never been properly dealt with by modem scholars, and given its importance to 
an understanding of Beattie's work, I have included the text in its entirety as transcribed from the original held 
in Aberdeen. See Appendix 321-26. 
357 Joseph Priestley, An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common 
Sense. Dr. Beattie's An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth. and Dr. Oswald's Appeal to Common 
Sense in-Behalf-of-Religion (London: >Johnson, 171-5)·1, l$. 
3s8 Priestley, Examination 115. 
359 
"If you attend only to his assertions, you would take him for the greatest genius that ever appeared upon the 
earth; so passionate is he in admiring himself and despising his adversaries." Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 4 
October 1774. Beattie, Correspondence 2:281-83. 
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He argues that the Essay could subvert the cause of religion rather than vindicate it: 
"But there is danger lest other persons, of greater penetration, finding that Dr. Beattie argues 
on fallacious unphilosophical principles, should reject at once, and without farther 
examination, all that he has built upon them.m60 Beattie particularly responds to this charge in 
his preliminary remarks: "Well, be it so; if my book has done good even to superficial 
thinkers, it is still useful. 00361 Beattie's tendency to fall back on assertions that cannot be 
demonstrated argumentatively no doubt led Priestley to his conclusion, and Beattie's 
confidence in the validity and necessity of his arguments explains his answer. 
Priestley begins his investigation into Beattie's ideas by questioning his use of the 
word "sense" in relation to truth. He calls into question Beattie's use of"sense" for the 
faculty that perceives truth, because "By this term philosophers in general have hitherto 
denominated those faculties in consequence of which we are liable to feelings relative to 
ourselves only."362 Priestley's argument overlooks the use of the "moral sense" by many 
philosophers as the basis of a moral system. Beattie's extension of the term 'sense' to the 
faculty of discerning truth in Priestley's view complicates the very definition of truth as a 
universal, unchangeable characteristic, because the connotations of truth become personal 
and subjective.363 The table of contents of Beattie's manuscript includes a section on the term 
common sense, but there is nothing drafted on the subject. The defmition of truth in the Essay 
implies that the ability of the individual to distinguish universal truth and falsehood is an 
integral part of the human constitution. Priestley argues that this definition leads to the 
relegation of truth to a subjective rather than universal quality. 
--~ Priestley, Examination 117.-
361 James Beattie, Hints for an Answer to Dr. Priestley's Remarks on the Essay on Truth. AUL MS 30/46. 
Appendix , 321. 
36 Priestley, Examination 123. 
363 Paraphrased from Priestley, Examination 124. 
174 
Beattie builds his system upon the notion that truth is universal, immutable, and 
identified through the faculty which he defmes as common sense.364 Priestley then 
investigates Beattie's faith in the evidence of the senses. He argues that Beattie's theories 
concerning the evidence of sense depend upon belief in the notion of common sense he 
articulates. According to Priestley: 
the same common sense that bids him believe his touch in preference to his 
sight, and to correct the evidence of sight by that of touch, assures him that 
touch requires no correction whatever. But this can have weight only with 
those who have faith in this same common sense. 365 
In the manuscript Beattie refutes this argument by explaining the evidence of the senses 
concerning a straight twig dipped in water. He illustrates first that the stick while in water 
appears crooked to the eyes, but appears straight when seen out of the water. He then explains 
the necessity for belief in these perceptions and the futility of doubting the validity ofbelief: 
That the visible appearance of the stick in the water is crooked, I do most 
firmly believe, because I trust my eyes, which are the only proper judges of 
visible appearance: that the stick is straight I also believe on the evidence of 
my sight, and of my touch; I see it straight in a pure medium; therefore I 
believe it to be so-the belief follows the perception immediately. I perceive 
also by touch that it is straight-and therefore I believe it straight. Were I to 
doubt my senses, I should neither believe nor disbelieve in either case.366 
This illustration is meant to highlight the idea that belief in visible perception arises 
inherently within the mind, and is not caused by any outside force. 
364 See pp. 144-45 for Beattie's definition of common sense. 
365 Priestley, Examination 144. 
366 Beattie, AUL MS 30/46, Appendix 323. 
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Priestley argues that this conviction in the evidence of the senses arises only from 
conviction in Beattie's particular brand of common sense. Beattie attempts to illustrate the 
inherent nature of common sense, thereby refuting Priestley's assertion that conscious faith is 
essential for its operation. Priestley quotes passages from the section of the Essay dealing 
with liberty and necessity but does not systematically examine them. 367 Priestley paraphrases 
Beattie's arguments on liberty and necessity in strong language, attempting to illustrate 
Beattie's philosophical shortcomings. According to Priestley, Beattie begins: 
first [by] disclaiming all reasoning about it, then, from his natural 
ingenuousness, not being able intirely to satisfy himself with this conduct, half 
hinting at some objections, and subjoining some half answers to them; then 
acknowledging that the arguments on both sides come at last to appear 
unanswerable. (p.362) and so reverting to his common sense again .... 368 
This criticism on the building of Beattie's philosophical arguments is not addressed in the 
manuscript; either Beattie felt it beneath his dignity to respond to such a charge or he had not 
yet formulated a proper answer to it. 
It is this lack of philosophical argumentation, identified by Priestley, that has led 
modem scholars to discount the importance of Beattie's Essay. Priestley was of course a 
necessitarian, and attempts to overthrow Beattie's assertion that necessitarianism is 
inconsistent with the idea of virtue and vice. He begins by arguing that "strictly speaking, the 
doctrine of necessity would oblige a man to depart from the common language in speaking of 
367 He charges Beattie with not arguing his position and also refusing to listen to opposing arguments upon the 
subject. Priestley, Examination 169. Beattie responds to this charge in his manuscript by referencing 366, 374, 
and.37c7-of-the.Essay on Truth . .:.Beattie,,AULMS-30/46.'--The·manuscriptcdoes·not specify•anedition·ofthe·~ 
but the pages referred to in the 2nd edition do deal with free will, specifically the arguments offatalists (366}, the 
dangers of abstract reasoning (3 7 4 ), and ability of some to defend false doctrines with clever language, when the 
doctrine is inherently false (377). 
368 Priestley, Examination 172. 
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human actions; but this makes no change with respect to his conduct.369 He refers to the 
doctrine of the sun standing still to prove the validity of this argument. He refers to 
Copernicus and Newton, who spoke of the sun rising and setting with the same language as 
that available to an ordinary farmer,370 but their knowledge of the circumstance was far 
greater. For Priestley, this illustration proves that "it is impossible that, with respect to 
common life, a necessitarian should have any other ideas to the words praise and 
blame ... than other people have, and he will be influenced as much by them."371 
In the manuscript Beattie illustrates the potential of language to be accurate 
· irrespective of the truth of the statement, and therefore to be used to deceive: "Modes of 
expression therefore which imply that the earth stands still & the sun moves, may be used 
without the least inconvenience notwithstanding the true system of the universe if now 
discovered. "372 In this way knowledge does not affect the language used to express particular 
attributes of the sun or earth. However, Beattie makes an important distinction between an 
abstract law of science and the notion that individual actions are pre-determined before our 
existence and eternally out of human power to alter. According to Beattie, the consequences 
of such a realisation would manifest themselves in a reworking of the language used to 
express such actions, because they would no longer involve willed affections or inclinations: 
But if every man were now to be convinced that necessity is true, that no past 
action of his life could have been different from what it is, it is certain that a 
great change must take place in language; because the thoughts of men in 
regard to what is the object of the daily conversation and meditation ... must 
369 Priestley, Examination 178. 
370 Paraphrased from Priestley, Examination 178. 
371 Priestley, Examination 178. 
372 AUL MS 30/46, Appendix 326. 
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be totally changed.373 
Clearly Priestley and Beattie adhered to opposing philosophical notions concerning liberty 
and necessity; each one based upon his own religious convictions. Moral obligation is the 
next section of Priestley's Examination which Beattie answers in his manuscript, and is the 
last before the final miscellaneous remarks. Priestley takes issue with Beattie's argument in 
favour of common sense as the foundation of moral obligation. Priestley argues that 
Beattie's common sense leads to actions based solely upon internal feelings, which make it 
"impossible to distinguish the injunctions of a well-informed from those of an ill-informed 
conscience. "374 
According to Priestley, the internal nature of Beattie's common sense leads to 
subjective rather than objective moral imperatives, and this complicates the distinction 
between moral and immoral actions. In the Hints manuscript, Beattie explains that in the 
Essay on Truth he attempts to show "that there are first principles in Morals as in other 
sciences, which are perceived by the light of their own evidence, and carry a degree of 
conviction along with them which no man supposes fallacious.'ms Priestley's criticism 
assumes that Beattie places common sense as the foundation of moral doctrines, and 
illustrates the problematic nature of such a relationship. In the manuscript response, Beattie 
clarifies the position of common sense with regard to morals, which is similar to the 
arguments in the Essay concerning belief as well as liberty and necessity. These sections are 
the farthest advanced of any in the manuscript, and their arguments illustrate the beginnings 
of an adequate answer to Priestley's challenge on this issue. 
373 AUL MS 30/46, Appendix 324. 
374 Priestley, Examination 159. 
375 AUL MS 30/46, Appendix 325. 
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Priestley's conclusion to his section on the Essay upbraids Beattie for his verbal abuse 
ofHume and his voluntary involvement in controversy, and accuses Beattie of falling short of 
explicating his philosophy of common sense in a manner that would lead to acquiescence. He 
concludes that "Dr. Beattie's vehemence, and his antipathy to those who differ from him, 
though he is quite a volunteer in the controversy, and cannot plead that he was heated by any 
personal opposition, approaches too near to the spirit ofpersecution."376 Beattie restates in his 
preliminary remarks that "Mr Hume's writings have done great hann to society (whatever 
pleasure Dr P. make take in them)-& the Essay on Truth has been so fortunate as in some 
considerable degree to counteract their pernicious influence.mn He makes no apology for his 
strong language against Hume's theory in the Essay, since he deemed it justified given the 
danger to religion posed by Hume's system. 
He then remarks particularly upon Priestley's indictment of him as a man addicted to 
controversy and discontent: 
I disclaim all ambition of being thought a suitable disputant, that I never took 
pleasure in an [confrontation], and have [not] once made controversy my 
study; I aim at no paradoxes, and would not wish to say any thing in the 
evidence of Truth but what has often occasioned to in common sense of 
mankind. 378 
Priestley's Examination highlights some of problematic consequences of Beattie's proposed 
doctrine, and presents the only reasoned critical assessment of the Essay among 
contemporary philosophers. 379 
376 Priestley, Examination 192. 
3!7"AULMS,c-30/46, Appendix 321. 
378 AUL MS. 30/46, Appendix 321. 
379 There were numerous negative pamphlets written on the Essay, but their criticism was not reasoned 
philosophy in the same manner as Priestley's, and they were all published anonymously. Paraphrased from 
Robinson, introduction to Essay, xxxi-ii. 
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Indeed, Priestley's reputation as a gentleman and learned scholar prompted Beattie to 
action in a way an anonymous publication would not have done. He considered the entire 
school of common sense to be a conservative reaction to sceptical doctrines, and his 
treatment of the arguments in the Essay illustrates his own particular philosophical 
inclinations. Beattie's letters prove the attention he paid to the work and his sense of ill 
treatment by Priestley in his drafted response. Priestley's criticism prompted Beattie to recast 
some of the essential elements of the Essay into a new form, but he never completed his 
Hints. The incomplete manuscript provides interesting answers to what Beattie recognised as 
the crucial criticisms made by Priestley and presents modem scholars with a new avenue of 
investigation into the theories of both philosophers. 
A significant positive response to the Essay is The Fall of Scepticism and Infidelity 
Predicted; An Epistle to Dr. Beattie. Occasioned by His Essay on the Nature and 
Immutability of Truth. To which are subjoined by way of notes. Dissertations on several 
metaphysical and religious subjects (1785). It is an interesting response to the Essay because 
it is a verse epistle as well as philosophical treatise, and includes two postscripts which 
discuss the philosophy of Joseph Priestley. While the work bears no name, it is attributed to 
William Cockin (1736-1801) a writing master at Lancaster Grammar school.380 Cockin is 
characterised as a man of literary tastes and a metaphysical writer, and his works include 
another anonymous philosophical treatise, which deals particularly with Joseph Priestley and 
his ideas concerning free will. 381 
380 John Romney, Memoirs of George Romney (London: Baldwin, 1830) lists The Fall of Scepticism as one of 
Cocldn's most important works of poetry and philosophy. 
381 Ihe Freedom of Human Action Explained and Vindicated: In which the Qpinions of Dr. Priestley on the 
Subject are Particularly Considered (London: Nicol, 1791). 
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Biographical information concerning William Cockin is available primarily through 
his connection with painter George Romney, because his poetical and philosophical works 
have received little critical attention. The epistle and notes present an interesting response to 
Beattie's Essay, because he praises Beattie in poetry but defends his doctrines in 
philosophical prose. In the first postscript he is the champion of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald, 
and takes up their defence against the attacks made by Priestley, since neither Reid nor 
Beattie engaged in the sought after philosophical controversy that Priestley perhaps wished to 
generate. 382 
Cockin presents himself as the champion of those who defend religion and society 
against what he perceived to be the un-Christian philosophical antagonism of Priestley, since 
the authors Priestley addresses in his Examination refused to engage in controversy. There is 
no mention of the epistle or its author in Beattie's letters or day-book, and as it was published 
anonymously it is unclear whether Beattie had any knowledge of it. In the preface the poet 
explains that the majority of the epistle was written in 1775, though it was first published ten 
years later. This delay, the author explains, was due to an imperfection in the explanatory 
notes, and his desire to add to them upon the publication of Priestley's Examination. 
The topics of the notes which Cockin attaches to this epistle are predominately 
theological in subject,383 but the first topic mentioned in the postscript is entitled: "Remarks 
on Dr. Preistley's Examination of Drs. Reid, Beattie, and Oswald" in which he defends their 
philosophies in an interesting fashion. 384 The poet hopes that his epistle and notes will serve 
''to caution the young adventurer in philosophy against the dangerous impositions of 
382 James Somerville argues: "Priestley evidently hoped that some of Beattie's fame might be deflected on to 
himselfby entering into a protracted controversy with him." James Somerville, The Enigmatic Parting Shot: 
. What was Hume!s .'Compleat"Answer to,Dr-Reidand to That-Bigotted·Silly'FelloW;"BCattie? '"(Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1995) 245. 
383 Topics include but are not limited to: "On the Being of a God," "On the Necessity of a Revelation," "On the 
Efficacy of Faith," "What at present most prevents the progress of religion." Cockin, xi. 
384 This postscript is dealt with later in the chapter, see pp. 184-86. 
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metaphysical subtlety-and to impress on his mind a favourable idea of our most holy 
religion.mss The author clearly introduces himself as a protector of youthful minds, and so his 
motivations for publication are similar to Beattie's own concerning the Essay on Truth.386 
Coclcin presents his work as a reasoned defence of the arguments made against scepticism by 
common sense philosophers. 
The opening of the poem situates Beattie's Essay in terms of its ability to thwart the 
progress of scepticism, and praises his work because it served ''To check some potent evil's 
drear career'' (8). The speaker then celebrates Beattie and his defence of religion against 
sceptical doctrines in clear terms: 
Such, BEATTIE, thy fair volume, such the meed 
Thy worth demands, and virtue has decreed; 
A work, where, mix'd with all the charms of art, 
We feel the influence of the purest heart (11-14). 
The epistle pays tribute to Beattie's motives, as well as the diverse abilities displayed in The 
Minstrel and the Essay on Truth, while imploring him to continue to work in the cause of 
truth, and turn from fanciful poetry: 
A stranger Muse attunes her humble lyre, 
And asks thy ear to what thy themes inspire. 
Bold the request! Yet should the trivial strain 
From nobler views thy active mind detain; 
Though new ESSAYS a while forget their foes, 
And other MINSTRELS from fresh plaudits pause (27-32). 
385 William Cocldn, The Fall of Sceoticism and Infidelity Predicted: An Epistle to Dr. Beattie. Occasioned by 
His Essay on the Nature and Immutability ofTruth. To Which are subjoined by way of notes. Dissertations on 
several metaphysical and religious subjects (London: Cadell, 1785) vii. 
386 See pp. 135-36. 
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The poem then shifts to an image of an untaught youth whose mind is a victim of scepticism, 
and in his mind: "One thing another seems, and woods and hills I Are clouds or hamlets, just 
as Fancy wills" (47-48). The ability of the imagination to alter reality is further bemoaned, 
because it can lead to a perversion of reason: "Some phantom dread usurps fair Reasons 
throne; I His judgement farther swerves, till by degrees I A goblin frowns in ev'ry bush he 
sees" (50-52). 
According to the speaker, it is within this context that scepticism is able to take hold 
of the mind, and the consequences of this domination are dangerous to society because they 
lead the distrust of commonly held maxims. Sophistry and the claims of philosophers ''Have 
been believ'd, where creeds and axioms plain I Met nought but cavil, or disavow'd disdain" 
(75-76). The poem upholds Beattie's Essay as an antidote to the blind adherence to 
scepticism, which, says Coclcin, involves quibbling about terminology, and manipulating 
language for pointless or nefari<Jus philosophical ends: "Truth still is Truth, and man may 
find it out; I At least what's useful,-hence the sacred ray, I Which shews life's goal, and 
light's us on the way" (98-1 00). The poem goes on to lament the current climate in Britain, 
where a positiv~ reception is given to sceptical doctrines with all the confidence that 
characterises those who believe themselves to be on the side of"progress." The poem argues 
that religion is the balm to be applied to the wounds inflicted upon society by its 
acquiescence in the doctrines and implications of sceptical reasoning. The speaker turns to 
religion as the only possible solution to the problem of scepticism: 
RELIGION! Heavn'ly gift! the wise man's theme, 
Affiictions solace, and our good supreme, 
The needful guide, wh~e Re~on's glimmr'ing light 
But little shews, nor oft that little right (263-66). 
183 
The poem argues that it is through religion and the work of philosophers such as Beattie that 
a new golden age will be ushered in to Britain, is articulated through sylvan images, because 
in a rural setting sceptical doctrines seem out of place and ludicrous: "In simplest guise the 
rural manners reign; I Pride has no sanction, and, as Virtue's trade, I Man wields his old 
primeval crook and spade" (335-37). This scene does not stimulate sceptical thoughts, and 
the poem depicts a future which is characterized by virtue free from scepticism. 
The poem then upbraids particular sceptical philosophers and wishes them absent 
from the newly created golden age, and they are banished from this newly created world. 
Their doctrines, meanwhile, are treated with public condemnation rather than approbation: 
"But still, as public pests, to public shame I Coercive manners give each baneful name" (378-
79). The fmal verse paragraph is another rehearsal of the bliss that will accompany a world 
free of sceptical philosophers and doctrines, a world depicted with an image of piety, in this 
new society: "The Christian virtues gain the first regard; I All Reason's friends her genuine 
rera see, I Nor think on TRUTH, but still remember THEE" (387-89). The final lines ofthe 
poem depict the innate belief that is the basis of common sense philosophy. In a world devoid 
of sceptical philosophies there is no need to defend the innate sense of truth, because it is not 
questioned. As we have seen, not all of the responses to the Essay were as positive as the 
reviews and The Fall of Scepticism and Infidelity Predicted, but it represents the kind of 
positive reception which greeted the Essay in the 1770's. 
Though Beattie's response to Priestley's attack remained unfmished, William 
Cockin's first postscript to The Fall of Scepticism attempts to vindicate the philosophy of 
common sense articulated by Reid, Beattie and Oswald. Beattie makes no mention of this 
pub.lication in any of his l~tter§ or bisoprivat~ o~y~_books, ,but it seems unlikely that the 
publication would have entirely escaped his notice. It is more probable that he declined to pay 
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any attention to it given his staunch position against engaging openly in a philosophical 
controversy after the Essay on Truth. The "Remarks on Dr. Priestley's Examination of the 
Drs Reid, Beattie, and Oswald" is not a fully developed philosophical defence, but consists of 
a superficial gloss of the context in which common sense philosophy became necessary, an 
explanation of its main tenets, and a wann harangue against Priestley's treatment of the three 
philosophers, as well as their proposed systems. Cockin focuses on what he believes to be 
Priestley's misconceptions and ill"founded arguments against their doctrines, and defends 
them by explicating their doctrines and questioning Priestley's motivations. Cockin's 
postscript is an interesting engagement with Priestley's Examination, and represents the kind 
of response his criticisms would have received from contemporary adherents to the doctrines 
of the Essay on Truth. 
Cockin begins with the philosophical context into which common sense was 
introduced, intending to justify the philosophical writings of Beattie, Reid and Oswald. These 
philosophers introduced common sense into a philosophical climate in which the Lockean 
system, which relies upon the acquisition of ideas and impressions through the senses, leads 
many "to adopt the selfish scheme of morals; and his [Locke] disciples to contend (with Des 
Cartes and Malebranche) that we ought to believe nothing without being compelled to it by 
the most scrupulous investigation.m87 He supports Beattie's assertion that Locke's system 
inadvertently became ''the prolific parent of paradox and scepticism; and that it ultimately 
tended to destroy all belief, even in the most obvious certainties of common sense."388 Cockin 
argues that this misappropriation of Locke is solved by the authors he defends, and turns to 
the arguments Priestley makes against them in his Examination. He begins by arguing that 
387 Coclcin, 114. 
388 Coclcin, 114. 
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Priestley's criticisms "rise either from misconception or misrepresentation"389 and begins with 
Priestley's assertion that the arguments made by common sense philosophers misunderstand 
the use of the reasoning faculty. He argues that Priestley "labours to make it appear, that their 
doctrines are unfriendly to all proper reasoning; that the common sense they contend for is 
but another name for opinion or fancy''390 which he refutes by defining common sense and its 
relation to reason in a similar way to both Reid and Beattie. 391 He continues the defence by 
explaining the authors' systems as an element "of the mental frame, overlooked by Locke and 
his followers"392 to situate common sense as an antidote to an element of the mind overlooked 
by Locke rather than a refutation of his theory. Having illustrated the general tenets of 
common sense, Cockin turns to some of Priestley's arguments in the Examination, such as 
the danger these arguments pose to religion. 
Cockin argues that "our examiner pretends likewise to fear the evidences of revelation 
will suffer from these new and offensive principles.m93 Cockin makes no reasoned argument 
against this assertion, but that which Beattie makes in the Essay,394 claiming that in Reid, 
Beattie, and Oswald: "The principles in debate are advanced as being peculiarly favourable to 
religion; and there are readers, I make no doubt who will be inclined to think they espy more 
calumny than verity in what our author has insinuated to the contrary. 395 Cockin does not 
present evidence from the authors' works to support this claim, but relies upon the general 
acceptability of the assertion. 
389 Coclcin, 121. 
39° Coclcin, 121. 
391 
"Their writings are intended to shew, that there are certain feelings, or instinctive suggestions of the mind, 
which in certain cases, under~ circwnstances of operation, are as authoritative in themselves, and have 
always had as powerful an influence over hwnan conduct, as the deductions of the strictest reasoning." Cocldn, 
121.~ _c_· ------
392 Cockin 122. 
393 Cockin, 126. 
394 See pp. 139-40. 
395 Cockin, 126-27. 
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His assessment of Priestley's arguments is made later in the postscript, in which he 
concedes that the Examination does expose some problematic areas in their arguments, but 
argues that this results from isolating sentences and taking arguments out of context. He 
explains that Priestley: "In his skirmishes with detached sentences, he may now and then gain 
a victory; and one or all of them may have extended their principles a little too far, and yet he 
be to blame, and they deserve well of the public."396 Again Cockin refers to no particular 
instances of such offences by Priestley nor does he quote any of the authors he defends to 
illustrate their worth; instead he argues that: "I have no doubt but the sensible Public will 
easily see, that this candid Examination was entered upon with intent to find fault; and that it 
is so conducted, that no one, unacquainted with the works he criticises, could gather from it 
the real principles and designs of their authors.397 
Cockin finishes his investigation by acknowledging Priestley's good intentions while 
condemning the tone of his investigation: 
I have no doubt of his sincerity, and believe him to be a zealous friend of 
religion. But since he has shewn, in the work before us, that these qualities 
deserve very little attention in a animated quest of truth, I hold it as 
unnecessary to apologize to him for a similar, though far inferior degree of 
warmth, as it must be unavailing to urge a sincerity and zeal, which has been 
so slender a protection to writers and metaphysicians who rank far above 
either Dr. Priestley, or the humble narrator of his ill-judged quarrel with 
Common Sense. 398 
Cockin's "Remarks" is a contemporary reaction to Priestley's Examination and illustrates the 
stffil!g_~11PP_9rt fo! B~a!tie's c5>mmon s~se doctri11es in the late eighteenth~century. 
396 Cockin, 129. 
397 Cockin, 129. 
398 Cockin, 131. 
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The receptions of the Essay on Truth fall into two distinct categories: those who 
dismiss it as nothing more than a zealous criticism of the proper philosophical investigations 
ofHume, and those who praise it as a pious, well reasoned response to the dangerous 
consequences of modem philosophy. Priestley's Examination and Cockin's Fall of 
Scg>ticism represent the diverse reception of Beattie's work, and while they advance 
opposing ideas concerning Beattie's doctrines, they illustrate that there was significant 
engagement with the arguments ofthe Essay by contemporary thinkers. Beattie's partly 
drafted answer to Priestley's criticisms illustrates Beattie's desire to clarify the arguments of 
the Essay, and reinforces the high regard in which Beattie held Priestley as a clergyman and 
gentleman, despite their philosophical differences and the antagonism between them which 
was publicly displayed by Priestley in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review. 
The Philosophical Satires 
It is well known that Beattie composed The Minstrel as an intellectual break from the 
Essay on Truth, but the satires on sceptical thought he composed around this same time have 
received little critical attention. "The Castle of Scepticism" and "Letter: From a Regular Flow 
ofldeas and Impressions to the Idea of a Friend in the Country" (hereafter "Letter") were 
transcribed by the biographer ofHume, Ernest Campbell Messner, in 1948 and 1951 
respectively99 and have been included in Roger Robinson's recent collection of Beattie's 
works.400 The dating of''The Castle of Scepticism" manuscript is simple, since it bears a note 
written by Beattie, which reads: "This was written about six years ago, & before the Essay on 
39~Emest CampbellMossner,c''Beattie!s Uhe Castle of Scepticism': An~Unpublished Allegory AgainstHume, 
Voltaire, and Hobbes," Studies in English 27 (1948): 108-45, and Ernest Campbell Mossner, ''Beattie on 
Voltaire: An Unpublished Parody," The Romanic Review 41 (1950): 26-32. 
400 James Beattie, The Works of James Beattie, introduction Roger Robinson vol. 10 (London: Thoemmes-
Routledge, 1996). 
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Truth was finished. It was never intended for publication"401 and the end of the manuscript is 
dated April1767. The dating of the "Letter" is more problematic, since it bears no date, but 
its subject matter suggests it was written around the same time as "The Castle of Scepticism." 
However, it could also have been written when Beattie was preparing the second edition of 
the Essay, which includes a lengthy footnote dealing with the philosophy of Voltaire; but, 
given the similarities in the handwriting, it is more likely that it was composed around the 
same time as ''The Castle of Scepticism." The lack of a later note by Beattie supports the 
notion that Beattie considered it a purely private exercise. 
These two unpublished satires represent another important literary condemnation of 
sceptical doctrines. The Minstrel attempts to address philosophical issues in poetic language, 
and ends with a sense of desperation and frustration with the genre as an inadequate vehicle 
for this kind of endeavour. "The Castle of Scepticism" and the "Letter" are two prose satires 
with the same goal, to expose the ridiculous nature of sceptical theories and the hypocritical 
nature of philosophers who articulate them, and to provide Beattie with an intellectual escape 
from the composition of the Essay on Truth. While there is no reference in Beattie's letters to 
the "Letter," he does hint at the possible publication of''The Castle of Scepticism," but he 
subsequently abandoned the scheme. 
The reasons for this suppression are speculated upon by Messner in his introductions 
to the works, but his arguments are not wholly convincing. He argues that Beattie did not 
publish ''The Castle of Scepticism" because the publication of such a satire ''might 
conceivably lower his prestige among the serious-minded."402 Beattie himself explains the 
difficulties concerning the proper expression of sceptical doctrines in a letter to Thomas 
Blac!dock, in which h~ responds to his friend's sugg~st_iqn that Beattie write a philosophical 
401 AUL MS 30/18. 
402 Mossner, "Castle of Scepticism," 110. 
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romance on the subject, in which he articulates the obtuse nature of sceptical doctrines: 
"many of the capital doctrines of our Scepticks are so perfectly inconceivable and 
impracticable, that some of them could not be exemplified in Action at all, and others not 
without the grossest violation ofprobability."403 Beattie reveals to Blacklock his concern over 
his ability adequately to express what he considered to be obtuse doctrines, as well as his 
recognition that if he were to try to do so, the narrative of the piece would probably need to 
be unrealistic. 
The age's "growing distaste for ridicule"404 no doubt contributed to Beattie's anxiety 
concerning the publication of the satire. Mossner also suggest that he may have felt an 
illogical fear of possible retaliation from Hume and his numerous friends, explaining that 
such people were "already sufficiently outraged by the abuse heaped on him [Hume] in a 
supposedly philosophical essay without Beattie's unnecessarily risking their reactions to a 
fictionalized satire."405 Certainly, the reception of the Essay amongst Hume's friends and 
supporters interested Beattie upon its original publication, but a letter on this topic does not 
reveal any illogical fear of their remarks.406 The first mention of "The Castle of Scepticism" is 
in a letter to Thomas Blacklock, in which Beattie relates the nature of the satire, and the fact 
that it was read as a graduation address by one of his students.407 A little more than a year 
later he writes to Blacklock in similar terms, but makes it clear that he does not hold the satire 
to be of much value: "I wrote two or three years ago the Castle of Scepticism, a Vision; 
403 Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 18 Aprill769 (NLS Fettercairn Box 91) Beattie, Correspondence 2:85. 
404 P.K. Elkin, The Augustan Defence of Satire (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1973) 67. 
405 Elkin, 67. 
406 Beattie makes his opinions ofHume's friends clear in a letter to James Williamson: ''The illiberal and 
invidious tales which have been circulated by Mr Hume's party, I thought it best to overlook, for I would have 
them to know that I despise them too much to be hurt by them." Beattie to James Williamson, 13 April 1771. 
Beattie,,Correspondence 2: 135~3-~ .. ··-
407 "S~me years ago, I wrote a small Essay, about twice the length of a paper in the Spectator, called, 
The Castle of Scepticism, a vision. I gave it to a Student, an excellent Scholar and a favourite of mine, and 
caused him deliver it in public as his Graduation-speech; and it was much applauded." Beattie to Thomas 
Blacklock 18 April 1769. Beattie, Correspondence 2:86. 
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which I wonder how I have never showed you. It is at the Trifler's service."408 Despite the 
implication that Beattie held the satire in such low esteem, his London diary of 1773 shows 
that he took the manuscript with him to that city, and circulated it among some ladies of his 
acquaintance.409 Beattie only mentions showing the satire to these ladies, and it is unclear why 
he did not share it with his other influential acquaintances, such as Joshua Reynolds and 
Samuel Johnson. 
There is no evidence that the "Letter" was ever circulated, and Beattie makes no 
mention of its composition in his letters. Years after the composition of this satire, Beattie 
mentions Voltaire's reputation and position, in terms that explain his neglect of the "Letter'' 
in his earlier correspondence, and his obvious desire to keep its existence private: 
But while it continues to be the fashion, all over Europe, to read and admire 
Voltaire; and while some, even of the Clergy themselves, extol not only his 
wit, but his learning, and (what is more strange) his candour, it is to be feared, 
that the person who should write against him would not every where obtain a 
hearing. 410 
This attitude concerning the works and reputation of Voltaire places the satire of the "Letter'' 
within its proper context. The content of the "Letter'' is not as developed as that of the other 
satire; it is a concise, and private, imaginative response to the popularity, and what Beattie 
considered the absurdity, of Voltaire's ideas. 
408 ,Beattie:to~Thomas Blacklock 27May. l770.,Beattie,oCorrespondence-2: 106-9,- also in-Wi--Forbes, l:l-70. 
409 
"I put in Mrs. Montagu's hands some scraps of prose Essays-... the castle of scepticism." And speaking of the 
Countess Cowper "she has now read some of my prose-essays as well as the Minstrel, and speaks in the highest 
terms of them all." Walker, London Diary 34, 79. 
410 Beattie to Lord Hailes, 22 November 1778. Beattie, Correspondence 3:85-87. 
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Its content is hinted at in a note written in a hand other than Beattie's, which survives, 
pasted to the top of the manuscript: "Proving after the Manner of Voltaire that Mathematics 
are false." This note was probably added by Beattie's nephew-in-law George Glennie, who 
inherited Beattie's numerous letters and papers, and sorted them so that the appropriate 
material could be available for Sir William Forbes, during his composition of Beattie's 
biography. The "Letter" is indeed predominately a satirical examination into the history of 
mathematics, which ends with the conclusion that mathematical systems are contrary to the 
very nature of true knowledge. These two satires represent an unexplored aspect of Beattie's 
literary works, and so an investigation into their content as well as the literary works to which 
they are indebted is essential to a full understanding of Beattie's literary career. 
It is probable that Beattie took the hint for his title "The Castle of Scepticism" from 
Thomson's satirical poem, The Castle of Indolence, which he echoes in some of the satirical 
lines of The Minstrel. Beattie follows Thomson's model for his pilgrimage through the castle 
and the allegorical figures he meets, and his text relates to the second canto of The Castle of 
Indolence in which the speaker "aspires to be a moralist, not a self-indulgent self-absorbed 
dreamer."411 Nowhere does Beattie suffer from indolence regarding the necessity of confuting 
sceptical doctrines, and his zealous treatment of the subject has brought modem criticism as it 
brought contemporary fame. The various influences that are evident throughout the work 
suggest that Beattie values satire as a vehicle for the vindication of religion and the ridicule of 
sceptical philosophers; but his insecurities concerning his own satirical abilities are illustrated 
by his reluctance to make the satires public. The structure of "The Castle of Scepticism" is 
similar to that of Bunyan's The Pilgrim's Progress, as Robinson and King have noted, but the 
similarities go no further. 
411 Thomson, 172. 
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There are many literary borrowings in the satire, and Beattie's invocation of many 
notable satirists and other authors (such as Milton, Shakespeare, Swift, and Pope) in the text 
itself reinforce his intention to situate the work within the English satirical tradition. While 
these literary echoes are important, "The Castle of Scepticism" should be investigated within 
the context of the composition of its contemporary works, the Essay on Truth and The 
Minstrel. This satire is another vehicle Beattie sought to use as a refutation of Scepticism, and 
an imaginative refuge from his rigorous philosophical inquiry. "The Castle of Scepticism" 
also represents a unique satirical depiction of scepticism and its consequences, as perceived 
by a member of the religious establishment. 
Beattie's satire opens in a similar way to Bunyan's work, with the speaker dreaming 
the narrative. Beattie's dream begins after falling asleep while reading a volume ofHume's 
works in a garden. The recounting of the vision begins with an interesting allusion to the 
descent of Aeneas into the underworld in the Sixth Book of The Aeneid, which has led 
Everard King to make a case for the considerable literary debt of the "Castle of Scepticism" 
to Virgil's epic. Beattie's "Remarks" on this book of The Aeneid outlines its theology and 
narrative structure, aspects of Virgil's work which do not appear in the "The Castle of 
Scepticism." 
The speaker begins by relinquishing any pretensions to Second Sight (a Scottish 
belief), and assures the reader ofhis objective intentions: ''but of which I do not pretend to 
conjecture whether it [the vision] issued through the gate of ivory, or through that of hom" 
(115). The contemporary debate concerning Virgil's intention for two gates at the end of 
Book VI provides an interesting context for this opening. Virgil places Aeneas and the sybil 
at the_ two gates whlt:;h lead [rom fue un9erworld: ''The:r_e are twin Gates of Sleep, of which 
one is said to be of hom, allowing an easy exit for shadows which are true. 
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The other is all of shining white ivory, perfectly made; but the Spirits send visions 
which are false in the light of day."412 Why Virgil chose to send his hero through the ivory 
gate generated much conjecture from Beattie's contemporaries, and he himself addressed his 
question years later in "Remarks on Some Passages in the Sixth Book of the Eneid."413 
Beattie argues that the common argument is not wholly sound: "What can this imply, but that 
the poet meant to insinuate, that every thing he had said concerning a state of future 
retribution, was nothing more than a fallacious dream?'0414 He answers this argument by 
proposing that Virgil intended the character ofhis poet to be separate from himself, and "By 
making the poet his own interpreter, and not seeking to find things in his book which we have 
no good reason to think were ever in his head"415 there is no evidence to suggest a deeper 
meaning in the choice of gate. 
Clearly the opening of"The Castle of Scepticism" harkens back to this Virgilian 
image, consciously setting up the speaker as an objective storyteller, and also seeming to 
encourage the reader to take the work at face value. King makes a great deal of Beattie's 
literary debt to The Aeneid for his fable, but relies solely upon the initial allusion to support 
this relationship. He argues: ''the satire is a direct adaptation of the descent of Aeneas into the 
underworld."416 This overlooks the allegorical nature of Beattie's work, which illustrates the 
characters of various sceptical philosophers, and Virgil's intention to honour the ancestors of 
Augustus through the recitation of great Romans and their fate in the afterlife. 
412 Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. W. F. Jackson Knight (London: Penguin, 1958) 174. 
413 This was the subject of a discourse to the Royal Society of Edinburgh, into which Beattie was admitted as a 
member of the literary class in 1783. His essay was published in the Society's proceedings of 1790. 
414.James~Beattie, ~~Remarks on Some~Passages~in the Sixth Book of the Eneid," Miscellaneous Items (London: 
Thoemmes-Routledge, 1996) 50. 
415 Beattie, "Remarks," 52. 
416 Everard King, "James Beattie's 'The Castle of Scepticism' ( 1767): A Suppressed Satire on Eighteenth-
Century Sceptical Philosophy," Scottish Literary Journal2 (1975): 28. 
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The dream journey begins with the speaker thinking the journey will end "at some 
Auditory erelong, and hear a dissertation on the nature of things" ( 116). Instead, the speaker 
is told that the purpose of their pilgrimage is "to learn wisdom from this Great Oracle of 
modem times; who is acknowledged by all the world to be the deepest genius and wisest 
philosopher ever known" (118). To reach this pinnacle the group wanders on, and some of 
the speaker's companions expound sceptical theories: ''My friend has proved, that there is no 
human mind [and that] man has no more soul than an oyster-shell" (119). This strikes at La 
Mettrie's L' Homme Machine, which denies the existence of a soul and illustrates the 
mechanistic nature of the body. Beattie's characters then illustrate the paradoxical nature of 
sceptical philosophy, while repeating some of the accusations made against Hume in the 
Essay on Truth: "His [Hume's] tenets obviously lead to the utter subversion of all truth, 
learning, and virtue; but he has always employed his greatest talents in promoting the cause 
oftruth and the interests of mankind" (121). 
The travellers reach the castle, and to be admitted the group disperses to sacrifice their 
common sense to their gods, at temples dedicated: "To Affectation, another To Ignorance, a 
third To self-Conceit" {123). To this scene of sacrifice King attributes great importance, but 
misapprehends the text by arguing that Beattie is admitted without making a sacrifice "in the 
hope of his later conversion."417 But there is no evidence in the text to support the idea that 
the sceptics felt confident that Beattie would be converted. Upon reaching the gate Beattie 
has a conversation with a guard which explains his position, but makes no reference to any 
desire to "convert" him.418 
417 King, "Castle" 22. 
418 
"the sacrifice ofConunon Sense to the Divinities we worship is a kind of test by which we distinguish a 
friend from a stranger; if you choose to appear among us in the latter character, you need not expect many 
extraordinary civilities, but you may depend on meeting with no bad treatment" (124). 
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The speaker asks whether a person must make this sacrifice to enter the castle, and a 
nearby guard explains the ritual: 
'We do not object' continued he, 'to the principles of any man: the sacrifice of 
Common Sense to the Divinities we worship is a kind of test by which we 
distinguish a friend from a stranger; if you choose to appear among us in the 
latter character, you need not expect many extraordinary civilities, but you 
may depend on meeting with no bad treatment (124). 
This toleration springs from the idea that varying philosophical systems are important to the 
development of the discipline and contribute to overall knowledge. This initially introduces 
sceptical philosophers as open minded, but their later condemnation of Beattie's arguments, 
which he articulates using his common sense, illustrate the actual paradoxical nature of 
sceptical doctrines. Beattie is admitted as a stranger with his common sense intact, and 
proceeds into the castle, where he will engage with a series of philosophers, before his 
climactic exchange with Hume. 
Beattie then comes upon the caricature of Descartes, and delves into his theories with 
much interest. Descartes is not named, but his identity becomes clear through the description 
of his character. This philosopher: "denied, and hoped in a short time to bring himself to 
doubt, his own existence. He had tied up a bandage over his eyes, and stopt his ears, which 
however could not entirely prevent his hearing; his nostrils also were stuffed; and his tongue 
and palate, and the points of his fingers were seared with a hot iron" (127). Descartes then 
relates to Beattie that denial of this kind, and indeed of what every rational person will 
accept, is a cornerstone in the development of sceptical theory: "By falling in with their 
notions we shall never be able to raise our~elves into notice: we must therefore pursue the 
different and opposite method of denying whatever they affirm, and doubting whatever they 
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hold for certain" (127). Beattie answers this assertion with a rehearsal of famous men whose 
works did not overturn nature: Bacon, Newton, Archimedes, Homer, Virgil, etc (127). This 
roll-call sparks a debate between Beattie and Descartes over the nature of genius and the 
value of explaining the mysteries of nature. This scene relates to the debate on genius and 
originality in The Minstrel and further reinforces the opposing views of scepticism and 
common sense. The debate ends when a fight breaks out between two other pilgrims nearby, 
and so there is no certain resolution between the factions. 
Before Beattie arrives at the next prominent philosopher, he meets two strangers 
expounding the philosophies ofHume the Governor. The first explains Hume's system of 
argument with an absurd illustration of reasoning as used by sceptics: "[to] prove by 
argument that by argument nothing can be proved, he has contrived a puppet of mushrooms, 
cork, cobwebs, gossamer, and other fungous and flimsy materials, to which he gives the name 
of Reason" (132). This is perhaps an attack upon La Mettrie's argument against the existence 
of the soul through reasoning. The next stranger explains the tendency of sceptics to 
disbelieve the senses, yet rely upon each others' theories with confidence: ''we admit none of 
those tenets in which all the rest of mankind are agreed, yet believe in one another with the 
most implicit and most obstinate assurance, especially when our belief is required to 
something inconceivable" (132-33). This sceptical devotee illustrates the paradoxical 
interaction between sceptical theorists. Beattie illustrates here that they determine to 
disbelieve the evidence of the senses, despite its being-from Beattie's standpoint-self-evident, 
but will acquiesce in their colleagues' theories, which are based upon ambiguous argument. 
He further witnesses many other curious sceptics before arriving at the caricature of Voltaire. 
Th~se sp_~ct~les ~cluqe a m_Wl who ''was continually busied in turning a large engine, like 
that described in Gulliver's travels, which threw up an endless variety of 
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combinations of words and letters, out of which were framed sentences and paragraphs, 
sections, chapters, and treatises" (134). This comment on the rhetorical care and attention 
paid by sceptical writers to their works is supplanted by two scenes of cruelty to two young 
children, which illustrates the absurdity of two physiological theories. 419 
This is followed by a gruesome depiction of Mandeville's paradox, in which a 
hangman explains the use of human parts in manure, thus showing "that private vices are 
really publick benefits" (137-38). From this disturbing sight Beattie turns and is soon met by 
Voltaire, whose depiction is in keeping with his predecessors. The exchange between the two 
begins with Voltaire sneering at Providence, and the promised eternal afterlife of Christianity 
which Beattie will refute: 
Those cruel and hypocritical blockheads the parsons, and some philosophic 
pedants too, have taken for granted, that all the events of life are directed by 
what they call Providence, that in a future and better state of existence every 
thing will appear to have been ordered for the best. This you know, 
Gentleman, is the same thing with saying, that the present is the best of all 
possible worlds (138). 
To this Beattie makes a simple and logical answer: "it is a very different thing. If we believe 
in a future world that shall be better than the present, we cannot surely believe the present to 
be the best world possible" (139). Voltaire replies with "his eye glistening with inexpressible 
rage and disdain" (139). This outrage will be mirrored in Beattie's encounter with Thomas 
Hobbes, whose character and philosophy are more developed. Hobbes ''was armed cap-a-pic 
in the Gothick fashion, and held in each hand a cocked blunderbuss" (140) and begins by 
419The~frrst is a lampoon of Shaftesbury,_and depictS-a boy with a cat's-tail stuck to his rump, proving that "man 
was originally a beast, and would never live agreeable to natlU'e, till he had again relapsed to that state." (34) 
The second is ofMonboddo, which deals with a philosopher attempting to affix two human thumbs cut from a 
boy onto the paws of a monkey. To prove that "it is from his Thumb alone, that man derives his superiority; and 
therefore Logicians ought to have distinguished him by this organ" (135-36). 
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explaining the basic elements of his own moral system: "Man's natural state is a state of war. 
All men have originally an equal right to all things, and an equal desire of power and 
superiority" (141). This right, Hobbes would argue, logically leads Beattie to a desire for all 
that another possesses: "nothing hinders you [Beattie] from attempting to divest me of these; 
but either the impossibility of success or the fear of punishment" (141). To this assertion 
Beattie proposes the idea of the conscience: "I assure I would not do you any harm, or divest 
you of any one of them even though it were in my power. My conscience, Sir, would not 
allow me" (141). Hobbes retaliates by explaining his opposing defmition of that faculty: 
"what is Conscience? Nothing but the fear of inconvenience or punishment" (142). 
Hobbes further argues that there is no inherent distinction between vice and virtue, 
because they are within the sphere of conscience, and so are subjective and individual. 
Hobbes then explains the social contract as one "by which they bind themselves, every man 
for himself, that he will obey and support the sovereign to the utmost of his power, on 
condition that the rest of his fellow-subjects do the same" (143). Beattie illustrates the 
paradoxical nature of this definition, because it hinges upon a distinction between vice and 
virtue, but Hobbes has argued that there is no difference between them: "could men enter into 
a contract or promise, who had no notion of the unlawfulness of falsehood or treachery, but 
imagined that all sorts of human conduct were equally lawful?" (144). 
Hobbes makes no answer to this question, but wears "a most furious look" (144) and 
Beattie leaves the scene in fear for his life. This departure, King argues, is evidence that 
"Having defeated Hobbes in argument, Beattie sees no point in battling with him 
physically."420 However, this interpretation is not supported by the text, rather, the speaker 
has reason to fear for his safety: "[I] accordingly took to my heels, and ran a full quarter of a 
420 King, "Castle" 26. 
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mile before I ventured to take breath" (144). This heated scene is followed by the climax of 
the satire, the introduction of David Hume, the Governor of the Castle. 
Hume is attended by priests, lawyers, and venerable gentlemen, "and with a show of 
extreme politeness, yet methought very officiously, invited travellers to the threshold, and 
then pushed them out headlong; smiling at the same time with a mixture of contempt and 
self-complacency'' (144). It is not Hume's actions, but his words, which shock Beattie's 
sensibilities, but he does not put words into Hume's mouth directly. Instead the reader is 
privy to Beattie's interpretation of them: "[Hume] concluded a long harangue with a few 
corollaries, plausible indeed and well-disguised, but of such blasphemous import that my hair 
stood on end with horror" (145). This oration is suddenly halted by the crash of a thunderbolt, 
which seems to bring Hume to some religious repentance: "The orator fell on his knees, and 
began to repeat the Apostles creed with the utmost vehemence of voice and gesture" (145). 
Mossner argues this particular passage refers to a well known anecdote ofHume's doing this 
in order to be assisted in freeing himself from a bog. According to the anecdote, a passing 
woman offered to help Hume if he first recited the Apostles' creed. 
He turns his attention to a voice which says: ''Tum ye mortals, from the path of the 
destroyer, and now listen to the words of Truth" (145). This Deus-ex-machina is the first 
religious intervention, and as these words slowly die away, a physical incarnation of religion 
is invoked to restore the speaker. He is brought back from his dream into the physical world 
by "the bell of the parish-church that now summoned [him] to prayers" (145). The church 
bells symbolise the faith that has enabled the speaker to negotiate his way through the castle, 
encountering sceptical doctrines and withstanding arguments through the use of the 
philosophers' common sense. The end of the satir_e brings the pilgrim back to his present 
circumstances with a particular reference to his own piety, personifying the inherent value of 
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religion as an antidote to sceptical philosophy. It is a fully developed satirical response to the 
philosophy which Beattie combated in the Essay on Truth. The other satire in the manuscript 
collection presents a shorter satirical response to Voltaire, whose great reputation and 
impious doctrines Beattie found dangerous to society. 
It is another example of Beattie's desire to refute scepticism even in his leisure 
compositions. "Letter From a Regular Flow ofldeas and Impressions to the Idea of a Friend 
in the Country," adopts a different persona and tone. Ernest Campbell Mossner titled his 
article "'Beattie on Voltaire: An Unpublished Parody,"421 which gives a clue to its subject. The 
work of Voltaire's mentioned by name in the "Letter" is the Dictionnaire Philosophique 
(1764); the speaker praises the style of the collection of topical essays as well as the style of 
the author himself. Its length (under two thousand words) and subject matter (the history of 
mathematics) support the claim which Mossner's title makes for the work. 
TheDictionnaire Philosophique was infamous in Voltaire's lifetime: "it was 
condemned by all the establishments, religious and governmental, drawing from Voltaire the 
usual flood of protestations and disavowals. "422 Voltaire's lack of conviction in this work 
presented Beattie with what he took to be another example of sceptical hypocrisy, as well as a 
dangerous philosophical system that was widely read and discussed throughout Europe. 
Bestennan argues: "Voltaire deliberately planned the Dictionnaire as a 'revolutionary' book, 
in which the most 'liberal' ideas were to be expressed openly and lucidly, and made available 
to all who could read."423 To accomplish this aim he "tried to ascertain the facts, then drew 
ethical conclusions from them, and finally presented these conclusions with the lucidity and 
~· --~--~-
421 The title ofthe satire implies that it is intended to mock the style of Voltaire's entries in the Philosophical 
Dictionary. 
422 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary trans. Theodore Besterman (London: Penguin, 1971) 5. 
423 Theodore Besterman, Voltaire (London: Longman, 1969) 435. 
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elegant irony which were the secrets of his unique style."424 It is this style, and the 
philosophical conclusions it is used to convey, which Beattie found dangerous, and he 
attempts to discredit Voltaire's impious assertions by illustrating their absurd nature through 
satire. 
The length of the satire also suggests that Beattie intended to emulate an entry in 
Voltaire's work, which explains the seemingly less developed argument in this satire when 
compared to the "Castle of Scepticism." The "Letter" begins by establishing the speaker as a 
confirmed sceptic; he presents many elements of sceptical arguments and acknowledges their 
merit, and faults Voltaire with limiting his investigations to the confutation of religion alone. 
To rectify this, the speaker, writing in the style of Voltaire, inserts a portion of a forthcoming 
chapter of a treatise, entitled "Historical Remarks on Mathematicks." This is the particular 
argument of the letter, and it is a satirical response to Voltaire's rebuttal ofMaupertuis' 
mathematical formula (m.AR+n.RB) to prove the existence of God. 
In the Dictionnaire Philosophigue Voltaire alludes to Maupertuis in his section on 
religion: "One need only give one's soul a certain degree of exaltation, as has been admirably 
conceived by the honest philosopher425 or fool in our days who wanted to pierce a hole to the 
antipodes, and wanted to smear the sick with resin."426 It is likely that Voltaire's attack upon 
this philosopher/scientist sparked Beattie's imagination on this particular topic, and the 
subject matter of the bulk of the satire supports this proposition. The speaker begins by 
praising his supposed reader for his advancements in sceptical thinking, such as the non-
existence of God, of the self, of right and wrong, and the impossibility ofbelief.427 He then 
turns to the Dictionnaire Philosophique, which prompts sincere reverence: "and [I] am 
424 Besterman,Voltaire438~9. -
425 Besterman's note to the passage: "Maupertuis, who, if he was not so great a philosopher as he thought 
himself: was by no means so great a fool as Voltaire thought him." Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary 349. 
426 Voltaire, Philosophical Dictionary 349. 
427 Mossner, ''Beattie on Voltaire, 28-30. 
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delighted to find so much wit and genius so well directed in supporting the common cause of 
infidelity & virtue" (29). To introduce the argument concerning mathematics the speaker 
relates it to the evidence used by Voltaire to refute Christianity: "you may perhaps find 
objections as convincing, brought against Geometry and Algebra, as any with which our 
pious philosopher has been able to perplex the hopes and enjoyments of the Christian" (30). 
The chapter attempts to refute the notion of mathematical truth, which is "founded upon a 
knowledge of the existence and original properties of points and lines"428 (30). This law of 
mathematics allows for infinite points along any given line, "And surely such points cannot 
be material, since every material substance must have all the properties of which they are 
destitute" (30) such as length and breadth. This argument illustrates the fact that common 
sense and mathematical precepts are not easily reconciled, and it will be further exemplified 
in the discussion of the asymptote. 
The satirical climax of the "Letter'' comes in the next paragraph, when the speaker 
turns to the definition and function of the asymptote. This is a line in a hyperbola which 
approaches the other line but never meets it, and so the speaker concludes they must run 
parallel, but "Common Sense, whose knowledge a definition improves, answers No" (12). 
This contradiction is explained by the particular language used to illustrate this proof. The 
speaker explains: "For Common Sense by your saying they approach understands nothing but 
this, that to some common point both are bending, and therefore to some common point both 
must arrive" (31 ). Here the speaker illustrates the ambiguities in language which can be 
problematic in philosophical or mathematical systems, but turns a satirical bend and 
comments that there can be "no mystery so mysterious, as the mystery of the Asymptote" 
(31 ). The followi11g passage illustrates what the .speak~ believes to be errors in the 
- -
428 Mossner argues this passage refers to Hume's argument against the infmite divisibility of space in the 
Treatise. Mossner, "Beattie on Voltaire'' 30. 
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presentation of Euclid, and mathematicians who followed him. This passage contains the 
second reference to Voltaire's Dictionnaire Philosophigue, but it differs from the former 
greatly, because it presents a particular argument of that philosopher against Christianity. 
The speaker first outlines his objection to Euclid and his followers: "Pure and abstract . 
truth can surely acknowledge no appeal to scrawls and hieroglyphicks; especially scrawls 
which are shaped in a manner repugnant to decorum" (31 ). For verification of this scheme the 
speaker turns to Voltaire, ''whose favourite arguments in confutation of Christianity is 
founded upon the indelicacy of a passage in Ezekiel" (31). This reference to Voltaire's 
section on the book of Ezekiel in the Dictionnaire Philosophigue presents an interesting 
context for Beattie's use of Voltaire's style of argument in the satire. Voltaire argues that this 
book of the Bible illustrates the evils of Jeritsalem, and cannot be compared by modem critics 
with contemporary morality. 
He then articulates a passage from Ezekiel, chapter xv, which presents the crimes 
Jerusalem has committed against God through the metaphor of God the father, and Jerusalem 
the daughter. Beattie then praises Voltaire's manipulation of the biblical text to suit his own 
needs, which Mossner argues is not supported by Voltaire's actual text.429 Besterman makes a 
similar note to this passage concerning Ezekiel,430 illustrating that Beattie's assumptions 
concerning Voltaire's meaning have not survived amongst modem scholars. 
The manipulation of scripture is ''to signify, that those declarations, which Israel 
preserved as the words of Omniscient Purity, were too indelicate for the chaste ears of the 
French philosopher'' (12). Voltaire's text omits certain words because of their indelicate 
associations, and explains that "The expressions that to us appear broad were not then so 
429 ~o.ssner's.note to this passage: "Beattie's comment is curious because Voltaire has merely followed the 
Biblical text in referring to Jerusalem as a girl who became a harlot; and his astericks merely indicate the 
omission ofpassages." Mossner, "Beattie on Voltaire" 31-32. 
430 Besterman comments: "Rather than a direct quotation this is a selective abstract, but perfectly accurate, of 
Ezekiel xvi.4-34, 44. Voltaire, 198. 
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regarded."431 Beattie's displeasure no doubt came from his own attitudes towards scripture as 
the word of God, which should not be condensed to suit a modem author's purpose. Nowhere 
in the satire does Beattie make this overtly clear, but his mockery ofVoltaire's supposed 
reserve in his use of the Bible in the Dictionnaire Philosophigue supports this proposition.432 
The final paragraph of the satire draws a parallel between the outlandish arguments 
made for the illogical nature of mathematics and Voltaire's investigations of Christianity. The 
speaker champions his arguments as valid "since arguments similar in kind, and of evidence 
perhaps inferiour, have been deemed by our great master Voltaire, and his numerous 
adherents, sufficient for the confutation of Christianity" (32). Voltaire's section on 
Christianity focuses upon the history of the religion, and its tone is biting in a number of 
instances. Voltaire ironically comments that the life, ministry and death of Jesus are not 
recorded by Greek or Roman historians, because "God did not want all these divine things to 
be written down by profane hands."433 He then turns to the conflicting modem genealogies of 
Jesus, illustrating the conundrum. From this controversy he rehearses the history of 
Christianity as an organised religion, and is confident that "So many lies fabricated by badly 
informed and falsely zealous Christians did not injure the truth of Christianity; they did not 
hinder its establishment."434 Voltaire's comments in this section do not refute Christianity, but 
trace the history of Jesus and the development of the organised religion based upon his life 
and ministry. Despite Voltaire's seeming detachment toward his subject the ironic tone of this 
section undoubtedly upset Beattie and his parody is an attempt to highlight the impious nature 
of his writings, and to illustrate the implications of the popularity of these arguments. 
431 Voltaire, 199. 
432 Beattie asserts that Voltaire changes the biblical passage "to signify, that those declarations, which Israel 
preserved as the words of Omniscient Purity, were to indelicate for the chaste ears of the French Philosopher." 
Mossner, "Beattie on Voltaire" 31. 
433 Voltaire, 117. 
434 Voltaire, 129. 
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The "Castle of Scepticism" and the "Letter" represent an important satirical defence 
of religion by Beattie, and were written during the most productive period ofhis career. 
Together they represent a little explored response to sceptical theories and the consequences 
of their popularity. Beattie's repression of these satires during his lifetime suggests that his 
insecurities concerning his poetry extended to these prose satires, in which he vented some of 
his frustrations concerning scepticism and its contemporary popularity in a less formal setting 
than in that of the Essay on Truth. They show that Beattie's response to sceptical doctrines 
was not limited by genre. The fact that he chose to suppress the prose satire and allowed his 
philosophical treatise and The Minstrel to see the light of day highlights his conscious desire 
to protect his reputation as a serious philosopher and poet. 
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Chapter 5: The Making of a Legacy, Beattie's Final Poetry 
These three editions represent the final stages of James Beattie's poetical career, and 
demonstrate his desire to protect his poetic reputation as he turned his attention to essays, 
criticism, and theological issues. The success of The Minstrel solidified his reputation as a 
poet, but the Essay on Truth made a name for him as a serious philosopher, and Beattie knew 
that he could not easily reconcile this way of thinking with his poetic inclinations. Beattie's 
final volumes of poetry represents his attempt ''to appeal equally to an immediate audience, 
to posterity, and to the Christian afterlife [so] that some residue of the self, whether as name 
or Soul, would last beyond death."435 He had composed no new poetry since the completion 
of The Minstrel, and the death of Dr. Gregory, but there remained several unpublished poems 
from his most productive poetic years, which he published in the first of his later volumes. 
Beattie's career at this time exemplifies the conflict between the poetic and philosophical 
genius he articulated to Charles Boyd in 1766: ''The incompatibility of philosophical and 
poetic genius is, I think, no unaccountable thing. Poetry exhibits the general qualities of a 
species; philosophy the particular qualities of individuals."436 
Throughout Beattie's career his poems had hinted at this conflict between imagination 
and reason, which climaxes in the frustration and sorrow that ends The Minstrel. The crisis of 
the poetic imagination articulated in The Minstrel arose in Beattie's own career because of 
his intense philosophical pursuits, and so he reinvents his creative inclinations as a critic and 
essayist. Later this letter foreshadows the conflict between the creative imagination and 
philosophical investigation that led to his desire to protect his already made reputation, while 
prep~g!l!e criti~,al essayswbich he f~t woul~ do f8!'_greater service t() sO<~iety. 
435 Leo Braudy, The Frenzy of Renown: Fame and its History (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986) 387. 
436 Beattie to Charles Boyd 16 November 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 1:22. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:94-
95 and M. Forbes, 32. 
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Beattie begins by recognising the importance of what he calls a "superficial" 
knowledge of philosophy for the poetic imagination, but reasons that philosophical 
knowledge: 
if it is any thing more than superficial, will do a poet rather harm than good; 
and will give his mind that turn for minute observation, which enfeebles fancy 
by restraining it, and counteracts the native energy of judgement by rendering 
it fearful and suspicious. 437 
The philosophical study required for the composition of the Essay on Truth stifled Beattie's 
poetic powers, and he makes a conscious decision to shift his focus from poetry to criticism. 
His life experiences in the years following his days as a schoolmaster in the hills ofFordoun 
have altered his perceptions of poetry and solitude. In 1778 his second son, Montagu, was 
born, and the birth signalled the collapse of his wife's mental health. Two years later Beattie 
admits to close friends that his wife is insane, and two years after that it became necessary to 
remove her from the household permanently. 
Throughout this time, "Beattie often wrote in such anguish and perplexity about [her 
illness that], he would often give a great deal of detail;"438 but her actual illness is unclear. In 
June of 1784 Mary Beattie was taken into a private house in Musselburgh, and it is unlikely 
that she ever saw her husband again.439 The drastic change in Beattie's household at this time 
presents an important context for his determination to give up poetry; he faced the daunting 
task of raising his sons alone and suffered the grief of his wife's estrangement, as well as his 
own precarious health. This domestic tragedy arguably completed the quenching of his poetic 
imagination begun by his philosophical pursuits. 
437 Beattie to Charle~ Boyd 16 November 1766. Beattie, Correspondence 1:22. Also found in W. Forbes, 1:94-
95 and M. Forbes, 32. 
438 Roger Robinson, ''Madness" 191. 
439 Paraphrased from Robinson, "Madness" 192. 
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Beattie begins the process of protecting his poetic career in Poems on Several 
Occasions (1776), which was requested by William Creech for inclusion in his British Poets 
series. Only a handful of Beattie's early poems are revised for this edition, and it also 
contains four poems hitherto unpublished, at least one of which Beattie included to disprove 
his reputation as a sombre philosopher.440 While these poems were newly printed, they had 
been composed before the publication of The Minstrel in 1771.441 Three of the new poems 
featured in this edition were composed for a particular purpose, such as honouring an 
occasion or praising an acquaintance, while another is closely linked to The Minstrel. 
The "Epistle to the Honourable C.B." was composed as a response to a verse epistle 
introduction written by Charles Boyd to Beattie: "Epitaph: Being part of an inscription for a 
monument, to be erected by a gentleman to the memory of his lady'' was written at the behest 
of John Gregory in honour of his late wife, and the "Ode on Lord Hay's birth-day'' was 
composed to celebrate the birth of James Hay's son and heir. "The Hermit" is the final new 
poem in the collection, and is unique amongst them because of its connection to The Minstrel 
in both its subject and themes. 
It is likely that the new poems were chosen because they reflected his particular desire 
to honour his friends, and those whose influence and acquaintance enriched his life, both 
privately and professionally. They are poems of occasion and purpose, composed during 
Beattie's most productive poetic period. Beattie makes only slight revisions to these poems 
between the editions of '76 and the final '84 edition,442 while the revised poems included in 
this edition are altered from the previous text. 
440 
"The Epistle to C.B. is inserted merely to show, that I am not quite so sour a metaphysician as some people 
imagine." Beattie to Cosmo Gordon, 22 May 1777. Beattie, Correspondence 3:56. 
4~ ~~atti~ shar_e_cl_thes..e R~!D1! i11letters: Beattie to _Charles Boyd,c-LAugustJ766 .. Beattie, Correspondence 2:49-
50; Beattie to John Gregory, 20 December 1770. Beattie, Correspondence 2: 131-33.Beattie to William Forbes, 
22 October 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:63-68. Additionally, Thomas Gray writes to Beattie in praise of the 
"Ode" 24 December 1767 (AUL MS 30 B24/6/4). 
442 The changes made are replacing full names with* (ie. Hay becomes H**) and other revisions to punctuation. 
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Beattie condemns to ignominy the bulk of his early poetry, and he speaks ofthose 
poems which he does revise for the edition with derision, aroused by his now negative 
opinion of solitude and the imagination. He revises five poems for this new edition, and 
thinks them of"very little merit; but the Author deserves praise for submitting to the task of 
correcting those incorrigible performances, which the more he reads the more he dislikes."443 
These five poems represent all that Beattie would perpetuate from his early works, and he 
renounces his others in strong terms: "As to all my other Poems, the Ode to Peace, Judgement 
of Paris, etc. I would not rescue them one instant from oblivion, even if a wish could do it."444 
This negative view of his early poetry culminates in the final two editions of poetry which he 
edits, "The Minstrel." in Two Books: With Some Other Poems (1779 and 1784), in which 
Beattie includes less than a third of the poems in his two early volumes. He intended the 1779 
edition ofhis poems as an answer to the unauthorised editions of The Minstrel and ofhis 
early poems. While preparing this edition for the press he gave the property of his poems to 
his publishers Creech and Dilly, 445 who were responsible for the subsequent editions of the 
1790s. In the advertisement (dated 1777t46 Beattie makes it clear that these poems are the 
only ones he would reprint, or indeed acknowledge, in the future. For this edition, Beattie 
eliminated the "Epistle to the Honourable C.B.," and made minor changes to poems 
previously published. Five years later Beattie would see a final edition of his poems through 
the press, keeping the title and order of the 1779 edition. While the order and content do not 
change between 1779 and 1784, substantive changes were made to The Minstrel.447 
443 Beattie to William Creech, 4 November 1776. Beattie, Corremondence 3:28~29. 
444 Beattie to William Forbes, 16 November 1776. Beattie, Correspondence 3:30-33. 
445 
"I am likewise .about publishing the-MinstreLwith a fewothercpoems;cwhich I have given-the property of the 
Messrs Dilly and Creech, in return for some favours I have received from them." Beattie to Sir William Forbes 
10 March 1778. Beattie, Correspondence 3:57~59. 
446 Beattie drafted a version of this advertisement in his day-book, dated February 1778: See Appendix, p. 327. 
447 These are outlined in Appendix, 315-17 and discussed in chapter 3, see pp. 108-9. 
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Beattie writes to Elizabeth Montagu shortly before the publication of this final 
edition, in which he states his weariness with the exercise in poetic terms: 
When this affair is settled, and the volume revised once more, I bid adieu to poetry 
forever-! wish I could say of my voice, what Milton said of his; that it is-
unchanged To Hoarse or mute, though fallen on evil days, On evil days though 
fallen-But alas, I am in the condition of Virgil's forlorn shepherd, to whom indeed it 
becomes me to compare myself. Omnia fert retas, animum quoque."448 
This is the first reference Beattie makes to the diminishing nature of his poetic powers, and it 
supports the idea that his career as a philosopher has stifled his poetic creativity. He also 
reprinted the advertisement dated 1777 in this edition, which reinforces his desire to renounce 
his earlier works in favour of those in this volume. The edition of 1784 was intended to 
protect his reputation as a serious poet, and to publish for the final time those of his early 
poems he would acknowledge. Three other editions were published by Creech and Dilly 
during Beattie's lifetime, though Beattie did not sanction two of these, and this irresponsible 
behaviour of his publishers brought him great anxiety. The first of these editions appeared 
1796 and was published without his knowledge or involvement, and bears the title of the 
1776 edition, which did not contain Beattie's final editorial changes. It is clear from his 
letters that he did not intend to revise his poems after the 1784 edition, and so the 
inaccuracies of this edition vexed him. He vents his frustrations in a letter to Sir William 
Forbes in December of that year, in which he believes "with most unaccountable inattention, 
they [the editions of 1797 and 1799] follow, not the last and best edition corrected by myself, 
and printed by Dilly 
448 .B~~ttie to_E1izab~_th Montagu, 2 February 1784. Beattie, Correspondence 3:198-200. Beattie's translation of 
these lines from Virgil's Eclogue IX from OPT is of interest here: "The rest I have forgot, for length of years I 
Deadens the sense, and memory impairs. I All things in time submit to sad decay; I Oft have we sung whole 
summer suns away. I These vanish'd joys must MOERIS now deplore, I His voice delights, his numbers charm 
no more" (92-7). 
211 
in 1784, but an imperfect edition of a prior date"449 which omits the names of John Gregory 
and Elizabeth Montagu, as well as the stanza added to Book II of The Minstrel for the 1784 
edition. The subsequent editions of 1797 and 1799450 reprint the text of the 1784 edition. 
Beattie did not edit these last two editions, and relied upon his publishers to follow the 
revisions of 1784. Taken as one entity, these later volumes represent a shift in Beattie's 
poetic tastes and his desire to renounce many of his early poems, which were inspired by the 
solitude and the natural surroundings of his young adulthood. Beattie omits two of his early 
poems, "Ode to Peace" and "The Triumph of Melancholy." The former is politically charged, 
while the latter is representative of his youthful attachment to the natural sublime, and the 
effects of solitude upon the poetic imagination. 
He explains his current view of his early poetry in a letter to Elizabeth Montagu, 
which he wrote upon learning she had lately read his 1766 volume: "The glare of images, the 
tawdry style, the overcharged harmony, to say nothing of its other faults, are to me the 
objects of very great disgust; and it covers me with shame and with sorrow to think, that you 
should have had the misfortune to peruse it."451 This passage highlights Beattie's 
determination to banish from all memory the early poems he does not deem worthy of 
inclusion in the later editions. His attitude toward his early poetry is indeed severe, and an 
investigation into the early poems he chooses to revise, and the revisions made for his later 
editions, present an interesting context for his altered criteria for poetic excellence. 
449 Beattie to Sir_ William Forbes, 3 December 1796. Beattie, Corremondence 4:223-24. 
450 This edition also contained a volume of James Hay Beattie's poetry and an account of the author written by 
Beattie. 
451 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 20 April1778. Beattie, Correspondence 3:60-63. Also found in M. Forbes, 
143. 
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Revised Poems 
The revisions made to the early poems revised for POSO consist generally in 
clarifying the diction and the flow of the verse. An investigation of the poems Beattie chooses 
to revise for these final volumes can provide some insight into the poetic legacy he is 
attempting to build, and his abandonment of his early poetry illustrates his altered poetical 
outlook. Two of the four early Pindaric odes are revised, "Retirement," and "Ode to Hope," 
but as already noted, he eliminates the "Ode to Peace" and "The Triumph of Melancholy'"'52 
from all of his later volumes. Beattie's reason for excluding the "Ode to Peace" was probably 
the poem's politically charged subject, its comments upon the Seven Years' War, as well as 
the obsession with luxury and wealth ofthel760s. 
It is likely that Beattie perceived his youthful political and social commentary as too 
dated, (though he remained a staunch Whig throughout his life) and too negative toward the 
memory of a government which had bestowed honour and an annual pension upon him, to be 
included in his later editions. This desire to condemn to ignominy his politically charged 
poems is supported by his exclusion of his attack upon the memory of Reverend Charles 
Churchill. His decision to exclude "The Triumph of Melancholy" from his later editions 
exemplifies his altered opinion of the effects of melancholy and solitude upon the 
imagination. The poem deals with melancholy's effect upon the mind, and investigates its 
place within the poetic imagination and the consequences of indulgence in such a state. 
452 Sir William Forbes reprinted both poems in the Appendix to his Life so they would not be lost. W. Forbes, 
1:50-51. 
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The melancholy and solitude which once inspired his poetic imagination is 
investigated in his early ode, but Beattie's beliefs concerning the consequences of indulgence 
in these forces changed dramatically in his later life. His remarks in a letter to Elizabeth 
Montagu demonstrate his altered perceptions, as well as the melancholia which was the 
fashion when he composed much of his early poetry: 
My admiration of Thomson's poetry and sentiments, and the intoxication 
produced by the melancholy strains of Young, made me admire also the style 
and composition of those authors; which you know, Madam, is very 
unclassical, at least in the Seasons and the Night-thoughts.453 
Thomas Gray's "An Elegy Written in a Country Churchyard" (1751) marks the climax of 
melancholy as a genre, but later in the century melancholy poetry was criticised as 
"dangerous to society, [and] an excessive manifestation of 'self-love"'454 and its continued 
use as a literary trope might have appeared of questionable taste to the older Beattie. He had 
by this time resolved that melancholy and solitude are harmful to the mind because they 
detract from the daily operations of life, and he wished to reinforce his own personal piety 
and virtue.455 Some of the sentiments in this poem are also explored in "The Hermit," for 
example, as showing the negative impact of melancholy and solitude upon day to day 
operations of life, contrasted with its inspirational impact upon the imagination.456 ln this 
early ode, melancholy overpowers the speaker, and the negative aspects of melancholy are 
unresolved, but the version of"The Hermit" Beattie includes in his later editions resolves this 
453 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 20 April 1778. Beattie, Correspondence 3:60-63. Also found in M. Forbes, 
143. 
454 Amy Reed, The Background of Gray's Elegy: A Study in the Taste for Melancholy Poetry 1700-1751 (New 
Yot:k:Russell,J962) 250.,_ . . . -
455 This is in opposition to the idea of early poets of the century, who favoured solitude because "the 
contemplation of nature is good for the soul, inducing actual virtue, love of God, and benevolence towards 
man." Reed, 250. 
456 See pp. 130-32. 
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issue through a confidence in Christianity and its powers of comfort and consolation. 
"Elegy" (which is the revised "Elegy Occasioned by the Death of a Lady''), is the only 
memorial poem from Beattie's early collections to be included in the later collections. Beattie 
alters the title so that it is not obvious that it is the poem which was written in honour of Lord 
Monboddo's sister Elizabeth Burnet. This memorial poem ends with a strong overt 
conviction in the consolation of the Christian afterlife- something the other earlier memorial 
poems do not share. In this respect it is similar to the new epitaph for Elizabeth Gregory, 
which banishes the doubts of Beattie's early poetry with an innate confidence in Christianity. 
He does not include his own epitaph; possibly he considered its inclusion an illustration of 
vanity and melancholy rather than poetic power.457 
He also omits the early poem originally titled "Elegy," which investigated the 
effectiveness of Christian doctrines as an antidote for the pain of loss, and the "Epitaph on 
Two Brothers"458 which was inspired by the tragic death of two brothers in the 
neighbourhood. These ruminations in his early memorial poems conflict with his conviction 
in the consolation of Christianity and the public character which Beattie wishes to preserve in 
these later volumes. His decision to eliminate his early memorial poems from these 
collections reflects his desire to preserve his public image as a serious poet and a devout 
Christian. This motivation is reflected in the fact that, while he eliminates much of his early 
poetry, Beattie includes both of the fables in his later editions. 
457 Gray's "Elegy" as published; not in the Eton MS. ends with-a-poet's nielaricholy epitaph, which Beattie 
echoes in his own poem, and reinforces the connection between melancholy and the poetic imagination which 
inspired Beattie in his youth. See pp. 45-46. 
458 This poem was only included in Beattie's ftrst volume of poetry, probably to reinforce his status as a serious 
poet and a public voice, see pp. 46-47. 
215 
In his Life, William Forbes questions Beattie's reasons for including "The Hares: A 
Fable" his later editions, remarking that it is "a poem which seems to possess little other 
merit than smooth versification and a faultless moral."459 "The Hares" as presented in 1776 is 
significantly shortened from the 1766 volume, and eight lines are added to the end to 
reinforce the Christian nature of their resolution. No significant alterations are made to the 
text after this initial revision for the '76 edition, and so my textual comparisons in this case 
will focus on this first revision versus the first published version. Beattie begins by cutting 
the first thirty-eight lines of the poem from the earlier version, (most notably the echo of"My 
Own Epitaph"460) and removing many lines throughout the narrative. The editing enables the 
plot to develop easily, and in one case changes the overall thematic nature of the poem. 
One passage in particular exemplifies the kind of changes Beattie made to the poem 
generally, by reinforcing the conviction in Christian values, and toning down the suicidal 
bent of the hares. The revised stanza focuses on the promise of peace in the eternal afterlife 
promised by Christianity,461 while the earlier version addresses the antagonistic relationship 
between the hares and nature's forces. Nature is characterised as a benevolent force, which 
inclines creatures towards the lesser evil: "'Tis Nature bids us dare to die, I And disappoint 
our destiny" (185-86). The council of hares choose suicide as an alternative to living in fear 
of predators. In the revised passage this relationship is more explicit: ''No. Be the smaller ill 
our choice: I "So dictates Nature's powerful voice" (127-28). The fable and moral of"The 
Hares" remains the same; the revisions reflect Beattie's desire to make the themes, rather 
than the images, the reader's focus. He removes superfluous images that do not advance the 
plot or themes, and strengthens the hares' conviction of the promised Christian afterlife, 
W~£h is unattainable_ thro~gh sl!icide .. 
459 Forbes, 1:49. 
460 See pp. 48-49. 
461 See Appendix pp. 327-28 for the stanzas in their entirety. 
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"Pymreo-gerano-machia: The Battle of the Pygmies and Cranes" is also revised from 
its earlier version, but the changes are not as significant as those made to its predecessor. The 
revisions are primarily to the diction, and strengthen the images while making the action 
sequences more sympathetic. An example of this kind of revision is the depiction of the 
pygmies preparing for war: they "Couch' d the long quivering lance, and grasp' d the shield; I 
They form the glittering lines, and lengthening far, I Well ranged in firm array, await the 
war" (95-97). The revised passage remains true to the intent of the original, but brings the 
action into the present tense, which builds suspense in the reader for the impending battle: 
"And grasp the shield, and couch the quivering lance; I To right and left the lengthening lines 
they form, I And rank'd in deep array await the storm" (99-100). Few substantive changes are 
made to the poem, evidence that the high opinion Beattie had of the poem upon its 
completion was not affected by his changing attitude toward poetry. 
New Poems in Poems on Several Occasions (1776) 
"Epistle to the Honourable C.B." is the first new poem in the edition, though it is 
dated 1766. The subject of the poem, Charles Boyd, was the second son of the Earl of 
Kilmarnock, and the younger brother of Beattie's patron the Earl ofErroll. The "Epistle" 
represents Beattie's desire to illustrate his light-hearted poetic abilities, though Beattie 
attempts to dissuade his noble correspondent from a poetic career. Its obvious message is a 
humorous explanation for Beattie's delay in waiting upon its subject, but Beattie's desire to 
warn Boyd against poetic ambition pervades the poem. In this poem Beattie essentially warns 
Boyd concerning ~e critici~_m ~d inevitable strife of a poeti~ career which he mentions in 
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"An Epistle, to the Reverend Mr. Thomas Blacklock."462 According to William Forbes, Boyd 
''was master too of no inconsiderable portion of humour, and had some tum for making 
verse."463 This affinity for poetry no doubt prompted Boyd to introduce himselfto Beattie 
through a verse epistle, which prompted Beattie's polite but significant caution to Boyd 
concerning his poetic ambition. The poem opens by praising its subject's character, and 
establishes him in pastoral scenery reminiscent ofVirgilian swains: "Whence he looks down 
with pity on the great; I And, midst the groves retired, at leisure wooes I Domestick love, 
contentment, and the Muse" ( 4-6). The next stanza rehearses many mythical means of 
transport (the wings designed by Dedalus and the winged horse Pegasus) but makes a 
significant distinction between ancient vehicles and the fate of modem poets: "Such vehicles 
were common once, no doubt; I But modem versemen must even trudge on foot, I Or doze at 
home, expectants of the gout" (23-25). The juxtaposition of these ancient noble images with 
the reality of life for eighteenth-century poets is a significant moment in the poem, because it 
illustrates Beattie's quiet desire to dissuade Boyd from romanticising the status of 
contemporary poets. The poem then shows Boyd the difficulty for poets to maintain a 
separate persona in daily life: "Hard is the task, indeed 'tis wonderous hard I To act the Hier, 
yet preserve the Bard" (26-27).464 These lines present in a comical style the conflict Beattie 
perceived between pragmatic necessity and the desire for a poetic career, and foreshadow the 
conflict between philosophical reasoning and poetic imagination Beattie articulated in a letter 
to Boyd later that year. 
462 See pp. 82-84 for details of this poem. 
463 W. Forbes, 1:92. 
464 The reference to this word reads: "One who keeps horses to let is so called in Scotland. See Johnson's 
dictionary." 
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Though he warns Boyd against a poetic career, he still wishes for natural scenery to 
inspire both speaker and subject: "And (for I know the Muse will come along) I To B*** I 
mean to meditate a song: I A song, adom'd with every rural charm" (50-52). Beattie 
reinforces the influence of nature upon his poetic imagination by situating his composition in 
an unspoilt setting, the kind of setting which inspired his early poetry. The final stanza 
invokes an image of classical delicacies laid upon a banquet table, which the speaker would 
renounce if it meant the favour of his subject's company. He resolves that "IfB*** be happy, 
and in health, his guest, I Whom wit and learning charm, can wish no better feast" (66-67). 
This final stanza praises Boyd for his learning and his nobility as a host, reinforcing 
the gratitude being expressed in the poem for hospitality offered to the speaker. The ending 
highlights the muted nature of the panegyric element of the poem, since Beattie implies that 
poetry should not be an act of self-glorification. Though it is somewhat veiled, Beattie's 
intention in the poem is clearly to warn Boyd of the dangers of poetic ambition. The poem 
also highlights Beattie's frustrations as a professional poet. While he publicly reasoned that 
the poem was included in the 1776 edition to prove his lighter poetic powers, this poem is 
another example of Beattie's desire to publicly recognise his patrons, and those whose 
influence or approbation has assisted his poetic or professional career. 
"Epitaph: Being Part of an Inscription for a Monument to be Erected by a Gentleman 
to the Memory of his Lady" was composed by Beattie in honour of Dr. Gregory's wife 
Elizabeth. The poem is in the style of Beattie's early memorial poetry in OPT, and is similar 
to "Elegy'' in content. The poem opens by rehearsing the virtues of the lady, "Farewell my 
best beloved; whose heavenly mind I Genius with virtue, strength with softness join' d; I 
Devotion, undebased by pri<!e or art" (1-3). The poem then shifts to the unrivalled virtues of 
the lady in both private and public life: "Unblamed, unequalled, in each sphere of life, I 
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The tenderest Daughter, Sister, Parent, Wife. I In thee their Patronness th' affiicted lost;" (7-
9) which builds sympathy for these men and women who must continue to live without the 
beloved person. 
The final four lines are important because they echo sentiments prevalent in Beattie's 
other memorial poems, and significantly lack an affirmation of the Christian consolation: 
And I-but ah, can words my loss declare, 
Or paint th' extremes of transport and despair! 
0 Thou, beyond what verse or speech can tell, 
My guide, my friend, my best beloved, farewell! (11-14). 
The earlier version of this poem written in a letter to Dr. Gregory concludes with two lines 
not found in any subsequent text: "Farewell a while! These days oftrouble o'er, I We soon 
shall meet again, to part no more."465 These lines were inserted on the advice of Dr. Gregory, 
and Beattie's reasoning for removing them highlights his altered view of Christian 
consolation: ''the immortality of the soul, and the continuation of the friendship of the pious 
thro' all the periods of a future existence, being points so fundamental among Christians, that 
they may be always supposed, whether expressed or not, to form a part of every meditation of 
this kind.'0466 Beattie's earlier memorial poetry does not share this later conviction; indeed, the 
other poem meant for a public monument amongst Beattie's memorial poetry, "Epitaph on 
Two Brothers" states his early desire to take comfort in the certainty of the Christian afterlife. 
The sentiments of that poem's final lines, ''They liv'd united, and united died; I Happy the 
friends, whom Death cannot divide!" (25-26) he publicly affirms his conviction in the 
465 Beattie to John Gregory, 20 December 1770. Beattie, Correspondence 2: 131-33. 
466 Beattie to John Gregory, 20 December 1770. Beattie, Correspondence 2:131-33. 
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Christian consolation which his early memorial poems question.467 
The following poem commemorates a birth, and illustrates Beattie's continuing 
connection to his patron the Earl ofErroll as well as the influence of the poetry of Thomas 
Gray. "Ode on Lord Hay's Birth-day'' was composed to commemorate the birth of George 
Hay,468 and is in the metre of Thomas Gray's "Ode on the Spring." The inclusion of the poem 
in the 1776 volume further reinforces Beattie's connection to his patron James Hay, and his 
desire to immortalise his gratitude to him. The poem is eliminated from the later collections, 
possibly because by their publication the son whose birth he honoured in the poem had 
succeeded to the Earldom. The poem was printed privately for the family shortly after its 
composition469 and Beattie also sent a copy of the text to Thomas Gray. 
It was subsequently printed in the Edinburgh Magazine and Review in 1773 along 
with ''The Hermit" prior to its inclusion in the 1776 edition,470 but there is no reference to this 
publication in Beattie's letters, so it is unclear whether the periodical publication had 
Beattie's authority. "The Hermit" might have been published as an enticement and to build 
anticipation for the forthcoming Second Book of The Minstrel, since the poems are similar in 
theme and subject. The public display of the "Ode" was probably intended to reinforce 
Beattie's connection to his patron, and to celebrate the nobility of Lord Hay and his family. 
467 Examples of this can be found in "The Hermit" which Beattie revised for POSO: "I have added two stanza's 
to the Hermit, and made him conclude like a Christian. I have really a tolerable good opinion of that piece." 
Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 16 November 1776. Beattie, Correspondence 3:33. 
468 George Hay (1767-98) succeeded his father as the sixteenth Earl ofErroll in 1778: see Correspondence of 
Thomas OGray,J~d_._ )lagetl:oynbee,and Leonard,Whibley,3.Yols.~(Oxford:c0xford UP;-1935)3 :983"-· 
469 Lady Eroll made a gift of the poem to James Boswell and Samuel Johnson when they visited Stains Castle in 
August 1773, which supports the hypothesis that it was printed privately shortly after its composition, although 
no copies of this publication survive. Boswell's Life of Johnson 5:105. 
470 This is information is taken from Boswell's Life of Johnson 5:499. 
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Thomas Gray writes to Beattie in December of 1767 praising the poem, commenting 
that "the diction is easy & noble. The texture of the thoughts lyrick & the versification 
harmonious."471 Gray makes insightful comments into the mechanics of the poem, and his 
praise of it could also have led Beattie to include it in his 1776 volume, since he valued 
Gray's poetic criticism highly. Beattie's use of Gray's metre from the "Ode on the Spring," 
gives the poem an easy lyrical movement, and the simple diction characterise the speaker as a 
natural poet. The employment of this persona disguises his personal motivations for 
composing the poem, and allows him to praise his patron while building the poem as a 
genuine and simple panegyric, rather than an artful device to further his poetical career. 
Beattie's ode depicts the possibility of future prosperity promised by the child as an antidote 
to the inevitable decay of human life which Gray deals with in the "Ode on the Spring." 
The opening of the panegyric reinforces this notion by invoking a simple unrehearsed 
muse, to reinforce the virtue of the youth and his lineage. The speaker invokes "A Muse, 
unskill'd in venal praise, I Unstain'd with flattery's art; I Who loves simplicity oflays" (1-3). 
Here Beattie makes a deliberate attempt to mask the poem's main purpose of honouring a 
patron whose influence has been beneficial to his career. The opening introduces the speaker 
as an untaught poet whose lay is inspired by a rural muse. It is reminiscent of the "Ode on the 
Spring," which also depicts a rural muse amidst the budding rejuvenation of spring: "Beside 
some water's rushy brink I With me the Muse shall sit, and think I (At ease reclin'd in rustic 
· state)" (15-17). This initial statement is essential, because the poem then shifts to a rehearsal 
of the nobility and virtue of the Hay family, and becomes didactic in its sentiments for the 
future behaviour of the family. 
471 Gray, Correspondence 3:983-4. 
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The next stanza rehearses the nobility of the child's family, by depicting their defence 
of their nation in battle: "For not on beds of gaudy flowers I Thine ancestors reclined" (11-
12), but rather "To stem the deluge of war, I And snatch from fate a sinking land" (16-17). 
This invocation of the family's military history could be problematic,472 but Beattie focuses 
upon their ancient nobility and their long period of prosperity. This defence of their ancient 
land justifies their current position, despite the treasonous actions of the recent past. The 
poem continues by recounting in general terms the benevolence of the family with regard to 
the common people on their lands, and the subject shifts to universal didacticism which is 
present in much of Beattie's early poetry. This section presents Beattie's continuing 
preoccupation with the necessity of sympathy and compassion versus luxury and material 
wealth: 
Y e Sons of Luxury be wise; 
Know, happiness for ever flies 
The cold and solitary breast; 
Then let the social instinct glow, 
And learn to feel another's woe, 
And in his joy be bless'd (45-50). 
This denial of ambition and wealth is reminiscent ofthe "Ode to Peace," in which luxury and 
temporal ambition lead to destruction of nature and virtue.473 While the earlier ode ends with 
no resolution of the conflict between ambition and virtue, these lines present compassion and 
sympathy as the virtuous solutions to the vices of ambition and material desire. 
472 George Hay's grandfather, the fourth Earl of Kilmarnock, had been executed as a Jacobite rebel in 1746. 
473 See pp. 24-28. · 
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The poem then shifts to particular blessings for the child, and in the final stanza the 
speaker reverts back to a didactic tone, this time celebrating the natural world as well as the 
simple environment of his tenants. The speaker highlights the importance of nature to the 
growth of the mind, and the positive force of the simple life upon the mind: "Let not thy 
towering mind despise I The village and the grove" (73-7 4). The final lines reinforce these 
sentiments concerning the values of nature: "For Innocence with angel smile, I Simplicity that 
knows not guile, I And Love and Peace are there" (78-80). The pastoral image these final 
lines invoke is reminiscent of the final lines of ''The Hares," which reinforce the positive 
influence ofnature.474 The ending of the poem recalls the invocation of the natural untaught 
muse of the opening, and the innocence and potential of the newborn subject. 
''The Hermit" is situated in scenery reminiscent of that of Edwin's first introduction to 
the Hermit in The Minstrel, but there are a number of important differences between the two 
speakers. Unlike the Hermit Edwin meets, the speaker of this poem is investigating the 
consequences of the human condition. The Hermit of The Minstrel is introduced as a jaded 
poet whose experiences are meant to curb the young Edwin's imaginative instincts. The 
character of the Hermit of this poem is preoccupied solely with the mutable fate of man 
versus the rejuvenating character of nature. Beattie also sent this poem to Thomas Gray 
shortly after its composition. Gray recognises within it the sentiments of the sublime in nature 
which inspired Beattie's early poetry: ''the sentiments are such as a melancholy imagination 
naturally suggests in solitude & silence, & that (tho' light & business may suspend or banish 
them at times) return with but so much the greater force upon a feeling heart."475 
474 Seep. 50. 
475 Gray, 3:974. 
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The Hermit's character is initially introduced with a clear separation between intellect 
and emotion: "A Hermit his song of the night thus began; I No more with himself or with 
nature at war, I He thought as a Sage, while he felt as a Man" (6-8). Line six is altered for the 
final '84 edition,476 which eliminates the reference to night and reinforces the Hermit's 
character as a poet with more eloquent diction. King argues that "The hermit intrudes into the 
evening solitude, showing the tension between man's desires and his inevitable failure and 
thus the need to seek atonement in nature,"477 but there is no evidence in the poem that the 
Hermit is invading the scene in which the poem opens; on the contrary, he is inspired by the 
sublime environment of the evening, and throughout the rest of the poem he recognises the 
difference between humanity's inevitable decay, and the cyclical natural world around him. 
Rather than seeking to make amends with nature, the Hermit is seeking consolation for the 
mutable nature of man and laments the inevitable pain of human life, which he contrasts with 
the continual cycle of death and rebirth in nature. King also argues that "The hermit has 
become a sage because in gaining the joy and perfect recompense of nature's solitude he has 
achieved a balance between intellect and emotion,"478 but there is nothing in the poem to 
suggest that the Hermit's solitude has had this kind of impact. The rest of the poem is spoken 
by the Hermit, and his laments recall the speech of Beattie's aged poet in The Minstrel.479 
The Hermit begins by celebrating the cyclical aspects of nature, which highlights the 
mutable aspects of human life: "Why thus, lonely Philomel, flows thy sad strain? I For Spring 
shall return, and a lover bestow" (10-11). For the '84 edition the allusion to the nightingale is 
altered from a question concerning its song to one that depicts its sorrow and weakness, 
476 
"While his harp rung symphonious, a Hermit began" (6). 
4~7 ~.Y~!~4.King,,''J~~,Beattie's.Retirement and The Hemit: Two Early Romantic poems," South Atlantic 
Sfarterly 72 (1973): 581. 
4 8 King, "Retirement" 581. 
479 That Hermit deals with the inevitable pain caused by ambition and a desire for temporal wealth by recounting 
his own desires and their negative impact upon his mind. See Book II, stanzas X-XX. 
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drawing on the established literary conventions associated with it: "Why, lone Philomela, that 
languishing fall?" (10). 480 This change makes the line flow more naturally into the next 
line,481 and reinforces the allusion to rebirth, which will be contrasted with the inevitability 
and permanence of human death. This permanence is reinforced by the parallel the poem 
draws between nature's cycle and the progression of human life. The natural world will 
continue to die and be reborn as long as life continues, but man is separated from the natural 
world because of his impermanence, without the possibility of eternal rejuvenation: "Mourn, 
sweetest Complainer, Man calls thee to mourn: I 0 soothe him, whose pleasures like thine 
pass away- I Full quickly they pass,- but they never return" (14-16). The transience of 
humanity's temporal pleasures is compared with the perpetual state of nature, as well as 
nature's indifference to humanity's situation. This theme is more fully explored in the 
following stanza by acknowledging the aspects of the natural world which separate humans 
from the world around them. This stanza returns to nature, building the image of the waxing 
and waning moon to "Roll on thou fair orb, and with gladness pursue I The path that conducts 
thee to splendour again.- I But Man's faded glory no change shall renew.482 I Ah fool! To 
exult in a glory so vain!" (21-24). The subtle change to line 23 for the 1784 edition shifts 
from a pessimistic tone to an optimistic one, which foreshadows the new final stanzas that 
Beattie added to the poem to reinforce the Christian faith of the Hermit. 
These negative consequences of melancholy and solitude are introduced but not 
resolved in this ode, but in "The Hermit" daylight banishes these phantoms.483 The depressed 
sentiments concerning the human condition when compared to the death and rebirth in nature 
is fully developed in the following stanza, which was originally the end of the poem, until 
480See Akenside,Odes, 1.15. 
481 
"For Spring shall return, and a lover bestow," (11). 
482 Line in 1784 edition reads: "But Man's faded glory what change shall renew." 
483 The Christian afterlife is characterised as eternal daylight in "The Minstrel": "0 when shall that Eternal Mom 
appear, I These dreadful forms to chase, this chaos dark to clear!" (179-80). 
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Beattie added two stanzas for the version to be included in POSO to make the Hermit console 
himself in the hope of the Christian afterlife. In the new final stanzas of"The Hermit" the 
speaker overcomes the depression introduced in "The Triumph of Melancholy'' by building 
confidence in the certainty of the Christian afterlife. 
The Hermit's speech articulates his depressed spirits while reinforcing the contrast 
between man and nature. He begins by recognising that the natural world present around him 
will continue to be deformed by night, and rejuvenated by day: "I mourn, but, ye woodlands, 
I mourn not for you; I For mom is approaching, your charms to restore" (26-27). The division 
between night and day is also important in The Minstrel, where night works fitfully upon the 
imagination, and its apparitions are banished by daylight. 484 He then turns to nature's never 
ending cycle of seasons: "Nor yet for the ravage of winter I mourn; I Kind Nature the embryo 
blossom will save.-" (29-30). Man, however, is exempt from this cycle of death and rebirth, 
which permanently separates him from the natural world in which he lives. 
The Hermit's recognition of this state, and the depression which it causes, is clear in 
the climactic fmal two lines of this stanza, in which the Hermit laments his own impending 
death, to which nature is entirely indifferent: "But when shall spring visit the mouldering urn! 
I 0 when shall it dawn on the night of the grave!" (31-32).485 The Hermit finds no solace from 
the impermanence of human life, and is left with a lingering notion that nature has a better 
kind of existence, because death leads to rebirth rather than an end. This section evokes 
strong emotions from the reader, because it presents the human dilemma without any 
484 Th~ ~gin~tlve power of night is invoked in Book I stanza XXXIII and is banished by the daylight in stanza 
XXXVI of The Minstrel. 
48s The power of nature to console humanity is also questioned in "The Triumph of Melancholy:" "Say, can ye 
chear pale Sickness' gloomy bed, I Or dry the tears that bathe the untimely urn?" (67-68). 
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confidence in a better state.486 This ending is reminiscent of Beattie's early memorial poetry, 
in which he questions the power of Christian consolation and the possibility of an eternal 
afterlife. 487 The revisions made to this poem show Beattie's desire to banish the doubts that 
were prevalent in his early poetry, so he adds two new stanzas to the poem which are 
intended to "make him [the Hennit] conclude like a Christian," rather than ending the poem 
without a firm resolution of his Hermit's questions. 
The answer to the pervading question of the poem comes in the two new final stanzas, 
which allude to the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which enabled Christians to defeat 
death through the promise of an eternal afterlife. The first new stanza begins with the speaker 
recounting the allurements of worldly explanations for the process of life/death without any 
hope of a future state, and addresses similar arguments to those which Beattie battled in the 
Essay on Truth: '"Twas thus, by the glare of false Science betray' d I That leads, to bewilder; 
and dazzles to blind;" (33-34). The poem upbraids the kind of scientific investigation that 
defies religious doctrines and seeks pragmatic explanations for humanity and nature. 
The speaker believes that it is only through God's mercy that he is saved from the 
consequences of this kind of science: "0 pity, great father oflight," then I cry'd" "Lo, 
humbled in dust, I relinquish my pride: I From doubt and from darkness thou only canst free" 
(39-40). The humility displayed at the end of this stanza is essential to the resolution ofthe 
poem, in which the Hennit trumps the poem's earlier laments with confidence in the peace 
and happiness promised by the Christian faith. In the final stanza, the confidence in God has 
banished the woes of the earlier stanzas, is heralded by the approach of day, and this, which: 
... breaks on the traveller, faint, and astray, 
486 Boswell notes the effectofthis particular stanza upon Samuel Johnson: "so much was he affected by 
pathetick poetry, that, when he was reading Dr. Beattie's 'Hermit' in my presence, it brought tears into his 
e1,es." Boswell, 4:186. 
4 7 Beattie asks the same question in "An Elegy, Occasioned by the Death of a Lady" and "Elegy." See pp. 42-
44 and 47-48. 
The bright and the balmy effluence of mom. 
See Truth, Love, and Mercy, in triumph decending, 
And Nature all glowing in Eden's first bloom! 
On the cold cheek of Death smiles and roses are blending 
And Beauty immortal awakes from the tomb ( 43~48). 
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The images refer to the perfection of Eden and the final line refers to the resurrection of 
Christ which makes salvation possible. Beattie added this confidence in Christian consolation 
to the poem for its publication, which further exemplifies his desire to banish his earlier 
poetic indecisiveness concerning the effectiveness of the Christian afterlife as an antidote to 
human suffering. Clearly "The Hermit," "achieves an unusuaily fine blending of emotion and 
thought about life and death with a newly conceived natural setting,"488 and creates a 
sympathetic, and at times interrupted, relationship between man and nature which will 
occupy the imaginations of poets that will follow. 
In sum, Beattie's professional success as a philosopher and educator demanded a 
study of metaphysics which he associated with the deterioration of his health and, he 
believed, depressed his imaginative powers. His poetic success with The Minstrel brought 
him prosperity and. acquaintance with the eminent literary minds of his day, but the illness 
and eventual removal of his wife from their home depressed his spirits. In the later years of 
his poetic career he sought to preserve his poetic reputation, which he did by publicly 
denouncing much of his early poetry and editing for the final time those works which he 
wished to preserve as his poetic legacy. The new poems he includes in the '76 collection 
reinforce his lively poetic imagination and his desire to preserve his reputation as a poet of 
energy and enthusiasm for nature. 
488 King, "Retirement," 583. 
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Chapter 6: Education and Reflection: Beattie's Later Prose Works 
Beattie's numerous prose works represent the final phase of his public career, and 
further illustrate his desire to leave a lasting positive contribution to his society. They were 
revised and published during a time when Beattie's health was deteriorating and his 
household under increasing stress. Upon the birth of their second son, Montagu, in 1778 
Mary Beattie's mental health deteriorated, and by 1781 she was permanently removed from 
the household.489 Many of the essays were originally composed as lectures to his students, or 
as discourses to be read to the Aberdeen Philosophical Society.490 While the majority of these 
discourses were composed from the late 1760s to the early 1770s, it is clear from Beattie's 
letters that he took considerable care to revise and enlarge them before publication. 
Revising and preparing the essays for publication probably distracted his mind from 
the melancholy of his household, and allowed him to make one final contribution to society. 
The corpus of essays articulate Beattie's ideas concerning a wide variety of topics, and so for 
the purposes of this study it is necessary to choose from these works those which are relevant 
to Beattie's poetry, and those that illustrate his interest in literary criticism. The essays are 
also intimately connected to Beattie's overall philosophical system, as elements of it are 
expressed in a variety of ways throughout the chosen essays. In addition to the essays, Beattie 
collected Scoticisms, in an attempt to correct young writers in their usage and illustrate the 
particular Scottish nature of the words. This reference book illustrates Beattie's desire for 
correct usage oflanguage and his attitude toward 'Scots dialect' as well as his preoccupation 
489 Mary Beattie's condition and whereabouts were a constant anxiety to Beattie, and as her condition worsened 
he_was_afraid to have her in the same neighbourhood. It is seemingly poignant that at the-time of her removal he 
was most likely composing his essay "On the Attachments of the Kindred," which deals with the responsibilities 
entailed in married life. 
490 See H. Lewis Ulman, ed., The Minutes of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society: 1758-1773 (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen UP, 1990). 
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with the disadvantage the Scots faced when writing and conversing in English. This 
collection, along with Beattie's only poem in the Scots dialect, "To Mr. Alexander Ross," 
illustrates Beattie's attitude toward this native dialect and presents an interesting context for 
his collection of Scottish words. 
It is the style of the essays that sets them apart from contemporary discourses; in a 
letter to Elizabeth Montagu he acknowledges the lack of novelty of his arguments, but also 
explains the motivation behind these projects: "On subjects that have been so often discussed, 
it is not easy to devise any thing new, in the way of either doctrine or illustration: my chief 
purpose was to be intelligible, and (if possible) entertaining, and moral."491 The essays present 
many commonly held ideas but do so in a simple articulate style, which Beattie worried 
would bring them little commercial success. 492 Despite his anxieties, the reviews of the Essays 
"praised the essays and Beattie's style and approach"493 and while many reviews of 
Dissertations Moral and Critical (1783) were not wholly favourable, even the staunch critic 
Gilbert Stuart "acknowledged that the essays were 'enlivened by many pleasing scenes and 
anecdotes, and written in a stile, unaffected, simple, and perspicuous.' "494 
491 Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu, 3 April1777. Beattie, Correspondence 3:53-56. 
492 He explains in a letter to Elizabeth Montagu: "I am afraid the plainness and simplicity of the style will not hit 
the taste of the present race of orators and criticks." Beattie to Elizabeth Montagu 30 January 1783. Beattie, 
Correspondence 3:161,65. _ 
493 Roger Robinson, introduction, Essays: On Poetry and Music, by James Beattie (London: Thoernmes-
Routledge, 1996), xxvi. 
494 Roger Robinson, introduction, Dissertations Moral and Critical, by James Beattie (London: Thoemmes-
Routledge, 1996), xxi. 
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The first two essays, "On Poetry and Music as They Affect the Mind" and "On 
Laughter and Ludicrous Composition," were published with the sixth edition of the Essay on 
Truth in an octavo volume in 1776.495 The former addresses many current topics concerning 
poetry: the role of the poet and poetical composition, poetic genius, poetry's relation to 
music, and the use and propriety of poetical language. It is ''the culmination of the long 
debate over the conditions and principles which best unite poetry and music, showing the 
complexity of the problem as it forces the critic to draw upon new developments such as the 
notion of music as a means of communication and the theory of the association ofideas."496 
The unity of poetry and music which Beattie makes is unique in eighteenth-century criticism. 
Poetry and painting were usually considered the "sister arts," and so Beattie is more closely 
aligned in this essay to the Romantic authors who followed. The "Essay on Laughter" 
critiques the philosophical arguments concerning laughter and ridicule of Thomas Hobbes, 
Francis Hutcheson, and Mark Akenside. Beattie also investigates the ideas or qualities in 
objects that provoke laughter, and the elements needed to produce laughter, and examines the 
similarities and differences between ridicule and satire. 
The final three essays I will examine were published in Dissertations Moral and 
Critical, which is an expanded form of Beattie's lectures to his students, and written in the 
same style as the formerly mentioned essays. "Of Memory and Imagination" makes a clear 
distinction between memory and imagination, and establishes the purview of each faculty, as 
well as particular qualities of each, exploring how their function can be improved, as well as 
utilised by an individual in daily activities. "On Fable and Romance" is a prime example of 
literary criticism among Beattie's essays; it deals with the difference between ancient and 
495 James Beattie~ Essay~: On th~ N~~e and l~utability ofT~th. in Onpo~ition to Sophistry and Scepticism. 
On Poetry and Music. as they Affect the Mind. On laughter. and Ludicrous Composition. On the Utility of 
Classical Learning (Edinburgh: Creech, 1776). 
496 Everard King, "Literary Essays" 206. 
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modem fable, and the labels the five characteristics of chivalry. "Illustrations on Sublimity" 
identifies the general characteristics of the sublime in nature and their effect upon the mind. 
Beattie intended these essays to be introductions to these various topics for young people on 
the verge of entering university, and so their language is simple and direct. 
Beattie's essay "On Fable and Romance" owes a debt to the arguments of Richard 
Hurd's "Letters on Chivalry and Romance" (1762) concerning the characteristics of chivalric 
knights,497 but diverges from this source in its assessment of the value of gothic romance and 
the use by modem authors of this genre. The essay also investigates fable as utilised in the 
modem novel, and argues that modems have surpassed the ancients in this species of writing. 
"Illustrations on Sublimity'' situates the sublime within a moral framework, establishes 
criteria upon which sublimity in all things should be judged, and illustrates the way in which 
the sublime can be distinguished from other powerful reactions to objects that occur either in 
nature or in reproductions based on natural objects. Beattie's argument is reminiscent of his 
predecessor John Dennis, who in The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry (1704) argues that 
poetry has an inherent moral purpose, and develops the notion of the sublime in terms of an 
objects ability to inspire religious passion. 
497 Beattie acknowledges borrowings from Hurd concerning the character of chivalric knights, such as their 
religious devotion and responsibility to defend friends and ladies. See Beattie's footnotes, pp. 539 and 543-44. 
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Essays: On Poetry and Music, As they Affect the Mind; On Laughter and Ludicrous 
Composition; On the Utility of Classical Learning (1776) 
Beattie explains his proposed plan for the essay "On Poetry and Music" in a letter to 
Robert Arbuthnot, in which he outlines the three main topics of the essay. The essay follows 
the structure which Beattie explicates in this letter (to Arbuthnot), and his abstract introduces 
the philosophical approach Beattie will take to support his propositions throughout the essay. 
He outlines the arguments of the essay in the following terms: 
The first part contains a philosophical inquiry into the nature of poetry in 
general, considered as an imitation of nature, by means oflanguage [the 
second concerns] principles which determine the degrees of our approbation in 
the imitative arts [and the third deals with] the several kinds of poetry, with a 
view to these principles, and to determine their comparative excellence.498 
The essay thus follows the pattern which Beattie explained to Arbuthnot, and begins by 
defining criticism of poetry as a philosophical endeavour, 499 a start which is intended to 
illustrate the differences between poetry and other forms of composition. Beattie opens the 
section on poetry with a clarification of the purpose of poetry. He acquiesces in the standard 
view that instruction is an important purpose of poetry, but makes the case for pleasure as the 
primary goal of poetical composition. He argues that: "pleasure is undoubtedly the immediate 
aim of all those artifices by which poetry is distinguished from other composition. "500 He then 
clarifies this argument by illustrating that instruction is an artifice employed by poets to 
enhance the reader's pleasure. 
498 Beattie to Robert Arbuthnot, 28 December 1762. Beattie, Correspondence -1:6. Also in W. Forbes, l :64. 
499
"true Poetry is a thing perfectly rational and regular; and nothing can be more strictly philosophical, than that 
part of criticism may and ought to be, which unfolds the general characters that distinguish it from other kinds 
of composition." Beattie, Essays 4. 
500 Beattie, Essays 9. 
234 
This is an integral part of the general purpose for poetry which Beattie is building, and 
he further argues that the instruction of poetry is essential because it gratifies the reader's 
moral sense: "Poetry, therefore, that is uninstructive, or immoral, cannot please those who 
retain any moral sensibility, or uprightness of judgement; and must consequently displease 
the greater part of any regular society of rational creatures."501 Since Beattie's system 
champions instruction as an important element of pleasure he then clarifies what he means by 
instruction, which also has an intrinsically moral purpose. 
In his system, "whatever tends to raise those human affections that are favourable to 
truth and virtue, or to repress the opposite passions, will always gratify and improve our 
moral and intellectual powers, and may properly be called instructive."502 However, songs and 
pastorals are said to be immune from any moral purpose, since their sentiments are 
indifferent to vice and virtue alike, they reflect the moral sentiments of nature, which they are 
intended to reproduce. 503 Beattie defends this particular part of his argument against the claim 
that it is in direct opposition to the views of Horace in Ars Poetica. While Horace argues that 
poetry should please and instruct, Beattie illustrates through numerous passages that his 
arguments concerned the Greek and Roman writers and the poetry of the stage. Beattie 
advances an interpretation of Horace that fits his theory of poetry: "Horace never meant to 
say, that instruction, as well as pleasure, is necessary to give any composition the poetical 
character."504 
501 Beattie, Essays 13. 
502 Beattie, Essays 19. 
503 Paraphrased from Beattie, Essays 24. 
504 Beattie, Essays 26-27. 
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Beattie supports this supposition by highlighting the other elements essential to 
poetry: "pathos, and harmony, and elevated language, were, in Horace's opinion, essential to 
poetry; and of these decorations no body will affirm, that instruction is the end, who 
considers that the most instructive books in the world are written in plain prose."505 This is an 
interesting statement for Beattie to make, given his decision to abandon poetry for prose. The 
focus of the essay then shifts to poetic genius, and makes many arguments which underlie the 
themes of The Minstrel. 
Beattie's arguments concerning poetic genius operate on the assumption that his 
readers are familiar with the arguments made by Gerard and Young,S06 and he acknowledges 
the contributions of their systems to the gloss he makes on this complicated topic. The 
investigation into poetic genius begins by identifying the pleasure which the poetic genius 
takes in nature, and argues that accurate observation of nature is essential to the development 
of poetic genius, because the poet's work is an imitation of nature. According to Beattie, if 
poetry is to please it must be imitative of nature: "Poetry, therefore, and indeed every art 
whose end is to please, must be natural; and if so, must exhibit real matter of fact, or 
something like it; that is, in other words, must be either according to truth, or according to 
verisimilitude."507 While poetry is imitative, Beattie upholds the capacity of the mind of the 
poet to recreate scenes inspired by nature that swpass the original in power, because "nothing 
sensible transcends, or equals the capacity of thought:- a striking evidence of the dignity of 
the human soul."508 The essay then turns to the varying states of mind which are presented in 
the works of the poetic genius, thereby providing an interesting context for Beattie's own 
poetic career. 
sos-Beattle, Essays i7. 
506 See pp. 18-195 and 102-3 for a close examination of their works. 
507 Beattie, Essays 33. 
508 Beattie, Essays 46. 
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The variations of the mind of the poetic genius create a kind of portrait of the author, 
because they express in eloquent terms the tum of his mind upon particular topics or scenery: 
"We often see an author's character in his works; and if every author were in earnest when he 
writes, we should oftener see it."509 This self-portrayal in poetry is evident in Beattie's own 
works, which range from occasional subjects to the intellectual process of poetic creation. 
It is interesting that by this point in his career he had condemned his early poetical 
works, and declared the early stylised melancholy poems of his 1760 volume as meretricious 
and wished those copies still extant to be destroyed.510 The essay then shifts to an examination 
of the nature of poetic character, and uses the characters from Homer's Iliad to illustrate the 
positive and negative qualities required for a character to be labelled heroic. The section of 
the essay dealing with music explores the significance of music as an imitative art, and more 
specifically the necessity of words to evoke an aesthetic response. 
The music which Beattie classifies as an imitative art "extends to those natural sounds 
and motions only, which are agreeable in themselves, consistent with melody and harmony, 
and associated with agreeable affections and sentiments."511 Beattie further argues that the 
ability of music to evoke pathos and affections results from its relationship with language, 
because "the expression of music without poetry is vague and ambiguous; hence it is, that the 
same air may sometimes be repeated to every stanza of a long ode or ballad."512 The essay 
then shifts focus to an investigation of the natural affinity of people to the music of their 
native land, regardless of its objective merit. 
509 Beattie, Essays 50. 
510 See pp. 209-210 for more information on Beattie's attitude in middle age toward his early poetry. 
511 Beattie, Essays 128. 
512 Beattie,~ 147. 
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This is an important section, as Beattie expresses in prose sentiments which are 
prevalent in his corpus of poetry, and which present an interesting context for his later 
attitude towards his early work. Beattie believes that early associations are the most powerful 
and influential in the mind, and in his passage I believe he looks back upon his own emotions 
and ideas concerning the natural scenery of his youth, and recalls the scenery that inspired 
much of his early poetry. 
Native music is more likely to evoke from a native hearer a significant nostalgia for 
the neighbourhood and scenes described, and so it evokes stronger sentiments and ideas than 
music foreign to the hearer's experience: 
It is not their merit, which in the case supposed would interest a native, but the 
charming ideas they would recall to his mind:- ideas of innocence, 
simplicity, and leisure, of romantic enterprise, and enthusiastic attachment; 
and of scenes, which, on recollection, we are inclined to think, that a brighter 
sun illuminated, a fresher verdure crowned, and purer skies and happier climes 
conspired to beautify, than are now to be seen in the dreary paths of care and 
disappointment, into which men, yielding to the passions peculiar to more 
advanced years, are tempted to wander. 513 
This passage transcends the topic of music and illustrates the nostalgia for youthful innocence 
which Beattie depicts in the first book of The Minstrel, which is starkly contrasted by the 
depiction of himself as the aged, serious minded Hermit who educates the young swain. The 
youthful scenery of a person's past is impressed vividly in the imagination, and acts as an 
antidote to the harsher, pragmatic concerns of middle age and daily life. Beattie then turns 
specifically to the music native to the Scottish highlands: this, he ~gues, is greatly influenced 
513 Beattie, Essavs 162. 
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by the striking landscape and activities necessary for survival in that region. Beattie's 
descriptive passage evokes the kind of sublime imagery he utilises in The Minstrel, and he 
goes on to argue that such scenery has a profound negative impact upon the imagination, 
which is indeed Beattie's position concerning solitude and melancholy in his later years. The 
passage recalls the eloquence of similar nature passages in the early poetry. The highlands of 
Scotland are a form sublime, but in general a melancholy neighbourhood: 
Long tracts of mountainous desert, covered with dark heath, and often 
obscured by misty weather; narrow vallies, thinly inhabited, and bounded by 
precipices resounding with the fall of torrents; ... the mournful dashing waves 
along the friths ... in a lonely region, full of echoes, and rocks, and 
caverns;. the grotesque and ghastly appearance of such a landscape by the light 
of the moon. 514 
This landscape has considerable consequence for the individual's cast of mind, and according 
to Beattie: "Objects like these diffuse a gloom over the fancy, [which] cannot fail to tincture 
the thoughts of a native in the hour of silence and solitude."515 Beattie's description of the 
sublime scenery of the highlands is reminiscent of mid-eighteenth-century accounts of the 
Alps. Thomas Gray recalls similar emotions inspired by the Grande Chartreuse: 
Not a precipice, not a torrent, not a cliff, but is pregnant with religion and 
poetry. There are certain scenes that would awe an atheist into belief, without 
the help of other argument. One need not have a very fashionable imagination 
to see spirits there at noon-day: You have Death perpetually before your eyes, 
only so far removed, as to compose the mind without frighting it. 516 
It is not surprising that_ Beattie's depiction of this kind of scenery is derived from the 
514 Beattie, Essays 169. 
515 Beattie, Essays 169. 
516 Gray to West, 16 November 1739. Gray, Correspondence 1:128 
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highlands rather than the Alps. Since Beattie's travels never took him to the continent but 
frequently to the highlands, it is logical that he would express the melancholy and sublimity 
ofthe landscape in terms ofhis own experience. To support this argument ofthe inspiring 
and awesome highland scenery, Beattie invokes the melancholy poetry of Ossian517 as an 
example of the kind of savage, dreary poetry inspired by the highland landscape, and explores 
the characteristics of the people who inhabited this kind of region. This argument leads into 
an interesting examination into the feelings of sympathy which it is poetry's aim to evoke. 
In this section, Beattie addresses the sympathy felt for the dead, and when examined 
within the context of Beattie's numerous memorial poems, it is a poignant passage. Beattie 
focuses on the physical body rather than the immortal soul, because it is with that part of the 
person that the mourner sympathises. The immortal soul is in heaven and so does not suffer 
the same fate as the physical body, which is what is left of the beloved on earth after their 
death. The passage depicts in similar terms the alienation from the dead felt by mourners, and 
the inevitable ignominy of death. 
Beattie explains: "With the dead we sympathise, and even with those circumstances 
of their condition whereof we know that they are utterly insensible; such as, their being shut 
up in a cold solitary grave, excluded from the light of the sun, and from all pleasures of life, 
and liable in a few years to be forgotten forever."518 The section on sympathy continues with 
an investigation into the pathos evoked by ancient and modem writers alike, through the use 
of poetic language. Beattie focuses on a number of poetic devices and their use in poetry to 
evoke pathos and heighten emotions, especially within the context of mourning. It begins by 
arguing that poetic language must imitate natural language, since poetry is measured by its 
imit{tFion ofp.ature. Beatti~ defines natural htnguage as "that use ofspeech, or of artificial 
511 Beattie denounced Ossian in 13 June 1782 to John Carr but only engaged in the controversy over 
Macpherson's works once before that. See pp. 99-100. 
518 Beattie, Essays 182. 
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language, which is suitable to the speaker and to the occasion."519 Though he argues for the 
use of natural language, he further argues for the necessity of figurative language in poetry, 
and delves into the specific characteristics of this kind of language, examining such features 
as tropes, personification, and apostrophe. In poetry the use of "Tropes and Figures 
promote[ s] brevity; and brevity, united with perspicuity, is always agreeable"520 and heightens 
the pleasure of readers and thereby increases the poem's power. He argues that while tropes 
and figures "agitate the soul, and rouse the fancy ... so those that depress the mind adopt for 
the most part a plain diction without any ornament. "521 Poets utilise figurative language to 
elevate emotions, and the final section of the essay deals with the sound of poetic language, 
and its quintessential relationship to the strength of pathos that poetry is capable of evoking 
in a reader. 
The section focuses on sweetness, measure, and imitation, as the characteristics of 
poetic language which contribute to the overall sound and harmony of poetry. Beattie 
contends that to "In order to give sweetness to language, either in verse or prose, all words of 
harsh sound, difficult pronunciation, or unwieldy magnitude, are to be avoided as much as 
possible."522 With regard to measure, he argues: 
That the rhythm and measures of verse are naturally agreeable; and therefore, 
... poetry may be made more pleasing than it would be without them, is 
evident from this, that children and illiterate people, whose admiration we 
cannot suppose to be the effect of habit or prejudice, are exceedingly delighted 
with them. 523 
To illustrate this point Beattie rehearses excerpts from ancient and modem writers, and 
519
,Beattie, Essays 194. 
520 Beattie, Essays 241. 
521 Beattie, Essays 247. 
522 Beattie, Essays 272. 
523 Beattie, Essays 275-76. 
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concludes that "the poet takes into consideration the tone of voice suitable to the thoughts 
that occupy his mind, and thereto adapts the sound of his language."524 The arguments of the 
essay "On Poetry and Music" are not unique to Beattie, but his concise language and 
pragmatic examples set it apart from contemporary works on the topic. The essay is also a 
clear presentation of Beattie's later ideas concerning essential aspects of poetry, and offers an 
interesting context for the poems included (and those excluded) from his final volumes of 
poetry. In keeping with Beattie's other prose works, the essay is a clear and concise 
philosophical investigation into important aesthetic topics, and presents many contemporary 
ideas concerning poetry and music in eloquent terms. 
"An Essay on Laughter and Ludicrous Composition" does not introduce a full 
philosophical analysis, but articulates what Beattie considers to be the origins of laughter in 
the mind, and the definition and role of ridicule. Beattie begins by criticising the theories of 
laughter presented by Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Akenside, a process which allows him to 
develop his own ideas on the subject within the proper context. Beattie's purpose is to 
determine the causes of laughter and to identify the characteristics which distinguish it from 
ridicule. He also explores the role of ridicule in society and gives guidelines for its general 
usage. Beattie makes his purpose clear, and differentiates between the two distinct types of 
laughter; the purpose of the essay is: "to analyse and explain that quality in things or ideas, 
which makes them provoke pure Laughter, and entitles them to the name of Ludicrous or 
Laughable."525 Beattie defines the term "pure laughter'' in his distinction between ludicrous 
composition and ridicule: "the former excite pure laughter, the latter excite laughter mixed 
with disapprobation or contempt."526 This distinction leads directly to the theory oflaughter 
advanced by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan, which Joseph Addison articulates in the forty-
524 Beattie,~ 283. 
525 Beattie, Essays 302. 
526 Beattie, Essavs 302. 
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seventh issue of The Spectator27 in order to clarify his own perception of laughter. 
According to Hobbes, laughter "is caused either by some some sudden act of their 
own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by 
comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves."528 Beattie takes issue with Hobbes's 
assertion because it is impossible to prove it accurate: "I cannot see how they should prove, 
that laughter is owing to pride, or to a sense of our superiority over the ludicrous object."529 
Richard Terry similarly comments that ''the Hobbesian theory seems to attest to the 
irredeemably competitive nature of human relations."530 In the Spectator Addison comments 
on the cynical nature of Hobbes's system. Terry astutely observes that according to Addison, 
"laughter is all too often turned to the purpose of exposing 'every single Defect in another' 
and in 'attacking' every thing that is Solemn and Serious, Decent and Praise-worthy in 
Human Life. "'531 Beattie considers such a relationship to be fundamentally at odds with 
human nature, and so he illustrates the flaws in Hobbes's hypothesis by turning his attention 
to the supposedly inferior person, the butt of the company, who, he argues, "is generally 
known to be one of the wittiest and best-humoured persons of it; so that the mirth he may 
diffuse around him cannot be supposed to arise from his apparent inferiority. "532 Beattie then 
argues that laughter does not result from some turpitude or deficiency in an author's mental 
process, because laughter is evoked by combinations that are fortuitous, when there is no 
thought or premeditation involved on the part of the author. 533 
527 Beattie comments that it is because of Addison's approbation ofHobbes's arguments that he includes them in 
his survey of systems concerning laughter. See Beattie, Essavs 307. 
528 Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes. ed. Sir William Molesworth 11 vols. (London: 
Bohn, 1939) 3:46. 
5_~9 Beattie,~ 3_09. 
530 Terry, Mock-Heroic 172. 
531 Terry, 175. 
532 Beattie, Essays 310. 
533 Paraphrased from Beattie, Essavs 313. 
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The essay then shifts focus to the theory of laughter explicated by Francis Hutcheson 
in "Reflections on Laughter." Hutcheson does not approve of Hobbes's theory, which he 
categorizes as an attempt "to deduce all human Actions from Self-Love: by some bad Fortune 
he has over-look'd every thing which is generous or kind in Mankind."534 Hutcheson takes 
Hobbes's theory to its logical conclusion,535 and explains in greater detail the problem 
highlighted by Beattie; then, he proposes a theory of laughter based on oppositions which are 
perceived in objects and interpreted in the mind. 
Hutcheson argues that "Laughter often arises without any imagined Superiority of 
ourselves, [and] may appear from one great Fund of Pleasantry, the Parody. and Burlesque 
Allusion; which move Laughter in those who may have the highest Veneration for the 
Writing alluded to, and also admire the Wit of the Person who makes the Allusion."536 Here 
Hutcheson makes an important distinction between laughter as an aesthetic response based on 
perception and the value placed upon the author and the author's subject. The gemes which 
Hutcheson utilises operate on an inherent distinction between dignity or virtue, and their 
opposites to evoke the aesthetic response of laughter. 
Beattie argues that there are situations which evoke laughter even though there is no 
opposition between dignity and meanness in either object or character-such as the 
performance of an actor one time mimicking a grave person and then mimicking the quirks of 
his own class. This is true in Beattie's system because he "defines humour as arising from a 
mixture of uniformity and difference in a single assemblage."537 To illustrate this point he 
534 Francis Hutcheson, Qpera Minora, Collected Works ofFrancis Hutcheson, ed. Bernnard Fabian 7 vols. 
~Hidesheim: Georg Olms, 1971) 7:102. 
35 
"If Mr. Hobbes's Notion be just, then first, There can be no Laughter on any occasion where we make no 
Comparison of our selves to others, or of our present State to a worse State, or where we do not observe some 
Superiority_ofour sel\Tes .above some other: Thing: And again;.itmust-follow, that every sudden Appearance, of 
Superiority over another, must excite Laughter, when we attend to it. If both these Conclusions be false, the 
Notion from whence they are drawn must be so too." Hutcheson, 7:103. 
536 Hutcheson, 7:103-4. 
537 Terry, Mock-Heroic 50. 
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goes through some characters of the modern novel, such as Dr. Harrison in Fielding's 
Amelia, who "is never mean, but always respectable; yet there is a dash of humour in him, 
which often betrays the reader into a smile. "538 He argues that characters like this cleric 
illustrate the ability of a character to be laughable without any established oppositions. 
Beattie argues that it is "rather a mixture of sameness and diversity, sameness in the sound, 
and diversity in the signification"539 that evokes laughter. Beattie's acquiescence in many of 
the ideas of Mark Akenside's theory of ridicule, as presented in Book III of The Pleasures of 
Imagination sets his theory apart from the other sources under discussion, and introduces 
many ideas concerning laughter and ridicule which Beattie addresses in the essay.540 
Akenside begins his investigation into ridicule by illustrating the kind of characters 
that are ridiculous, such as "ignorant pretenders to learning, boastful soldiers and lying 
travellers, [and] hypocritical churchmen,"541 but Beattie argues that Akenside "does not 
distinguish between what is laughable in them, and what is contemptible; so that we have no 
reason to think, that he meant to specify the qualities peculiar to those things that provoke 
pure laughter."542 Beattie's comment insinuates that no such distinction is made by Akenside 
or other theorists between those characteristics that are contemptible and those that evoke 
laughter without any sense of approbation. 543 Beattie leaves this perceived lack of distinction 
and turns to Akenside's arguments concerning ridicule. 
538 Beattie, Essays 316. 
539 Beattie, Essays 316. 
540 It has recently been argued that Akenside initially categorises laughter and ridicule as aesthetic responses in 
"Pleasures of Imagination." And so for Beattie as well as Akenside the two become "something which exists in 
the mind of the viewer (or reader),just as attraction or awe exist in the minds of those responding to the 
beautiful or sublime." Robin Dix, Literary Career 8. 
541 Beattie, Essays 316. 
542 Beattie,~ 317. 
54!_Beattie seemsJo have,overlooked uignificantpart ofAkenside's argument-He argues that for a being or 
object to be ridiculous, the person or "the occurrence must excite no acute or vehement emotion of the heart, 
such as terror, pity, or indignation; for in that case, as was observed above, the mind is not at leisure to 
contemplate the ridiculous." Mark Akenside, The Poetical Works of Mark Akenside, ed. Robin Dix (London: 
Associated UP, 1996) 171. 
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Beattie's critique operates on the assumption that Akenside's arguments are familiar 
to his readers, and the arguments of Pleasures of Imagination are essential to a full 
understanding of Beattie's engagement with it. Beattie notes that the poem begins its 
investigation with a rehearsal of characters whose qualities make them both laughable and 
worthy of contempt. As Richard Terry observes: "Akenside's version of ridicule comes close 
to that advanced earlier by Hutcheson [who argues that ridicule is] constituted by the 
juxtaposition of contrary things in a single entity. But Akenside's is also a satiric version, in 
that ridicule is always shown censuring affectation and waywardness."s44 Initially, Akenside 
argues that a major source of ridicule is vanity, because it allows the perceiver to celebrate 
their better qualities, which are accentuated by comparison to the subject of ridicule. He 
illustrates that this kind of comparison can lead to a false sense of virtue: 
Behold the foremost band; of slender thought, 
And easy faith; whom flatt'ring fancy sooth 
With lying spectres, in themselves to view 
lllustrious forms of excellence and good (Ill. 84-87). 
The note to this passage further articulates the idea that ridicule "is vanity, or self-applause 
for some desirable quality or possession which evidently does not belong to those who 
assume it. "545 Folly can be accentuated by a distorted, and distorting imagination, at which 
point the fool becomes laughable, stimulating the sense of ridicule in others: 
By fancy's dazzling optics, these behold 
The images of some peculiar things 
With brighter hues resplendent, and portray' d 
With features nobler far than e'er adom'd 
544 Richard Terry, "The Mirthful Sting: Akenside and the Eighteenth-Century Controversy over Ridicule," Mark 
Akenside: A Reassessment, ed. Robin Dix (London: Associated UP, 2000) 121-22. 
545 Mark Akenside, The Poetical Works of Mark Akenside, ed. Robin Dix (London: Associated UP, 1996) 168. 
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Their genuine objects. Hence the fever'd heart 
Pants with delirious hope for tinsel charms; 
Hence oft obtrusive on the eye of scorn, 
Untimely zeal her witless pride betrays! (III. 153-60). 
Although Akenside argues that at times ridicule is achieved through obscuring characteristics 
of objects and the perceptions of the viewer, ridicule can also function as a test for the 
validity of ideas, and therefore can be utilised by learned persons in the pursuit of truth. 
Akenside deals with this particular use of ridicule in a note to an important passage of 
the poem. The lines to which the note refers are quoted by Beattie to support his ideas 
concerning the origins of laughter. Richard Terry argues that this usage "is a little 
disingenuous since he [Beattie] knows that the incongruities and dissonances that Akenside is 
concerned with here are always seen by the poet as having moral repercussions."546 While this 
may be the case, Beattie's use of the quotation547 does not confirm or deny the role of 
morality in a poem which produces laughter or the virtues which should be articulated by a 
poet. He utilises Akenside's lines to support the supposition that '"Laughter arises from the 
view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, 
considered as united in one complex object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual 
relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them. "'548 The matter 
under consideration is the process by which connections and distinctions are made that 
produce laughter, without regard to the moral consequences of such a response or its moral 
justification. 
54
c
6
_Terry, "Mirthful Sting'~l29-30. 
547 Beattie quotes Pleasures oflmagination lines 249-52: ": "Where'er the power of ridicule displays I Her 
quaint-eyed visagea some incongruous form. I Some stubborn dissonance of things combined, I Strikes on the 
~uick observer." Beattie, Essays 320. 
8 Beattie,~ 320. 
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Support for Terry's interpretation of Beattie's use of these lines comes from the note 
to this passage, which reinforces the use of ridicule as a barometer of moral truth. In the note 
Ak:enside argues that a sense of the ridiculous is natural to all, and therefore its usage cannot 
in all cases be detrimental to society or religion. He dismisses the question of whether the 
ridiculous can be morally true, because ridicule functions in cooperation with the reasoning 
faculty, articulating this notion by arguing that: 
reason examines the terms ofthe proposition, and finding one idea which 
was supposed equal to another, to be in fact unequal, of consequence rejects 
the proposition as a falsehood; so in objects offered to the mind for its esteem 
or applause, the faculty of ridicule finding an incongruity in the claim, urges 
the mind to reject it with laughter and contempt.549 
For Ak:enside, ridicule tests the validity of ideas, and the incongruity perceived in those ideas 
evokes laughter. Ridicule operates to enable a person to "detect the moral falsehood sooner 
than in the way of speculative inquiry, and impress the minds of men with a stronger sense of 
the vanity and error of its authors."550 In this system ridicule is able to detect the moral 
principles which are factors in how propositions presented to the mind are interpreted. In 
contrast to Ak:enside's theory, the system of laughter and ridicule which Beattie outlines, as 
Terry observes, is non-moralistic. However, he does argue that laughter does not arise from 
the perception of a person or object that is inherently contrary to a person's innate moral 
principles. He begins by setting out the scope of his argument, which differs from those 
which he has criticised: "A complete enumeration ofludicrous objects it would be vain to 
attempt [and] All that can be done in a case of this kind is to prove, by a variety of examples, 
that the theory now proposed is more comprehensive, and better founded, than any of the 
549 Akens ide, Pleasures of Imagination 171. 
550 Akenside, Pleasures oflmagination 172. 
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foregoing."551 The section that follows describes a veritable laundry list of structures that 
produce laughter in the reader/viewer: contiguity, cause and effect, hyperbole, and the 
unexpected likeness between objects which at first glance appear dissimilar. 
Beattie affirms: "things incongruous are often laughable, when united as parts of a 
system, or simply when placed together."552 To illustrate this point, he directs his attention 
first to bodily singularities which produce laughter, but recognises that even though there 
may be distortions they do not always evoke laughter in the viewer. Later in the essay he 
clarifies that for incongruity "to be ludicrous, [it] must be in some measure uncommon."553 
He further asserts that laughter can arise without an apparent opposition between things: 
"description may sometimes be laughable, when the ideas or phrases are related by juxta-
position only, and imply no perceptible contrast of dignity and meanness. 554 In this system, 
laughter can be provoked by a variety of different elements perceived in an object or action, 
and its ability to evoke laughter is dependent upon the effectiveness of the juxtaposition and 
perceived incongruity. The relationship of cause and effect provokes laughter when intense 
emotion is evoked that does not inspire sympathy; an example of this is the reaction of an 
audience to a scene in which the character and his actions are unsympathetic: "Violent anger 
occasioned by slight injury makes a man ridiculous; we despise his levity, and laugh at his 
absurdity. " 555 Although intense emotions provoke laughter in this way, Beattie argues that it 
cannot arise from an immoral characteristic or action: "those absurdities in ourselves or 
others, which provoke the disapprobation of the moral faculty, cannot be ludicrous; because 
in a sound mind they give rise to emotions inconsistent with, and far more powerful than, that 
SSl Beattie, Essays n4-25. 
552 Beattie, Essays 325. 
553 Beattie, Essays 386. 
554 Beattie, Essays 330. 
sss Beattie, Essays, 334. 
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whereof laughter is the outward indication."556 This argument is similar to Akenside's critique 
of Aristotle's definition of ridicule in The Poetics. Aristotle argues that "the ridiculous is 
some certain fault or turpitude without pain. and not destructive to its subject."557 Akenside 
counters this notion by illustrating that there are certain circumstances which fit this 
definition but cannot be called ridiculous, and highlights that the characteristics of ridicule 
defy the simple definition provided by Aristotle. 
For Akenside, "the sensation of ridicule is not a bare perception ofthe agreement or 
disagreement of ideas; but a passion or emotion of the mind consequential to that 
perception."558 Upon this distinction that ridicule is more than mere perception, he asserts that 
. 
ridicule "must excite no acute or vehement emotion of the heart, such as terror, pity, or 
indignation; for in that case, as was observed above, the mind is not at leisure to contemplate 
the ridiculous."559 Beattie takes up this argument of Akenside's, and further asserts that 
laughter is not at odds with the moral nature of human beings, because it cannot be evoked by 
objects which are contrary the moral nature. 560 
Beattie then turns to hyperbole, and contends that it is also capable of evoking 
laughter, when it is in some way uncommon: "Familiar hyperboles excite neither laughter nor 
astonishment. All ludicrous and all sublime exaggeration, is characterised by an 
uncommonness of thought or language."561 The final verbal structure which provokes laughter 
is an unexpected similarity between objects which superficially appear to be dissimilar. He 
explains that ''the greater the apparent dissimilitude, and new-discovered resemblance, the 
greater will be the surprise attending the discovery, the more striking the opposition of 
556 Beattie, Essays 392. 
557 Akenside,.Pleasures oflmagination, 169. 
558 Akenside, Pleasures of Imagination 169. 
559 Akenside, Pleasures of Imagination 171. 
560 This is Akenside's argument also, but he reaches the conclusion differently. 
561 Beattie, Essays 339. 
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contrariety and relation, and the more lively the risible emotion."562 Beattie argues that the 
main quality in things which provokes laughter "IS AN UNCOOMON MIXTURE OF RELATION 
AND CONTRARIETY, EXlllBITED, OR SUPPOSED TO BE UNITED, IN THE SAME ASSEMBLAGE,"563 
and that these verbal structures present the clearest examples of the ludicrous combinations 
available in modem language. The final section of the essay sets out to prove that the 
ludicrous writings of the modems are superior to those of the ancients. By way of 
introduction to the topic, Beattie acknowledges that there are reasons why modems are not 
competent judges of ancient humour, and explains that: ''works of wit and humour would 
appear to be less permanent in their effects, and more liable to become obscure, than any 
other literary compositions."564 He swiftly leaves this contested topic, and turns to the nature 
of modem ridicule, which, when "compared with the ancient, will be found to be, fi.rst, more 
copious; and, secondly, more refined."565 Beattie rarely upholds modems as superior to the 
ancients, and so their superiority with regard to ridicule is a rare moment in Beattie's thought. 
In conclusion, Beattie points to revealed religion as an important refining characteristic of 
modem society. He argues that religion humanises society and refines conversation, and links 
politeness in conversation with virtue, and in his system the sense of virtue originates in 
religion. 566 
This is the only aspect of Beattie's theory of ridicule that expresses an overtly pious 
view, which is meant to further highlight the superiority of Christian ridicule over its ancient 
pagan counterpart. While Beattie's theory oflaughter and ridicule operates on the assumption 
that what is laughable or ludicrous does not necessarily evoke moral disapprobation, his 
arguments concerning the refinement of modem ridicule are deeply rooted in the effect of 
562 Beattie, Essays 340. 
563~ Beattie, Essays 419-20. 
564 Beattie, Essays 425. 
565 Beattie, Essays 426. 
566 Beattie,~ 448-50. 
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religion upon society. Beattie's system oflaughter and ridicule argues that objects which are 
contrary to morality evoke an emotion that is stronger than mere laughter. 
"An Essay on Laughter" attempts to trace the origins of laughter and the way in which 
it is provoked in the mind. It does not articulate a full philosophical system on the subject, but 
rather an examination of the particular linguistic structures and qualities in objects that evoke 
laughter. Beattie's criticism of other philosophical systems concerning laughter and ridicule 
highlight problems in their interpretations, but more importantly, it introduces the aspects of 
the topic which he explores throughout the essay. Clearly Beattie's arguments concerning 
laughter and ridicule are not unique to him, but he presents them in the concise and engaging 
manner which is characteristic of Beattie's prose works. 
Dissertations Moral and Critical (1783) 
In the preface to this volume, Beattie introduces these essays as a means of instruction 
rather than a collection of"nice metaphysical theories, or other matters of doubtful 
disputation."567 The essays are intended to improve the minds of young readers and to 
introduce difficult topics in a clear and entertaining prose style. His goal is to "set before 
them such views of nature, and such plain and practical truths, as may at once improve the 
heart and the understanding, and amuse and elevate the fancy."568 The essays in this volume 
are a continuation of Beattie's basic philosophical purpose, to prepare young people for the 
business of life, and to reinforce rather than undermine the validity of what he believed to be 
the truths of the natural world. 
567James Beattie, Dissertations Moral and Critical: On Memory and Imagination. On Dreaming. The Theory of 
Language. On Fable and Romance. On the Attachments of Kindred. Illustrations on Sublimity (London: Strahan 
and Cadell; Edinburgh: Creech, 1783) · 
568 Beattie, Dissertations, x. 
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"Of Memory and Imagination" begins by distinguishing faculties of the mind from the 
organs of sense. The faculties of memory, imagination, reason, and abstraction "are exerted, 
with no dependence on the body we can explain, in perceiving the human mind and its 
operations, and the ideas or thoughts that pass in succession before it."569 He then outlines the 
characteristics that denote the use of memory: "When we remember, we have always a view 
to real existence, and to our past experience; it occurs to our minds, in regard to this thing 
which we now remember, that we formerly heard it, or perceived it, or thought ofit."570 In 
contrast: "When we imagine, we contemplate a certain thought, or idea, simply as it is in 
itself, or as we conceive it to be, without referring it to past experience, or to real 
existence."571 Beattie then turns to the particular characteristics of memory: the way it 
functions, the laws that govern its operation, and the methods by which memory can be 
improved. Beattie's arguments concerning the function of memory are in keeping with his 
overall philosophical system of common sense. He begins the essay by rejecting the 
commonly held theory 
that every thing, in a word, that we remember, makes upon the brain a certain 
impression, which, remaining for some time after, is taken notice of by the 
mind, and recognized, as the mark of that particular sensation or idea; and that 
this sensation or idea, thus obtruded upon us anew, gives rise to 
remembrance. 572 
Beattie reveals the problematic nature of this system by pointing out that impressions made 
upon the brain must have solidity, magnitude and figure, and these qualities are not present in 
569 Beattie, Dissertations 4. 
570 Beattie, Dissertations 6. 
571Beattie, Dissertations 6. An interesting comparison can be made between this argument and Burne's argument 
concerning the function of the imagination. See pp. 152-53. 
572 Beattie, Dissertations 1 0. 
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thoughts, feelings, or sounds, but are stored as impressions in the mind.573 Therefore, he 
reasons "that the theory in question ought not to find a place in philosophy, because [it is] 
incapable of proof from experience; it being impossible, with bodily eyes, to discover, in 
what way the human brain may be affected by thinking and perceiving. "574 
This declaration is a comment representative of common sense philosophy, and 
enables Beattie to bypass Hume's philosophy, which supports the validity of the argument 
concerning memory that Beattie has discounted. Beattie's refusal to engage in a discussion of 
Hume's alternative theory is doubtless based on the belief that his were harmful to the young 
and less educated in society: in other words, the less said about them, the better. The rest of 
the section on memory abandons the problematic topic of the cause of remembrance and 
focuses on the rules that govern the function of memory, and how it may be improved. 
The only law articulated in the essay is the importance of attention to the development 
of memory. According to Beattie, a sensation or piece of information "is likely to be long 
remembered, which at first appearance affects the mind with a lively sensation, or with some 
pleasurable or painful feeling."575 Thus, the intensity of the response which a stimulus evokes 
corresponds to the strength of the remembrance of it. Furthermore: "The force wherewith any 
thing strikes the mind, is generally in proportion to the degree of attention we bestow upon 
it."576 Having established this tenet of memory, the essay then argues against the way in 
which children are forced to commit complicated sermons and religious doctrines to memory 
without any true understanding of their content. 
573 Paraphrased from Beattie, Dissertations 11. 
574 Beattie, Dissertations 11. 
515 Beattie, Dissertations 14. 
576 Beattie, Dissertations 15. 
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Beattie argues that to exercise the memory of children ''their tasks [should] be 
proportioned to their ability, and their attention directed to such things as they may easily 
comprehend."577 The essay then shifts focus to the methods of improving the functions of 
memory in writing and conversation, and the final section on memory deals with the memory 
of animals. Neither of these sections is relevant to my purpose, so I will turn to the second 
half of the essay, which deals with the imagination, its function and improvement. 
This section defines the imagination in common philosophical terms: "Imagination 
seems to denote; first, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, simply as they are in 
themselves, without any view to their reality: and secondly, the power of combining into new 
forms, or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have derived from 
experience, or from information."578 The imagination is also the faculty by which ideas are 
associated, on the basis, he says, of resemblance, contrariety, nearness of situation, or cause 
and effect. 
For Beattie as well as his colleague Alexander Gerard, "Invention in tum derives 
solely from the faculty of imagination"579 because it is the part of the mind that reassembles 
thoughts and ideas, a process essential to the operation of genius. The essay's treatment of 
genius is intended to supplement the work of Gerard580 on the topic. He then defmes the term 
genius, illustrating its relationship to the imagination, and defming taste: "The talent of 
invention, applied to useful purposes, is called Genius. Imagination, united with some other 
mutual powers, and operating merely as a percipient faculty, in conveying suitable 
impressions of what is elegant, sublime, or beautiful in art and nature, is called Taste."581 
577 Beattie, Dissertations 21. 
578 Beattie~ Dissertations 74. 
579 James Engell, The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 
1981) 80. 
580 See pp. 18-19 and 102-3 for eighteenth-century theories of original genius. 
581 William Duff argues that the imagination collects images upon which judgement will work. Seep. 100-2. 
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hnagination and other powers work together to judge objects in nature, which they 
label taste. In Beattie's system the imagination is integral to the development of genius, 
because it is integral to the invention of new ideas and connections. He argues that creation is 
within the purview of the imagination, and therefore a lively and active imagination is 
essential to the development of genius: "Genius being the talent of useful invention, and 
invention the work of imagination, it may seem to follow, that whatever diversifies 
imagination, must give variety to genius."582 Beattie's argument concerning poetic genius 
questions the argument of Edward Young, 583 by proposing that poetic genius can develop 
through experience: "Those who relish harmony of language, and read the works of poets, 
especially of good poets, very early in life, acquire in time a poetical taste, which, if other 
circumstances be favourable, will produce something like a genius for poetry."584 
Beattie then turns to the particular modes of genius, which are a rehearsal of the 
arguments made by Gerard. He advocates the regulation of the imagination, and highlights its 
dangerous consequences, which are reminiscent of his own youthful experiences: "The 
hnagination stands most in need of restraint, when it runs into one or other of the opposite 
extremes of Levity and Melancholy. The first is incident to youth; the second to manhood and 
old age. The latter is more fatal to happiness than the former; but both are attended with much 
evil."585 Clearly the effect of solitude upon the imagination is now considered dangerous in 
Beattie's mind, which contrasts greatly to his juvenile poetry, in which solitude elevated the 
imagination and produced striking figures of beauty. This passage shows Beattie's very 
altered perception of solitude and melancholy over the course of his lifetime. 
582 Beattie, Dissertations 155. 
583 Young argues that poetic genius is not made, but grows organically in nature and cannot be taught. Seep. 18. 
584 Beattie, Dissertations 157. 
585 Beattie, Dissertations 194. 
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This cautionary tale is strikingly akin to the development of Beattie's own poetic 
imagination, for in youth he did indeed welcome solitude and melancholy,586 and in his 
middle age he warns against the consequences of an indulgence in emotions which he himself 
had valued earlier in life. He now considers solitude and melancholy to be harmful, and 
illustrates their negative influence in practical life: "Indolence and solitude sound prettily in 
pastoral poems;587 but we were made for fellowship and labour: and if we give ourselves up to 
idleness, or abandon the society of our fellow-creatures, our lives will be unnatural, and 
therefore unhappy."588 Beattie cautions his readers against indulgence in the imagination in 
solitude and melancholy scenery, because it does nothing to qualify them for the day to day 
practicalities oflife.589 To guard against indulgence in the melancholy which can harm the 
mind, Beattie advises that his readers should "pursue those studies only, which are amusing, 
practical, and useful; whereof there is a sufficiency to fill up every leisure hour oflife."590 The 
essay then focuses on dreaming in an attempt to call into question many of the superstitions 
surrounding it. Though it is an interesting section of the essay, it bears no relevance to 
Beattie's poetic career. 
The essay "On Fable and Romance" begins with a rehearsal of fables both ancient and 
modern, and divides them into allegorical and poetical subgroups. Within the allegorical 
category he makes further distinction with regard to modern fable: "The Allegorical part of 
modern prose fable may be subdivided into two species, the Historical and the Moral; and the 
Poetical part I shall subdivide into two sorts, the Serious and the Comick."591 
586 See pp. 16-19. 
587 It should be remembered that Beattie translated the Eclogues of Virgil in his youth, when he believed 
solitude to be a positive influence upon the mind. Seep. 18-19. 
588
'BeattietDissertationsc200. - -
589 He deals with these themes in much of his early poetry, such as ''The Triumph of Melancholy'' and ''The 
Hermit." See pp. 36-41 and 223-26. 
590 Beattie, Dissertations 201. 
591 Beattie, Dissertations 511. 
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The last two categories are hence referred to under the general term Romance. The essay is 
essentially a criticism of the use of fable in both ancient and modem works that fall into these 
general categories. His comments on Pilgrim's Progress are of particular interest, since he 
uses the same narrative structure in his unpublished satire "The Castle of Scepticism." 
His criticism of Bunyan's work reinforces the value which Beattie places upon 
education as a ~eans of refining the creative faculty: "some of the allegories are well 
contrived, and prove the author to have possessed powers of invention, which, if they had 
been refined by learning, might have produced something very noble."592 The subject of the 
essay then shifts to an investigation into ''The rise and progess of the MODERN ROMANCE, or 
Poetical Prose Fable"593 which occupies a considerable portion of the essay. This section is "a 
lively account of the rise of chivalry and the feudal system;"594 which naturally led to the 
development of the medieval romance. 
This leads in to a discussion of the characteristics of chivalry, which he argues was 
the origin ofromance.595 Beattie's borrowings from Richard Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and 
Romance (1762) are not great in number, but do present an important context for Beattie's 
arguments on the subject. Audley Smith argues that "many of Beattie's points pertaining to 
the characteristics of Chivalry were taken from Letters I and II of Hurd's discourse."596 While 
Hurd's critique's of the uses of gothic romance as a vehicle for expression and investigation 
into moral behaviour do not extend farther than Spenser's Faerie Queene and Milton's 
Paradise Lost, Beattie's focus is on the use of the romance genre in the modem novel. 
592 Beattie, Dissertations 514. 
593 Beattie, Dissertations 518. 
594 Roger Robinson, introduction, Dissertations Moral and Critical, by James Beattie (London: Thoemmes-
Routledge, -1996) xxv .. 
595
"It was one of the consequences of chivalry. The first writers in this way exhibited a species of fable, different 
from all that had hitherto appeared. They undertook to describe the adventures of those heroes who professed 
knight-errantry." Beattie, Dissertations 559. 
596 Audley L. Smith, "Richard Hurd's Letters on Chivalry and Romance" ELH 58 (1939): 76. 
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He argues that modem romance was initiated by Cervantes in Don Quixote which 
''was more read, and more relished, than any other romance had ever been."597 He further 
proposes that Don Quixote illustrated to the reader the ridiculous nature of the genre of 
romance: "And thus, the extravagance of those books being placed, as it were, in the same 
groupe with the appearances of nature and the real business of life, the hideous disproportion 
of the former becomes so glaring by the contrast, that the most inattentive observer cannot 
fail to be struck with it."598 For Beattie, Cervantes illustrates the absurdity of incorporating 
old romance into the day to day operations of life, an argument supported by the humour of 
the situations into which the hero is placed, and the reactions of the characters he encounters. 
It also highlights the dangers of indulgence in the genre of romance; in Beattie's system 
(which he uses Don Quixote to illustrate) romances are capable of clouding the mind and 
making the reader incapable of functioning in society.599 
The rest of the essay is concerned with what Beattie calls "modem romance" or the 
novel. His treatment of the novel is interesting because it marks the beginning of critical 
engagement with the novel as a serious literary genre. He deals with Defoe's Robinson 
Crusoe, Richardson's Clarissa and History of Sir Charles Grandison, and Fielding's Tom 
Jones and Amelia. His criticism of these authors is generally complimentary, though the 
essay ends by reinforcing his earlier comment outlining the dangers of indulgence in the 
genre of romance, which is reminiscent ofBeattie's general philosophical outlook. He insists 
that "Romances are a dangerous recreation. A few, no doubt, of the best may be friendly to 
good taste and good morals; but far the greater part are unskilfully written, and tend to 
597 
-Beattie,-Dissertations-563. 
598 Beattie, Dissertations 562-63. 
599 Beattie's argument contrasts with Clara Reeve's in ''The Progress of Romance" (1785), in which she gives 
greater credit to the use of gothic romance in the modem novel, and has more respect for the genre of romance 
than Beattie. 
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corrupt the heart, and stimulate the passions."600 Beattie warns against overindulgence in this 
genre because it has the power to distract the mind and elevate the passions, which can hinder 
a person's ability to perform the day to day operations oflife. This warning concerning the 
effect of romance upon the mind is once again hinges upon the potential of the imagination to 
distract the mind from daily life and the ability of fiction to undermine belief God and 
revealed religion in the minds of the young. Beattie's fears concerning romance are 
characteristic of his ideas concerning the potential of the imagination to harmfully impact the 
young, and he considered it his duty as one charged with the education of young students to 
warn them against the dangers he perceived in romance. This didacticism is also prevalent in 
"Illustrations on Sublimity," which deals with the characteristics of the sublime in nature and 
its representations in poetry, and how both experiences affect the mind. 
In "Illustrations on Sublimity" Beattie engages with ancient rather than modem 
philosophers on the characteristics of the sublime and its effect on the mind. It is significant 
that nowhere in the essay does he discuss Edmund Burke's A Philosophical Enquirv into the 
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757).601 It is possible that Beattie felt 
that Burke's theories were too advanced to be referenced in an essay meant as an introduction 
to the sublime, or that he did not wish to introduce Burke because his theory of sensations is 
in direct opposition with Beattie's common sense theory concerning sensations and 
perceptions. James Boulton highlights the few points in the essay which he believes point to 
Beattie's indebtedness to Burke. Boulton insinuates that Beattie's debt to Burke's Enquiry is 
substantial, but Beattie insultingly never acknowledges this in the essay. He also suggests that 
this omission arises from a reluctance to "accept his [Burke's] central, sensationist 
600 Beattie, Dissertations 573-4. 
601 Roger Robinson points out in his introduction to the essay that James Boulton argues that Beattie borrows 
many of Burke's ideas without giving him due credit. See Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, ed. James T. Boulton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) xxix-xxx. 
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principle."602 The omission of Burke's Enguiry is similar to that ofHume in the essay "On 
Memory and Imagination." Beattie refuses to introduce philosophers whose systems 
contradict his own philosophical ideas, because it would then be imperative to refute their 
ideas, and in so doing, he would be obliged to offer to his young reader philosophies which 
he believed had great potential for hann, especially on the minds of youths. Since the essay is 
intended as an introduction to the topic of the sublime and an illustration of its function in 
literature. 
Beattie's gloss on the topic presents a number of commonplace notions concerning 
the sublime, and points solely to ancient rather than modem philosophers as references for his 
ideas and his definition of the sublime and his illustrations are drawn from painting as well as 
poetry by both ancient and modem artists.603 Beattie begins the essay with an exploration of 
the etymology of the word 'sublime' as first used by Longinus, and articulates his own 
definition of the term sublime: "it is rather the relative magnitude of things, compared with 
others ofthe same kind, that raises this emotion, their absolute quantity ofmatter."604 He 
disagrees with the illustration of sublime pleasure articulated by Lucretius: 
"It is pleasant," says Lucretius, "to behold from the land the labours of the 
mariner in a tempestuous ocean; - but nothing is more delightful, than from 
the heights of science to look down on those who wander in the mazes of 
error: not (says he) because we are gratified with another's distress; but 
because there is a pleasure in feeling evils from which we ourselves are 
"free ... 6os 
According to Beattie this illustration of the sublime is inaccurate, because the sublime cannot 
602 Boulton introduction, lxxxvii. 
603 Virgil, Raphael, Homer, Joshua Reynolds, and John Milton are mentioned. 
604 Beattie, Dissertations 609. 
60s Beattie, Dissertations 606~ 7. Beattie is quoting Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 2.4~8. 
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be evoked by a situation which is dangerous or harmful to another being: ''to see others in 
danger, or unhappy in their ignorance, must always give pain to a considerate mind, however 
conscious it may be of its own security, and wisdom."606 For Beattie, the sublime cannot be 
evoked by circumstances in which it would be immoral to take pleasure, or those events 
which would instinctively evoke sympathy and compassion rather than comfort and 
confidence in a superior situation. Beattie's moral intentions for the sublime lead to his 
articulation of the sublime nature of religious emotions, and religious passions. 
Beattie's understanding of the sublime is similar to that of John Dennis, who argues 
that "that Religion is that thing from which the Sublime is chiefly to be deriv'd ... .'>607 because 
it excites the strongest passions in the soul and inspires the greatest thoughts. In the tradition 
of Dennis, Beattie's-system of the sublime is inundated with moral purpose, as he argues that 
"Benevolence and piety are sublime affections; for the object of the one is the Deity himself, 
the greatest, and the best; and that of the other is the whole human race, or the whole system 
of percipient beings."608 However, the sublime is not limited to these emotions, because "the 
test of sublimity is not moral approbation, but that pleasurable astonishment wherewith 
certain things strike the beholder."609 This pleasurable astonishment can be mingled with 
intense negative feelings, but it cannot be evoked by a situation in which it would be immoral 
to take pleasure. That the sublime must adhere to moral principles is an important element of 
Beattie's overarching system of the sublime, which the essay develops. He then turns to the 
sublime horror which impresses itself upon the mind of the viewer, and the pleasure which it 
inspires: ''There is a kind of horror, which may be infused into the mind both by natural 
appearances, and by verbal description; and which, though it make the blood seem to run 
606 Beattie, Dissertations 607. 
607 John Dennis, The Grounds of Criticism in Poetry, introduction by John Valdimir Price (London: Thoemmes-
Routledge, 1994) 81. 
608 Beattie, Dissertations 611. 
609 Beattie, Dissertations 612. 
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cold, and produce a momentary fear, is not unpleasing, but may be even agreeable: and 
therefore, the objects that produce it are justly denominated sublime."610 This complex 
relationship between terror and pleasure is reminiscent of Dennis's system, but Dennis also 
argues that the greatest terror is inspired by religion: "The greatest Enthusiastick Terrour then 
must needs be deriv'd from Religious Ideas, for since the more their Objects are Powerful, 
and likely to hurt, the greater Terrour their Idea's produce."611 
Though Beattie's system does not articulate the same sentiments concerning religious 
ideas, the notion of pleasurable terror is the crux of Beattie's illustration of the sublime; and 
the essay then investigates the characteristics of poetry and painting which are capable of 
evoking this kind of sublime response in the reader/viewer. Beattie's investigations reinforce 
the philosophical undercurrents ofhis essays, the superiority and perfection of nature and 
representations which reflect the beauties of nature. He explains that "The most perfect 
models of sublimity are seen in the works of nature."612 The larger portion of the essay 
discusses the characteristics ofthe sublime in architecture, painting and poetry. He begins 
with architecture, and argues that for a structure to be sublime it must be "large and durable, 
and withal so simple and well-proportioned as that the eye can take in all its greatness at 
once."613 The simplicity which Beattie articulates as essential to the sublime in architecture is 
also integral to the sublime in poetry, which Beattie illustrates in common terms: 
Poetry is sublime, when it elevates the mind. This indeed is a general character 
of greatness. But I speak here of sentiments so happily conceived and 
expressed, as to raise our affections above the low pursuits of sensuality and 
610 Beattie, Dissertations 615. 
611 Dennis, 70. 
612 Beattie, Dissertations 617. 
613 Beattie, Dissertations 618. 
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avarice, and animate us with the love of virtue and ofhonour.614 
According to Beattie, sublime poetry is capable of elevating the mind above sensual human 
desires and connects the reader/viewer with intangible positive emotions which are meant to 
improve the mind rather than distract it from moral virtues and daily life. 
The final section of the essay argues that the sublime in poetry is an expression of the 
sublime experienced in nature, and therefore takes on a universal purpose: "true poetry is 
addressed to all mankind; and therefore its ideas are general; and its language ought to be so 
plain, as that every person acquainted with the poetical dialect may understand it."615 The 
"lllustrations on Sublimity'' articulates a system of the sublime which is in symmetry with 
Beattie's system of common sense philosophy, though appropriating particular aspects of 
contrary philosophical systems that reinforce what Beattie argues are the characteristics ofthe 
sublime and its effect upon the mind. 
The publication of Beattie's two volumes of prose essays as well as the two volume 
collection of his lectures, coincides with a number of personal tragedies, and presents an 
important context for their composition as well as Beattie's intellectual decline upon the 
completion of these volumes. As previously noted, the health of his wife Mary Beattie had 
deteriorated and Beattie was forced to remove her from their home; her permanent absence 
depressed Beattie's spirits and caused him constant anxiety. 
Shortly after the publication of the first volume of Elements of Moral Science616 in 
1790, his eldest son James Hay died of consumption, and Montagu died of the same disease 
just six years later. The early deaths of his sons broke Beattie's spirit, and the death of his 
youngest son signalled the decay of Beattie's active intellectual powers. He began to suffer 
from mental confusion and was forced to retire from his position as professor. 
614 Beattie, Dissertations 620. 
615 Beattie, Dissertations 652. 
616 This is a collection in abstract form of the various lectures given to his students during his professorship. 
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The tragic events of his late years present an interesting backdrop for the publication of the 
essays, because they represent what Beattie knew would ultimately be his final collection of 
public works. Nature is a key theme throughout these essays, and indeed throughout Beattie's 
career. 
Beattie's Scottish Language Works 
Beattie intended his Scoticisms. Arranged in Alphabetical Order. Designed to Correct 
Improprieties of Speech and Writing (small run printed for private circulation 1779, 
published for public consumption in 1787) to be a reference work, "to put young writers and 
speakers on their guard against some of those Scotch idioms, which, in this country, are liable 
to be mistaken for English."617 Beattie states in the advertisement that this collection is meant 
to reinforce the purity and proper usage of English, in opposition to what he calls the 
debasement of "the purity of the language, by a mixture of foreign and provincial idioms, and 
cant phrases; a circumstance, which has in other countries generally preceded, and partly 
occasioned, the decline oflearning."618 The following two hundred words are meant to aid 
young men of Scotland in their use of English, and the collection is intended to enable them 
to write with confidence. Beattie's case highlights the validity of John Butt's assessment of 
the status of the English language at the time: ''Though a man should speak Scots, it seemed 
good sense to learn how to write English, for English was now the language of Parliament as 
well as of the court, and was useful in a united kingdom, as Latin had been in medieval 
Europe."619 
617 James Beattie, Scoticisms. Arranged in Alphabetical Order. Designed to Correct Improprieties of Speech and 
Writing (Edinburgh: Creech; London: Cadell, 1787) 2. 
618 Beattie, Scoticisms 3-4. 
619 John Butt, The Mid-Eighteenth Century, ed. Geoffrey Camall (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979) 142. 
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Beattie articulates his concerns over the uses of English by Scottish gentlemen in a 
letter to William Forbes: "We dare not hazard idiomatical expressions, for fear they should be 
Scotch or not English; we write with a dictionary at our elbow, and are continually 
apprehensive of committing some blunder: this fear gives a constraint to our manner, in spite 
of all our endeavours to the contrary; and from this fear an Englishman is perfectly free."620 
Beattie's intention for the collection of Scoticisms was clearly to educate Scottish youths of 
the proper use of words, which was a consequence of their seclusion from the idioms of their 
southern compatriots. This education was intended to improve their ability to converse in the 
wider world, as Ralph Walker comments in his introduction to Beattie's Day-Book: 
Educated Scotsman strove to acquire accuracy and purity of idiom in their 
English in much the same way that the educated medieval Scot aimed at 
accuracy and facility in Latin, because it gave him the entree, on equal terms 
with others, to a wider culture than that of any one nation and sealed him of 
the fellowship of the lettered.621 
This collection can be perceived as an attempt to rid Scottish youths of their native idiom, 
however, as Walker points out, the desire to command English idiom in eighteenth century 
Scotland resulted from a desire to succeed rather than to assimilate. Beattie's desire to 
contribute to the positive improvement of the youth of Scotland through this collection once 
again highlights his continued commitment to the education. 
620 Beattie to Sir William Forbes, 12 June 1779. Beattie, Correspondence 3:101-4. Also found in W. Forbes, 
2:47. 
621 RalphS. Walker, James Beattie's Day-Book: 1773-1798 (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP, 1948) 17. 
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"To the Printer of the Aberdeen Journal" and "To Mr. Alexander Ross" (1768) were 
published as forewords to a volume of poetry in Broad Scotch by Alexander Ross. Beattie's 
poem was composed before the first book of The Minstrel, and is his only poem in the 
"Broad Scotch" dialect. The poem, ''To Mr. Alexander Ross at Lochlee," was written to help 
advance the sale of Ross's own volume of poetry. Ross had known Beattie's father in 
Laurencekirk, and "in 1766 Ross brought to him [Beattie] his MSS., from which Beattie 
selected for publication Helenore and a few songs.'0622 In 1768, Beattie sent his poem together 
with a letter praising Ross's poems to the Aberdeen Journal with the pseudonym Oliver 
Oldstile.623 Beattie's assistance to Ross marks an interesting reversal of roles. Beattie is now 
acting as patron, using his reputation in the neighbourhood to promote the volume. He makes 
his intentions known to John Gregory: 
Having some acquaintance of the Author, and knowing him to be a 
goodhumoured social old man, I wrote a few scotch verses in recommendation 
of his work, which were inserted in the Aberdeen Journal, and have been of 
some use in promoting the sale."624 
He continues in the letter to clarify his position in favour of the English language as the best 
vehicle for poetry over Broad Scots: 
Without regard to our political circumstances, the English language, from its 
own intrinsick value, is a thousand times more worthy of our cultivation. 
The Scotch tongue is really barren in itself, and, having been long confmed to 
the lowest sort of people, is now become incapable of expressing any thing but 
622 Alexander Ross, The Scottish Works of Alexander Ross. M .A. ed. Margaret Wattie (Edinburgh and London: 
Blackwood, 1938) xv. 
623 The Letter, "To The Printer of the Aberdeen Journal" is dated 1June 1768. 
624 Beattie to John Gregory, 1July 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:61-63. 
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low humour.625 
The subject and light tone of the poem reinforce the frivolous character Beattie assigned to 
poems written in this dialect. Nevertheless, he did feel that a collection of Scots dialect 
poems in their original verse should be collected, and often pressed his friend Thomas 
Blacklock to be the editor of such a piece.626 Later in life, however, Beattie expressed his 
private displeasure over not receiving due credit for the volume: at the time of the second 
edition Beattie himself procured the fine paper for the edition to be printed upon as a gift for 
the Duchess of Gordon, and he relates his displeasure at the slight acknowledgement ofhis 
contributions by the author. 627 
Beattie's use of the Scots dialect in this poem is meant to excite curiosity in the 
readers of the Aberdeen Journal, which was intended to spark interest in what would be the 
target readership for Ross's volume. The poem is written in the "Standart Habbie" verse 
form, which was traditionally used in comedic or light-hearted poems north of the border. 
The poets Beattie celebrates were masters of this form, and he appreciates the abilities of the 
Scottish dialect to illustrate comedic and fanciful scenes. Allan Ramsay used this form 
specifically for humorous poetry, and his innovations in its usage were taken up by Robert 
Fergusson and perfected by Robert Bums. 628 This versification is unique to Scots dialect, and 
the poem itself celebrates the versatility of this metre as well as Scottish culture generally. 
625 Beattie to John Gregory, 1 July 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 2:61-63. 
626 
"I sincerely wish, you would undertake such a publication; it would amuse without fatiguing you; 
and it would do a credit to our country." Beattie to Thomas Blacklock, 24 May 1768. Beattie, Correspondence 
2:58-60. 
627
"1t was I who planned the Edition, and procured the Duchess's consent that it should be dedicated to her. I 
also corrected the press, and the poems too, in many places. My only view in this was, to get a little money for 
the Author, whom, besides his own merit, I esteem, because he was a particular acquaintance of my Father, and 
has told me several things of him, which I never heard from any body else" Beattie's Day-Book vol. 2 (AUL 
MS.-30/15). . 
628 Burns quotes the poem in a letter to Mrs. Dunlop: "as Dr. Beattie says to Ross the poet, of his muse Scota, 
from which, by the by, I took the idea of Coila: ('Tis a poem of Beattie's in the Scottish dialect, which perhaps 
you have never seen)" and he goes on to quote the fifth stanza. Robert Burns, The Letters of Robert Burns, ed. 
J. Delancey and G. Ross Roy, 2nd ed. 2 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985) 1:256. 
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Unlike the nationalistic sentiments of Ramsay and Fergusson, Beattie favoured the 
incorporation of Scotland into Britain, culturally as well as politically. Despite his attitude 
toward "Broad Scotch/' the poem champions the value of Scotland • s rich literary heritage, 
which other eighteenth-century Scottish authors will build upon. The revival of vernacular 
poetry in Scotland "was manifest partly in the rediscovery of the vernacular for the purposes 
of poetry, and partly in the mastery over a closely related, yet still alien language."629 
The poem's purpose is to situate Ross amidst the great Scots poets, such as Allan 
Ramsay: "Since Allan's death, naebody car'd I For anes to speer how Scota far'd" (32-33). 
The speaker then defends the versatility and ancientness of the Scottish dialect: "Our countra' 
leed is far frae barren, I It's even right pithy and aulfarren" (43-44).630 These strengths ofthe 
ancient Scots dialects were discounted by contemporaries and Beattie himself; his attitude 
concerning the value and limitations of Scots dialect poems present another reason Beattie 
did not think highly of his poem, and neglected to include it in any future poetic volumes. 
The Act of Union in 1707 sparked linguistic and cultural assimilationism within 
Scotland among intellectuals, and as a result the traditional languages and education were in 
steady decline: "Our fine newfangled sparks, I grant ye, I Gie poor auld Scotland many a 
taunty'' (61-62). The speaker then argues that to discount such a rich ancient language is to 
show ignorance rather than education: "Sae comes oflgnorance, I trow,/ It's this that crooks 
their ill-fa'rd mou' I Wi' jokes sae course, they gar fouk spue" (67-69). 
The poem then shifts to a celebration of great Scots dialect poets of the past, whose 
example Ross (and Beattie himself in this poem) emulate: '"Twould taka live-lang summer-
day I To name the haff' (83-84). And so the speaker turns back to Ross and his particular 
volume by naming the landscape and dialect of Ross's volume, with a hope that they will 
629 Butt, 142. 
630 Leed =Language, Aulfarren =Old-fashioned. 
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survive into posterity: "But ilka Mearns and Angus bairn I Thy tales and sangs by heart shall 
learn" (91-92). The poem is not a particularly brilliant use of Scots dialect, and Beattie 
himself was well aware of his poetic limitations using this vocabulary and verse form. Yet 
despite its deficiencies, it is an interesting moment in Beattie's career. He is serving as Ross's 
patron and by anonymous endorsement Beattie seeks to interest readers in Ross's work. 
Beattie's entry in his day-book in 1773 illustrates his personal financial investment in the 
poetic endeavour of his old family friend. It is likely this relationship began with the first 
edition in 1766, which would explain Beattie's thinly veiled public endorsement of Ross's 
poems. 
Though Beattie's later prose works present many commonplace eighteenth-century 
arguments concerning poetry, laughter, the imagination, romance writings, the sublime, and 
Scots dialect, they represent a significant stage in his public life. The essays selected for this 
study shed new light on many aspects of Beattie's poetry, as well as other subjects which 
occupied him in the Essay on Truth. Because Beattie published the essays in an effort to 
make a positive impact upon young students, they are written in an accessible style and 
refrain from introducing what he considered to be dangerous ideas. 
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Chapter 7: Into the Future-Beattie's Influence on Scott, Coleridge, and Wordsworth 
The influence of The Minstrel on the poetry of Sir Walter Scott illustrates the impact 
of the poem upon the next generation of Scottish poets in particular. Though Scott refers to 
Beattie only occasionally in his letters, he seems to have engaged with The Minstrel on a 
more than superficial level. fu 1811 Scott speculates on the reasoning behind Beattie's 
decision not to compose a third book of The Minstrel:631 
But I conceive one reason of his deserting the task he had so beautifully 
commenced, was the persuasion that he had given his hero an education and 
tone of feeling inconsistent with the plan he had laid down for his subsequent 
exploits.632 
This letter illustrates that he knew Beattie's text well enough to garner from it particular ideas 
concerning the character of Edwin, and the consequences ofhis education by the Hermit. His 
conjecture into Beattie's motivation and intentions for the poem provides insight into his own 
poetic expression. While many of Scott's poems have been linked to The Minstrel,633 I will 
focus mainly on The Lay ofthe Last Minstrel (1803-4), because it offers the most 
comprehensive example of Scott's engagement with Beattie's poem. 
Scott's interest in the character of ancient minstrels is evident from his earlier 
collection of ballads, Minstrelsy of the Scottish Border (1802-3). The collection was intended 
to fill a particular void in scholarship. He intended the volume to highlight Scotland's own 
rich tradition of minstrelsy, and to "combine popularity (at a modest 5 shillings) with the 
631 Scott!s reasoned conjecture is remarkably akin to Beattie's own disappoinbnent with his chosen fable. 
632 Sir Walter Scott, Letters of Sir Walter Scott 1811-1814, ed. H. J. C. Grierson (London: Constable, 1932) 26. 
633 Everard King links The Minstrel with the autobiographical elements of Mannion and the natural scenery in 
the Lady of the Lake. See Everard King, James Beattie's The Minstrel and the Origins of Romantic 
Autobiography (New York: Mellen, 1992) 155-59. 
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more strenuous standards applied by scholars like Percy's critical antagonist, Joseph 
Ritson."634 This academic interest in minstrelsy and traditional ballads, and his preoccupation 
with a national literary heritage culminate in The Lay, which explores the decline in the 
honourable status of minstrelsy, and the resulting declines in the status of traditional story 
telling and folklore. 
In Essays on Chivalry, Romance, and the Drama, Scott criticizes the historical 
accounts of minstrels given by Thomas Percy and his rival antiquarian Joseph Ritson, and 
explains his interest in the character of minstrels: 
In fact, neither of these excellent antiquaries has cast a general or philosophic 
glance on the necessary condition of a set of men, who were by profession the 
instruments of the pleasure of others during a period of society such as was 
presented in the middle ages. 635 
The Lay explores the situation and character of a minstrel -matters which had, according to 
Scott, been overlooked by his fellow scholars. Scott's ideas expressed in this essay 
concerning the character of the historical figure of the minstrel are important to an overall 
understanding of his development of this character in The Lay. Scott further speculates that 
the decline of the Metrical Romances was "probably on account of the depreciated character 
of the minstrels by whom they were recited."636 
Scott situates The Lay in this declining era of minstrelsy, and puts the narrative into 
the mouth of such a minstrel and uses a medieval verse form, ''which forms the structure of 
so much minstrel poetry."637 Scott chose to present his narrative in an archaic verse form to 
connect his narrator with the tradition of minstrelsy, and in so doing adds credibility to the 
- - -- -
634 John Sutherland, The Life of Sir Walter Scott; A Critical Biography (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) 75. 
635 Scott, Essavs on Chivalry and Romance. and the Drama (London; Warne, nd) 81. 
636 Scott, Essays 88. 
637 Sir Walter Scott, The Poetical Works of Sir Walter Scott. Bart (Edinburgh; Cadell, 1841) 4. 
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characterisation of his minstrel as the last ofhis kind. The characterisation of Scott's minstrel 
as the sole survivor of a bygone age is an interesting point of departure for an exploration of 
the connection between Beattie's and Scott's characterisations ofthe minstrel. 
Though The Lay is the minstrel's final narrative, Scott interrupts at the start and finish 
of each Canto to develop the character of the minstrel, and highlights traits that are 
reminiscent of those of the Hermit whom Edwin encounters in The Minstrel. Like Beattie's 
Hermit, who takes comfort in burdening Edwin's mind with subjects such as history, 
philosophy, and science,638 Scott introduces his minstrel as "a pathetic old man, vulnerable in 
his isolation, unfitted to the new regime, and deriving life only from the memories of a past 
as mortal as himself.'0639 Until his encounter with Edwin, Beattie's Hermit suffers the fate of 
Scott's minstrel at the beginning of The Lay: poverty and isolation from society and its 
comforts. King takes this similarity further, arguing that "Scott's minstrel is in effect a picture 
of Edwin as he might have grown old."640 Though their characterisations are similar, Beattie 
does not delve into the personal history of the Hermit, nor does he make minstrelsy the focus 
ofhis narrative. 
Minstrelsy is vitally important to both The Minstrel and The Lay, but in different 
ways. For Beattie, minstrelsy provides the apparatus for his investigation into the natural 
versus formal education, and the consequences of education upon poetic genius; Edwin's 
crisis cannot be resolved because the narrative appara,tus does not lend itself to further 
investigation into his swain's future. Scott explores the decline of minstrelsy using the 
experiences of the last minstrel in his last courtly performance. Scott argues that the history 
638 The Hermit implores Edwin to continue his education with him: "Come often then; for, haply, in my bower, I 
Amusement, knowledge, wisdom thou may'st-gain: I Ifl one soul improve, I have not lived in vain" (II. 286-
88). 
639 Fiona J. Stafford, The Last of the Race: The Growth of a Myth from Milton to Darwin (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1994) 163. 
640 King, Romantic Autobiography 156. 
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of minstrelsy is an important part of Scotland's literary development, and explores the 
implications of its decline on the poet as well as the audience. Scott's fictional minstrel finds 
himself in the court of Anne, the heiress ofBuccleuch, whose connection to Scott's own 
family641 adds a personal connection to Scott's narrative. The lay the minstrel sings to the 
court of Scott's ancestor pertains directly to their line, and is filled with references to their 
nobility and virtue. Though the feudal narrative is interesting in terms of its depiction of the 
medieval environment of the Scottish border, it is the framing stanzas of each Canto that 
carry the main impact of the poem. Jeffrey notes that "the elegance and the beauty of this 
setting, if we may so call it, though entirely of modem workmanship, appears to us to be fully 
more worthy of admiration than the bolder relief of antiques which it encloses. "642 The 
descriptions of the courtly scene in which the ancient narrative is sung by the minstrel 
provide the greatest insight into the common theme of minstrelsy between The Minstrel and 
The Lay. 
The Lay opens by depicting the aged minstrel on a journey similar to that planned by 
Beattie for Edwin,643 and introduces him as a wayward vagabond: "A wandering Harper, 
scorn'd and poor, I He begg'd his bread from door to door. I And tuned, to please a peasant's 
ear, I The harp a king had loved to hear'' (23-26). The opening of The Minstrel laments a 
similar fate for poets, and illustrates the kind of dejection which Scott's minstrel suffers: 
Check' d by the Scoff of Pride, by Envy's frown, 
And poverty's unconquerable bar, 
In life's low vale remote has pined alone, 
Then dropped into the grave, unpitied and unknown! (1. 6-9). 
641 Scott was ancestrally related to the Buccleuch family. 
642 Scott, 9. 
643 In Beattie's plan for the third book of The Minstrel Edwin's land was to be attacked and he would be forced 
to take up his harp and become a wandering minstrel. See pp. 93-94. 
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Beattie's minstrel is a creature of nature destined to be misunderstood and unappreciated by 
his rural community, just as Scott's last minstrel is fated to wander in poverty. While The 
Minstrel focuses primarily upon education, poetic genius, and the effect of nature, Beattie 
does specifically situate the narrative in Scotland. He also situates Edwin and his kinsmen in 
particularly Scottish surroundings644 but it is their natural surroundings rather than specific 
locations which drive the scenes in the poem. For Scott "placename, family and landscape 
dominate the narrative with a localising power"645 and root the characters to their 
surroundings. Scott's minstrel is also introduced into specifically Scottish surroundings: "He 
pass'd Newark's stately tower I Looks out from Yarrow's birchen bower: I The Minstrel 
gazed with wistful eye" (Intro.27-29). Scott's minstrel finds himself as Scott did, upon the 
banks of the Yarrow in his old age, looking upon a symbol of nobility which personifies the 
lost ancient nobility of courtly minstrels. 
The end of Canto I characterises the aged minstrel and his insecurity concerning his 
powers of oratory: "Dejectedly, and low, he bow' d I And, gazing on the timid crowd, I He 
seem'd to seek, in every eye, I If they approved his minstrelsy" (I.xxxii.3-5). The end of 
Canto ill laments the death of his only child and his enforced solitude, while the fmal stanza 
of Canto IV highlights the function of minstrels as chroniclers of history. This 
characterisation of the last minstrel is reminiscent of Ossian's lament for the death of his 
youngest son in book V ofFingal/46 highlighting Scott's desire to place his bard within this 
tradition of great Scottish oratory. Canto V comments on the prospects of greater affluence 
644 Edwin and his shepherd father are described as being of the "north countrie." Seep. 112. 
64~ Iarnes Reed, SirWalter'Scott: bandscape·andcLocality (London:-Athlonei 1980) 28, 
646 
"The tear is on the cheek of the king; for terrible was his son in war. His son! that was like a beam of fire by 
night on the hill; when the forests sink down in its course, and the traveler trembles at the sound." Book V, 
Fingal. James Macpherson, The Poems of Ossian and Related Works, ed. Howard Gaskell (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh UP, 1996) 93. 
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for minstrels further south, but it is the end of Canto VI that most pointedly brings to the fore 
the fate of this aged bard. 
His lack of confidence in the opening Canto is a startling contrast to what we see at 
the end of Canto VI when his lay has earned him a home and an established place in a court. 
No longer doomed to wander "close beneath proud Newark's tower, I Arose the Minstrel's 
lowly bower" (VI.xxxii.S-6) where strangers "Oft heard the tale of other days" (VI.xxxii.ll). 
The minstrel's performance of the lay and its warm reception by the court earn him a 
permanent dwelling within a community. He has managed to succeed in reclaiming the noble 
carriage and persona characteristic of the rank and position Scott assigns to minstrels. Beattie 
characterises minstrels as important to their community but does not assign them high social 
rank. For Beattie, the minstrel is important as a poet, and functions as a link to the natural 
world around him rather than as a chronicler of human deeds. 
Though their characterisations differ in many respects, both illustrate their power as 
conveyers of nature's inspiration. In The Minstrel, Beattie recalls the power of poetry to raise 
the emotions of an audience, and implores his young minstrel to carry on this tradition: 
0 let your spirit still my bosom sooth, 
Inspire my dreams, and my wild wanderings guide! 
Your voice each rugged path of life can smooth; 
For well I know, where-ever ye reside, 
There harmony, and peace, and innocence, abide (1.374-78). 
Similarly, Scott depicts the power of the minstrel to raise the emotions of an audience, but 
also explores the affect of the audience upon the bard: 
The Harper smil'd, well-pleas'd; 
For ne'er 
Was flattery lost on poets' ear: 
A simple race! they waste their toil 
For the vain tribute of a smile; 
E'en when in age their flame expires, 
Her dulcet breath can fan its fires (IV.xxxvi.l9-24). 
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Scott's focus is on the effect of the audience on the minstrel in an attempt to illustrate the 
importance of human encouragement upon the bard, to further reinforce the communal nature 
of poetry. 
The sublime nature of the Scottish landscape is the driving inspiration of the 
imaginative mind of the minstrels depicted in both poems. In The Minstrel however, the 
landscape is in a sense universal, while for Scott the specificity of the Scottish landscape and 
place names root the action of the romance and the minstrel's presentation in an historical 
locale. Beattie introduces Edwin into an environment of solitude in the natural world, which 
is particularly Scottish only in the sense that it is derived from his own youthful experiences. 
The depictions of Edwin in this scenery reveal his close relationship with nature: "To deep 
untrodden groves his footsteps led, I To there would he wander wild, Till Phoebus' beam I 
Shot from the western cliff, released the weary team" (1.151-53). For Scott, the sublimity of 
the particularly Scottish landscape intensifies the scenes in the romance sung by the minstrel, 
and elevates the emotions of his courtly audience by appealing to their own sense of 
nationhood, and the parts which they and their ancestors have played in developing it. A 
notable example in the romance of this is the arrival of the knight Deloraine to the Abbey: 
"Old Melros' rose, and fair Tweed ran: I Like some tall rock with lichens grey, I Seem'd 
dimly huge, the dark Abbaye" (I.xxxi.4-6). 
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For Scott, landscape becomes a narrative tool, while Beattie deals with the impact of 
such a close relationship with the natural world on a growing, poetically inclined, intellect. 
Throughout The Minstrel, nature's ability to delight and inspire Edwin's imagination is 
apparent, but for Scott's minstrel the importance of nature as an inspiring force upon the 
imagination is not explicit until the final stanza of the final canto. The rendezvous of a maid 
with her knight in the minstrel's narrative is introduced by soft natural imagery. At dawn 
"The wild birds told their warbling tale, I And waken'd every flower that blows; I And 
peeped forth the violet pale" (II.xxv.S-7). The personification of the flowers foreshadows the 
rising of the maid "lovelier than the rose so red, I Yet paler than the violet pale, I She early 
left her bed" (ll.xxv.9-ll). The beauty of the passage is created by the diction and imagery of 
nature while advancing action. The narrative is advanced and an amorous tone set for a 
rendezvous through nature imagery. 
The evidence suggests there is a strong possibility that in The Lay of the Last Minstrel 
Scott is consciously building upon the prototype for the use of minstrelsy as a means of 
narrative structure presented in The Minstrel. The characterisations of the minstrel in the 
poems, as well as the use of landscape and its impact upon the creative imagination seem 
closely related. Scott diverges from his predecessor in terms of his narrative and the strong 
connection he builds between the audience and his minstrel; his intention appears to be to 
explore the consequences of the decline of minstrelsy upon the development of Scottish 
poetry, rather than to explore a poet's imaginative development. Scott chooses to adopt only 
Beattie's characterisation of his minstrel and similar attitudes towards nature. In contrast, 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge presents a seemingly different philosophical approach to many of 
the. topics Beattie addre.sses. 
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The philosophical thinking of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, as it comes through in the 
Biographia Literaria (1817) is not normally considered to have a close relationship with 
Beattie's works, because there is a fundamental difference in their two approaches. For 
Beattie, the rational and the emotional (or imaginative) faculties were in opposition, a fact 
that led him to eventually abandon poetry in favour of the philosophical pursuits, which, as 
we have seen, he felt morally obliged to take up. For Coleridge, on the other hand, the 
intellectual and emotional, or the philosophical and the poetic, are not at odds in great 
writing. They may begin by appearing as opposites, linked to such polar oppositions as the 
objective and subjective, but under the stimulus of imagination, these very different elements 
are transformed into the alloy of the unified and successful work of genius. 
Previous studies of Coleridge's debt to Beattie have focused solely upon the influence 
of The Minstrel647 in terms of character and theme, while the connection between their 
philosophical and critical arguments has been relatively neglected. This is due in part to the 
misconception that if Coleridge thought at all of Beattie's Essay on Truth, it was in a negative 
way. Coleridge mentions Beattie's work in a number of works, and is not dismissive of all the 
philosophy, but rather the comments upon the work of David Hume.648 Coleridge believes 
that the Essay "was· a book that honoured Beattie from the display of genius and eloquence 
which shot through and through as it were with a good heart and sincere piety"649 but goes on 
to admonish Beattie for what he believes to be Beattie's apparent misrepresentation of 
647 King refers to the ''Dejection Ode," "Monody on the Death of Chatterton," and ''To Wordsworth." King, 
Romantic Autobiography 108-10. 
648 Though there is little direct mention of Hume in Biographia, I agree with Cairns Craig that " ... what 
Coleridge is trying to achieve is the suppression of the associationism ofHume, with all of the aesthetic, 
political, and'religiolis-consequences that it brought in its train." Cairns Craig, "Coleridge, Htime, and the 
Romantic Imagination." Scotland and the Borders of Romanticism, ed. Leith Davis, Ian Duncan, and Janet 
Sorensen (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 27. 
649 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, ed. Kathleen Coburn 
(London: Pilot, 1949) 202-3. 
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Hume's doctrine of cause and effect.650 
These passages have been hitherto used as proof that Coleridge dismissed Beattie's 
work, which does not present an accurate account of his comments concerning the Essay or 
Beattie's character generally. The philosophical debt of the Biographia to German Idealists 
has long overshadowed the important influence of empirical philosophy on this work.651 
Modem critics have begun to investigate Coleridge's other major philosophical debt: the 
empiricism of the eighteenth centllft52 Additionally, M. H. Abrams examines the importance 
of eighteenth-century thinkers on Coleridge's thought, and suggests that many aspects of his 
philosophical system are rooted in the theories of his empiricist predecessors.653 Though 
critics have generally focused on influence of other empiricist thinkers on Coleridge, there is 
evidence to support his engagement with Beattie's philosophical and critical works 
throughout the Biographia. Coleridge's engagement with Beattie's thought is also evident in 
the theory of the imagination expounded in the Biographia. Though "in forming his concept 
of the imagination, Coleridge draws on nearly every other writer who discussed the 
subject;"654 my focus is on those aspects ofhis thought that are reminiscent of Beattie's 
arguments. Coleridge divides the faculty of the imagination into primary and secondary. 
65
°Coleridge, The Philosophical Lectures of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 202-3. He also admonishes Hume for his 
"attacks on the principles of religion and morality" but does not agree with Hume's "contemporary opponents 
on either side of the Tweed" that his common sense was deficient. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Logic, ed. Barbara 
Rooke (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1981) 192-3 
651 The debt of Coleridge to German thinkers has been assessed by a number of important critics, such as 
Thomas Weiskel, Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology ofTranscendece (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins UP, 1976). James Engell, The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (London, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard UP, 1981). 
652 In his discussion of the distinction between fancy and imagination, Engell explains "By the last thirty years 
of the century a number of distinctions were available, each influenced by one or more previous writers, both 
German and English. Duff, Gerard, Beattie, and Reynolds were all read in Germany." Eng ell, 183. 
653 M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (London: Oxford UP, 
1953). 
654 Engell, 328. 
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He famously postulates that the primary imagination is "the living Power and prime 
agent of all human Perception" while the secondary diverges from this power "only in 
degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-
create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to 
idealize and to unify.''6ss In "Of Memory and Imagination," Beattie defines the imagination in 
similar terms, though he does not divide its function into distinct categories: "the word 
Imagination seems to denote; first, the power of apprehending or conceiving ideas, simply as 
they are in themselves, without any view to their reality: and secondly, the power of 
combining into new forms, or assemblages, those thoughts, ideas, or notions, which we have 
derived from experience, or from information."656 Beattie's definition of the imagination is 
closest to Coleridge's "fancy," since it focuses on combination and not re-creation. Further, 
he argues that a distinction between comprehension and combination within the imagination 
would be redundant, since their functions are so closely connected.657 Though Coleridge 
diverges from Beattie in the designation of primary and secondary powers in the imagination, 
both assign the power of assemblage (fancy) and creation (imagination) of new ideas, based 
on those of sense perception, to the imagination. Coleridge's distinction between fancy and 
imagination is interesting in comparison to Beattie's. Engell argues that though the contrast 
between these terms has often been attributed to Coleridge or to a German source, "a growing 
distinction between the terms took place in English usage throughout the eighteenth 
century."658 In contrast to the imagination, Coleridge labels fancy as "indeed no other than a 
mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; blended with, and modified 
• 
655Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria: Or Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and Qpinions, 
: ed. James Engell and W. Jackson Bate 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1983) 1:304. 
·d 656<Beattie;Dissertiltions 74. 
: 
657 
"These two faculties, therefore, of Simple Apprehension and Combination (as I shall take the liberty to call 
.· them) are so nearly allied, that there can be no harm in referring both to the Imagination or Fancy." Beattie, 
, Dissertations 74. 
658 Engell, 172. For more on the philosophical evolution of these terms see Engell, 172-83. 
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by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the word CHOICE."659 
Coleridge argues that the fancy is a part of the memory that is ruled by the will of an 
individual rather than the usual conventions of space and time. 
Conversely, Beattie separates memory from the imagination, and defines fancy in 
tenns of the imagination rather than the memory. For Beattie, imagination and fancy "are, 
indeed, names for the same faculty; but the fonner seems to be applied to the more solemn, 
and the latter to the more trivial, exertions of it. A witty author is a man of lively Fancy; but a 
sublime poet is said to possess a vast Imagination."660 While their definitions converge, both 
recognise the need to differentiate between the imagination and the fancy, but for Coleridge 
this divergence is of greater importance, since he defines fancy as part of the memory, 
whereas for Beattie it is characteristic ofthe imagination in its more superficial operations. 
Coleridge's exploration of the characteristics of a poet, as well as the attributes of a poetic 
genius, is similar in many ways to those arguments made by Beattie in his essays "Of 
Memory and Imagination" and "On Poetry and Music." 
Like Beattie, Coleridge argues that pleasure is the purpose of poetry: "a poem is that 
species of composition, which is opposed to works of science, by proposing for its immediate 
object pleasure, not truth.'0661 Though Beattie argues that pleasure is the ultimate end of 
poetry, he also argues that poetry cannot please if it does not also instil moral values.662 
Beattie and Coleridge are also connected in their investigations into the characteristics of 
poetic genius. Coleridge's investigation into the characteristics and qualities of poetic genius 
also builds upon the foundation laid by Gerard, Young, and Duff. He begins by arguing that 
adequate poetic imitation of nature does not in itself denote poetic genius: 
659 Coleridge, Biographia 1:305. 
660 Beattie, Dissertations 72. 
661 Coleridge, Biographia 2:13. 
662 See pp. 233-34. 
282 
images however beautiful though faithfully copied from nature, and as 
accurately represented in words, do not themselves characterize the poet. They 
become proofs of original genius only as far as they are modified by a 
predominant passion; or by associated thoughts or images awakened by that 
passion; or when they have the effect of reducing multitude to unity, or 
succession to an instant; or lastly, when a human and intellectual life is 
transferred to them from the poet's own spirit.663 
His description of the ability of genius to modify aspects of nature in poetry in order to raise 
the passions of the reader is similar to Beattie's argument that the products of the poetic 
genius must be modelled upon nature, but the mind adapts them to suit the poet's intentions 
and to build pathos. Coleridge's particular philosophical theory is in many ways an 
engagement with, and reaction to, many theories of his eighteenth century philosophical 
predecessors, but his debt specifically to Beattie's Essay on Truth has never been addressed, 
and I believe the philosophical similarities with the Biographia are more than an expression 
of common eighteenth-century motifs, or coincidental attributes. In the Biographia Coleridge 
deals with many of the philosophical and critical issues concerning the characteristics of the 
mind, including the perception of truth, the imagination, and poetic genius that engaged 
Beattie's attention. 
The first compelling similarity comes in Coleridge's description of the characteristics 
of the mind, and the perception of truth. Coleridge recalls reaching the realisation that the 
truth of commonly held beliefs that cannot be proved by sensation, but are in fact verified by 
internal conviction: "I saw, that in the nature of things such proof is impossible; and that of 
all modes of being, that are not objects of the senses, the existence is assumed by a logical 
663 Coleridge, Biographia 2:23. 
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necessity arising from the constitution of the mind itself, by the absence of all motive to 
doubt it, not from any absolute contradiction in the supposition of the contrary."664 Beattie 
makes a similar claim in the Essay on Truth, arguing that "The certainty of some truths, for 
instance, is perceived intuitively; the certainty of others is perceived, not intuitively, but in 
consequence of a proof."665 According to Coleridge, "if the mere intellect could make no 
certain discovery of a holy and intelligent first cause, it might yet supply a demonstration, 
that no legitimate argument could be drawn from the intellect against its truth.'>666 Here, 
Coleridge argues that the validity of the belief in the existence of a divine creator cannot be 
verified by reason, nor can it be disproved by it. For Beattie the conviction of truth in things 
that cannot be proved by reason comes from the perception of an internal sense:667 
We believe the truth of an investigated conclusion, because we can assign a 
reason for our belief; we believe an intuitive principle, without being able to 
assign any other reason for our belief than this, that the law of our nature 
determines us to believe it, even as the law of our nature determines us to see a 
colour when presented to our open eyes at noonday."668 
Beattie makes the belief in truth that is not proven through reason rely on the use of common 
sense, while Coleridge makes a similar claim for the existence of truth that cannot be proved 
by reason, but does not assign this function to common sense, referring instead to a general 
mner sense. 
664 Coleridge,, Biographia 1:200-1. 
665 Beattie, Essay 31. Also see pp. 144-45 for the defmition of truth and of common sense and its origins. 
666 Coleridge, Biographia 1 :201. 
667 For more on the internal sense and the test of truth see pp. 153-54. 
668 Beattie, Essay 41. 
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Coleridge's description of the inner sense and its function in the mind leads him to 
examine the purpose and operations of philosophy. He argues that philosophical 
investigation, "if it is to arrive at evidence, must proceed from the most original 
construction"669 - which is determined by the direction of the inner sense. It is the inner sense 
that intuits the existence of a line drawn in the sand, because it "is the sensuous image of the 
original or ideal line, and an efficient mean to excite every imagination to the intuition of 
it."670 This notion of an inner sense as an integral part of consciousness and interpretation of 
sensations is not unique to Coleridge;671 it is his incorporation of idealism with empirical 
arguments concerning the interpretation of sensation and the inner consciousness that sets his 
system apart. 672 He goes on to argue that the inner sense can be expanded and enriched, or 
denied, according to the will of the person. This freedom leads him to resolve that 
"philosophy in its first principles must have a practical or moral, as well as a theoretical or 
speculative side."673 Similarly, Beattie argues that the purpose of philosophy is to make 
human life better, by explaining the workings of God and enabling human beings to be at 
peace with the world around them. 
For Beattie, philosophy that undermines morality and general codes of conduct harms 
society. He argues that philosophy should generally be practical, and labels esoteric 
philosophy as detrimental to society.674 Coleridge argues that philosophical investigation must 
instil morality, but also a responsibility to investigate aspects of the human mind that should 
have no practical application: as "philosophy is neither a science of the reason or 
669 Coleridge, Biographia 1 :250. 
670 Coleridge, Biographia 1:250. There are definite echoes of the Platonic notion of the ideal forms here, 
Coleridge argues that the inner sense is that which identifies the connection between the ideal and the external, 
and so sensations are governed by this intuitive faculty. 
671 See pp. 148-50 for eighteenth-century theories concerning the internal sense. In Beattie's system the internal 
sense is a broad term used to identify that which is perctHved bfthe niirid, but not through the external serises. 
672 See Lucretius and his attack on scepticism. Lucretius, De Rerum Natura 4.502-27. 
673 Coleridge, Biognwhia 1 :251. 
674 Beattie argues that scepticism is negative because it is speculative and without merit in human life. See pp. 
160-61. 
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understanding only, nor merely a science of morals, but the science of BEING altogether, its 
primary ground can be neither merely speculative or merely practical, but both in one.''~>75 
Coleridge is able to reconcile these generally opposing forces in philosophical discourse by 
building a system in which both are essential. 
Coleridge argues that sceptical philosophers are in mislabelled as metaphysicians, 
they have: "perverted metaphysical reasonings to the denial of the mysteries and indeed of all 
the peculiar doctrines of christianity; and others even to the subversion of all distinction 
between right and wrong"676 and are those who take "advantage of the general neglect into 
which the science of logic has unhappily fallen, rather than metaphysicians."677 Like Beattie, 
Coleridge admonishes those philosophers whose theories undermine the basis of Christian 
doctrines, and those that attempt to dissolve the fundamental tenets ofmorality.678 
Though critics have hitherto focused on Coleridge's critical engagement with 
Beattie's poetry, his philosophical and critical works present an interesting context for many 
of the philosophical arguments of the Biographia. But Coleridge's philosophical debt is often 
limited to German idealism, but his engagement with empirical systems of thought is 
important to an understanding of his philosophical arguments.679 Beattie's philosophical and 
critical arguments were a part of the empirical tradition which Coleridge inherited, and his 
knowledge of, and engagement with, Beattie's ideas present an interesting context for a 
reading of the Biographia. 
615 Coleridge, Biographia 1:252. 
676
,Coleridge; Biographia 1:291. 
m Coleridge, Biographia 1 :291. 
678 Beattie's defence of Christian tenets and morality in the face of sceptical philosophy is well documented. 
619 For a detailed investigation into Coleridge's engagement with some empirical philosophers, see James 
Engell's chapter on Coleridge in The Creative Imagination, 328-66. 
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Duncan Wu's studies on Wordsworth's reading introduce the notion of a significant 
relationship between Beattie's works and those of Wordsworth. Wu proposes that Beattie's 
Original Poems and Translations influenced many ofWordsworth's his early poems. Wu 
illustrates a close poetic link between the two in sqme ofWordsworth's early poems such as 
"Vale ofEsthwaite," and his translation of Horace Book Til Ode 13,680 which contain verbal 
echoes and allusions to Beattie's early poems such as "Ode to Hope" and "Retirement, an 
Ode." He also proposes that Wordsworth read The Minstrel at a young age: "W was 
introduced to The Minstrel by his teacher, Thomas Bowman, during his schooldays at 
Hawkshead'0681 and that his interest in the poem continued thereafter: "He [Wordsworth] was 
fond ofit, ... and if he took any poetry to France, one would expect him to have taken The 
Minstrel.682 While Wu highlights Wordsworth's engagement with Beattie's poetry, the 
popularity of Beattie's prose works during Wordsworth's adolescence supports the notion 
that the young Wordsworth "had almost certainly encountered the philosophical writings of 
James Beattie."683 Geoffrey Hartman acknowledges the verbal echoes of The Minstrel in the 
"Vale ofEsthwaite" as well as the strong connection between the earlier poem and 
Wordsworth's own interest in the growth of the mind.684 
In addition to the verbal echoes and allusions cited by Wu and Hartman, King points 
to a review of The Excursion in Blackwood's Magazine but does not develop it further. 685 It is 
important to note the harshness with which Blackwood's reviewers generally attacked the 
works of the Lake Poets, but the points of this review that are relevant to Beattie speak to the 
680 See Duncan Wu, Wordsworth's Reading 0770-1799) (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1993) 10-12, 68 and 
Duncan Wu, Wordsworth's Reading 1800-1815 (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1995) 221,253. 
681 Wu, Reading 1770-1799 11. 
682Wu; Reading 1770-"179912. 
683 Duncan Wu, Wordsworth: An Inner Life (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) 16. 
684 Geoffrey Hartman, Wordsworth's Poetry: 1787-1814. (New Haven: 1964) 76-79. 
685 King quotes a small fragment of the review but immediately shifts to the "Excursion" itself and the 
possibility of The Minstrel as Wordsworth's poetical model for the poem King, Romantic Autobiography 96. 
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originality of the narrative's characters and setting, rather than Wordsworth's poetic skill. 
John Wilson ("Christopher North") argues that the similarities in character between The 
Minstrel and The Excursion are significant, and points directly to the themes of the former. 686 
Wilson's review also points to the widespread readership of the poem well into the nineteenth 
century, and its enduring popularity: "We have most of us read Beattie's Minstrel, and some 
of us may return to that poem even after reading the Excursion, without feeling much 
disenchantment of the old charm which it exerted over us."687 The review quotes extensively 
from both poems to illustrate their close resemblance, and also argues that the general plan of 
The Excursion leads to "a vindication of those very principles of hope and faith which Beattie 
so well inculcated in his Minstrel."688 Clearly the complex thematic aspects of the poem were 
still well known in the nineteenth century, a fact which attests to the universality of the 
poem's themes, despite its didacticism with regard to sceptical philosophies and their 
proponents. This review of The Excursion illustrates the enduring popularity of The Minstrel 
as well as the continued investigation into its merit and themes by nineteenth century poets 
and critics. 
Rather than providing a simple assessment of verbal echoes and possible borrowings, 
I wish to investigate a more thematic and philosophical link between the two poets. The 
fragment "Essay on Morals" provides evidence of Wordsworth's engagement with Beattie's 
version of common sense philosophy, while the preface to Lyrical Ballads illustrates his 
engagement with Beattie's ideas concerning poetry and the role of the poet. But it is The 
Prelude that throws into the sharpest relief the presence of Beattie's poetry and philosophical 
thought in Wordsworth's own mind. 
686 
"This is not the first time that the development of intellect and imagination in a humble mountain-boy has 
been made the subject of poetry, and of good poetry too." Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 5.44 (1838): 513. 
687 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 513. 
688 Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine 513. 
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The fragment "Essay on Morals"689 (probably 1798) presents Wordsworth's ideas 
concerning the purpose of philosophical systems of morality. The arguments of this fragment 
are strikingly similar to Beattie's argument against the manipulation of language in the Essay 
and The Minstrel. For Beattie, sceptical philosophers have "unhappily been too successful in 
producing that confusion of thought, and indistinctness of apprehension, ... which are so 
favourable to error and sophistry."690 The Minstrel argues that scepticism is dangerous 
because it defies the limitations of human reasoning, by questioning the truthfulness of our 
senses and intuition. Beattie argues that we should accept the natural limitations of the human 
mind and reject philosophy "That aims to trace the secrets of the skies: I For thou are but of 
dust; be humble, and be wise" (1.449-50). According to Beattie, sceptics fail to acknowledge 
the limitations inherent in man's intelligence, as we have seen, for him this arrogance has 
dangerous consequences. 
Wordsworth argues that philosophers who rely upon wordplay and syllogisms 
"attempt to strip the mind of all its old clothing when their object ought to be to furnish it 
with new. All this is the consequence of an undue value set upon that faculty which we call 
reason."691 Wordsworth rejects moral systems built on abstract arguments, and those that rely 
on cunning word usage in favour of those that prepare the reader for daily life, which is an 
aspect of his reasoning which was ultimately incompatible with the ideas propounded by 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge.692 The systems he condemns: 
contain no picture of human life; they describe nothing. They in no 
respect enable us to be practically useful by informing us how men placed in 
689 William Wordsworth, The Prose Works of William Wordsworth, ed. W. J. B. Owen and Jane Worthington 
Smyser 3 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1974) 1:103-4. 
690,Beattie,.Essay 20. 
691 Wordsworth, The Prose Works 1:103. 
692 In Biogri!Phia Literaria Coleridge argues that philosophy "defines itself as an affectionate seeking after truth; 
but Truth is the correlative of Being" and it is this notion that truth can be discovered by reasoned argument that 
separated him from Wordsworth. Coleridge, Biographia 1:142. 
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such or such situations will necessarily act, & thence enabling us to apply 
ourselves to the means of turning them into a more beneficial course, if 
necessary, or of giving them new ardour & new knowledge when they are 
proceeding as they ought. 693 
This passage illustrates the close link between Wordsworth's condemnation and Beattie's 
arguments concerning the influence of language upon the mind, and the problematic nature of 
philosophicallanguage.694 Beattie argues that the use of metaphorical expressions "has done 
great harm, by leading philosophers to mistake verbal analogies for real ones; and often, too, 
by giving plausibility to nonsense, as well as by disguising and perplexing very plain 
doctrines with an affected pomp of high-sounding words and gaudy images."695 
The problematic nature of philosophical language Beattie identifies is clearly 
expressed in this passage, and a later one articulates a purpose for philosophical investigation 
similar to Beattie's. The essential purpose for philosophy which Wordsworth outlines is 
strikingly similar to that in Beattie's Essay. Here he argues that philosophy should enrich life 
and enable humans to understand the workings of God and the universe in a way that will 
benefit society. He argues that sceptical philosoph~rs do great harm to society because "they 
want to prove, or to disprove, what I know by instinct to be unquestionably certain .... "696 
Wordsworth illustrates these particular fears in the Fenwick note697 to "Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood": "I was often unable to think of external 
things as having external existence, and I communed with all that I saw as something not 
693 Wordsworth, The Prose Works 1:103-4. 
694 I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Gavin Budge, who initially suggested this relationship, and 
~inted me to some of the above quotations. 
95 Beattie,~ 46. 
696 Beattie, Essay340. 
697 Robin Dix highlights Wordsworth's youthful fear of the consequences of indulgence in scepticism, and he 
makes it clear that in adulthood Wordsworth considered such terrifying experiences to be valuable, and they 
became his Spots of Time. Robin C. Dix, ''Wordsworth and Lucretius: The Psychological Impact of Creech's 
Translation," ELN 39 (2002): 25-33. 
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apart from, but inherent in, my own immaterial nature. Many times while going to school 
have I grasped at a wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality."698 
This passage recalls the consequences of scepticism Wordsworth perceived in his youth, 
which is reminiscent of Beattie's own concerns. However, in adulthood Wordsworth 
diverged from Beattie's sentiments, and considered such transcendental experiences to be 
valuable.699 
Both Beattie and Wordsworth argue that scepticism is detrimental to the daily 
workings of society, because it undermines the foundations of human relationships and 
morality in general. For both Wordsworth and Beattie philosophy should improve society and 
make human life easier. Wordsworth's engagement with Beattie's literary criticism also 
presents an interesting context for the "Preface" to the 1800 edition of Lyrical Ballads. The 
primary purposes of the preface are to justify the use of rural setting and colloquial language 
in the forthcoming poems, since they present a style hitherto denoted as "low," and to 
introduce the volume's general themes. Wordsworth gives two reasons for the setting of the 
poems in a rural society: "the manners of rural life germinate from those elementary feelings; 
and from the necessary character of rural occupations are more easily comprehended; and are 
more durable; and lastly, because in that situation the passions of men are incorporated with 
the beautiful and permanent forms ofnature."700 Wordsworth goes on to argue that "a 
language arising out of repeated experience and regular feelings is a more permanent and far 
more philosophical language than that which is frequently substituted for it by Poets."701 
Beattie, too, argues that poets should utilise language that is natural rather than manipulate 
698 William Wordsworth, The Fenwick Notes of William Wordsworth, ed. Jared Curtis (Bristol: Bristol Classical 
P, 1993)61. · 
699 See pp. 296-97, which discusses this divergence in greater detail. 
700 William Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads: Wordsworth and Coleridge: The text of the 1798 Edition with the 
1800 additional Poems and the Prefaces, ed. K.L. Brett and A. R. Jones (London: Methuen, 1963) 239. 
701 Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads 239-40. 
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language with figures, because it will sound contrived. For him, poetic language must imitate 
natural language, since poetry is measured in terms of its imitation and resemblance to nature. 
And he delves into the use of figurative language, defining natural language in "On Poetry 
and Music"702 as "that use of speech, or of artificial language, which is suitable to the speaker 
and to the occasion.m03 
Although he cautions against the excessive use of figurative language, the use of 
"Tropes and Figures promote[ s] brevity; and brevity, united with perspicuity, is always 
agreeablem04 and heightens the pleasure of readers, thus increasing the poem's power, and 
illustrating the judgement of the poet. While they generally agree that poetry is grounded in 
experience in nature, Wordsworth goes somewhat further, by recognising that the 
manipulation of figurative language by poets can lead to a distortion of poetry and the 
character of the poet. But ultimately the most important similarity between the two poets can 
surely be found in Wordsworth's argument concerning the purpose of poetry, which is 
ultimately to articulate the truths apparent in the natural world. 
The following passage of the "preface" echoes Beattie's definition of truth, and the 
basic doctrine of common sense is used to reinforce the connection between man and nature. 
Wordsworth begins by supporting the philosophical nature of poetry, and then expresses his 
own interpretation of Beattie's common sense: 
Aristotle ... hath said, that Poetry is the most philosophical of 
writing: it is so: its object is truth, not individual or local, but general, and 
operative; not standing upon external testimony, but carried alive into the heart 
by passion; truth which is its own testimony, which gives strength and divinity 
to the tribunal to which it appeals, and receives them from the same tribunal. 
702 See pp. 239-41. 
703 Beattie, Essays 194. 
704 Beattie,~ 241. 
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Poetry is the image of man and nature. 70s 
This passage recalls Beattie's assertion that there is inherent truth which cannot be proven by 
arguments. He had insisted that belief in truth of this kind is the result of the human 
constitution, and that any questioning of such truths (as done by sceptical philosophers) is 
dangerous to society.706 Beattie also argues in "On Poetry and Music" that poetry must 
represent nature,707 but the products of the mind that result from experience in nature can 
surpass the original in power, because "nothing sensible transcends, or equals the capacity of 
thought:- a striking evidence of the dignity ofthe human soul.mos Wordsworth also asserts 
that the poet "considers man and nature as essentially adapted to each other, and the mind of 
man as naturally the mirror of the fairest and most interesting qualities ofnature.m09 Both 
authors recognise the importance of the interactions with nature with poetry, and both argue 
that poetry necessarily derives from nature, but their thoughts diverge when it comes to the 
specific characteristics of that connection. 
For Wordsworth, the poetic genius "is a man speaking to men: a man, it is true, 
endued with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater 
knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be 
common among mankind.m10 Beattie's arguments concerning poetic genius operate on the 
assumption that his readers would be familiar with the arguments made by William Sharpe, 
Alexander Gerard, William Duff, and Edward Young,711 and begin by identifying the pleasure 
which the poetic genius takes in nature, going on to argue that accurate observation of nature 
70s Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads 251. 
706 See Beattie's definition of common sense pp. 144-45, and his definition of truth pp. 143-44. 
707 Beattie argues that poetry must be natural to please, seep. 233. 
708 Beattie; Essays 46; · · 
709 Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads 253. 
710 Wordsworth, Lyrical Ballads 249. 
7ll For a description of their systems concerning genius and the imagination see p. 17-19 and the influence of 
these theories on The Minstrel see pp. 100-3. 
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is essential to the development of poetic genius, because the poet's work is an imitation of 
nature. 
The limited modem attention to Beattie's poetry has led many critics to consider The 
Prelude: Or. Growth of a Poet's Mind as "the ftrst example of what has since become a major 
genre: the account of the growth of an individual mind to artistic maturity, and of the sources 
of creative powers. "712 However, The Minstrel; or. The Progress of Genius- several decades 
earlier- also deals with the growth of a youth into intellectual maturity, the poet's interaction 
with the natural world, and the way in which scientific or philosophical knowledge can 
depress the workings of the imagination. There is also a particularly philosophical tum to The 
Minstrel, and its philosophical investigations are not limited to the qualities of genius; it 
vilifies scepticism and deals with familiar topics, such as ambition, pleasure, and the sublime. 
While the corpus of Beattie's poetry has only recently been collected and republished, 
his poetic reputation remained strong well into the nineteenth century. Dorothy Wordsworth 
quotes Beattie in order to describe her brother's character: "'In truth he was a strange and 
wayward wight fond of each gentle--' etc., etc. That verse of Beattie's 'Minstrel' always 
reminds me of him [Wordsworth], and indeed the whole character of Edwin resembles much 
what William was when I ftrst knew him."713 Wordsworth comments that the Spenserian 
stanza "is exquisitely harmonious also in Thomson's hands and ftne in Beattie's MinstreF14 
but his letters do not reveal any overt engagement with Beattie's philosophy. However, there 
are various close echoes of Beattie's common sense philosophy in The Prelude, as in the 
1800 preface to Lyrical Ballads, and poetic similarities which I believe are not coincidental. 
712 Preface to William Wordsworth, The Prelude: 1799. 1805. 1850. ed. Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams, 
and Stephen Gill (New York: Norton, 1979)'ix. 
713 D. W. to Jane Pollard, 10 July 1793. The Early Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth: 0787-1850), 
ed. Ernest De Selincourt (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1935) 97-98. 
714 W.W. to Catherine Grace Godwin, Spring 1829. The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth, ed. Ernest 
De Selincourt, Revised by Chester L. Shaver 8 vols. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1967) 5:58. 
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The Prelude is Wordsworth's philosophical investigation into his development into 
maturity as both a man and a poet. The imagination and the growth of a poet's mind from 
childhood to adolescence occupy both poets, but Wordsworth goes into more detail and 
depicts the changes that occur into adulthood. These reflections are overt in The Prelude but 
are not absent from The Minstrel, because Beattie's treatment of his youthful experiences 
highlights the values of his middle age. The effect of education on the imagination is central 
to the development of both poets, but Wordsworth is able to depict in striking images its 
emotional and intellectual impact in ways that Beattie only suggests in The Minstrel. The 
education of Beattie's minstrel by nature is essential to his poetic development, and this is 
contrasted by his formal education by the Hermit, whose instruction ultimately brings about 
an intellectual conflict between nature and education which the poem does not solve. 
The relationship which he builds between his swain and the natural world is strikingly 
similar to that of Wordsworth's youthful poet, who embodies a modern Romantic Edwin; a 
poet whose interactions with nature inspire him to contemplate the highest characteristics of 
human beings. The Prelude deals with Wordsworth's intellectual growth including his 
commitment to the ideas of the French Revolution and his philosophical investigations into 
the workings of the imagination, the sublime, and the moral characteristics ofhuman beings. 
The poem investigates the way in which nature and education affect the poetic imagination, 
and the implications of the poetic sensibility for daily activities. The poem engages with 
Beattie's earlier poetic investigation into the growth of a poetic mind born into rural scenery, 
and also makes philosophical claims which reflect a knowledge and working through of the 
common sense expounded by Beattie in the Essay. 
295 
The action of The Minstrel takes place amidst striking natural scenery, and the poem 
explores the impact of this scenery upon Edwin's imagination, and the consequences of 
immersion in nature on the developing poetic mind. Edwin is characterised as a youth whose 
, experiences with nature evoke the emotions associated with the sublime. The poem's 
depiction of a sublime scene and its impact on his youthful imagination illustrate the kind of 
engagement with nature that also occupies much of The Prelude: 
What dreadful pleasure! there to stand sublime, 
Like shipwreck' d mariner on desert coast, 
And view th' enormous waste of vapour, tost 
In billows, lengthening to th' horizon round, 
Now scooped in gulfs, with mountains now emboss'd! (1. 183-87).m 
Beattie's depiction of sublimity in the poem initiates the poet's meditations on those 
experiences. This scene also locates the youth amongst powerful natural forces that work 
upon his mind without guidance or hindrance, while Book II illustrates the problematic 
aspects of this intense bond with the natural world and the creations it inspires in the mind. 
The character of Edwin is similar in many respects, for instance in his proclivity for solitude 
amidst the natural world. Like Wordsworth he sought solitude: he "roam'd at large the lonely 
mountain's head; I Or, where the maze of some bewilder' d stream I To deep untrodden 
groves his footsteps led" (1.149-51 ). For each poet solitary experience in nature is essential to 
the development of the imagination, as it introduces powerful and terrifying experiences to 
the mind which are essential to poetry.716 
m For the context of this quotation and its relationship with Lucretius, see pp. 113-14. 
116 For Beattie solitude in the natural world is essential to the growth of the poetic mind, see "Retirement, an 
Ode," pp. 30-33. The first two books of The Prelude illustrate the importance of solitary contemplation upon the 
youthful poet. See pp.298-300. 
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The sublime creations of the imagination inspired by nature are for Beattie, ultimately 
negative to the mind despite their aesthetic allure, because they instil horror, and are 
damaging to the soul: "But, in the mental world, what chaos drear! I What forms of mournful, 
loathsome, furious mien!" (II.177-78). The images it fosters can harm the psyche of the poet 
as well as that of the reader. Wordsworth's depiction of the sublime does not share Beattie's 
apprehensive tone, but his concern with the consequences of Godwinian rationalism is similar 
to Beattie's concern with scepticism. Wordsworth recalls his commitment to a rationalist 
philosophy "so pure that it could not admit a spiritual dimension to lifem17 in Book X: 
Thus I fared, 
Dragging all passions, notions, shapes of faith, 
Like culprits to the bar, suspiciously 
Calling the mind to establish in plain day 
Her titles and her honours, now believing, 
Now disbelieving, endlessly perplexed 
With impulse, motive, right and wrong, the ground 
Of moral obligation-what the rule, 
And what the sanction-till, demanding proof, 
And seeking it in every thing, I lost 
All feeling of conviction, and, in fine, 
Sick, wearied out with contrarieties, 
Yielded up moral questions in despair (X. 888-900). 
Godwinian rationalism argues that "all human knowledge is the result of perception. We 
know nothing of any substance but by experience. If it produced no effects, it would be no 
717 Dix, "Lucretius" 28. 
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subject of human intelligence.mts The Godwinian system does not admit the existence of 
moral imperatives that are not initially garnered by perception and experience. In this way, 
rationalism is more closely linked to empiricism than has been traditionally allowed. Clearly 
for Wordsworth, "where reason is dependent upon sense data in order to function, rationalism 
will lead ultimately to solipsistic scepticism, just as surely as empiricism does.m 19 This 
preoccupation with the destructive consequences of rationalism is similar to Beattie's 
nervousness concerning the negative implications of scepticism. Wordsworth's treatment of 
the sublime is clearly illustrated in the stolen boat sequence of Book I of The Prelude. The 
famous stolen boat episode highlights the frightening and powerful natural images which are 
capable of inspiring the imagination better than any human instruction. Like Edwin, the 
young Wordsworth does not at the time wholly comprehend the implications ofthe sublime 
experiences of his youthful wanderings. It was the supreme power of the imagination to 
interpret images of the sublime into negative thoughts which worried Beattie. 
By contrast, Wordsworth argued that sublime poetry is capable of elevating the mind 
above sensual human desires and connects the reader/viewer with intangible positive 
emotions which are meant to improve the mind rather than distract it from moral virtues and 
the daily operations oflife.720 Here Wordsworth highlights the capacity ofthe sublime to 
affect the conscious and subconscious mind, without any suggestion that discomfort or 
damage would occur as a result. The end of the stolen boat episode illustrates the staggering 
power of sublime images with no hint of the negative consequences that worried Beattie.721 
718 William Godwin, An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, ed. Mark Philip Political and Philosophical 
Writings of<WilliamGodwin(London: Pickering; 1993) 159. 
719 Dix, "Lucretius" 29. 
720 Beattie also makes this argument in "Illustrations on Sublimity." See pp. 262-63. 
721 
''But huge and mighty forms that do not live I Like living men moved slowly through my mind I By day, and 
were a trouble to my dreams" (1. 420-22). 
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Beattie illustrates its power and cautions against what he considers to be its negative 
consequences while reinforcing its moral purpose, while Wordsworth presents the sublime 
experience in nature as integral to the growth of the poetic imagination, and recognizes its 
disturbing power as a moral lesson, inspired by fear as much as by beauty. Edwin's 
innocence and instinctual attachment to the sublime in nature is evident from the depictions 
in the poem of his interactions in nature. The similarities in character which Dorothy 
Wordsworth identified between Beattie's receptive, innocent swain and William illustrate the 
fundamental similarities between the poetic characters developed in these two poems. Edwin 
is introduced in sublime natural scenery, and the speaker introduces the relationship between 
humans and nature that is central to the poem: 
Nor less, than when on ocean-wave serene 
The southern sun diffused his dazzling shene 
Even sad vicissitude amused his soul: 
And if a sigh would sometimes intervene, 
And down his cheek a tear of pity would roll, 
A sigh, a tear, so sweet, he wish'd not to control" (I. 193-98).722 
This empathy with the natural world and humanity's emotional and intellectual response to it 
is also, of course, repeatedly depicted in The Prelude-for instance: 
While on the perilous ridge I hung alone, 
With what strange utterance did the loud dry wind 
Blow through my ears; the sky seemed not a sky 
Of earth, and with what motion moved the clouds! (I. 347-50). 
122 The sentiment expressed in this passage is echoed by Wordsworth in "Ode on Intimations of Immortality 
from Recollections ofEarly Childhood." The use of"tears" links The Minstrel to this passage: "Thanks to the 
human heart by which we live, I Thanks to its tenderness, its joys, and fears, I To me the meanest flower that 
blows can give I Thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." (199-202). 
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Though these scenes do not at first glance appear to be connected, both recall scenes of great 
natural power, and their emotional impact upon the speaker. But Wordsworth transcends 
Beattie, and uses this setting as a spring board for an investigation into the transcendental 
potential in the mind, which is sparked by sublime experiences in nature. 
Nature's operations are interpreted by the mind and so become translated into human 
terms. As Albert Wlecke argues, for Wordsworth the sublime consciousness "is not 
necessarily a sudden intrusion into ordinary consciousness, accompanied by the profoundly 
felt emotions of abrupt of astonishment and amazement. Such a consciousness is also- at 
least in the circumstances of his youth in the Lake Country- a structure of awareness that 
can be gradually elicited by nature."723 This passage is also reminiscent of the emotions 
evoked by Beattie's description of Edwin's first view of the sea724 which depicts a similar 
scene of sublimity and leads to the development of empathy in the later passage. The 
education garnered through interaction with the natural world is contrasted by that provided 
by human beings, and the consequences of these experiences are central to the thematic 
development of both of these poems. 
Despite the interruptions of formal education upon Wordsworth's interactions with 
the natural world, his imagination still thrives: 
My first creative sensibility, 
That by the regular action of the world 
My soul was unsubdued. A plastic power 
Abode with me, a forming hand, at times 
Rebellious, acting in a devious mood, 
A local spirit of its own, at war 
723AlbertWlecke, Wordsworth and the Sublime (Berkeley and London: U. of California P, 1973) 61. 
724 See pp. 113-14. 
With general tendency, but for the most 
Subservient strictly to the external things 
With which it communed (II. 379-87). 
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The external objects of the natural world are essential to the development of the imagination, 
because it is through this experience that the mind is able to grow and realise the power of the 
imagination as a mental faculty. The workings of the imagination are undiminished by the 
constraints placed upon it by education, (although political commitment becomes more 
seriously problematic in books 9 and 10), and in The Minstrel Edwin's education by the 
Hermit leads him to look upon nature with a more critical eye, but it does not diminish his 
pleasure in the natural world: in his mind poetry "Still claim th' Enthusiast's fond and first 
regard. I From Nature's beauties variously combined, he learns to frame" (II. 517-18) the 
products of his imagination. Edwin explores the natural world with a more studious eye, and 
so he tempers his poetry with his newly acquired knowledge of human history and 
philosophies of the mind. Both poems deal with the consequences of formal education upon 
the creative powers. 
After his education by the Hermit, the connection between Edwin and nature has 
irrevocably changed; the natural world has become a conscious inspiration rather than a 
sympathetic entity of its own. Nature: ''Tempers his rage: he owns her charm divine, I And 
clears th' ambiguous phrase, and lops th' unwieldy line" (II. 530-1). The images of nature 
and the sublime are now weighed by his taste and judgement, which are faculties that enable 
thoughtful engagement and the creative process. Wordsworth's poet is very much akin to the 
newly educated Edwin. 
The poem is primarily a narrative of his intellectual growth and the inevitable 
destruction of innocence by education: 
This history, my friend, hath chiefly told 
Of intellectual power from stage to stage 
Advancing hand in hand with love and joy, 
And of imagination teaching truth 
Until that natural graciousness of mind 
Gave way to over-pressure of the times 
And their disastrous issues (XI.42-8). 
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The final two lines of this passage illustrate Wordsworth's concern with the lure of 
rationalism and political commitment as a distraction from nature's inspiration on the 
imagination. Wordsworth also investigates the importance of nature and its dominance even 
over human investigations. He praises Samuel Taylor Coleridge for recognising that nature 
cannot be held as subservient to the laws and sciences of man, to nature: 
Science appears but what in truth she is, 
Not as our glory and our absolute boast, 
But as a succedaneum, and a prop 
To our infirmity. Thou art no slave 
Of that false secondary power by which 
In weakness we create distinctions, then 
Deem that our puny boundaries are things 
Which we perceive, not which we have made (II. 217-24). 
By 'science' Wordsworth as eighteenth-century authors before him, refers to ''philosophy or 
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the inquiry after truth in the widest sense. •ms While sciences are meant to demystify the 
workings of the natural world, science is still subject to its laws, which gives nature the 
ultimate advantage over science. Despite the proposed supremacy, sciences cannot take the 
place ofnature in the development of a poet's mind. 
Though The Minstrel ends with no resolution of Edwin's educational crisis, the poem 
does address the issues raised by education and makes similar claims to those made by 
Wordsworth. Edwin's education by the Hermit leaves him with a desire for his now lost 
innocence, because his education has weakened rather than strengthened his confidence in the 
virtues ofhumanity.726 This is an intensely autobiographical moment in the poem, in which 
the older more experienced Beattie mourns the loss of his innocence. Wordsworth recalls a 
similar scene that evokes these sentiments when describing the innocent joy of knowledge 
that enriches rather than detracts from human happiness: 
Many are the joys 
Of youth, but oh! what happiness to live 
When every hour brings palpable access 
Of knowledge, when all knowledge is delight, 
And sorrow is not there (II. 304-8). 
Beattie and Wordsworth depict their early intellectual innocence in terms of the dichotomy 
between the positive knowledge of nature and the problematic knowledge gained by formal 
education. 
72~ Karina Williamson, "Akens ide and the 'Lamp of Science'," Mark Akenside: A Reassessmen!, ed. Robin Dix 
~London: Associated UP, 2000) 52. 
26 Edwin asks the Hermit to: "Restore those tranquil days, that saw me still/ Well pleased with all, but more 
with humankind; I When fancy roved through Nature's works at will, I Uncheck'd by cold distrust, and 
uninform'd by ill" (II. 258-61). 
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Wordsworth credits books with providing his infant mind with gruesome knowledge, 
which is tempered by an invisible force, as shown in the depiction of the drowned man: 
For my inner eye had seen 
Such sights before among the shining streams 
Of fairyland, the forests of romance-
Thence came a spirit hallowing what I saw 
With decoration and ideal grace, 
A dignity, a smoothness, like the words 
Of Grecian art and purest poesy (V. 475-81). 
For Wordsworth there is a sense that the creations of the imagination can include horrifying 
images which are tempered by the processes of the mind, and their product is the finest 
poetry. 
For Beattie, the images of horror of the sublime are beneficial only when they are 
disconnected from any actual suffering, because the sublime cannot be evoked from images 
of torture of others, whose indulgence would naturally lead to moral approbation. The Hermit 
invokes philosophy, "To curb Imagination's lawless rage" (II. 399). This line further 
reinforces the notion articulated by Duff; that judgement, which results from knowledge, 
must govern the products of the imagination.727 The Hermit invokes disciplines that are 
intended to temper the imagination, and reinforce the importance of taste and judgement as 
the governing faculties of the imagination. 
Without education as represented by the Hermit, the untaught imagination has the 
capacity to confuse fiction with reality and can lead to negative emotions which are damaging 
to the soul. Wordsworth by contrast argues that the imagination interprets perceptions of the 
727 Duff also argues that the study of classical authors can improve genius, but not give the rule to genius. 
304 
outside world, and that education, specifically that which refines language, enables the poet 
better to express the ideas of the imagination, while but also illustrating the consequences of 
knowledge which distorts the natural use of language: 
I was a better judge of thoughts than words, 
Misled as to these latter not alone 
By common inexperience of youth, 
But by the trade in classic niceties, 
Delusion to young scholars incident-
And by old ones also-by that overprized 
And dangerous craft of picking phrases out 
From languages that want the living voice 
To make of them a nature to the heart, 
To tell us what is passion, what is truth, 
What reason, what simplicity and sense. (VI. 124-34). 
This passage warns against manipulation of language that intrudes upon the transmission of 
universal truths and characteristics of human nature. This warning is similar to that made in 
the Essay, which argues that "the ambiguity of its [sceptical philosophy] language, and the 
intricacy and length of some of its fundamental investigations, have unhappily been too 
successful in producing that confusion of thought, and indistinctness of apprehension, in the 
minds of both authors and readers, which are so favourable to error and sophistry."728 It also 
highlights the consequences of the manipulation of language that Beattie argued sceptical 
philosophers used to prove the futility of commonly held beliefs. 
728 Beattie, ~ 19-20. 
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Beattie attacks these philosophers in The Minstrel in strong terms, which illustrates 
his desire to discredit scepticism in poetry as well as prose.729 The sceptics attempt to reach 
beyond reason's limitations, by questioning the truthfulness of our senses and intuition. 
Beattie argues that the existence of the universe is known in the same fashion as the existence 
of self, which is rooted in his definitions of truth and belief. 730 His allusions to the 
consequences of this kind oflanguage are only hinted at initially by Wordsworth, but in the 
following passage in Book XI he outlines the consequences of rationalism in terms akin to 
Beattie's: 
The wizard instantaneously dissolves 
Palace or grove, even so did I unsoul 
As readily by syllogistic words 
(Some charm of logic, ever within reach) 
Those mysteries of passion which have made, 
And shall continue evermore to make--
In spite of all that reason hath performed, 
And shall perform, to exalt and to refine-
One brotherhood of all the human race (XI. 80-88). 
Wordsworth condemns those who manipulate language to discredit mundane subjects, 
because this leads to the rejection of commonly held truths of humanity, which are essential 
to the doctrine of common sense. He indirectly condemns empiricist philosophers who use 
syllogisms to disprove the doctrines of liberty, and free will, but also supports Beattie's 
philosophy, which insists that common sense enables humans to discern self evident truth and 
cannot be overturned through clever use of language. 
729 See pp. 100-4. 
730 See pp. 144-46. 
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Wordsworth's poetical engagement with common sense philosophy is also clear in 
Book XI, in which Wordsworth's purpose for the poem reinforces the faith in self-evident 
truths which Beattie's relies upon in both the Essay on Truth and The Minstrel, but for 
Wordsworth considers this truth and human knowledge compliment each other. In the 
following passage Wordsworth explains that truth is acquired through the faculty ofthe 
imagination, which interprets experiences in nature into truth: 
This history, my friend, hath chiefly told 
Of intellectual power from stage to stage 
Advancing hand in hand with love and joy, 
And of imagination teaching truth ... (XI. 42-45). 
Beattie does not make any connection between truth and the imagination in this manner, but 
the truth that Wordsworth argues comes from experience in nature is more akin to the self-
evident truths ofBeattie's common sense philosophy than the empirical investigations of his 
contemporaries. 
Wordsworth defines the attributes that distinguish humans from other forms of life in 
common sense terms, namely that the reasoning faculty, and other operations of the mind, are 
the gift of the divine, and therefore require no in-depth explanation by philosophers: "Such 
minds are truly from the Deity, I For they are powers; and hence the highest bliss I That flesh 
can know is theirs" (Xill.106-8). For Wordsworth the highest pleasure open to humans is that 
which comes from the reasoning faculty, which connects enables humans to connect with 
their divine creator. He denies the notion that the validity of religious doctrines and 
philosophies of the mind can be tested by complex philosophical systems such as rationalism, 
because its inevitable end leads to the destruction of spirituality. 
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Conclusion 
By examining the poetical works and relevant prose of James Beattie in order of 
publication, I have shown that modern scholarship has generally underestimated the value 
and importance of these works, and the publication history supports the notion that they were 
well known and circulated up to the twentieth-century. I have aimed in this comprehensive 
and contextual study of Beattie's works to enhance our understanding of Beattie's important 
contributions to many eighteenth-century debates, and his influence upon later generations. 
As I have shown in the initial chapter of this study, Beattie's dismissal of his early poetry was 
also part of his insecurity, and his desire to be remembered by posterity as a serious thinker 
and teacher rather than an experimental poet. Beattie's wish seems to have been granted by 
the twentieth-century, since only eleven separate editions of Beattie's works were published 
between 1900 and 1990. Of those eleven editions, eight of them are reprints of his critical and 
moral works, one is a small collection of previously unpublished letters, and the final two are 
reprints of Beattie's housekeeping and intellectual duties; the diary of his eventual trip to 
London in 1773, and the day-book he kept from 1773-1798. 
Though Beattie's published works are widely published and known in the nineteenth-
century, I believe that one of the reasons critics have overlooked him stems from his staunch 
empirical views. I think the movement of Romantic poets from empiricism to a philosophical 
outlook deeply rooted in sensation and emotion, meant that Beattie's works were considered 
to be too empiricist and archaic. 
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In Lamia Keats laments the disenchantment that results from empirical investigation, 
which is in direct opposition with the Romantic philosophy of the natural world, which 
sought to celebrate the beauty of the world without attempting to dissect it, as their 
philosophical predecessors had done. Keats's famous "negative capability'' letter explains in 
precise language the Romantic frustration with the empirical method of investigation they 
inherited: "I mean Negative Capability, that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, 
Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.m31 I believe that Keats 
articulates the frustration and disillusionment with empiricists and their works that led to the 
decline in Beattie's popularity, as well as the critical underestimation of his subsequent 
influence and his contemporary importance. 
From Philip Sidney's Defence of Poesy (1595) poetry had been considered a powerful 
method of investigating complex intellectual matters. Sidney argues that other disciplines 
utilise poetic devices to entertain and to gain a wide audience: "So that truly neither 
philosopher nor historiographer could at the first have entered into the gates of popular 
judgements, if they had not taken a great passport of Poetry ... .'m2 But the easy reconciliation 
of the imagination and reasoning is under threat in the late seventeenth century with the rise 
of sensibility. From the beginning of Beattie's career as a poet, he attempted to reconcile 
poetic imagination and creativity with philosophical explication and reasoning. For him the 
faculties of the poetic imagination and the reasoning power used in philosophy were at odds 
from the outset. Though he perceived an impenetrable divide between poetry and philosophy, 
his poetry illustrates his desire to reconcile these two opposing forces within his mind if at all 
possible. 
731 Keats to George and Tom Keats, 21,27 (?)December 1817. John Keats, Selected Letters of John Keats, ed. 
Grant F. Scott (Cambridge Mass: Harvard UP, 2002) 60. 
732 Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry or The Defence of Poesy, ed. Geoffrey Shepherd revised by R. W. 
Maslen (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1965) 83. 
309 
In a letter to Charles Boyd in late 1766, while he was deeply occupied with the 
composition of the Essay on Truth and The Minstrel he speculates upon the incompatibility 
between philosophical and poetic genius that will ultimately lead to his decision to abandon 
his career as a poet.733 Beattie begins by questioning the success of philosophical poets before 
him, and introduces in plain language the conflict between philosophical investigation and 
poetic creativity that haunts him in his career: 
Do you not think there is a sort of antipathy between philosophical and poetical 
genius? I question, whether any one person was ever eminent for both. Lucretius lays 
aside the poet when he assumes the philosopher, and the philosopher when he 
assumes the poet: In the one character he is truly excellent, in the other he is 
absolutely nonsensical. Hobbes was a tolerable metaphysician, but his poetry is the 
worst that ever was. "734 
This letter reveals the inherent disconnection between the faculties in Beattie's mind, though 
his poetry represents his strong desire to reconcile them in imaginative and intellectually 
stimulating ways. The fact that Beattie perceives failure in these eminent persons to reconcile 
poetry and prose sheds light on the origination of his own insecurity concerning his abilities 
to poetically express philosophical ideas. 
His insecurity is apparent later in the letter, when he addresses the failings of Milton 
(whom Beattie considered to be the greatest English poet) to resolve this conflict: "Observe 
the effect of argumentation in poetry; we have too many instances of it in Milton: it 
transforms the noblest thoughts into drawling inferences, and the most beautiful language 
733 I also refer to this letter in the contextofBeattie's final three editions of his poems, seep. 206. 
734 Beattie to Charles Boyd, 16 November 1766. W. Forbes, 1:93-4. 
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This significant letter to Charles Boyd illustrates that Beattie's informed and 
conscious decision to abandon poetry, and to turn his talents to critical and philosophical 
prose in an effort to educate and entertain, came gradually as the result Beattie's acceptance 
of the incompatibility between philosophy and poetry. Beattie's inability to reconcile the 
poetic and philosophical imagination is rooted in his perceptions of the properties of the 
philosophical and imaginative parts of the mind, as well as the dangerous consequences he 
perceived of uniting the products of the imagination (i.e. poetry) and intellectual 
investigation. This insecurity concerning the way in which philosophical investigation can be 
manipulated and re-branded by the imagination. 
It is clear in the proceeding analysis of Beattie's poems that the characteristics of 
poetic genius and the methods of literary self-fashioning are present from the beginning of his 
career. The investigation into the works of Wordsworth illustrates that Beattie's exploration 
of the growth of the poetically inclined mind to intellectual maturity had far reaching 
influence upon poets of the next generation. Since Beattie is more representative of his time 
than more pronounced talents, his self-conscious development of his career, as it unfolds over 
the course of his works, gives us new insight into the accepted modes and conventions of the 
development of an ambitious literary career in the eighteenth-century. By examining the kind 
of care and concern that Beattie showed with regard to his reputation as a poet from the start, 
we can better understand the wider conventions of building a literary reputation in the later 
eighteenth-century. 
The study of Beattie's career is also insightful in terms of his engagement with the 
changing system of patronage in the eighteenth-century. His relationship with his first patron 
sparked his first translation of philosophical poetry, his influential friends in London in the 
1770's helped to secure him his royal pension, and his role as patron to Alexander Ross 
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brings his journey through this system full circle. I have endeavoured to show that his career 
exemplifies the changing aspects of patronage, and how an author/intellectual would navigate 
his way through its waters. 
Beattie's desire to use poetry as a vehicle for his philosophical and religious inquiries 
is evident from his inaugural volume of poetry, Original Poems and Translations (1760/1), 
through to his final volume, The Minstrel. in Two Books. With Some Other Poems (1784). 
Throughout his career as a poet Beattie concerns himself with many contemporary 
philosophical, moral, and political issues, such as the effects of the Seven Years War and an 
indulgence in sensual pleasures, the conflict between the philosophical and poetic 
imagination, the characteristics of poetic genius, and the adequacy of consolation offered by 
finn belief in the Christian afterlife. The poem chapters in this study track the progression of 
Beattie's ideas concerning these various issues, and illustrate the firm connection between his 
poetry and importance political, social, and philosophical subjects of the eighteenth-century. 
An important part of Beattie's literary legacy is of course the Essay on Truth. which is 
significant in terms of Beattie's own career as well as the philosophical debate surrounding 
scepticism as well as the influence of its doctrines upon his poetry. His philosophy articulates 
in precise language many commonplace eighteenth-century objections to the empirical 
suppositions of David Hume, and sceptical doctrines generally that began as an unfortunate 
consequence of Locke's empiricism. This study presents compelling evidence that Beattie 
raises important contemporary issues, and had far reaching intellectual influence. 
The publication of his various critical works throws into sharp relief his desire to 
affect the education of future generations positively. For this study I have chosen to focus on 
those essays concerning sublimity, memory, the nature of poetry and poetic genius, and 
ridicule; because they deal with the fundamental issues that animate Beattie's poetry. 
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The corpus of Beattie's critical writings, though it presents many commonplace eighteenth-
century arguments, is interesting within the context of larger intellectual movements, and 
when seen in the context of Beattie's professional and personal decline, they become all the 
more compelling. They represent his continuing commitment to education toward the end of 
his career, and his desire to leave a critical foundation for future students. 
The career of James Beattie was wide-ranging and productive. His career exemplifies 
the Romantic and post-Romantic bind between philosophical reasoning and poetic 
inspiration, as well as the desire to consciously craft a legacy and reputation for posterity. His 
poetic imagination was hindered by his commitment to philosophical investigations as well as 
personal tragedies, but his critical essays show a continued desire to positively impact his 
society. Beattie's career as a poet in many ways exemplifies an eighteenth century inability to 
resolve the conflict between intellectual reasoning and poetic inclinations. From the outset of 
his career, Beattie is concerned with the nature of poetic genius, and its ability to distract the 
mind from essential duties and operations of daily life. Though modem scholarship has 
relatively neglected him, the corpus of his works has had a lasting impact on poetry, 
philosophy, and criticism in the eighteenth century and beyond. 
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Appendix 
Dating Original Poems and Translations 
The dating of Original Poems and translations initially presented a number of 
questions. The book appears with both a 1760 and 1761 title page, without any other 
significant differences. Settling the actual date of publication is important because the events 
in Beattie's life around this time were also significant. The first reference to Original Poems 
and Translations is made in the Aberdeen Journal, 18 March 1760. "PROPOSALS for printing 
by SUBSCRIPTION. In an Octavo volume, with an elegant TYPE, and fine Paper'' 1 were being 
collected from booksellers in Aberdeen, Edinburgh, and Montrose. The next mention of the 
volume in the same periodical comes in December of 1760: "In the Press, and will be 
published about the first of February next, ORIGINAL POEMS and TRANSLATIONS, By J. Beattie, 
A.M."2 This is in fact the same edition that was advertised earlier in the year, which was 
expected before the end of 1760. It seems that copies with the 1760 dating are the result of 
the first, more conservative run, and those with the 1761 dating were printed as a result of the 
quick sales of the first edition. This delay could have been caused by Beattie's endeavour to 
secure appointment to the chair of Philosophy at Marischal, which occurred between May 
and October of 1760, and Beattie's insecurity concerning the venture also lends weight to the 
idea that the 1760 version was a small run printed to test the public's reception. 
1 Aberdeen Journal, 636 (March 1760): 4. 
2 Aberdeen Journal, 674 (December 1760): 4. 
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The publication date of 1761 fits the events of Beattie's life and evidence in the 
volume better than 1760. In a letter to his friend and patron Robert Arbuthnot dated 21 
October 1760 Beattie enclosed the proposed preface to his poems, and the dedication of the 
work to the Earl ofErroll also suggests the publication date of 1761. Through Arbuthnot, 
Beattie enlisted the help of the Earl to secure him the vacant position at Marischal. The 
dedication is "in Testimony of the Utmost Esteem and Gratitude"3 for his intervention with 
the Duke of Argyll on Beattie's behalf. Beattie did not know his petition through the Earl was 
successful until the end of September 1760.4 Therefore Beattie would have no reason to 
compose that dedication until the end of September at the earliest. 
A more thorough advertisement for the edition appears 16 February 1761, obviously a 
fortnight later than originally intended. It proves that Beattie's book was being launched by 
numerous booksellers in a variety of areas: "ORIGINAL POEMS AND TRANSLATION, By JAMES 
BEATTIE, A.M. London: Printed and folded by A. Millar in the Strand, and folded by the 
Booksellers ofEdinburgh, Glasgow, Montrose, and Aberdeen."5 The 1761 edition does not 
vary from its predecessor in any technical respects, which supports the notion that the type 
setting was done in late 1760 with a small run printed, and based on its quick success a more 
ambitious and larger run was printed in early 1761. 
3 James Beattie, OPT the dedication. 
4 Bower, 146. 
5 Aberdeen Journal, 684 (February 1761): 4. 
Textual Changes to Book I of The Minstrel 
Stanza N in 1771 edition (cut for all subsequent editions) 
Life's slender sustenance his only meed; 
'Twas all he hoped, and all his heart desired, 
And such Dan Homer was, if right I read, 
Though with gifts of every muse inspired, 
0 when shall modem bard like him be fired! 
Give me but leisure to attend his lays, 
I care not, though my rhymes bene' er admired. 
For sweeter joy his matchless strain shall raise 
Than courts of Kings can yield, with pensions, posts, and praise. (28-36) 
Stanza V in 1771 edition (will be revised in subsequent editions as stanza N) 
Fret not thyself, thou man of modem song, 
Nor violate the plaister of thy hair; 
Nor to that dainty coat do aught of wrong; 
Else how shalt thou to Cesar's hall repair?· 
(For ah! no damaged coat can enter there). 
Fret not thyself, that I, a simple wight, 
Of thee, and thy trim brethren, take no care, 
But of poor old-fashion'd pilgrim write, 
Whom thou wouldst shun, I ween, as most unseemly sight. (37-45) 
Stanza N in 1774 edition (slightly altered in 1776, and greatly altered in 1784) 
Fret not yourselves, ye silken sons of pride 
That a poor Wanderer inspires my strain. 
The Muses fortune's fickle smile deride, 
Nor ever bow the knee in Mammon's fane; 
For their delights are with the village train, 
Whom Nature's laws engage, and Nature's charms: 
They hate the sensual, and scorn the vain; 
The parasite their influence never warms, 
Nor him whose sordid soul the love of wealth alarms. (28-36) 
Changes made in '76: "That a poor Wanderer should inspire my strain." (29) 
"For their delights are with the village-train." (32) 
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Stanza N in 1779 and 1784 editions 
Fret not thyself, thou glittering child of pride, 
That a poor Villager inspires my strain; 
With thee let Pageantry and Power abide: 
The gentle Muses haunt the sylvan reign; 
Where through wild groves at eve the lonely swain 
Enraptured roams, to gave on Nature's charms. 
They hate the sensual, and scorn the vain, 
The parasite their influence never warms, 
Nor him whose sordid soul the love of gold alarms. (28-36) 
Lines 19-20 in '76: 
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"This sapient age disclaims all classic lore; I Else I should here in cunning phrase display'' 
Revised lines 19-20 in '84: 
"The rolls of fame I will not now explore; I Nor need I here describe in learned lay." 
Line 379 in '76: "Ah me! abandon'd on the lonesome plain," 
Revised in '84:"Ah me! neglected on the lonesome plain," 
Line 458 in '76: "This art preposterous renders more unfit;" 
Revised in '84: "This idle art makes more and more unfit;" 
Line 534 in '76: "But if--- on this labour smile," 
Revised in '84: But on this verse ifMONTAGU should smile," 
317 
Textual Changes to Book D of The Minstrel 
1784 edition adds a stanza between the XXXIV and XXXITI of the '74, '76, and '79 editions. 
"Ambition's slippery verge shall mortals tread, 
Where ruin's gulf, unfathom'd, yawns beneath? 
Shall life, shall liberty be lost," he said, 
"For the vain toys that Pomp and Power bequeath? 
The car of victory, the plume, the wreath 
Defend not from the bolt of fate the brave: 
No note the clarion of Renown can breathe, 
To alarm the long night of the lonely grave, 
Or check the headlong haste of time's o'erwhelming wave. (298-306) 
Line 494 in '76: "Sublime from cause to cause exults to rise" 
Revised as 503 in '84: "Aloft from cause to cause exults to rise" 
Line 530 in '76: "Gracefully terrible, sublimely strong," 
Revised as 539 in '84: "Without art graceful, without effort strong," 
Line 550 in '76: "Art thou, my G*******, for ever fled!" 
Revised as 559 in '84: "Art thou, my GREGORY, for ever fled!" 
Beattie's notes in the 1784 Edition 
"The southern Sun diffused his dazzling shene. *" I.XXIT.194. 
* Brightness, splendour. The word is used by some late writers, as well as Milton. 
"The yellow moonlight sleeps on all the hills;*" ll.XXIII.204. 
* How sweet the moonlight sleeps upon this bank. Shakespeare 
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Excerpts from Lectures on Moral Philosophy AUL MS 30/49a 
10. Philosophy is the knowledge of the appearances of nature and of their causes. It is useful 
first because it exercises and consequently improves the faculties of the human mind; 2d1Y, 
because it gives rleasure, by gratifying curiosity; 3rdly because it leads to the (2) knowledge of 
the Deity; and 4t because it regulates human practice, and enlarges human power. 
Without some knowledge of nature, man could not act whether in pursuing good, or in 
avoiding evil. Brutes have little knowledge of nature; but their want is in them supplied by 
instinct, which directs them to do what is necessary, to answer the end of their creation. 
The Philosophy of the Human Mind 
17. This we divide into two parts. In the 1st we shall treat of the faculties or powers of the 
human mind; in the 2d we shall prove it to be immaterial and immortal. 
18. These have been long ago reduced to two, Perception & Volition. The former 
comprehends all those powers of our nature by which we acquire knowledge; and to the latter 
are referred all those faculties, which more immediately prompt us to action. This division is 
not accurate, but it will serve our purpose well enough. 
19. Our perceptive faculties may perhaps be all comprehended under the following. 1st 
External Sense. 2dly Consciousness, reflexion, or internal sense. 3rdly Memory. 4thly 
Imagination or Fancy. 5thly Dreaming. 6th Abstraction, ihly the faculty of speech, whereby we 
perceive whatever passes in the minds of one another. 8thly Reason, by which we perceive the 
difference between truth and falsehood, & lastly conscience or the Moral faculty, whereby we 
distinguish between virtue and vice. Of these we shall speak in their order. (5) 
Of External Sense 
20. This is that faculty, by which the focusing the body as an instrument, perceives corporeal 
things & their qualities. All animals have it in a greater or less degree; and every complete 
animal has it in that precise degree, which is necessary to its life and wellbeing. Corporeal 
things, when present to our senses, & attended to by us, affect our bodies in a certain manner, 
and so are perceived by the mind. But we cannot tell how this came to pass, we are only sure 
of the fact. What affects the outward parts of our body may affect those inward parts, which 
are called nerves, and animal spirits; but in what way these last may affect the mind, we 
know not; being quite ignorant of the nature of that union which subsists between human soul 
and body. 
21. Our perception of corporeal things is accompanied with a belief that they exist, and are 
present with us; and this belief is unavoidable, and amounts to absolute certainty. 
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22. Let us here distinguish between the faculty perceiving, the external object perceived, and 
the action of perception itself. Take sight for example. The faculties of seeing is in the mind, 
and is a permanent thing and sometimes is exerted and at present, and some (6) times is not 
exerted, as when we shut our eyes, or go into a dark place. The thing seen, the Sun for 
instance, is also a permanent thing, and exists without us, or externally, whether perceived or 
not. The perception itself is in the mind, and is there no longer than while the act of 
perception continues, for by shutting our eyes we put an end to it, and by opening them we 
renew it again. All these three are sometimes called by the same name, which makes it the 
more necessary to distinguish them so particularly. 
24. We must also distinguish between the faculties of the mind, and the mind itself. As 
running, walking dancing are not the body, but only different ways in which the body exerts 
itself, so Memory, Reason, Sight, Touch, Hearing, are not the soul (7) but only different ways 
in which the soul exerts itself. Our faculties are sometimes exerted, and sometimes not 
exerted, but our soul and our body are always the same, being two permanent substances, the 
one material, the other immaterial. (8) 
Of Imitation 
Man is of all creatures the most prone to imitation, & takes great pleasure in it. By imitating 
others we learn to speak to walk and to do many other things long before we are capable of 
attending, to rules, or even of understanding them. There is pleasure in beholding a good 
imitation of object, th' the object itself might be indifferent or perhaps disagreeable, as good 
pictures of a common plant, a wild beast or even of a dead man. A picture equally good of a 
beautiful object gives still greater pleasure. And this pleasure arises chiefly from our 
admiration of the skill displayed in the works of pictures, statues, and the like representations, 
[which] are valued in proportion to the genius & characteristics they show to have been in the 
artist, especially when the design is moral or at least innocent. Painting, poetry, & music are 
not necessary to life; but they give pleasure & adorn human society and are therefore called 
fine (139) arts. They are so called imitative arts, because in them nature is supposed to be 
imitated; in music by means of sounds in painting by means of colours; in poetry by means of 
language. (140) 
Of the General Nature of Poetry 
The practice of writing poetry is very ancient and some think even more ancient than prose 
which however is not strictly true, as the writings of Moses, the most ancient in the world are 
in prose, though many fine poetical passages are to be found in them. History does not inform 
us for what reason it was that men first thought of putting their sentiments in verse; a work 
which is attended with some difficulty, and which therefore there must have been some good 
reason for their attempting. We are told by Horace, that laws were antiently expressed in 
verse; no doubt that they might be more easily remembered. 
ButtQis, tho' it.may.have happened in some countries,·was·nevera general practice. The 
essential rules of Poetry, and consequently (225) its general nature are, like those of every 
rational art, to be inferred philosophically from its end or destination. 
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That one end of Poetry in all ages has been to give pleasure can admit no doubt. For why 
should a man take the trouble to put his thoughts in verses if by so doing, he did not render 
them agreeable; and to continue fables, if those fables had not something in them which 
people would take pleasure to read or hear. 
History & Philosophy aim at instruction as their chief end; and if they accomplish this end, 
they are allowed to have merit. But verses however instructive have no poetical merit; unless 
they be agreeable. The Philosopher & the Historian please that they may instruct the more 
effectually: the poet instructs that he may the more effectually please. Instruction therefore is 
one end of Poetry, but it is a secondary one; and we do not estimate the degree of poetical 
merit by the quality of instruction conveyed in the poem. For it is a cer (226) tain fact, that 
the more instructive books in the world are written in plain prose. (227) 
"In Lucretius too there are many fine sentiments and descriptions exprest with great elegance 
& harmony but unfortunately mixed with the absurdities of the Epicurean philosophy." (471) 
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Hints for an Answer to Dr Priestley's Remarks on the Essay on Truth AUL MS 30/46 
The empty pages in the notebook suggest Beattie's remarks on all subjects were never 
finished. In the right hand comer of the MS: "By reading Dr P's remarks no body could form 
first any notion pf the Essay on Truth; which is strange if there are a sufficient answer to the 
other" (1). 
Contents as listed: Preliminary remarks- p.1, Of the term Common Sense-5, Of the Evidence 
of Sense-8, Miscellaneous remarks-30, Of Liberty & Necessity-12, Moral Obligation-18. 
Preliminary Remarks 
The design of The Essay on Truth twofold. 1. To confute some of the most dangerous errors 
of the most dangerous errors of the modem Scepticism;6 and of Mr Hume's philosophy in 
particular. 2. To exhibit such a view of the theory of Evidence as might secure the human 
mind against the influence of Sceptical opinions in general. 1. The first of these ends Dr P. 
himself acknowledges that the book may answer and actually has answered; and he allows 
further that by so doing it has been and still may be useful to the cause of Religion.-He says 
indeed that Mr Hume's tenets are not dangerous, and he is greatly pleased with such writings. 
I cannot reconcile these two opinions. But this I am certain of, because I know it to be a fact, 
that Mr Hume's writings have done great harm to society (whatever pleasure Dr P. may take 
in them)--& that the Essay on Truth has been so fortunate as in some considerable degree to 
counteract their pernicious influence. If all this be true, it must be a good and useful book; 
even though the general theory of Evidence laid down it should be (as Dr P. says) both new 
& false. (1) 
Along with this compliment paid by Dr P. there is a censure which Dr P. no doubt intended 
for a severe one. He allows some of my [?] on Mr Hume to be just; but says, that my answer 
to that author, though lively, are superficial, and that none but superficial thinkers could 
receive either good from these then, or harm from Mr Hume. Well, be it so; if my book has 
done good even to superficial thinkers, it is still useful; and if Mr Hume's superficial 
absurdities are sufficiently ['answered' but B puts line through it] I do not care though Dr P. 
say, that they are superficially answered. By saying that Hume's philosophy is superficial, Dr 
P. no doubt meant to [vilify] me: and yet it is saying no more than I myself have said once 
and again in the Essay: and,.though Dr P. very injuriously charges me with entertaining a 
high opinion of my book and talents, it is certain that I have said, "that I disclaim all 
ambition of being thought a suitable disputant, that I never took pleasure in an argumentation, 
and have not once made controversy my study; that I aim at no paradoxes, and would not 
wish to say any thing of the evidence of Truth but what has often occasioned to the common 
sense of mankind." See also the first and second paragraphs of the second part of the Essay 
on Truth. 
2. As to the theory of evidence laid down in the Essay, Dr P. constantly represents it as new, 
and repeats against me the charge of arrogance and insolence for attempting to obtrude it on 
the publick. And yet I am certain that it is not new; and I do maintain that Dr Priestly could 
6 At this point on the manuscript is written: "Sceptical philos" but drawn through. 
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not be ignorant, that in my (2) opinion at least, it was as old as literature; nay as human nature 
itself. What my own opinion of it was when I wrote my book, and whether I deserve to be 
called insolent (a word of which Dr P. indulges himself in a most nauseous repetition) the 
publick will judge from the general tenor of my book and from the following passages in 
particular. p. 25. p. 28. p. 27 (3). 
Notes written on (4): See a Theory of the Human Mind, in vol. 3 of Davies's collection of 
fugitive [?] see particularly, p. 182. 
Lord Chesterfield, in one of his letters (Vol. 2 or 3) speaking of Berkeley's Theory, uses the 
term Common Sense in the same meaning which is given so it is in the Essay on Truth. 
J. Butlers Sermons vol. I p. 71. 
Of the Term Common Sense 
It is allowed in the Essay we have used this term to a peculiarly strict sense, and that there are 
[various?] ways in which it is commonly used. But it is hinted in the same Essay that the use 
we apply it to is according to the analogy of language. Now is not this the case? Sense 
besides the external faculties of perception, means Perception of Intellect, Apprehension of 
Mind, Understanding, Soundness of Faculties, Strength of Natural Reason, Judgement, 
Consciousness, Conviction, and Moral Perce,ption. See Johnson's Dictionary. Word Sense. 
What is more common than to say, he seems to have no sense of right and wrong. 
In an argument, suppose a man to refuse his assent to an Intuitive principle of any sort, What 
would you say to him? -"What do you say that a whole is greater than a part?-Y es, Sir: I 
desire you to prove it.-Prove it? It admits of no proof. You talk absurdly. I will reason no 
longer with you."- This I own is to be a very proper answer. But would it not also be proper 
enough to say "Sir, it admits of no proof: but I appeal to yourself, I appeal to the common 
sense of mankind, is it not true that a whole is greater than a part?"-Ifthis might be said 
even in math truth, it might be said with equal an perhaps more propriety, in [answer?] to any 
intuitive notions; moral [?],inference in regard to probability, the belief of a cause being 
needed to the production of which has a beginning. (5) 
Suppositions of the intellect are sometimes in the Essay on Truth called Feelings. And 
Feeling is in English used to signify Perce.ption in general. And to feel sometimes denotes to 
have a quick sensibility of right and wrong. See Johnson. Is there not then sufficient warrant 
for the use of this word in a work written in a popular style? Dr P. will not show that I run 
into any doctrine inconsistent with the general doctrine of the Essay by the use ofthis word. 
An doctrine instinctively absurd may be said to be contrary to the nature of things: and may 
not the belief of such a doctrine be said to be contrary to the common sense of mankind. ( 6) 
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Of the Evidence of Senses 
When I dip a straight stick in water, it seems crooked; when I take it out, it appears 
straight.-! believe my sense in both cases. That the visible ap,pearance of the stick in the 
water is crooked, I do most firmly believe, because I rust my eyes, which are the only proper 
judges of visible appearance: that the stick is straight I also believe on the evidence of my 
sight, and of my touch; I see it straight in a pure medium; therefore I believe it to be so-the 
belief follows the perception immediately. I perceive also by touch that it is straight-and 
therefore I believe it straight. Were I to doubt my senses, I should neither believe nor 
disbelieve in either case. Every man believes as I do in this matter; even Dr P. himself. 
See Collier's Essays. Part 2. p.86. 
Dr P. must not suppose, that I am the only person who thinks Berkeley's scheme not an 
innocent one. I shall give him the opinion of two authors, whose opinion he will perhaps 
value the more that they are both fatalists, and both of them disapprove most vehemently of 
the Essay on Truth. They are Mr Hume, & the author of Essays on Moral & Nat Religion, (in 
upper margin says 'cook') supposed to be written by Lord Kaims, and often quoted in his 
works. See Hume Sceptical Phy-and Kaims on morals. p.240, 241. (8) 
Liberty and Necessity 
Dr P. says I will not reason with him nor admit any reasoning in regard to the doctrine of 
Necessity, which he seems to think certainly true & a late discovery.-To satisfy him that I 
have no intention to preclude reasoning on any subject, I refer to his consideration Essay on T. 
p.366. When a new tenet &c. and p.374 and 377. 
This seems to be a discovery of a very strange sort. Dr P. grants that it is extremely unpopular 
and likely to continue so,--in other words that men in general disbelieve it. That in some ages 
men disbelieved it is evidently Dr P's opinion, from his supposing is to be new-and likewise 
from some conceptions he makes in regard to language; which he allows to seem [superior] 
to any doctrine. Yet he says, that no man can understand this new doctrine but one who enters 
on the study of it very early in life, & studies it in a particular way. Consequently, as in such 
that I do not now understand it, it must follow that I never can understand it as in early part of 
my life how then should I be first to argue about it. This is strange language in philosophy. It 
might have passed among Rosicrucian adepts, or among those who distinguish between 
Esoterick & Exoterick doctrines-but to use it now a days & in Great Britain is a strange 
thing. Nobody supposes, that the Copernican theory is equally obtuse & equally dubious; 
every body who understand it & the grounds of it believes it. And any man of mariner parts 
may in a short time be made to comprehend both. And yet the evidence of human liberty is in 
our own breast; and that (12) of Coperinican theory is connected with very remote objects. 
(See L Kaims in liberty & Necess. Essays in Nat. Rei. p. 202, and Mamhin) 
7 Though Beattie's note here is unclear, it is likely a reference to Kames's Sketches on the History ofMan 
(1774), which includes a section on logic and morality. 
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The doctrine of Liberty is more intimately connected with our actions & conduct; that of 
Copernicus not in the least. Modes of expression therefore which imply that the earth stands 
still & the sun moves, may be used without the least inconvenience notwithstanding the true 
system of the universe is now discovered, especially considering that the majority of 
mankind8 know nothing of it and believe nothing. But if every man were now to be convinced 
that necessity is true, that no past action of his life could have been different from what it is, 
it is certain that a great change must take place in language; because the thoughts of men in 
regard to what is the object of the daily conversation and meditation, i.e. in regards to their 
own actions and conduct, must be totally changed. 
I join heartily in confession which says "We have done the things we ought not to have done, 
and we have left undone those things which we ought to have done, and there is no health in 
us." But if it ran thus, "We have done those things which we ought not to have done, and 
which it was not in our power to avoid doing; we have left undone those things which we 
ought to have done but which it was not in our power to do," -I would not join it; for in truth 
I should not understand it. The one part of it would seem to me to be contrasted with the other. 
(13) 
Dr P. supposes, that there is as palpable a contradiction in the doctrine of the Trinity, and in 
supposing the Divine presence consistent with man's free will, as in transubstantiation. 
1. In the scripture doctrine of the Trinity, there is no contradiction. There are the [ink 
blocking word] in the Godhead, and then three are one God. There is no contradicting lore, if 
it had been, there are three persons in the Godhead, and that those are one person-This had 
been contrary & synonymous to there is one & one is three. When a human creature attempts 
to explain this doctrine further than the scripture has explained it, he may from his ignorance 
of the subject & from the wickedness of his faculties, & from the insufficiency of human 
language, run into absurdity and contradiction. But the doctrine, of the Trinity, as we read in 
scripture, implies nothing contradictory to my reason. 
2. Transubstantiation implies a palpable absurdity. The object of this union is Body, a thing 
which is corporeally present to our senses, and of which, if of any thing, we have reason to 
think ourselves competent judges. At least this we certainly know ofbody,--that one body is 
not another, and that one and the same body cannot be in a thousand different places at the 
same tim e.-When Christ said to his disciples-pointing to the bread he had just broke, this 
bread is my body-it was not possible for them to understand the expression in a literal 
sense---for they saw his body and that bread at one and the same instant and that the one was 
not the other. They saw this as plainly as I now see and speak with concurrence. That this 
book is not that Candlesticks.-They must therefore have understood the expression to be 
topical. 
3. As to the Divine Presence which Dr P most falsely asserts that I seem willing to stick out 
of my greedy (14) 
8 
• the attributes of language. 
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Moral Obligations 
Into the subject of moral obligation I have not entered further in the Essay on Truth, than just 
to show, that there are first principles in Morals as in other sciences, which are perceived by 
the light of their own evidence, and carry a degree of conviction along with them which no 
man supposes fallacious. Thus that it is right to be grateful to a benefactor, just in our 
dealings, faithful to our promises, and wrong to be ungrateful, unjust, deceitful, are what we 
may call moral axioms, whereof no man could doubt the truth without incurring in some 
measure the charge of irrationality. But now what is the evidence of these axioms? That the 
observance of them lead to the happiness of mankind is clear from experience. This motive to 
the practice of virtue is an inference of reason founded on what we know of human affairs, 
and ultimately resolvable into those intuitive axioms, or instinctive properties which are the 
sound action of all experiences. But if it be asked, what is our obligation to do that which 
contributes to the happiness of mankind? I know not what answer can be given but this, that 
there is something in our nature, call it what you please, Conscience, Reason, (18) 
Commonsense, Judgement, which intimates to every rational being, and with a very strong 
and low voice to every good man, that such is our duty-I say I know of no other answer but 
this, or saying that will communicate in this one. If it be said, it is the will of God that I 
should do this; the question still remains, Whence is your obligation to obey the will of God? 
It may be outward, because it is highly reasonable and right to obey the will of God?-How 
knew you that? There is something in my nature that gives me such a suggestion and I cannot 
help being sensible ofit;--for such is the frame of my constitution. 
This is no more than a hint; and in the Essay on Truth I have given no more. And I have told 
the reason of my being so brief in this part of my subject; or-if Dr P pleases, so superficial. 
It is because in my attempts at a further discussion of the subject, I found it swell to such a 
vast extent, and take in such a variety of materials, as would make a book superior in size to 
the Essay itself. A slight sketch of one part of what I intended on the subject (written before 
the Essay on Truth was published) extends to upwards of 100 large quarto pages closely 
written. I found that there were or at least seemed to me to be mistakes to be rectified in some 
of the commonly received theories of moral sentiment; and that I had a prodigious number of 
obligations to answer in regard to unchallenged and immorality of moral actions, some of 
which objections necessarily led (19) me into historical as well as philosophical disquisitions 
of very great length. I found, that I should have a very great number of books to read 
(particularly of history and travels) before I could collect materials sufficient to do justice to 
their part of my system; in a word I found that when I set on foot an inquiry into the first 
principles of moral evidence, I had engaged in what must be the work of years. And therefore 
I thought it better to give the hint abovementioned (which in the Essay takes up at best four 
pages}-and to give the publick notice of the imperfection of it which I have done at page 
213 and of my design to persecute this part of the work afterwards. I still mean to do so; but 
have hitherto been prevented, and I know not how long this may be the case, by bad health 
and some many accidents a detail of with which I need not trouble the publick. 
That an apportion to some of the first principles of moral duty is highly absurd and irrational, 
may be made clear by an example. (20) 
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Miscellaneous Remarks 
Dr P. says he has endeavoured to lay the axe to the root of the [sound and central?] principles 
of my virtue truth &c. -I allow, that he has actually laid it. But an ax laid to the root of a tree 
may be a very harmless thing. Before it do harm to the said tree there must be a strong arm to 
wield it and certainty too of sharpness in the edge:--Dr P. seems to misapprehend the 
scripture allegory to which he here alludes. 
In the P .S. to the Essay on Truth is this passage. 1. "That the human soul is a real and 
permanent substance; 2. that God is infinitely wise and good; 3. that virtue and vice are 
essentially different; 4. that there is such a thing as truth, and that man in many cases is 
capable of discovering it:--are some of the principles which this book is intended to vindicate 
from the objects of Scepticism." Dr P. quotes this passage, and says that he does not find I 
have demonstrated any of these points in my book, & therefore represents the passage itself 
as a false assertion, and an instance of my arrogance and self-conceit. But pray-what is it I 
have said here? That I have demonstrated these points. No-but that I have endeavoured to 
vindicate them from the objections of the Scepticks. And have I not done this? Mr Hume's 
objections to the first point are answered-Essay on T. p.255, 81, &c.-His objections, to the 
commonly received argument for the Divine existence and attribute, are answered p. 102-120. 
His theory of moral and intellectual virtue, which confounds all our moral notions, is 
answered p.407-432. and the Sceptical objections to the reality of truth are answered 
passion.-But why did you not demonstrate, what you say you have only vindicated?-
Because that in my opinion has long ago been done by others. (30) 
If Dr P. say, that the human soul has no existence distinct from the body of that the existence 
of the body is only a probability, does he not make his own existence a probability? I would 
ask them, whether he is more certain of a geometrick tenth than of his own existence; if not, 
then the axioms of demonstrations of Euclid come no higher than probability. See the 3d 
volume ofhis Senst. OfReligion p. 196-197. 
Dr P. wonders that I should quote Dr Hartley only to contradict him. Is this more astonishing, 
than that he should quote St. Luke St. Matthew and St. Mark only to contradict them?-
Which I think he does in speaking of the story of the penitent thief. Let Dr P. 's reverence 
from Dr H. he as high as it will, mine is as high at least for the Evangelists. 
Dr P.'s abilities in charity and in some parts ofNatural Philosophy I allow to be 
considerable; ... (31) 
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Beattie's Day Book. volume 2 1776-1798 AUL MS 30/15, February 20 1778. p. 24 
I reprint this entry here because it is not to be found in RalphS. Walker's printed version of 
the Day-Book, though its contents are relevant to Beattie's decision to publish the volume of 
his poems which appeared in 1 779. 
"Having lately seen in print some poems ascribed to me which I never wrote, and some of 
my own very inaccurately copied, I came to a resolution some time ago to print in one 
volume all the poems, whereof I am willing to be considered as the Author; namely The 
Minstrel 2 books, Retirement an Ode; An Elegy 'still shall unthinking man &c'; Ode to Hope; 
The Pygmies and Cranes from the Latin of Addison, The Hares a fable; Epitaph on the Hon 
Mrs G.; Ode on Lord Hay's Birthday, and the Hermit-renouncing all my other poems as 
juvenile and incorrect. Of these poems I give the copyright to Mr Dilly and Mr Creech in 
return for some favours I have received from them, particularly their refusing to take money 
for the trouble of distributing the subscription copies of my Quarto. Of this I gave notice to 
Dilly sometime ago, and sent him a corrected copy of these poems; designing him however to 
show them to Mrs Montagu before putting them to the press; and requesting it of her to 
suppress such of them as she thought would do me no credit.-She has read them all 
accordingly; approves of their being printed, and says they will do me honour. They go to 
press in a few days.-To be printed by Mr Strahan; the sheets to be corrected by myself. 15 
March. 
From "The Hares, a Fable" Poems on Several Subjects (1766) 
"Oh hapless race! Fate's scorn and sport, 
''Beset with ills of every sort, 
"And curs'd with keenest sense to feel 
"The sharpest sting of every ill! 
"We sure by nature were design'd 
''Most wretched of the wretched kind. 
"Say ye, who, fraught with mighty scheme, 
"Of liberty and vengeance dream, 
"What now remains! To what recess 
"Shall we our weary steps address, 
"Since fate is evermore pursuing 
"All ways and means to work our ruin? 
"Are we alone, of all beneath, 
"Condemn'd to misery worse than death? 
"Must we with fruitless labour strive 
"In misery worse than death to live? 
''No. Be the smaller ill our choice; 
"So.-.<lictates_Nature~s,prompting. voice. 
" 'Tis Nature bids us dare to die, 
"And disappoint our destiny. 
"Who grudges momentary grief, 
"To gain from woe even short relief? 
''Death' s pangs but for a moment last; 
"And when that transient ill is past, 
"Our sorrows are for ever fled; 
"For not even dreams molest the dead." 
Thus while he spoke, his words impart 
The dire resolve to every heart. (167-94) 
Same stanza revised stanza for Poems on Several Occasions (1776) 
"0 wretched race, the scorn of Fate, 
"Whom ills of every sort await! 
"0, curs'd with keenest sense to feel 
"The sharpest sting of every ill! 
"Say ye, who, fraught with mighty scheme, 
"Of liberty and vengeance dream, 
"What now remains? To what recess 
"Shall we our weary steps address, 
Since fate is evermore pursuing 
"All ways and means to work our ruin? 
"Are we alone, of all beneath, 
"Condemn' d to mistery worse than death! 
"Must we, with fruitless labour, strive 
"In misery worse than death to live! 
"No. Be the smaller ill our choice: 
"So dictates Nature's powerful voice. 
"Death' s pang will in a moment cease; 
"And then, All hail, eternal peace!" 
Thus while he spoke, his words impart 
The dire resolve to every heart. (112-32) 
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